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Abstract
In the decade since the events of 9/11, Muslims and Islam came to act as symbols for 
the putative correlation between immigration and the erosion of social cohesion in a 
number of Western countries, including Australia. Increasingly, immigrant integration 
was believed to be key to the maintenance of social cohesion and individual immigrant 
integration was seen as the main factor in successful integration. The Howard 
Government distanced itself from multicultural policies by rejecting group identities for 
‘ethnic’ minorities, while, conversely, strengthening group identity in terms of 
nationalism and citizenship. Following other Western societies, the integration of 
Muslims in Australia became characterised as a security imperative and the 
responsibilities of Muslim citizens increasingly became embedded within the discourse 
of terrorism, where Muslim citizens are simultaneously suspected as potential terrorists 
and encouraged to act as community watchdogs. Politicians also came to see terrorism 
as something harboured within Islamic communities in Australia and Muslim lack of 
belonging came to be viewed as having ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ underpinnings.
As a result of the securitisation of Islam and the view that Islam and Muslims are 
problematic, all Muslims were characterised as potential terrorists and negative ideas 
and actions toward Muslims, what some have called Tslamophobia’, were normalised 
and justified. There has, however, been remarkably little systematic attempt to examine 
any continuity between broader understandings of the official definitions of belonging 
and how and why Muslims are viewed as incapable of belonging. This research 
demonstrates the links between ideas about the ‘Other’ and their place in Australian 
society and how these ideas give meaning to the ways Muslims and Islam are thought 
not to belong. The focus on Muslim Australians as refusing integration and challenging 
Australia’s national identity is contextualised within the wider framework of Australian 
national identity, immigration policies (entry, settlement and citizenship) and the wider 
prevalence of Tslamophobia’ in Australia. This dissertation explicitly politicises the 
concept of belonging in order to demonstrate the social and political barriers to 
belonging for Muslim Australians. This dissertation uses Allen’s (2010) concept of 
Tslamophobia as ideology’ to empirically examine discourses about Islam and Muslims 
in the House of Representatives (2000-2006). The findings indicate that deeply- 
entrenched views about who belongs (and who does not), and how they belong in 
Australia, informed parliamentary discourse on Muslims and Islam. Islamophobia in the 
Australian House of Representatives demonstrates the ways in which discourses about 
the ‘Other’ are systematically used to strengthen negative meaning about Islam and 
Muslims and to consistently present them as anathema to everything ‘Australian’.
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Preface and Acknowledgements
I am a first generation immigrant to Australia who became a citizen in 2005. Australia 
has a long history of Muslim immigration, albeit on a small scale. However, Arab and 
Muslim immigration to Australia have also been affected by racial, religious and 
cultural considerations (see Hage, 2002). The years that led up to my citizenship 
ceremony were marked by the terrorists events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), which led 
to the introduction of anti-terror laws, increased physical and verbal assaults toward 
‘Muslims’ and ‘people of Middle-Eastern appearance’ (HREOC Isma Report, 2004; 
Aslan, 2009) and led to an intensification of the fear of the ‘Other’, exemplified by the 
rhetoric and action taken against refugees and asylum seekers in Australia (Klocker and 
Dunn, 2003; Lygo, 2004; Aslan, 2009). Moreover, the events of September 11, 2001 
(9/11) seemed to give credence to the already present idea that Muslims are unable to 
‘integrate’ in Western societies and therefore should be prevented from immigrating to 
Western states.1
In 2005, the year of my Australian citizenship, and the year that British-born youths of 
‘Pakistani origin’ committed terrorist acts in London, the debate changed from one 
centred on the ‘Other’, who is out there, in the guise of immigrants at the borders, or 
foreigners in our midst, to those already inside Western states as citizens and who are 
seemingly, but not actually, ‘one of us’. The idea, and indeed the fear, of Muslims 
acting as ‘a fifth column enemy within’ (Spalek, 2008:211) has led to the securitisation 
of whole ‘Muslim communities’ in Western states, including Australia. Muslim 
communities have been viewed suspiciously and have been targeted by anti-terror 
legislation and counter-terrorism surveillance policing (Poynting and Mason, 2008). 
Social and security policies have contributed to the view that Muslims in particular 
constitute one troublesome community that requires ‘isolation and suppression’, since 
their identities are viewed as ‘problematic’ and threatening (Spalek, 2008:213). These 
changes have re-ignited questions of citizenship and belonging for minorities and 
immigrants: key issues in relation to questions of nationality, citizenship and identity.
Indeed, the extent and prevalence of what many scholars call ‘Islamophobia’ (Aslan, 
2009; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2010) in countries such as Australia (which shares
’Anti-Muslim sentiment was identified in Australia before the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 (Dunn and 
McDonald, 2004:413; Aslan, 2009). In Australia, research in the late 1980s indicated high anti-Muslim 
sentiment in the population surveyed (See Dunn and McDonald, 2004). Contemporary anti-Muslim 
attitudes in Australia continue to be high (see Dunn et al, 2004:571)
its fears with other Western nations; see Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; 2010) has 
given cause to question previously ‘successful’ ‘immigrant settlement’ policies. While 
‘multiculturalism’ had been attacked and eroded by Western governments in a variety of 
countries (including Australia) before the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), fear of 
Muslims came to legitimate negative ideas about diversity and the surreptitious nature 
of ‘multiculturalism’. It took Australia over three decades to come to some terms with 
‘cultural’ diversity (Clyne and Jupp, 2011) and the Howard Government took less than 
ten years to erode many of these advances. On closer inspection, it would seem that 
various policies, whether assimilationist, integrationist or multicultural in nature, were 
‘pragmatic’ responses to immigration and ‘cultural’ diversity and, as a result, did not 
adequately deal with the philosophical, political and social ramifications of diversity. As 
such, these policies have failed to successfully incorporate diverse immigrants, in any 
significant way, into the ‘we’ of the nation.
My inclinations are strongly anti-racist, non-nationalist and sympathetic to minorities. 
My family is Jordanian/Palestinian; political identities greatly influenced by the British 
in the early to mid-Twentieth Century. This was a political act that resulted in the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict that has lasted for decades and has resulted in generations of 
dispossessed and bitter people. The distinction between Palestinian and Jordanian 
continues to be problematic in Jordan; it is a political distinction that alienates and 
humiliates an already anxious population. In Australia, the situation of the Aboriginal 
population is not lost on me and I am no stranger to xenophobia, discrimination and 
prejudice, especially in regard to Muslims and Islam. However, I am also aware of the 
great social advances made by the multicultural policies set in motion in the 1970s. I am 
particularly indebted to the formal broadening of the official ‘we’ of the nation to 
encompass those not from British backgrounds and the introduction of the ‘non- 
discriminatory’ immigration program. Yet, I am not an uncritical cheerleader for 
multicultural festivals and the use of ‘multiculturalism’ as an umbrella term for ‘racial’ 
and ‘cultural’ harmony. The increase in racism (Dunn and Nelson, 2011) and the 
‘demise’ of multicultural policies in Western countries reflect the fact that definitions of 
what unites people continue to rely on myths that find little or no resonance in the day 
to day lives of many Australians, nor in the increasing changes in the demographics in 
Australia. This clearly testifies to the fact that ‘multiculturalism’ cannot merely be 
deployed as a descriptor of a demographic reality. This has also led me to grapple with 
the contradictions involved in Australia’s immigration program, which is central to the
survival of the population and economy of the nation, but also a source of fear and 
recrimination.
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have been investigating the philosophical, social 
and political repercussions of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and the various local and global 
responses to Islam and Muslims in the West. There have been, for example, numerous 
studies of the media representation of Muslims and Islam in the Western media (Poole, 
2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Said, 1997). This scholarship has, at times, been 
fruitfully combined with wider questions of immigration, immigrant settlement and 
minority rights, in order to demonstrate the intersectional and complex nature of 
prejudice, ‘racism’ and government policies vis-a-vis immigrants and other internal 
minorities (see for example Aslan, 2009; Esposito, 2011; Modood, 2007; Poynting et al, 
2004; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010). However, the literature has also been divided between 
theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, as well as along disciplinary lines, 
and has therefore been limited, overall, in its capacity to offer the necessary 
methodological shifts to investigate the links between Islamophobia in local contexts 
and Islamophobia as a global phenomenon.
This dissertation has undergone a number of iterations. It began as an investigation into 
the media representation of Islam and Muslims in Australia and has, since then, 
broadened considerably in order to demonstrate the persistent historical foundations for 
the ways Muslims and Islam are represented in Australia. Indeed, even as many of the 
terrorists involved in the numerous ‘terrorist related activities’ in the last decade have 
been Muslims, this does not explain why and how Muslims and Islam have come to be 
viewed as pariahs, especially not given the enormous gains made by civil rights 
movements in areas of ‘racial’, ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ discrimination. As such, this 
dissertation suggests that the discourse about Muslims and the representations of 
Muslims in Australia are imbued with myths of belonging that come to be articulated 
through definitions of race, culture and citizenship; definitions that help explain which 
uncomfortable ‘truths’ remain pertinent to belonging in Australia and how these most 
evidently manifest in the way Muslims in Australia are represented.
The focus of this dissertation culminates with the Howard Government. However, the 
Rudd/Gillard Governments did not deviate much from the normative commitments that 
informed the actions and discourses during the Howard years. In 2012, the Gillard 
Government is just in the early stages of re-introducing Australian multiculturalism as
xiii
national government policy. It remains to be seen what Labor’s multicultural policies 
will mean for Australia and Muslims, especially as their place in Australia remains 
precarious. The findings of this research however, indicate that deeply-entrenched views 
about who belongs (and who does not) in Australia will continue to inform both popular 
opinion and government-led, ‘multicultural’ policies. If Australia’s national identity, 
institutions and government policies continue to ignore the holistic approaches 
necessary in order to make room for ‘Others’ to belong in Australia, it is doubtful that 
the disjointed and piecemeal approach to social cohesion will continue to be as 
‘successful’ as it has been.
This project would not have come to fruition without Professor David Marsh’s abilities 
to see beyond mere ideas. His patience and wisdom were sorely tested and the extent of 
my gratitude to him cannot be captured here. Thank you also to the ANU College of 
Arts and Social Sciences for their generous scholarship.
I am indebted to the many academics both from the University of Canberra and the 
Australian National University who have enriched my academic journey, especially 
Professors Chris Aulich and Janine O’Flynn. Thanks also to members of the Research 
School of Social Sciences writers’ group for their generosity and solidarity, especially 
Dr. Melissa Lovell, Dr. Selen Ercan, Penelope Marshall and Dr. Katie Curchin. The 
writers’ group was an invaluable emotional, social and intellectual forum which greatly 
enhanced my intellectual development while at the ANU. Thank you to Zoe Moses at 
UNSW at ADFA for her intellectual and emotional support and friendship. Her support 
and encouragement often helped relieve feeling like Sisyphus while writing this 
dissertation.
Thank you to my family, especially my husband, Michael de Percy, for the generous 
love and support he gave throughout. The fact that he was also writing his dissertation 
magnified every gesture. To have had my husband as a constant companion throughout 
intensified the intellectual, philosophical and emotional experiences that marked this 
journey. Thank you also to Hala and Feras Batainah, for supporting me throughout my 
academic exploits and to Her Royal Highness Princess Basmah Hamzah of Jordan for 
her unfailing encouragement.
Finally, thank you to Dr. Romulo Severino and Janna Wemekamp who encouraged me 
to take up Australian citizenship and to pursue an academic path in order to ‘be free’. 
Their intellectual, spiritual and material support is greatly appreciated.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On the morning of July 7, 2005, four bombers killed 52 people, including themselves, 
and injured over 700 in an attack that targeted the London transport system. The 
Foreign Secretary at the time, Jack Straw, remarked that the bombings had ‘the 
hallmarks of an al-Qaeda related attack’ {BBC News, 2005a). The bombers were 
subsequently identified as four British nationals from West Yorkshire of ‘Pakistani 
descent’ and one ‘Jamaican-born’ man who lived in Buckinghamshire. Two weeks after 
the bombings, four more bombs were identified and new terrorists were suspected, but 
the devices failed to explode. The next day police shot and killed a 27 year old Brazilian 
man whom they mistook for one of the suspected terrorists. According to authorities, his 
‘clothing and behaviour at the station added to their suspicions’ {BBC News, 2005b).
The suicide bombings in London marked a shift in the characterisation of ‘Islamic’ 
terrorists, from outright foreigners to ‘home-grown’ terrorists. The ‘presumed ringleader 
of the 7/7 bombers’ was portrayed as an ‘integrated’ and ‘Western-thinking’ British 
man {BBC News, 2005c), which led authorities, and subsequently the media, to question 
why he would become a terrorist. The two other bombers of ‘Pakistani descent’ were 
British-born and none of the bombers had any prior convictions. Investigation into the 
background of the bombers forced British authorities to reassess their characterisations 
of potential terrorists (O’Neil and McGrory, 2005), as the bombers did not ‘fit the 
profile’. The bombers were viewed as the ‘next generation’ of ‘Mujaheddin’ and the 
evolution of their radicalisation became a matter of security (O’Neil and McGrory, 
2005). However, even as questions remain as to how, or why, young ‘Muslim’ men 
brought up in the ‘West’ came to blow themselves up, the profile of ‘home-grown 
terrorists’, outside of their religion, is unclear. Yet, Islam is implicated and ‘Islamic 
communities’, Muslim clerics, mosques and Islamic centres are rendered suspicious and 
scrutinised and monitored in an effort to solve the mystery (Esposito, 2011). The 
London bombings added impetus to the idea, cemented after the September 11, 2001 
attacks, that the integration of Muslims in Western societies was a security imperative 
and the responsibilities of Muslim citizens increasingly became embedded within the 
discourse of terrorism; where Muslim citizens are simultaneously suspected as potential 
terrorists and encouraged to act as community watchdogs, as part of the anti-terror 
efforts of the state (Spalek, 2008:211-212).
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The threat of ‘home-grown’ terrorists captured the Australian imagination and the 
media did not fail to unearth ‘terrorists in our midst’ (Aslan, 2009). Politicians also 
came to see terrorism as something harboured within Islamic communities in Australia 
(Poynting and Mason, 2007). Further, the London bombings precipitated additional 
anti-terror legislation and government initiatives to regulate mosques, Muslim clerics 
and Muslim sermons, in an effort to prevent home-grown terrorism (Poynting and 
Mason, 2008). Indeed, the whole ‘Muslim community’ in Australia was viewed at once 
as a hotbed of terrorism and a source of anti-terrorism vigilance. ‘Muslim Community 
leaders’ were urged by a variety of commentators to continue to denounce terrorism (as 
they have done before and since September 11, 2001, see Aslan, 2009) and Members of 
Parliament and the media urged the Howard Government to treat the ‘Islamic 
community’ with sensitivity, as they were involved in the anti-terror efforts in their own 
community. Within this context, all Muslims were characterised as potential terrorists. 
They either were terrorists, or they would turn to terrorism if antagonised .The loyalties 
of Australian Muslims were constantly questioned and their immigrant status bemoaned 
as it gave credence to the idea that Islam is a foreign import to Western nations, 
including Australia.
Yet, the fact that the home-grown terrorists were simultaneously ‘Western’ and Muslim 
‘Others’ meant that any clear ‘either/or’ characterisation of their identities was 
impossible. The multifarious nature of ‘terrorism’ as, simultaneously, foreign and 
‘home-grown’, has meant that understanding Islam and terrorism as foreign is 
problematic. This realisation led many Western countries, including Australia, to turn to 
issues of ‘culture’, religion, social and economic disenfranchisement, lack of social 
cohesion and lack of belonging for Muslims within their countries as the potential 
answer to the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslims (Poynting and Mason, 2008). Consequently, 
this has meant that Muslims and Islam continue to be viewed as ‘problematic’ and the 
securitisation of Islam and Muslims is seen as justified (Esposito, 2010).
Moreover, Muslim and Islam came to act as symbols for the putative correlation 
between ‘high immigration’ and eroding social cohesion; concerns to do with national 
identity, sovereignty and the ‘integration’ of migrants that preceded the events of 
September 11, 2001 by at least a decade (Jupp and Nieuwenhuysen, 2007; Weinstock, 
2008). Immigration and concerns over social cohesion have been on the policy agenda 
in various Western countries, including Australia, for quite some time (in Australia it
2 See Dunn (2004) for an in-depth review of Islam in Australia and the ‘discourse of absence’.
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can be traced back to Federation, see Jupp and Nieuwenhuysen, 2007). There has been a 
growing belief that immigrant integration is key to social cohesion and individual 
immigrant integration is the main factor in successful integration. Consequently, this 
has been translated by various governments and policy makers in a variety of Western 
countries as a need to reject group identities for ‘ethnic’ minorities (Modood, 2007; 
Esposito, 2011; Sayyid, 2010:2)(even as group identities for ‘ethnic’ minorities were a 
key practice in multicultural policies), while, conversely, strengthening group identity in 
terms of nationalism. Indeed, this shift in focus has, in many respects, led to further 
confusion regarding the categorization of whole ‘groups’ of immigrants (prospective 
immigrants, as well as first and second generation immigrants) based on their perceived 
ability to integrate into the ‘mainstream’ (Hage, 1998).
Broadly, in a post-9/11 environment, ‘Muslims’ have been singled out as not belonging 
in ‘Western societies’ (Miles and Brown, 2003; Dunn, 2005; Poynting et al, 2004) and 
their ‘problematic’ nature has instigated a bifurcated approach to dealing with their 
presence in Australia (as well as other ‘Western societies’ see Weinstock, 2008). On the 
one hand, counter-terrorism measures were no longer contained within the realm of 
security agencies and whole communities became implicated in ‘counter-terrorism’ 
measures, while, on the other hand, broad social policies became necessary in order to 
‘enhance social cohesion and lessen the appeal of radical ideology’ amongst Muslims 
(Campbell, 2007). The resultant language about would-be Muslim ‘suicide couriers’ 
(bombers or hijackers, Mamdani, 2002:766) in the West, but also in Australia, became 
an issue about their belonging. Social cohesion and belonging became the catchphrases 
that would dominate in a post-London bombings’ world and ‘anti-Islamic sentiment has 
come to dramatically inflect public debates about national identity, citizenship and 
belonging’ (Dunn et al, 2007:570; Aslan, 2009; see also Yuval-Davis, 2011).
The language of social cohesion and belonging, however, continued to be framed within 
traditional understandings of belonging; citizenship and cultural integration, concepts 
that have not yet been sufficiently redefined to take diversity into account. Within this 
context, the idea that home-grown terrorism could be mitigated (if not eliminated) if 
social cohesion was increased and Muslims could be made to integrate into the 
‘Australian way of life’ (Dunn et al, 2007:569) has brought to the fore the issues 
surrounding immigration, citizenship and the cultural and religious rights of 
immigrants. However, more than any other issue, it has also brought to the fore the 
ever-present need to understand what immigrants are asked to belong to; a
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preoccupation that has attracted tremendous intellectual labour, while remaining an 
important and pertinent issue in Australia.
There is a clear tension between identifying certain immigrants as incapable of 
‘integration’ and the state’s response via policy to increase the integration of 
immigrants in the name of ‘social cohesion’. These two realities are overlapping, but 
distinct. In Australia, during the Howard Governments (1996-2007), especially after 
9/11, Australian Muslims became the focus of concerns about their putative lack of 
integration and their status as a threat to Australian identity (Aslan, 2009). It became 
common to ‘educate’ Muslims about their responsibilities as citizens, what it means to 
be Australian and the Australian values they must adopt (Poynting and Mason, 2008). 
However, little attention has been paid to what they are asked to integrate into, outside 
of a broad understanding of ‘Australian values’. The ‘we/they’ distinction co-opting 
Muslims in Australia has meant that their membership in the political community is 
contingent on their ‘cultural integration’ (religion, culture and ‘ethnicity’ are often 
conflated), a process where they are, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, told to 
abandon their religious and cultural practices in order to embrace ‘Australian values’ 
(Grattan, 2005).3
The focus on Muslim Australians as not belonging, refusing integration and challenging 
Australia’s national identity must be contextualised within the wider framework of 
Australian national identity, immigration policies (entry, settlement and citizenship) and 
the wider prevalence of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments in Australia (Aslan, 
2009; Rane et al, 2010; Ata, 2011; Dunn et al, 2007; Manning, 2006; Lygo, 2004). 
Therefore, to understand why Muslims are thought not to belong in Australia, it is 
instructive to look to the nation’s successive ideas about ‘Others’, and how these ideas 
can impact ideas about Muslims in Australia specifically.
Research Aims
This dissertation poses the question: How have accumulated ideas/definitions of who 
can, and cannot, belong in Australia and the circumstances of their belonging come to 
permeate the discourse on Muslims and Islam in Australia? The present study 
approaches the subject of belonging in Australia by exploring how ideas, concepts and
3 In 2005 Dr Brendan Nelson, then Federal Education Minister, warned: ‘If people don’t want to accept 
and embrace those values, then they ought to clear off, I don’t care where they are from’. Further, He 
especially announced that: ‘he would meet with the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils to discuss 
programs that ensure students understand Australia's history, culture and values’ (Grattan, 2005).
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policies of belonging for ‘Others’ in Australia impact specifically on views about 
belonging for Muslims in Australia. To answer this question, this dissertation is divided 
into two major sections.
The first section highlights the relevant ‘social and historical contexts’ within which 
discursive practices are situated. The social/cultural/political context is made up of 
various phenomena that are, as Thompson (1990:225) explains, ‘extremely complex, 
display different aspects and may be approached in different ways’, so the social and 
historical context in this study is confined to the socio-historical phenomena that have, 
over time, come to define how, and when, ‘Others’ come to belong in Australia. 
Nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship have been chosen as the areas to 
investigate in order to understand which state-led ‘projects of belonging’ have defined 
the ways in which ‘Others’ are thought to belong in Australia.
The second section of this dissertation focuses on Islam and Muslims in Australia. This 
section demonstrates the link between the socio-historical context investigated in 
section one of the dissertation and the ways in which Muslims and Islam are discussed 
by Australian politicians. The discursive practices analysed in this study focus on talk 
about Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives in the years 
between 2000 and 2006. The intent is to highlight how talk about Muslims in the 
Australian House of Representatives is related in a systematic way to the social and 
historical context of the ‘Other’ in Australia. Allen’s (2010) theory of Islamophobia as 
ideology is used to analyse the discourses from the House of Representatives. Allen’s 
(2010) theory highlights the shape and nature of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic 
discourses in the data analysed, and the ways in which ‘atavistic’ ideas about the 
‘Other’ come to shape anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic discourses in the Australian 
context.
Contribution
So much has been written about immigration, ethnicity, nationalism and minority rights 
since the 1970s. These areas continue to generate important scholarship, both empirical 
and theoretical, as more people immigrate and governments continue to reformulate 
national identities. Specific phenomena, such as the increase in the number of refugees 
and asylum seekers making their way to liberal democratic societies and the imperatives 
of ‘Islamic terrorism’, have meant that scholarship in the areas of nationalism and 
immigration has rapidly expanded in the last ten years (for example, see Voss and
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Bloemraad, 2011; Joppke, 2010; Modood, 2007; Yuval-Davis 2011 ). More specifically, 
literature on Muslims in the ‘West’, Islamic terrorism and the ‘problems’ of 
immigration has also increased since the events of September 11, 2001 (Sayyid and 
Vakil, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011).
Additionally, the role of discourse in producing and reproducing racism and 
discrimination has been researched by a variety of scholars in recent years (see for 
instance Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2009; Reisigil and Wodak, 2001; Wodak et al, 
2009; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000). In particular various scholars have researched the 
role of discourse in producing and reproducing discrimination that targets Muslims and 
refugees in particular (see for instance Akbarzadeh and Yasmeen, 2005; Lygo, 2004; 
Manning, 2006; Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Rane et al, 2010; Said, 
1997). While there are exceptions, the majority of this research has investigated the 
media representation of Muslims, Islam and refugees/asylum seekers. There has been 
research into racism and xenophobia undertaken in the political field, but this has 
largely focused on the European context (see for example Wodak and van Dijk, 2000; 
Kamali, 2009) including more empirical and theoretical attention on the existence and 
nature of Tslamophobia’ (Allen, 2010; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 
2011), a burgeoning area of study that seeks analytical and theoretical clarity in defining 
anti-Muslim trends in ‘Western’ societies.
In Australia there has been a plethora of multi-disciplinary research into the racist 
nature of the White Australia Policy and its continuing legacies (Carey and McLisky, 
2009; Fitzgerald, 2007; Jayasuriya et al, 2003, 2012; Jupp, 2007a; Tavan, 2005; 
Neumann and Tavan, 2009), as well as research into Australia’s multicultural policies 
(Bennett, 1998; Levey, 2008; Clyne and Jupp, 2011; Hage, 1998; Hage, 2002; Hodge 
and O’Carroll, 2006; Stratton, 1998; Davidson, 1997a; Castles et al, 1992) and more 
recently the exclusionary nature of the Howard government’s packaging of Australian 
citizenship and the ‘Culture Wars’ (Maddox, 2004; Batainah and Walsh, 2008; George 
and Huynh, 2009; Johnson, 2007; Jupp and Nieuwenhuysen, 2007). All of this 
scholarship has greatly furthered knowledge about the various aspects of the ‘politics of 
belonging in Australia’, aspects that include: ongoing issues about Australia’s 
immigration policies; governmental definitions of race and culture and, hence, 
government multicultural policies; more recent manifestations of these phenomena, 
including increased racism (Dunn, 2005; Dunn et al, 2011; Dunn and Forrest, 2004);
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and the concentration on Muslims and Islam as contemporary examples of ‘problematic 
others’ (Manning, 2006; Aslan, 2009).
Academic inquiry into aspects of the politics of belonging in Australia and the 
concentration on Muslims as representing all that is not ‘us’ has tended to be 
fragmented and focused largely on one, or another, aspect of the overall picture. There 
has been, in the last decade at least, a concentration on exposing the repercussions of the 
‘Culture Wars’ (George and Huynh, 2009), including nationalism and the erosion of 
multiculturalism; and the damaging effects of ‘the denial of racism’ on Australian 
multiculturalism (Dunn et al, 2011; Dunn & Nelson, 2011), including exposing the 
levels of discrimination, prejudice and negative representation of Muslims and Islam 
(and Arabs see for example Poynting et al, 2004; Manning, 2006; Aslan, 2009).
Much of this literature has become more global in focus, as scholars continue to realise 
the global implications of mass immigration and the new challenges presented. This 
literature has been tremendously important in canvassing the changing social and 
political conditions of our times. However, as May, Modood and Squires (2004: viii) 
contend , although much has been written, the literature has tended to belong to one 
discipline, or another, and, as such, the dialogue has suffered from the ‘constraints’ of 
their respective traditions (May et al, 2004:1). Similarly, Rogers Smith (2003:11-12) 
contends that political scientists in particular have paid less attention to how political 
memberships and identities come to exist, become institutionalised, sustained and 
transformed, than they have to issues of state structures, distributions of resources and 
power. He contends that, when they have addressed the topic, they have focused on 
particular phenomena, such as race and nationalism, and have tended to develop 
theories that are not explicitly political.
There has been very little systematic attempt to examine the continuity between broader 
understandings of the official definitions of belonging in Australia and how and why 
Muslims are viewed as incapable of belonging in Australia (for exceptions see Aslan, 
2009; and Dunn, 2004; Dunn, 2005). Thus, this research approaches the subject much 
more broadly, in order to demonstrate the links between ideas about the ‘Other’ and 
their place in Australian society and how these ideas give meaning to the ways Muslim 
and Islam are represented in specific discourses. Consequently, this dissertation differs 
from other scholarship in the field in four significant ways. Rather than focusing purely 
on the theoretical aspects of immigrant integration, which would involve responding to
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a plethora of scholars in the field (see for example Kymlicka, 1995, 1997, 2007; 
Kymlicka and Banting, 2006; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Levey, 2008; Laden and 
Owen, 2007; Parekh, 2000), it focuses on the nexus between theory and praxis in the 
Australian experience of immigration and immigrant integration. Further, while much 
has been written about immigration, immigrants’ settlement and government policies in 
Australia (see for example Castles and Davidson, 2000; Jupp, 1989, 1996, 2002a, 
2002b, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2011; Castles et al, 1992), there is very little literature that 
draws on an historical understanding of the various definitions used in the creation of 
immigrant settlement policies and how they can corrupt belonging for ‘religious 
communities’ in Australia.
There is ample literature on the demonization of Muslim and the extent of Islamophobia 
in the global, as well as the Australian, media (for example, see Poole and Richardson, 
2006, for the British experience, and Manning, 2006; Lygo, 2004; Poynting et al, 2004; 
Rane et al, 2010, for the Australian context). However, there has been no investigation 
into the discourses on Muslims and Islam in the Australian Parliament. Indeed, there is 
very little direct literature on the representation of minorities in Australia (for 
exceptions see Sawer and Zappala, 2001) and analysis of the Parliamentary debate has 
generally been a rarity in research, although it has vast implications for policy and 
policy making.4
Further, while there is ample literature on nationalism and multiculturalism in Australia, 
there is little literature that looks precisely at the political repercussions of framing 
Australian national identity in ways that problematise citizenship for migrants (for 
exceptions see Castles, 2000; Castles et al, 1992; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Castles 
and Miller 2003). Therefore, this dissertation aims to highlight how certain 
understandings of key identity markers, such as ‘culture’ and ‘race’, continue to act as 
identifiers of the status of ‘Others’ in Australia and how this is reproduced in the 
discourse on Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives.
The case of Muslims in Australia demonstrates an asymmetrical power situation in 
which the political membership of Australian Muslims is embedded within certain 
cultural and racialised understandings of belonging. This demonstrates a narrow 
understanding of Australian ‘peoplehood’ (Smith, 2003), one that excludes members of 
the community from full political membership and which demonstrates a narrow
4 For exceptions see Wodak & van Dijk, 2000. These researchers appear to be the most prolific in this 
area and their focus is primarily on European parliaments.
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understanding of belonging. This has vital repercussions for projects of national 
identity, but, more importantly, it has vast implications for the inclusion of diverse 
citizens in the ‘we’ of the nation, which affects social policies as well as the ability of 
individuals to imagine and feel that they too can belong in Australia.
Framework
This dissertation has eight substantive chapters with the research divided into two major 
parts: Part One: Social and Historical Contexts; and Part Two: Islam and Muslims in 
Australia. The research design is outlined in the first three chapters and Chapter 2 
introduces the conceptual background. The chapter outlines how traditional 
understandings of belonging, in the form of nationalism and/or citizenship, are generally 
problematic and do not explain what immigrants are asked to belong to: for immigrants 
this is much more than the attainment of citizenship, whether through birth or 
naturalisation. The chapter problematises traditional conceptions of belonging for 
everyone in order to understand belonging as something which is created and sustained 
through a ‘politics of belonging’. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology and research 
design. Multiple theoretical lenses are employed, drawing on the work of sociologists as 
well as political scientists. Further, three key methodological areas are explored in order 
to demonstrate how Muslims are excluded from conceptions of belonging in Australia: 
‘imagined communities’, ‘discourse theory’ and ‘Islamophobia as ideology’.
Part One examines the social and historical contexts, with Chapter 4 introducing the 
first of the three ‘projects of belonging’. The chapter presents a brief review of a history 
of Australian border-making, focussing on the ‘White Australia Policy’ and the 
subsequent development of an understanding of Australian nationalism produced and 
promulgated in response to immigration. The chapter considers some general theoretical 
ideas about the nation-state and nationalism before presenting ideas about the continued 
reliance on a ‘racialised’ understanding of the ‘Other’ espoused in the immigration and 
citizenship policies of the Howard Government (1996-2007). Chapter 5 focuses on the 
second ‘project of belonging’. It presents some of the theoretical problems linked to the 
definitions and explanations of ‘culture’ that continue to affect normative commitments 
to ‘multiculturalism’. The chapter also traces aspects of the history and arguments about 
‘multiculturalism’ in Australia and details the shifts in multicultural policies and the 
rationale behind these shifts. In this particular context, categories such as ‘culture’, 
‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are constructed in order to understand how they are mobilised in 
discourses of belonging and non-belonging. Chapter 6 focuses on the third ‘project of
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belonging’ advanced by the Howard Government. It outlines the growth in discontent 
about Australian multiculturalism stemming from the view that it was conceding too 
much to ‘ethnic groups’, at the expense of ‘social cohesion’. The chapter argues that the 
way social cohesion has been defined and mobilised in Australian political discourse 
against multiculturalism and ethnic/cultural diversity necessarily builds upon the 
traditional views on social cohesion, a premise that is untenable in a multicultural and 
diverse society such as Australia. The shift from the policies and rhetoric of 
multiculturalism to an increased stress upon citizenship as the cohesive force in 
Australia under the Howard Government is the focus of the chapter.
Part Two focuses on Muslims and Islam in Australia, with Chapter 7 introducing the 
reactions toward Muslims and Islam in Australia in the aftermath of global events such 
as 9/11, Bali bombings and 7/7 and local events, such as the Cronulla Riots in 2005. In 
a post 9/11 context, all three ‘projects of belonging’ came to focus on the putative non­
belonging status of Muslims in Australia and the chapter outlines the social and political 
contexts which directly implicate Muslims and Islam in Australia. Chapter 8 considers 
Allen’s (2010) theory of Islamophobia as ideology in detail. Allen (2010) posits that the 
anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiments prevalent in Western societies after 9/11 can be 
attributed to the way in which negative meanings about Islam and Muslim are 
disseminated in positive and negative discourses about Islam and Muslims. Allen’s 
(2010) theory is that Islamophobia is an ideology and therefore it has ‘modes of 
operation’. The chapter applies Allen’s (2010) theory to demonstrate that Islamophobia 
is evident in the way that members of the Australian House of Representatives spoke 
about Islam and Muslims in the years 2000-2006. Chapter 9 demonstrates the presence 
of a continuation of the discourses about the ‘Other’ in Australia in the way Members of 
Parliament spoke about Muslims and Islam. ‘Atavistic’ ideas about the Australian 
‘Other’ are mobilised to strengthen the case for Muslims and Islam being presented as 
the natural ‘out-group’. The chapter reveals four key ideas about the ‘Other’ in the 
parliamentary debate about Muslims and Islam in the years 2000-2006: ‘Asian 
invasion’; ‘too much cultural diversity’; immigration; and ‘other races’.
Chapter 10 highlights the areas where further research is needed to understand the 
implications of the definitions of the ‘Other’ in Australia, with special attention to the 
implications of the existence of Islamophobia in Australian parliamentary debate. The 
dissertation concludes that the concept of belonging for ‘Others’ in a multicultural
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society is challenged by a ‘politics of belonging’, which has social and political 
ramifications, that are not sufficiently understood.
1 1
Chapter 2: Belonging and the Politics of Belonging
Introduction
In the lead up to the millennium, Western societies were forced to rethink the centrality 
of the nation state and the importance of citizenship. Increased transnational 
immigration, interconnected economies, falling birth rates and the steady increase in 
‘visibly different’ immigrant minorities has led numerous Western states to rethink the 
relationship between the state and its citizens (Benhabib and Resnik, 2009; Joppke, 
2010; Weinstock, 2008; Antonsich, 2010a). As some states continue to enlarge their 
political community through the extension of ‘political rights’ to denizens (Joppke, 
2010 ) and citizens within the diaspora,'^ not to mention the increase in the acceptance of 
dual citizenships, other states are tightening entry and settlement criteria for immigrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers (Joppke, 2010; Weinstock, 2008).
Increased immigration has forced nations to decouple citizenship and ‘ethnicity’ in 
order to grant immigrants formal citizenship. In the last decade or so however, ‘cultural’ 
requirements for integration have also been on the rise in various Western societies 
(Weinstock, 2008), including Australia, where a recoupling of ‘cultural’ values and 
citizenship has been deemed necessary, so that immigrants can demonstrate their 
solidarity and commitment to the nation (Chapter 6). In many respects, ‘belonging’ to 
the nation and ‘citizenship’ have been coupled, resulting in the further blurring of 
necessary distinctions.
It has therefore become necessary to understand how definitions of belonging influence 
nationalist agendas and citizenship policies, rather than merely trying to understand how 
immigrants, racialised minorities and refugees and asylum seekers are thought to be 
‘incorporated by receiving societies’ (which some scholars take as their starting point, 
see for example the work of Kymlicka, 1997; 2007). Defining how political 
communities are created and recreated, and the processes through which belongings are 
articulated, means we can potentially see much more clearly how, and why, some 
‘groups’ are viewed as needing to demonstrate their commitment and solidarity to the 
nation, because of their putative failure to belong.
5 Such as the political enfranchisement of Italians within the global diaspora to run for national office see 
Panichi, 2008.
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While some scholars (Linklater, 2007:109; See also Beck, 2006; Spiro, 2008; 
Rubenstein, 2008; Benhabib and Resnik, 2009; Shachar, 2009 ) have, in various ways, 
called for the re-imagining of citizenship and ideas pertaining to the individual s 
membership of one state, the nation-state continues to hold power, both conceptually 
and legally, because of its ability to bestow or revoke citizenship from individuals'. 
Indeed, as Shachar (2009:2) suggests the legal distinction between citizen and alien ‘is 
back with a vengeance’. This distinction is imbued with urgency and brutality which is 
justified on the basis of security concerns prompted by acts of terrorism, such as 9/11 
and the London bombings in 2005 (7/7). Within this climate of fear and terror, refugees 
and asylum seekers have come to highlight, and Western nation-states have focused on, 
citizenship as the only source of rights and as the only guarantee of political 
membership. Therefore, while post-national and cosmopolitan theories of expansive and 
more just memberships are sorely needed, the nation-state continues to act as the only 
source of substantial rights for citizens. Citizenship continues to be thought of as ‘full 
membership in a political community of equals’ (Shachar, 2009:2); a political 
community bounded by borders, both metaphoric and actual.
However, conceding that the nation-state continues to be central to our understanding of 
nationalism, citizenship and individual and collective political, economic and social 
rights, does not mean that it is not problematic for the way that people within, and 
without, the state’s borders are envisaged to belong (Spiro, 2008; Antonsich, 2010a; 
Antonsich, 2010b). It may be the case, as Shachar (2009) notes, that the distinction 
between alien and citizen has sharpened at the turn of the millennium, but traditional 
conceptions of belonging to the state through the acquisition of citizenship have meant 
that, while at times ‘aliens’ can be made citizens, their informal alien status continues 
unabated as they find themselves ‘bordered’ by ‘cultural’ expressions of belonging in 
the form of exclusive nationalism and citizenship. Indeed, increasingly, certain 
immigrants, in a variety of Western societies, including Australia, have been urged,
6 Antonsich (2009:800) argues that the concept of ‘territory’ should not be dismissed in the age of 
‘globalisation and multiculturalism’ as it still holds power to ‘bind people together beyond a nationalist 
ideal o f ‘one territory, one people” (2009:790). Antonsich (2009:800) posits that although the concept of 
territory has previously privileged cultural and ethnic ties, territory as a ‘politicoinstitutional bounded 
space remains an important factor in society-building’.
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both in rhetoric and through policies, to ‘integrate’ into the ‘national culture’, with some
n
politicians actively threatening the revocation of their citizenship .
Central to the burgeoning idea of belonging for immigrants, and one of the 
consequences of 7/7 bombings in London, was the disbelief that national belonging may 
not have been a priority for the British citizens who enacted the violence on their 
‘fellow citizens’ and that British passports, or being born and raised in Britain, should 
have ‘automatically’ made their citizens ‘immune from taking part in such an attack’
o
(Yuval-Davis 2011:1; see also Spiro, 2008) . In this regard, the concept of belonging 
has been reinvigorated, by various governments in Western societies, to investigate 
which ‘communities’ within the nation do not belong, and hence are a threat to ‘social 
cohesion’, rather than a questioning of the premise of belonging for all within political 
communities.
Indeed, questions of belonging for immigrants are not new. Questions of assimilation, 
integration and ‘multiculturalism’ were introduced in the aftermath of World War II in 
almost all Western societies, in one form or another, in order to incorporate immigrants 
into the nation (Kymlicka and Banting, 2006). However, questions of what constitutes 
belonging were largely based on assumptions about residency and citizenship and little 
attention was paid to what immigrants were asked to belong to- what others have 
referred to as ‘benign neglect’ (Dieckhoff, 2004:10; Kymlicka, 1997). Belonging to the 
nation today has taken on a new urgency - as immigrants new and old, as ‘strangers’ at 
the borders, in the case of refugees and asylum seekers, or as threatening citizen 
‘Others’ within the state - are seen as threats to social cohesion and national identity. 
Therefore, it would seem that ‘nationalist politics of belonging [are] still the hegemonic 
model of belonging at the beginning of the twenty-first century’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011:1).
The question of who ‘does not belong’ is a question that relies significantly on the 
socio-historical context of the times. As such, it is sensitive to the historical, social, 
cultural and national context of specific localities (Spiro, 2008; Yuval-Davis, 2011). It 
is therefore, the aim of this chapter to introduce ‘belonging’, and the politics of
7 Chapter 7 describes some of the attacks made by Australian politicians against Muslims (not 
differentiating between citizens, prospective citizens, refugees and asylum seekers). For examples from 
Europe and North America see Weinstock, 2008.
s Antonsich (2010b) explains that there has been a distinct shift away from trying to understand personal 
sense of space and emotional connectedness at the individual level in favour of understanding belonging 
at the social level. He contends the two are interconnected.
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belonging generally, before, subsequently, demonstrating the ways in which certah 
definitions of belonging are articulated and deployed in Australia.
Political ‘projects of belonging’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011), such as nationalism, 
multiculturalism and citizenship, rely on specific understandings of belonging. The 
implications and repercussions for Australia are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, where 
theory and context are used to demonstrate the ways belonging is articulated and 
implemented in ideas and policies that implicate ‘Others’. However, this chapter will 
focus more broadly on the conceptual problems with identifying belonging and the 
politics of belonging in culturally diverse societies. It argues that automatically linking 
citizenship and national belonging is problematic, not least because political 
membership and cultural membership should not be conflated, but also because 
citizenship’s dual nature, as simultaneously inclusionary and exclusionary, brings the 
dividing threshold from the ‘borders’ into the very heart of states (Bosniak, 2006), 
framing some citizens as belonging, while others are characterised as ‘cultural’ 
‘problems’ (‘cultural’ incompatibility is one of the charges levelled at Muslims in 
Western countries see Weinstock, 2008), and hence not belonging. Therefore, 
understanding the broad frame within which politics of belonging (who is in and who is 
out and why) are articulated is essential to highlighting how the status of citizen 
‘Others’ is conceived within the nation-state. Moreover, the term ‘belonging’ itself is 
both insufficiently defined and has been used interchangeably with nationalism and 
national belonging (Dieckhoff, 2004; Antonsich, 2010a:644) and citizenship, concepts 
and practices that are best viewed as dependent on definitions of belonging, rather than 
as definitions of belonging in themselves.
The remainder of this chapter unpacks the definition of the politics of belonging and 
discusses ways in which this impacts on nationalism and citizenship. The inadequacies 
of conceptualising ‘belonging’ on cultural grounds, which consequently allows for 
citizen ‘Others’ to be represented as ‘cultural’ problems in need of political solutions, is 
the focus of the chapter.
Belonging
Belonging is a broad and multifarious concept which has often been used but which has 
also been under-theorised (Antonsich, 2010a:645). Belonging to the collectivity has 
been a prominent area of study in Sociology since at least Emile Durkheim’s (Dürkheim 
and Simpson, 1947) influential study on mechanical and organic solidarity. Issues of
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belonging, or not belonging, as are reflected in the increased alienation and distrust 
amongst citizens generally in Western societies (Putnam, 2007; Markova and Gillespie, 
2008, Giddens, 1991), have also been studied. In psychology and other disciplines, 
which directly deal with emotions and the life of the mind, ‘belonging’ has been viewed 
in recent years as a necessary precondition for mental health (Yuval-Davis, 2006; 
Antonsich, 2010a). For example, studies on the mental health of migrants in some 
European countries indicate that a sense of not belonging greatly increases the chances 
of psychological difficulties (Yuval-Davis, 2004:216; Phinney et al, 2002; Chow, 
2007).
Belonging is distinct from mere membership and is a difficult concept to codify, due 
both to its emotive underpinnings and its ability to function at both the subjective and 
the societal level (Yuval-Davis, 2011:10; Antonsich, 2010a:644). For Yuval-Davis 
(2011:10 see also Antonsich, 2010a), belonging is about ‘...an emotional (or even 
ontological) attachment, about feeling ‘at home” , which she views as an ongoing 
project9. Subjective feelings of belonging undoubtedly reflect, and work to inform, 
societal belonging (and vice versa). Indeed it is necessary to point to the role of 
emotional connection to space and place in feelings of belonging and ‘in the 
construction of the Self, both at a personal and a social level’ (Antonsich, 2010b). The 
role of emotions and their impact on politics is relevant to understanding concepts of 
belonging as the impact of emotions have been all too easily dismissed in political and 
social theory.However, this is not the current concern, as the study of emotions and 
personal feelings of belonging depend on a different kind of study and rely on a 
multitude of environmental factors that cannot be adequately generalized (see Batainah, 
2008 for example on the personal feelings of belonging for Arab-Australians).
At the societal level, belonging to ‘groups’, in one form or another, has been identified 
as necessary for humans (Calhoun, 2004; Smith, 2003) and the variety and combination 
of social locations and the identities that inform human belongings are numerous 
(Yuval-Davis, 2011). Belonging to a variety of ‘groups’ is not confined to belonging
9 Antonsich (2010a:646) presents rare research on belonging at the personal level. In his research on the 
notion of belonging Antonsich pays particular attention to the emotional feeling that individuals attach to 
a particular place. Here ‘home’ ‘stands for a symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, security, and 
emotional attachement’ (2010a:646). He also presents five factors which he argues can generate a feeling 
of being ‘at home’or ‘place-belongingness’: auto-biographical, relational, cultural, economic and legal. 
Antonsich (2010a:649) explains that absence of place-belonginingness can generate ‘...a sense of 
loneliness, isolation, alienation, and dis-placement...This according to group analysts might lead to 
motivational and also mental health problems’. Further, Antonsich believes that the focus on the ‘politics 
of belonging’ and the ways in which power has the ability to dictate the boundaries of belonging has 
neglected personal sense of space and emotional connectedness (2010b: 120).
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within the nation-state either, as ‘belongings’ can transcend nation states and 
geographical boundaries. For example, individuals can show more affinity to belonging 
to the diaspora or belonging to the Islamic ‘Ummah’ (Calhoun, 2007) than they might to 
nation-states or to other groups within the nation-state. However, as both Yuval-Davis 
(2006 and 2011) and Calhoun (1999) lament, identities have also too often been viewed 
in a singular manner, where it has become normative to view individuals as occupying 
one, all-consuming, identity at a time. Calhoun (1999:227) asks why this is so when 
empirical evidence and history demonstrate otherwise:
Two tacit guiding assumptions of much modem thinking on matters of identity are that individuals 
ideally ought to achieve maximally integrated identities, and that they need to inhabit self-consistent, 
unitary cultures of life worlds. It is thought normal for people to live in one culture at a time, for 
example; to speak one language; to espouse one set of values; to adhere to one polity. But why? Not, 
I would suggest, on the basis of historical or comparative evidence. On the contrary, throughout 
history and still to a considerable extent around the world we find multilingualism common; we find 
people moved simultaneously by different visions of the world (not least, religion and science); we 
find people able to understand themselves as members of differently organised collectivities at local 
and more inclusive levels, or at different times or stages in life.
Similarly, Yural-Davis (2006: 199) explains that, even stable ‘primordial’ forms of 
belonging, are not fixed and any fixity is a sign of ‘a naturalized construction of a 
particular hegemonic form of power relations’, and therefore contingent. Belongings 
become political, therefore, when they are threatened in one form or another 
(Antonsich, 2010a:650). Understanding the politics of belonging then is about 
understanding how certain belongings become naturalised accounts of belonging and 
are represented, disseminated and come to be seen as natural and normal for 
collectivities.
To further understand how constructions of identity become visions of belonging ‘for 
everyone’ and to appreciate what is at stake in doing so, it is useful to separate 
belonging analytically into different components. Two different approaches are 
presented here. Yuval-Davis (2006 and 2011) offers some analytical clarity about the 
way social locations, identities and political projects are connected and what a politics 
of belonging means and Calhoun (1999) offers analytical distinctions that attempt to 
separate the different ways individuals can belong to the political community. These 
accounts approach belonging from entirely different, although complementary, 
perspectives and offer some insight into the ways certain articulations of belonging 
obfuscate belonging for many.
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Yural-Davis (2006:199 see also 2011:12) makes a significant contribution to the 
concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging through her emphasis that belonging 
can be constructed on at least three analytical levels: the first level concerns social 
locations; the second relates to individuals’ identifications and emotional attachments to 
various collectivities and groupings; while the third relates to ethical and political value 
systems with which people judge their own, and others’, belonging/s.
The first level, ‘Social locations’, is concerned with how an individual’s social location 
significantly impacts on their belonging. People readily identify with, and belong to 
(through their own sense of belonging and others’ view of where they belong), social 
categories based on gender, sexuality, national and religious affiliation etc. Social 
locations, such as those attached to gender, sexuality, ‘race’ and profession, are not 
value-free social categories and, for Yural-Davis (2011:13), social locations are 
‘...virtually never constructed along one power vector of difference, although official 
statistics -  as well as identity politics -  would often tend to construct them in this way’. 
According to Yuval-Davis (2011:13) ‘When it is said that people belong to a particular 
sex, race, class or nation, that they belong to a particular age group, kinship group or a 
certain profession, we are talking about people’s social and economic locations...’. She 
explains that, in certain ‘historical moments’, individuals’ social and economic 
locations are politicised and are positioned ‘along axes of power’ (Yuval-Davis, 
2011:13).
The second analytical distinction that Yuval-Davis makes (2006 and 2011) is based on 
‘identification and emotional attachments’. Here, Yuval-Davis (2006:202) explains that 
‘identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about who they are 
(and who they are not)’. While not all stories are about belonging to collectivities and 
some identity narratives can be individual, narratives are social constructs that rely on 
the participation of others and, so, ‘such stories often relate, directly or indirectly, to self 
and/or others’ perceptions of what being a member in such a grouping or collectivity 
(ethnic, racial, national, cultural, religious) might mean’, with collective identities 
acting ‘as a resource’ for individual narratives (2011:14). Yuval-Davis (2011:16) further 
explains that the dialogical construction of identity necessarily means that it is both 
‘reflective’ and ‘constitutive’ and, therefore, it is not entirely individual or collective 
‘...but involve both, in an in-between perpetual state of ‘becoming’, in which processes 
of identity construction, authorization and contestation take place’.
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Further, as Yuval-Davis (2011:14) describes, narratives can be reproduced across 
generations, although they are necessarily contestable and constantly changing. The 
narratives often relate to the past and a myth of origin, as well as working to explain the 
present and also ‘function(ing) as a projection of future trajectory’. Yuval-Davis 
(2011:15) further notes that not all belongings are equally valued and the ‘emotional 
components of people’s constructions of themselves and their identities become more 
central the more threatened and less secure they feel’. Yuval-Davis (2011:15) posits that 
in ‘extreme cases’ people sacrifice their and others’ lives in order to protect the 
narratives that make up their identities.
The fact that narratives of identity are produced and the manner in which they are 
produced are, indeed, both important to understanding belonging. However, what is 
more important to Yuval-Davis (2011:17), and most relevant to the present study, is 
‘...whether their production implies any particular relationship between self and non­
self. In regard to the construction of boundaries between self and other, or as Yuval- 
Davis (2011:17) characterises it ‘ me’ and the ‘not me’, she emphasises that these 
boundaries are shifting and contested and that they are not necessarily symmetrical ‘In 
other words, inclusion or exclusion is often not mutual, depending on the power 
positionality and normative values of the social actors as well as, and in relation to, their 
cognitive and emotional identifications’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011:17).
The final analytic distinction Yuval-Davis (2011:18) makes is between ‘ethical and 
political values’. She argues that belonging is not just about the social locations and the 
construction of individual and collective identities ‘but also about the way these are 
valued and judged’ (2011:18). The process through which identities are constructed and 
boundaries are drawn is informed by ideas and ideologies. Indeed, the politics of 
belonging is not just about constructing boundaries, but also about decision- making by 
the people who have power, about which people to include and which to exclude (see 
also Antonsich, 2010a:650). Therefore, Yuval-Davis (2011:19) explains that ‘...Politics 
involves the exercise of power and different hegemonic political projects of belonging 
represent different symbolic power orders...’
Yuval-Davis (2011:20) further emphasises that the boundaries that the politics of 
belonging are concerned with are those that border the political community of 
belonging, where sometimes physically, but more often symbolically, the divide 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is revealed. Further, the politics of belonging are not simply
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about the creation of boundaries, but about their maintenance and reproduction ‘by the 
hegemonic political powers’ (Yuval-Davis 2011:20) and about ‘their contestation, 
challenge and resistance by other political agents...’ (Yuval-Davis 2011:20). Indeed, the 
politics of belonging also include (Yuval-Davis 2011:20) ‘struggles’ to determine what 
is involved in belonging to a community as well as issues of status and entitlements.
All three analytical modes (Yuval-Davis, 2006 and 2011) reveal that contesting of the 
boundaries of belonging can only occur when the social locations and the prevailing 
narratives are locally, historically and temporally identified and contextualised. 
Different political projects of belonging can mobilise different aspects of belonging; 
focusing on different social locations and identity narratives, as well as different ethical 
and political values, depending on the political needs of the times. This idea is central to 
the present study. The first two analytical levels that Yuval-Davis (2006 and 2011) 
presents indicate how important it is to the politics of belonging to deconstruct social 
locations and identities and how they are valued and the power relations underscoring 
them, before any contestations can take place. Moreover, the concept of the ‘projects of 
belonging’ (Yuval-Davis 2011) that those in power present in order to extend their 
visions of the collectivity is an astute addition by Yuval-Davis as it identifies some core 
narratives that are mobilised by those in power to extend their visions of belonging (see 
also Smith, 2003). Yuval-Davis (2011:20-21) presents some definitions about what is 
required of persons in order for them to belong or to be considered as belonging to the 
political community:
1) The myth of common descent, or some other commonality that is demanded of individuals which 
can include culture, religion and/or language.
2) Loyalty and solidarity which can be based on common values ‘and a projected myth of common 
destiny’.
3) Specific social locations, identities and ethical and political values can provide ‘requisites of 
belonging and the delineation of belonging’. These social locations include: origin, ‘race’, place of 
birth, language, culture, religion etc. and some are more permeable than others.
4) Common set of values, such as ‘democracy’ and/or ‘human rights’, can be used and Yural-Davis 
contends they are the most permeable boundaries of all. She also notes however, that ‘...these 
different discourses of belonging can be collapsed together or reduced down to each other in specific 
historical cases. Moreover, some political projects of belonging can present themselves as promoting 
more open boundaries than they actually do’.
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Calhoun (1999) also offers some interesting and insightful analytical distinctions that 
should be taken into account when understanding belonging, the political community 
and a politics of belonging. His focus is upon how debates on nationality and citizenship 
and cultural diversity need to look to how ‘a rhetoric of nations and nationalism shapes 
the representation of the political community’ (1999:219) and recognise that 
‘Nationalism privileges one sense of belonging, that of membership in a categorically 
distinct culture’ (Calhoun, 1999:222). Calhoun’s discussion of the ‘multiple meanings 
of solidarity and identity’ that come to confuse concepts and practices of citizenship 
will be briefly summarised.
In an analytical separation that complements Yuval-Davis’ distinctions mentioned 
earlier, Calhoun (1999:220) convincingly argues that ‘We use terms like 
‘community’...as though there is no problem in making them refer simultaneously to 
local, face-to-face networks and whole nations conceived as categories of culturally 
similar persons’. We therefore often treat ‘belonging’ to the nation as though we are 
discussing belonging to the community (dense and binding networks). Moreover, 
Calhoun (1999:220) outlines his differentiation between community and nation and 
argues ‘The term community has come to be used in an omnibus manner that obscures 
the distinctions among different kinds of grouping’. The different groupings are:
1) Communities-relatively small groups that are not primarily constituted though formal political- 
legal institutions but through informal, directly interpersonal relationships.
2) Categories based on the putative cultural similarity or jural equivalence of persons, and 
commonly comprised of large numbers of people with a low density of directly interpersonal ties; 
and
3) Publics-quasi-groups constituted by mutual engagement in discourse aimed at determining the 
nature of social institutions including states.
The difference between these groupings, Calhoun (1999:220) argues, is not simply 
analytical, but crucial to our understanding of the ways in which citizenship ought to be 
distinguished from cultural conceptions of belonging. He states that ‘We need to be 
attentive to the three distinct modes of relating to each other and to culturally produced 
and encoded information’. Moreover, like Yuval-Davis (2006, 2011), Calhoun 
(1999:219) uses the word ‘home’ to explain belonging. However, he argues that the 
notion o f ‘home’ is all too often exaggerated to the level of nation. Calhoun (1999:221) 
explains that ‘feeling at home with people whom we know personally’ should not be 
equated with ‘sharing largely similar cultural styles’. He argues that the two may
22
overlap, but that, often, cultural similarities are used to draw boundaries around ‘large 
categories of people not knit by dense interpersonal relationships’. He further posits that 
belonging to small communities forged by interpersonal relationships, or belonging to 
larger categories such as the state should be differentiated again from the ability to forge 
solidarity ‘through public discourse in which distinct individuals or subgroup positions 
may be articulated and draw their meaning, motives and power from the embeddedness 
in the larger, but differentiated whole’. Calhoun (1999:221) contends that, although at 
the local level ‘community, cultural categories and public discourses may overlap’, at 
the state level, this proximity is impossible.
Although the different modes may overlap, Calhoun (1999:222) suggests that engaging 
in a public discourse is ‘distinct from the activity of finding commonality in pre- 
established cultural similarity’. Because public discourse depends on the ability to 
‘articulate’ differences, including differences of opinion that might also include 
differences in relation to group identity. He argues that ‘...Public discourse in this sense 
is distinct from collective representations that invoke the common identity of the whole 
as a trump card against the internal differentiations of identities and interests’ 
(1999:222). Calhoun’s (1999:219) focus however centres on issues of scale and the way 
collectivities (ranging from local communities to ‘nations’) are both defined and seen as 
relating to each other. For Calhoun, community, nation and public space are three 
distinctive arenas that should not be, but often are, collapsed. He explains that ‘analytic 
distinction is important....We may feel at home in a certain public discourse...We are, in 
other words, comfortable with particular ways of expressing ourselves and with 
particular sorts of differences from others, as well with sameness or identification with 
‘people like us’ (Calhoun, 1999:221). Further, Calhoun’s analytic distinctions make us 
question issues of a ‘shared sense of belonging’ and its locus in the nation-state.
The different analytical modalities presented here by both Yuval-Davis (2006 and 2011) 
and Calhoun (1999) are not intended to be exhaustive accounts of belonging or 
modalities of belonging10. Indeed, there are also other scholarly areas that would engage 
in much more depth with Calhoun’s definition of community and his definition of 
‘public discourse’ (for instance, ‘deliberative democracy’), as there are others who 
approach belonging differently (Probyn, 1996; Antonsich, 2010a). Nonetheless, the 
analytical differentiations they both present work to give meaning to the politics of 
belonging. Certain identities and definitions of belonging are privileged and these are
10 See Antonsich (2010a) for an in-depth review of the various approaches to the notion of belonging.
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used to give meaning to political ‘projects of belonging’; national belonging, citizenship 
and multiculturalism (which are the ‘projects of belonging’ that are relevant to this 
dissertation).
Their analytical lenses show us how problematic it is to classify people as simply 
‘belonging’, or as needing further ‘integration and assimilation’ in order to belong (a 
characterisation that has been used to describe Muslims in Western societies which is 
the subject of Section Two of this dissertation), as questions regarding ‘belonging to 
what’ and ‘belonging for whom’ have not been answered. Further, Calhoun’s 
distinctions pay attention to issues of ‘scale’ and how this impacts both our 
understanding of belonging and the frameworks by which we envisage persons to 
belong to the ‘nation’ and to the political community. Further, the analytical 
separations that both Yuval-Davis (2006 and 2011) and Calhoun (1999) present tell us 
which aspects of the relationship between individuals and the state we should pay 
attention to in order to highlight which aspects of belonging are mobilised, including: 
which identities are preferred and which are shunned; how and in what manner are 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ created; and in what manner is difference dealt 
with within the state.
Belonging to Nations
Even as mass immigration has highlighted the need better to define the bases of modern 
belongings (Dieckhoff, 2004), much of the rhetoric available to try to explain who 
belongs and who does not continues to depend on terminology based on established 
(formal) relationships with the state: nationalism and citizenship (Calhoun, 2007; Beck, 
2006). Further, although the idea and practice of delineating peoples into distinct 
nations is not a recent phenomenon11, nationalism, in the way it is practiced today, is 
viewed by many as a modern phenomenon12 (Calhoun, 2007; Gellner, 1997a). Our 
modern understandings of belonging are more or less tied to an understanding of the 
nation-state and the various ways in which the relationship between the nation-state and 
the people living within the boundaries of the nation-state are characterised. A brief 
history of nationalism and its relevance for Australia is presented in Chapter 4, but it is 
useful to note the relationship between ideas about nation, nationalism and belonging 
here. As the nation-state and the practice of territorial sovereignty mean that the
11 The earliest example used tends to be the creation of the Jewish People.
12 Major debates on ‘Nationalism’ have been predominantly divided between ‘modernists’ and 
‘primordialists’ or ‘ethno-symbolists’ see Greenfeld, 2006:157-159.
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‘container model’ (Beck, 2006:27) of society persists, the nation-state continues to set 
the limits of political belonging and continues to be a central concept in the way 
‘belonging’ is understood today (Antonsich, 2010a).
Historic understandings of nations are relatively easy to grasp, as they depend on the 
putative idea of ‘bounded groups’ (Brubaker, 2004:2) and of ethnic solidarity, not 
necessarily tied to an administering body, such as the ‘state’. As Calhoun (2007:3-4) 
puts it ‘The idea of a nation-state is arguably pernicious. The hyphen ties the notion of a 
historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together to that of a 
modern polity with unprecedented military power and capacity for effective internal 
administration’. Consequently, the nation necessarily signifies an exclusive ethnic and 
cultural homogeneity (whether ‘organic’ or imposed) that centres on the uniformity of 
race and ethnicity (Baumann, 1999). However, the view that modern nations are based 
on ethnic identities that are somehow ancient, primordial or ‘natural’, and prior to 
political mobilization, is certainly contentious and has, in turn, generated much debate 
about whether: ethnicity exists as we commonly understand it (Brubaker, 2004; see also 
Smith, 2003); ethnicity explains nationhood; and nationhood explains nationalism (see 
Calhoun, 2007:54). Of course, this does not mean that political movements have not 
used the myth of ethnic solidarity as an underlying justification. As such, the way in 
which ethnicity and the state are imagined to relate to each other sets the tone of the 
discourse of nationalism within the state (Wimmer, 2002).
Whether we view ethnicity as primordial or as a political construct, the way in which 
the discourse of nationalism has been ingrained in the ways we imagine and speak of 
‘community’ (Calhoun 2007:54; see also Anderson, 2006 and the concept of ‘imagined 
community’) and ‘society’ gives the strong impression that primordial ties are real, 
enduring and matter for political causes and political control (Smith, 2006). Benhabib et 
al (2007:1) suggest that ‘No matter how historically contingent national identities may 
be, they are all too easily naturalized or otherwise taken for granted by the people who 
are caught up in them’. Primordial understandings of membership continue to provide 
powerful identity narratives that articulate ‘national affiliations as nonnegotiable-given 
for all time’ (Benhabib et al, 2007:3) and there is scarce evidence that ‘(p)olitical 
identities rooted in territorially defined nation-states’ (Benhabib et al, 2007:3) are 
seriously weakened by immigration, or ‘globalisation’ more generally. Moreover, the 
rhetorical and analytical ways in which we use the nation-state to demarcate ‘whole 
peoples’ and to advance political causes in the name of nation means that the
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categorizations and definitions of the relevant ethnic identities change according to 
political needs. As Calhoun (2007:60) argues ‘Nationalisms, vary, thus, between claims 
to have superseded traditional identities such as ethnicity by the founding of a true and 
modem nation, and claims to national identity and sovereignty rooted precisely in 
ancient ethnicity’ (also see Wimmer, 2002).
Consequently, there is no easy way of categorizing nationalism into either/or types 
(Smith, 2006), but the bounded nature of the nation distinguishes between citizens and 
foreigners and, in this way, the extent and nature of the contrast relies heavily on the 
ways in which the relationship between the nation and the state is envisaged and acted 
upon (Wimmer, 2002). For example, to view the nation as rooted in ethnic solidarity is 
to identify belonging to the nation-state as based on ties to kin and ‘proven’ (not only at 
the time of questioning but for ever) ethnic origin. In this way, nationalism, envisaged 
on the basis of a presumption of the naturalness of primordial ties, is very closely tied 
to the evolving identity of a nation and of a people and is heavily dependent on a 
fantasy o f ‘sameness’ in order to function as a single narrative o f ‘the people’ (Wimmer, 
2002). Because nation-states create borders and nationalism perpetuates the ‘theory’ 
that it is natural for one to live only with their own kind (Gellner, 1997a:7), nationalism 
itself is bordered. Put simply, though nation-states may never have been, and never will 
be, homogenous entities with linear narratives of nationhood, the way nationalism is 
politically mobilised within nation-states significantly contributes to images of who 
belongs to the nation, and who does not, and on what grounds.
‘Civic’ versus ‘Ethnic’ Nations
The idea that nationalisms come in different types is certainly not a new one. As 
Brubaker (2004:5) argues ‘For more than a century, scholars and public figures have 
distinguished “civic” and “ethnic”, western and eastern, liberal and illiberal forms of 
nationalism’. Moreover the rate at which immigrants are gaining citizenship through 
naturalization, rather than ancestry or birth, led scholars to investigate the variety of 
approaches different nation-states exercised in granting citizenship to immigrants not 
considered ‘co-ethnics’ (Brubaker, 1992; Smith, 2006).
While some theoretical and philosophical debates have engaged with the principles of 
civic nationalism (for example, see Habermas, 2009:106 for his defence of 
constitutional patriotism; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000 on the foundations of citizenship 
in diverse societies; Smith, 2006), most look at formal, institutional structures that deal
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with immigrants as an indicator of whether some states are considered ‘more’ civic than 
others (Joppke, 2010). At its simplest, civic-nationalism is ‘a form of political 
membership of the state that does not putatively require ethnic ties to the ‘nation’ 
(Bloemraad et al, 2008:158); and which ‘ties belonging to rights and a universalist, 
voluntary political membership, and thus arguably offers immigrants a greater chance of 
inclusion...’ (Bloemraad et al, 2008:158). A.D. Smith (2006: 170) explains that the 
civic conception of nationalism that underpins this form of nation is ‘...voluntaristic, 
rational and activist: it regards the nation as an association of willing citizens residing in 
a given territory and obeying the nation’s laws’.
Countries such as Australia, Canada, France and the United States are considered to 
practice civic conceptions of nationhood. The ‘civic’ nations are often contrasted with 
countries such as Japan, Switzerland and Germany (before it liberalized its immigration 
laws, see Joppke, 2010), as they have erected barriers to naturalization that privilege a 
‘jus sanguinis descent principle of citizenship’ (Bloemraad et al, 2008:158). Moreover, 
‘civic’ nations tend to promote a ‘civic’ culture that is putatively different to national 
cultures based on ethnic and religious understandings.
In contrast, ‘ethnic’ citizenship is an understanding of citizenship that is closely tied 
with the understanding of ‘nation'. You belong as a citizen when you have ethnic ties to 
the nation, through birth (jus soli) or through direct decent (jus sanguinis). This 
understanding of citizenship is based on primordial ties and views the ‘nation’ as 
necessarily signifying an exclusive, ethnic and cultural homogeneity that centres on the 
uniformity of race, religion, ethnicity and culture (Baumann, 1999). Smith (2006:170) 
explains that in this conception the notion of nationhood is understood as ‘a community 
of history and culture, whose members are linked by genealogical ties, native traditions 
and ‘ethno-history’, vernacular language, customs and religion...’. Nationalism, in this 
context, is viewed as ‘organic’ as ‘a natural phenomenon’ like those found in nature and 
therefore this type of nationalism envisages the individual to belong to and to be bound 
to the nation at birth.
Although the categorical distinctions between civic and ethnic nationalism (and 
citizenship) can be informative in regard to the reception of immigrants in ‘host’ 
societies, the distinction has lacked clarity and consistency, as civic and ethnic 
tendencies have been practiced by all nation-states (Smith, 2003; Smith, 2006). As such, 
the analytical split between civic and ethnic understandings of nation has been
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considered ‘conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading, and normatively 
problematic’ (Brubaker, 2004:5; see also Dieckhoff, 2004). Normatively however, there 
has been a push to promote ‘civic’ nationalism as a more desirable state (Levey, 2008), 
even while empirically ideas about belonging to the nation persist on ethnic grounds 
(Joppke, 2010; Brubaker, 2004). The basic distinctions however, continue to live on in 
the way that nationalist projects are envisaged and enacted vis-ä-vis immigrant, 
refugees and asylum seekers. The fact that no nation-state practices a purely civic form 
of citizenship and the fact that ‘ethnic’ ties are defined and redefined as categories of 
inclusion and exclusion that are subject to change, suggests, as Spencer (2006:xv) does, 
that ‘Racial and ethnic boundaries are subject to periodic softening or hardenirg, 
blurring or sharpening of emphasis’. Indeed, Beck (2006) argues that conceptions of the 
nation-state and our understandings of our identities are shaped by the limitations and 
constraints of the ideas of nationalism and nation-state. He highlights how the very 
frames we use to delimit the nation-state actually identify the dichotomies we disregard 
in preference to our nation-state lenses which collapse complexity and obfuscate 
empirical realities. Similarly, Calhoun (1999:218) contends that ‘The tacit assumption 
of nationalist rhetoric reinforces our acceptance of state-centred conventions of data 
gathering that make nation-states the predominant units of comparative research’. This 
continuously reinforces the predominance of the nation-state, as well as our reliance on 
it to frame our relationships within it, by it and through it. In this way, the idea of nation 
continuously shapes the basis for political community and continues to shape collective 
identity and belonging to the nation-state. Indeed, as Calhoun (1999:17) astutely argues 
‘our most basic understanding of what counts as a society are shaped... by the modem 
era’s distinctive rhetoric of nations and national identity’. Rhetoric that continues, 
despite strong argument to the contrary, to ‘construct societies as bounded, integral 
wholes with distinctive identities, culture and institutions’ (Calhoun 1999: 217; see also 
Brubaker, 2004). It is, therefore, not surprising that our understanding of political 
memberships continues to be guided and hampered by narrow understanding of nation 
and national identity, understandings which privilege ‘one sense of belonging, that of 
membership in a categorically distinct culture’ (Calhoun 1999:222).
Citizenship as Belonging
Theoretically, ‘civic’ ideas about nationhood and nationalism have putatively won over 
‘ethnic’ ideas of nationhood and nationalism, especially as citizenship has been 
markedly liberalised in Western countries (Joppke, 2010). However, citizenship
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continues to be an amorphous concept that has infiltrated every aspect of social enquiry, 
political discourse and policy making (Bosniak, 2006). The genealogy of citizenship in 
social and political theory has evolved, greatly building on the ideas first presented by 
T.H Marshall (1950), who saw citizenship in terms of a tripartite structure of civil, 
political and social rights. Traditionally, citizenship has been the only mechanism 
through which one could formally belong to the state and ‘The membership of 
individuals in modern democratic societies is marked by the status of citizenship’ 
(Castles and Davidson, 2000: vii). In the modern vernacular, citizenship has come to 
mean legal status, rights, political participation and belonging (Bloemraad et al, 
2008:156), all within a political and territorially circumscribed space. While many 
scholars have pointed to the gendered and class-based characteristics of citizenship 
(Oleksy et al, 2011; Andersen and Simm, 2004) and, hence, the often exclusive 
articulations of citizenship, the relationships between citizenship and culture and 
‘ethnicity’ have been made most prominent by mass immigration and the liberalisation 
of citizenship in some Western countries (Joppke, 2010).
Legal understandings of citizenship rest primarily on three principles: citizenship by 
birth (jus soli); citizenship through parental ancestry (jus sanguinis); and citizenship 
through naturalization. However, while all three legal ways of becoming a citizen 
supposedly share equal status in terms of conferring the ‘rights and obligations’ that 
accompany citizenship, they differ in their ability to impart a sense of belonging. This is 
due in large part to the coupling of nation and state (Calhoun 1999). Citizenship, in the 
context of the nation-state then, has two distinct, yet sometimes overlapping, meanings. 
Citizenship connotes legal membership of the state (without having to belong to the 
‘nation’ in any ethnic sense) or it can connote belonging to the nation which is 
automatically legally recognized as membership to the state (through birth for example 
which is how most individuals in the world become citizens, see Smith, 2006; Shachar, 
2009). However, while many would agree that legal status and political rights are 
theoretically part and parcel of formal citizenship for ‘everyone’, Heisler (2005:667) 
explains that, although ‘[Citizenship] figures in the assurance or denial of rights, 
economic benefits and social services, education, due process of law, and opportunities 
to affect political decision; it does not guarantee equality, fairness, justice, economic 
well-being, dignity, or the respect of public officials or fellow citizens’ (see also 
Wimmer, 2002; Antonsich, 2010a).
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According to Brubaker (1992:22-23) ‘The modern state is simultaneously a territorial 
organization and a personal association’. In this way, citizenship is ‘internally inclusive’ 
(Brubaker, 1992:31), to allow formal membership to citizens within the state, but 
‘externally exclusive’, in that it excludes foreigners from access to this membership. 
However, Brubaker (1992:23) also asserts that stressing the territorial aspects of 
citizenship and membership and viewing citizenship as a legal formula prevents one 
from appreciating it as a ‘social and cultural fact’ and its nature to act ‘as a powerful 
instrument of social closure’ (Brubaker, 1992:23); where citizenship can act to restrict 
‘the participation of some outsiders’ (1992:23). Similarly, Joppke (2010:15) explains 
that, viewing the state as a membership association, and not simply through the 
traditional focus on the ‘centralized rule over a territory with fixed linear boundaries’, 
involves recognising that the territory-centred approach ‘obscured the fact that the 
modem state, while being territorial, was at the same time a membership association, 
and one in which membership was more demanding than mere residence’. This means 
that equating belonging with citizenship, without questioning the basis of belonging and 
citizenship’s ‘jurisdictions’ (Bosniak, 2006:4), aside from a legal understanding of 
citizenship, means that ‘belonging’ is left unexamined and, therefore, the mechanisms 
and processes that create and sustain belonging are also left unexamined.
Conceding that there are different ways to view citizenship does not provide an 
adequate understanding of citizenship and how its exclusionary and inclusionary 
rhetoric actually works. Moreover, the multiple referents and definitions of citizenship 
have helped little in alleviating the confusion associated with coming to terms with 
citizenship. As Bosniak (2006:1) explains, the trouble with citizenship and its varied 
lenses and definitions demonstrates that the:
...divided nature of citizenship as an idea also implicates core issues of political and social theory. It 
leads us especially to focus on questions about who it is that rightfully constitutes the subject of the 
citizenship we champion. To the extent that we express our ideals of justice and democratic 
belonging by way of the concept of citizenship, we need to be particularly sensitive to the questions 
of exclusion implicated in the discussion. Citizenship of, and for, exactly whom?
Immigration has, indeed, problematised traditional views of citizenship as automatically 
meaning belonging, especially considering the increasing propensity for a large number 
of non-citizens to be residing within the state, citizens with multiple citizenships, ex­
patriots with voting rights that residents do not enjoy etc (Joppke, 2010; Castles and 
Davidson, 2000). Indeed, the idea that ‘(i)deally, citizens are meant to belong to one 
nation-state only’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000: vii), in order for a substantial form of
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citizenship to exist, is certainly made problematic by the diversity of the population. As 
such, according to Brubaker (1992:22-23) ‘political territory as we know it today- 
bounded territory to which access is controlled by the state- presupposes some way of 
distinguishing those who have free access to the territory from those who do not, those 
who belong to the state from those who do not’.
Similarly, Bosniak (2006:4) explains that our understanding of citizenship as ‘hard on 
the outside and soft on the inside’ means that this definition of citizenship only works 
when exclusion at the border is stringent and does not allow the inclusion of ‘aliens’ or 
‘others’ at all. Bosniak (2006:4) explains that ‘...in a world of porous borders, real 
separation is often elusive’. Consequently, the large number of migrants, from diverse 
origins, immigrating to Western nation-states has challenged long-established ideas of 
what citizenship means (Bloemraad et al, 2008:156; Castles and Davidson, 2000; 
Antonsich, 2009) and has led to political sociologists researching the ‘ethnic’ and/or 
‘civic’ bases of citizenship and ‘the implications of different notions of belonging for 
immigrants’ legal status, rights and participation’ (Bloemraad et al, 2008:156).
While it is necessary to emphasise that theoretical and empirical definitions of nation­
state and nationalism obscure complexity and present a culturally homogenous category 
to which citizens are required to conform, one of the key dilemmas in trying to separate 
ethnic understandings of nationalism from the state is that the very idea and practice of 
nation are reliant on taken-for-granted, traditional understandings of concepts such as 
‘community’ (similarly ‘groups’ see Brubaker, 2004). Community and nation become 
bound together conceptually by a myth of similarity and continuity (Calhoun 1999). So, 
Calhoun (1999:220) posits that ‘Citizenship, by contrast to community or categorical 
nationality, is a specific mode of belonging directly dependent on public space’. He 
explains that among citizens political participation is possible:
1) because the unit of membership is in fact a polity (and not simply a community or a nation);
2) because its collective affairs are to some considerable extent organised though public discourse;
and
3) because citizens are empowered to enter effectively into that discourse.
Calhoun (1999:223) is seeking analytical clarity about the place of citizenship, because 
he deems it necessary to be attentive to the ways in which citizenship is conveniently 
tied to a specific understanding of culture, community and nation. This understanding
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necessarily collapses diversity within the nation; views other nations as integral and 
whole; and conveniently conflates culture, community and nation. This understanding 
of citizenship and its connection with culture, community and nation articulates a 
certain way to belong to the nation. Viewing the nation and citizenship as culturally 
produced then, necessarily means certain definitions of ‘belonging’, ‘nation’ and 
‘citizenship’ have been formulated and come to be relied upon. Citizenship continues to 
be thought of within ‘racialised’ and cultured understandings and, where this was not 
made explicit previously, in the last decade citizenship has been further imbued with 
cultural meanings (Joppke, 2010).
Calhoun’s (1999) classification makes sense of how we should approach citizenship as 
immigration continues to challenge and, in some nation-states, reaffirm ‘notions of 
national identity, sovereignty, and state control that have historically been linked to 
citizenship’ (Bloemraad et al, 2008:155). Moreover, an increase in immigration has 
brought about resurgence in nationalist sentiment, intent on protecting the nation and 
safeguarding the preciousness of citizenship from the ‘huddled masses’ (Joppke, 2010). 
Although it is far easier to imagine those beyond our borders as ‘foreigners’, and those 
within as ‘co-citizens’, actually this distinction is far from realistic, as Bosniak (2006:8) 
explains. Once foreigners enter the bounded territory of the nation-state they enter ‘the 
spatial domain of universal citizenship’, however they remain ‘outsiders in a significant 
sense’, because citizenship norms do not apply to them and, therefore, ‘the border 
effectively follows them inside’.
The concept of the ‘alien citizen’ (Ngai, 2007), where, due to ‘racial’, ‘cultural’ or 
religious markers, citizens are not quite ‘one of us’, is a primary example of the ethnic 
predisposition nation-states retain; a situation in which the ideas of the nation, the polity 
and the citizen do not coincide with who is within the nation ‘The nation’s “Others” 
may be internal to the national territory, where minorities are “racialised,” considered as 
inherently or culturally inferior in comparison to the majority, and not, therefore, really 
part of the nation (Nash, 2010: 80; see also Ngai, 2007; Gilroy, 1991). Muslims in 
European states are currently viewed as ‘Others’ and as not belonging to the nation. 
(Nash, 2010:80-81; Joppke, 2010). As Nash (2010:81) argues ‘It is clear that some are 
outside “our” nation here, even if, as citizens, they live, work, raise children, pay taxes 
to the state, and obey French law under which individuals have historically enjoyed the 
freedom from state intervention to wear religious dress in public places...’. 
Consequently, the current resurgence of nationalism and the need to imbue citizenship
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with ‘values’ (Chapter 6) means that the ‘alien’ citizen continues to occupy a place in 
society, even as nation-states continue with the myth of homogeneity.
Castles and Davidson (2000) indicate that the idealistic presumptions in the criteria of 
belonging to the nation-state on cultural or ethnic grounds do not map onto real world 
conditions. They suggest that most nation-states have had internal groups that were not 
considered to belong and were considered incapable of belonging and ‘therefore either 
denied citizenship or alternatively forced to go through a process of cultural 
assimilation in order to belong’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000: vii). They also explain 
that even those with citizenship did not escape discrimination based on class, gender, 
ethnicity, race and religion and ‘as a result, have been denied their ‘rights vital to 
citizenship’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000:vii).
In this way, viewing belonging through the lens of citizenship is problematic. Indeed, 
the whole idea of contemporary citizenship is in flux (even the formal aspects of it in 
some countries see Bauböck, 2008; Weinstock, 2008). While Australia’s formulation of 
citizenship policy during the Howard Government will be discussed in Chapter 6, the 
way in which citizenship is approached by the state only tells a fraction of the story of 
who belongs, and on what grounds. Indeed, nationalism and primordial understandings 
of belonging continue to grip the imagination, even as ideas of ‘civic’ nationalism are 
encouraged over ‘ethnic’ forms of nationalism by theorists and scholars (Calhoun, 
1999; Smith, 2003). As Calhoun (2007:69) contends ‘...nationalism is not simply a 
claim of ethnic similarity, but a claim that certain similarities should count as the 
definition of political community’.
The Politics of Belonging
Contestations about belonging occur when belongings are threatened in one way or 
another (Yuval-Davis, 2006 and 2011) and the politics of belonging become about 
contesting the boundaries of belonging. The politics of belonging raise some 
fundamental concerns about the ways nation and nationalism, and hence community 
and society, are articulated (Yuval-Davis et al, 2006:4). There is an inherent need to 
disaggregate belonging in order to scrutinize and analyse much more closely: the 
shifting meanings of identity, ethnicity, immigration and nation; the ways in which they 
challenge traditional understandings of ethnic, religious and cultural affiliations; and 
how they are articulated in the longing for stable attachments and belongings.
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The politics of nationhood and nation-building and the constant (re)creation )f 
Andersonian ‘imagined communities’ (see Chapter 3) are all aspects of ‘politics )f 
belonging’ (i.e. the contestation and determination of who belongs and who does nat 
and under which circumstances). The politics of belonging have produced political 
projects in a variety of settings to determine the nature and characteristics of tie 
collectivities that exist and the nature and characteristics of the people who belong to 
these collectivities. As Yuval- Davis et al (2006:2-3) explain:
The politics of belonging comprises specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to a 
particular collectivity or collectivities which themselves are being constructed in these projects in 
very specific ways. Citizenships and identities, as well as ‘cultures and traditions’- in fact all 
signifiers of borders and boundaries play central roles in discourses of the politics of belonging.
According to Yuval-Davis (2006:7-8) the politics of belonging can be ‘viewed as 
situated in three different-but complementary ways’. First, the particular issues and 
context (historical, technological, economic, social and political) in society mean that 
the politics of belonging are situated ‘temporally’. At different times, different 
identities, needs and aspirations coincide to articulate specific forms of belonging and 
non-belonging. Second, although ‘globalisation’ has meant that the interconnected 
nature of collectivities is a modem fact, the effects have not been homogenous and, 
therefore, different localities have been affected in different ways. Third, Yural-Davis 
(2006:8) explains that the politics of belonging are situated ‘intersectionally’, meaning 
that ‘ Even at the same time and in the same place, not all people affect, and are affected 
by, specific politics of belonging in the same ways...’. She further explains that, if the 
politics of belonging are about ‘the dirty work of boundary maintenance’, then ‘some 
have to work harder than others, some get dirtier than others, and the boundaries can be 
more or less permeable and different people can find themselves on different sides of 
these boundaries’ (Yuval-Davis 2006:7-8).
Finally, what the politics of belonging necessarily means is understanding which 
‘similarities’ are preferred and which differences are shunned and the boundaries that 
are created as a result. Moreover, the politics of belonging are about contesting and 
challenging the very ideas about who belongs, by understanding what is involved in 
belonging and in being a member of a community (Calhoun, 1999).
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Conclusion
Boundaries do not simply define the boundaries of nations, but also work to border the 
imagination (Spencer, 2006:xv). The power of states to act as ‘people containers’ (Beck, 
2006) still persist and the idea that nations are closed entities with distinct ‘cultures’ still 
informs much of identity politics and ideas about belonging (Calhoun, 1999). However, 
even as primordial myths continue to inform identity narratives, the evidence that these 
narratives exclude and need to be articulated in more inclusive and relevant ways is ever 
present and growing not least due to mass immigration.
The politics of belonging and the presentation of fixed boundaries based on naturalised 
and essentialised notions of belonging are not a recent phenomenon and they should not 
be treated as such. However, as the politics of belonging also reflect the historical, 
social, political and economic context within which they take place, they also convey 
the specific environmental factors that give the politics of belonging in certain times 
their distinctive shape and boundaries. The current global context has given rise to a 
certain kind of politics where fear and anxiety, bom of economic and political 
uncertainty, have reinvigorated ‘cultural’ boundaries characterised in civilisational and 
ideological modes, specifically ‘us and them’, that are not limited to differentiation 
between ‘nations’ and states, but also between citizens.
The way citizenship and nationalism have been variously conceptualised and deployed 
across states has dealt with one side of belonging. This is a form of belonging that is 
‘once and for all’, or ‘zero-sum’, and which suspects complexity and diversity in 
‘allegiances’ as a form of deviance from the ‘norm’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This form of 
belonging does not allow for the capacity to view identities as contingent and, therefore, 
subject to change through robust political, not simply cultural, membership. The 
conflict arises when belonging is conflated with a citizenship and a nationalism that 
privileges a zero-sum, apolitical belonging. This means that, while some may be 
citizens of the state, they can, and will, never have the space to belong. The range of 
inclusiveness is limited to those who share ethnic, cultural or racialised views of 
belonging within the nation, which means that many more will always be ‘alien’ even if 
they are citizens (Ngai, 2007; Antonsich, 2010a). Nevertheless, even while the 
conditions for belonging might be unfavourable to many within the state, citizens who 
do not ‘belong’ have been, and continue to be, pushed to belong under the mantra of
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‘social cohesion’. ' Indeed, the stress on social cohesion and the singling out of certain 
‘ethnic groups’ as threatening or eroding social cohesion, threatens the very politics of 
belonging by neutralising the inherently political act of ascribing belonging for some 
and not for others.
There is a clear need to push arguments and generate new insights in order to 
understand how and why Muslims are characterised as not belonging in Australia. 
Indeed, there is a need to refresh the ways we look at how ideas about the ‘Other’, as 
social constructs, are created, implemented and come to directly affect people. The next 
chapter, then, examines some of the key methodological areas that are useful in coming 
to understand how ideas about belonging are socially constructed and come to impact 
on the discourse on Muslims in Australia.
13 This has and continues to be the case for Muslims in a variety of Western societies including Australia. 
Section Two of this dissertation deals with this issue.
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Method
Introduction
This chapter outlines the research design and methodology adopted to identify how 
ideas about belonging are socially constructed and the influence this has on the 
discourse on Muslims in Australia. Social constructionism is neither new nor novel 
(Berger and Luckmann, 2011). Indeed, it has taken its place as a valid analytical 
orientation in the social sciences (Marsh and Stoker, 2010) and has been deployed (in 
various ways) in research projects of this kind (see Brubaker, 2004). In recent decades, 
social constructionism introduced a ‘fertile metaphor’ to broaden our understanding of 
social phenomena. However, there can be ‘complacent and cliched constructivism’ 
(Brubaker, 2004:3). In fact, social constructivist approaches to the study of social 
science have become the norm (Hacking 1999:1) and this has meant that often ‘it fails 
to generate the friction, force and freshness needed to push arguments further and 
generate new insights’ (Brubaker 2004:4; see also Hacking, 1999: vii).
The analytical tools adopted here to investigate how political projects of belonging in 
Australia manifest in relation to the ‘Other’, generally, and how these understandings of 
who belongs, and who does not, affect discourses on Muslims in Australia, in particular, 
are designed to push the boundaries of our understanding of concepts that have become 
popularly and readily ‘normalised’. Defining belonging using concepts such as nation 
and citizenship necessarily entails burdening the definition of belonging with a 
‘cultural’ understanding and obscuring and/or disguising its contested and ‘political’ 
character - which results in imagining the ‘we’ of the nation in a restrictive, and 
intensely exclusionary, manner and which warrants the continued positioning of 
Muslims as ‘Others’ within the nation. Concepts (and practices) that can, and 
sometimes do, empower people, such as citizenship, are often defined in ways that 
disempower ‘Others’ (citizens as well as non-citizens). The way in which normative 
ideals are attached to nation and nationalism, culture and citizenship, necessarily means 
that we have to work with, or against, these concepts in order to make sense of novel 
contexts, such as increasingly visible, multi-cultural and multi-faith populations, and 
their attendant political ramifications.14
However, simply redefining individual concepts or their empirical scope is not enough, 
as many of the exclusionary practices are embedded in the definitions themselves;
14 ‘N ovel’ because they are not ‘new ’ but are recurrently treated as ‘new ’.
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whether nationalism and citizenship are envisaged as civic or ethnic, for example, or if 
belonging for citizens is envisaged along cultural or civic lines. It remains the case that, 
while definitions matter intensely in how we envisage our world, more often the 
definitions themselves are the problem and their intertwined nature means that 
piecemeal approaches to redefinition often lead to further confusion (for example, see 
Beck, 2006; and Calhoun, 2007, on the problems of methodological nationalism). 
Consequently, the present study approaches the subject of belonging in Australia by 
exploring how ideas, concepts and policies of belonging for ‘Others’ in Australia impact 
specifically on views about belonging for Muslims in Australia. This kind of study, 
Thompson (1990:225; see also van Dijk, 2011; Howarth, 2000) suggests, should be 
undertaken in two steps.
The first step is to highlight the relevant ‘social and historical contexts’ within which 
discursive practices are situated. The social and historical context in this study is 
confined to the socio-historical phenomena that have, over time, come to define how 
and when ‘Others’ come to belong in Australia. Yuval-Davis (2011) describes 
nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship as amongst the many ‘projects of 
belonging’ the state undertakes. These three areas impact directly on definitions of 
belonging for ‘Others’ within the state and, consequently, they will be the three key 
areas where the social/culture/political context for this study will focus. The second step 
is to undertake an analytical study of discursive practices that are not only embedded 
within the highlighted socio-historical context, but are inscribed with the normative 
commitments embedded within the social-historical context in relation to ‘Others’. The 
discursive practice analysed in this study focuses on talk about Muslims and Islam in 
the Australian House of Representatives in the years between 2000 and 2006. The 
intent is to highlight how talk about Muslims in the Australian House of Representatives 
is related in a systematic way to the social and historical context of the ‘Other’ in 
Australia.
This chapter is divided into two key sections: methodology and method. The 
methodology section examines alternative ways of viewing the process of envisaging 
political membership, in order to demonstrate the interrelated nature of meaning and 
power (Thompson 1990). As such, the methodology necessarily employs multiple 
theoretical lenses, drawing on diverse sociological, as well as political, literature. I 
purposefully take a broad approach in utilizing literature that points to the contingent 
and changing nature of the state, nationalism and ‘the people’, to move away from
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understanding the processes as anything other than contingent, and therefore ‘political’. 
Three key methodological concerns are explored: ‘imagined communities’; discourse 
theory; and Islamophobia as ideology.
Methodology
Imagining Communities
Benedict Anderson (1983; 2006) coined the phrase ‘imagined communities’ to describe 
the contingent nature of modern communities and their socially constructed nature. 
Numerous scholars have used his ideas to expand our understanding of the form and 
nature of modern nations (see, for example, Wodak et al, 2009; Wodak, 2002; Smith, 
2003) and some of the implications of ‘invented’ traditions (Thompson 1990). 
Anderson explains that defining nationalism is a difficult task, but suggests that the 
nation is ‘an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited 
and sovereign’ (Anderson, 2006:6). Anderson further explains that the nation is 
‘imagined’ ‘...because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion’.
Anderson goes on to argue (2006:6), contra-Gellner (1997a), that it is not the case that 
this makes the nation ‘false’ or a ‘fabrication’, but that they are ‘imagined’ and the ways 
in which they are imagined vary, ‘Communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ (Anderson, 2006:6). 
Anderson continues, ‘Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes 
it possible, over the past two centuries, for many millions of people, not so much to kill, 
as willingly to die for such limited imaginings’ (Anderson, 2006:7). Anderson’s most 
relevant contribution to understanding ‘nations’ is his claim that ‘imagined 
communities’ are political communities, imagined in that they are social and political 
constructs and not ‘natural’ or primordial entities.
The rest of Anderson’s (2006) insightful thesis explains how language and the print- 
media promulgate the fiction of the nation. Although his book is full of examples of 
how nations come to be imagined, and thus transformed, and how people become 
attached to ‘the inventions of their imagination’, Anderson’s thesis is limited in a 
number of ways. Yuval-Davis (2006:204) rightly argues that Anderson’s imagined
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community is ‘based on an abstract sense of imagined simultaneity’ and the solidarity 
assumed by Anderson that is derived from the inability to meet all members of a nation 
because of the size of the nation, fails to take into account how ‘former and future’ 
generations are implicated in the ‘imaginings’ of the community. Further, Yuval-Davis 
(2006:204) argues that the impossibility of meeting everyone in the nation cannot be the 
only explanation for why ‘imaginings’ take place, because, as she argues, the 
construction of boundaries, the creation of insiders and outsiders ‘involves an act of 
active and situated imagination’.
Consequently, the ways in which national, imagined communities are variously 
imagined ‘depend on people’s social locations, people’s experiences and definitions of 
self, but probably even more importantly on their values’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006:205). 
Indeed, Yuval-Davis rightly argues (2006:210) that ‘this dirty business of boundary 
maintenance’ that underlies the politics of belonging is all about potentially meeting 
other people and deciding whether they stand inside or outside the imaginary boundary 
line of the nation and/ or other communities of belonging, whether they are ‘us’ or 
‘them’. Similarly, Carr (2007:2) states that ‘Understanding boundaries and boundary 
making is understanding politics, however understanding how boundaries are made and 
(re)made provides a clearer understanding of how politics affects boundary making and 
how boundaries are contingencies of our own making. Boundaries necessarily imply the 
making of a “we” and, in turn, the creation of “they”’.
Additionally, the idea of imagined communities helps refocus the situating of current 
practices within their socio-historical contexts. As Thompson (1990:277) highlights, 
human beings are inclined to conjure up the past in order to justify their current actions 
‘...in order to disguise the present and to reassure themselves of their continuity with the 
past’. Thompson (1990:277) also notes that ‘invented’ traditions, even those so deeply 
entrenched they appear ancient, need analysis in order to recognise how they may 
obscure relations of power.
Nonetheless, as useful as the ‘imagined communities’ thesis is in helping to appreciate 
the procedural and political nature of nations, Anderson does not elaborate on the 
political forces that create and (re)create the image of who the people are in this 
‘imagined community’. Although Anderson’s book is full of political examples, he does 
not explain, or theorise, the processes involved in people-making. To fill this lacuna 
Rogers Smith (2003) calls for a theory of peoplehood which adds to Anderson’s theory
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of ‘imagined communities’. Smith (2003:129) claims that imagined communities are 
‘The products of both coercive force and persuasive stories inspiring a sense of trust and 
worth among a critical mass of supporters for particular visions of common 
membership’. Smith (2003:129) contends that persuasive stories include ‘economic and 
political power appeals’ and, more importantly, ‘ethically constitutive stories’ that 
‘claim membership is somehow intrinsic to the core identities’ of constituents.
Smith (2003) outlines the basic elements of a theory on the creation of political 
membership or what he terms 'peoplehood’ (he also uses people-making and people­
forming interchangeably). Smith (2003:10) believes that political scientists have not 
sought ‘an explicit general theory of the ways sense of political peoplehood are 
generated, maintained, and transformed’, even though, as he rightly points out, the 
formation of political communities seems to be an essential human feature (2003:9-10). 
Smith (2003:15) defines ‘people-making’ as ‘the generation of shared beliefs, among 
out-siders and insiders alike, that certain human populations comprise a political 
“people”’. He further explains (Smith, 2003:20) that ‘Political peoples’ are forms of 
‘imagined community’, in the way Anderson (1983) has applied to nations. However, 
Smith (2003:20) stresses that they are ‘political because they are communities 
“imagined” to impose binding obligations and duties; and many human associations 
beyond those that Anderson calls “nations” fall under this definition’.
In developing a theory of peoplehood, Smith (2003:32), like Anderson (2006), posits 
that no political people are natural or primordial and are to be understood as ‘human 
creations, formed by participants in pre-existing forms of peoplehood’. Smith (2003:32) 
rejects the view that a ‘sense of people emerges organically or evolve out of people’s 
particular economic, territorial, demographic, ancestral, religious, linguistic or cultural 
identities in a fairly automatic, unconscious response’. He contends that these factors 
influence personal identities and, therefore ‘none can automatically serve as the 
conception of political community’ (2003:33). He posits that the factors that influence 
personal identities are diverse and, hence, cannot automatically ‘translate into a 
conception of the political community’ (2003:32). As such, particular conceptions of the 
political community are mobilized by leaders, embraced by constituents and, in turn, 
become institutionalized conceptions of peoplehood.
Because different conceptions of ‘the people’ could be advanced, the particulars of a 
political community are formed through what Smith suggests is a political process
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(Smith, 2003:53). Because people-making is a political process, political stories are 
constrained by existing political identities. Smith (2005:55-56) explains that ‘stories of 
peoplehood always partly maintain and partly modify pre-existing senses of political 
identity, though in greatly differing proportions. In most contexts, elements contributing 
to maintenance are more prominent, particularly when a political community is well 
established’.
Smith (2003:129) also points out that ‘political projects of people-making are likely to 
be pursued through either coercive force or persuasive stories’. He contends that both 
approaches establish forms of membership ‘that structure and distribute power and 
resources in unequal ways. Both therefore contribute to the ongoing constitution, 
maintenance, and transformations of political identities’ (Smith, 2003:43). Crucially, 
Smith posits that a politics of people-making unavoidably means that the stories of 
peoplehood are, to an extent, always exclusionary. He contends that ‘to embrace one 
sense of peoplehood and shared way of life, however free and inclusive, is to reject at 
least some others... the politics of people-making, then, involves continual, partisan, 
conflictual, often invidious, and always exclusionary, processes that oscillate around 
stories and force’ (Smith, 2003:56).
Smith differentiates between three mains types of stories that are used in the processes 
of people-making: economic stories; those involving political power; and ethically 
constitutive stories. He explains that all three types of stories are important to the 
construction of political societies and contends that a close examination of such stories 
is necessary in order to have ‘adequate explanatory theories of political identity, and to 
have better informed normative theories of how we should seek to construct political 
memberships’ (Smith 2003:73). He further explains that, although economic stories 
may be politically central to modern societies, appeals to economic benefits are not 
enough to bond political societies (Smith 2003:83). He also posits that political power 
stories, such as those that appeal to democracy, are not enough to bond political 
communities. Although he admits that both economic and political stories work within 
society, he suggests that ‘ethically constitutive stories of humanity’s intrinsic moral 
identity have always been used to provide philosophic underpinnings for liberal, 
republican, and social democratic political visions’ (2003:86).
In this way, while Smith (2003:88) admits that economic and political power stories are 
necessary and often dominate, they are ‘never sufficient to sustain political community’.
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Rather, he argues (Smith, 2003:97-8) that ‘ethically constitutive stories’ provide 
something that the other stories do not:
...ethically constitutive stories can support claims of particularistic community memberships more 
effectively than economic or political power accounts, such as liberal commercial or democratic 
republican stories. Particularistic stories are often attractive to leaders and constituents alike, because 
everyone in both categories is endowed with economic and power interests, inherited identities, and 
religious, cultural and political ideologies that put them in tension, often stark and bitter opposition, 
to many others...Most people are therefore likely to perceive real advantages in conceptions of 
political membership that promise to protect and promote their distinctive interests, identities, and 
values against their rivals ( ....)  ethically constitutive accounts remain better suited to promote 
particularistic senses of membership than economic or political power themes, for they alone present 
membership in a particular community as somehow intrinsic to who a person is.
Smith (2003:48-49) believes that the forms of political peoplehood created are 
generated (motivated and limited), to a large extent ‘by the particular range of stories of 
possible political identity that they have inherited and long valued’. He also suggests 
that, while deeply cherished narratives of people are somewhat malleable ‘...in many 
regards and under many circumstances human attachments to their established senses of 
identity, interest, and ideals often prove to be quite tenacious’.
Smith’s (2003) preliminary theoretical ideas are broad and he does not directly offer a 
method for the investigation o f ‘narratives of people-making’ or even allow us to clearly 
distinguish between political narratives and ethically constitutive narratives (as the line 
between the two can be thin). Moreover, Smith (2003) seems to suggest that, while 
there is scope for change, people generally prefer to stick to their established identities, 
so resisting change. However, he does further the imaginary communities thesis (as 
presented by Anderson, 2006) by delving further into the mechanisms of both the 
‘imagining’ and how images of the nation are created, by whom they are created and 
promulgated and what kinds of narratives are most likely to present as the most 
powerful in the process of people-making.
For the purpose of this research the idea that nations are imagined is a fruitful 
proposition as there is ample theoretical and empirical data to suggest that nations are 
not primordial (Greenfeld, 2006; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004; Wimmer, 2002; Antonsich, 
2009). Moreover, a conceptualisation of how nations are imagined, and which 
narratives are capable of entrenching certain stories of peoplehood, is even more useful 
here. Smith’s (2003) idea of ‘ethically constitutive stories’ indicates that there are 
certain stories that tell of the ethnic, racial and cultural origins of people (imagined 
origins) that define, at particular times and in particular ways, who is with us and who is
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classified as an ‘Other’; stories that can, and do, portray exclusive primordial ties. 
Moreover, these ‘ethically constitutive stories’ are also not ideologically neutral and 
may work as media for nationalist or racist ideology. Moreover, over time, these 
‘ethically constitutive stories’ may become institutionalised and embedded in 
programmes and policies that come to delineate formal processes of discrimination 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
As such, the imagined communities thesis presented here is relevant because, if political 
identities are ‘political’, and not simply ‘necessary’, ‘cultural’, ‘racial’ or primordial, 
then they can ultimately be imagined differently. However, as Smith (2003) has argued 
above, the way they are imagined is constrained and limited by existing political 
identities and, as such, over time, they become naturalised and conceived in cultural or 
‘racialised’ terms (see also Benhabib et al, 2007). Moreover, as Smith (2003) rightly 
posits, conceptions of ‘us’ ultimately exclude some, if not all, conceptions that do not 
‘fit’. As such, the way that political memberships are envisaged, and ideas and attitudes 
about ‘us’ are promulgated, is through beliefs and symbols, all of which influence and 
impact upon social and political action and interaction. In turn, they shape and 
determine understanding and meaning and attitudes about ‘us’ and who belong to ‘us’. 
This then becomes part of the social consensus within society: social consensus 
involving the shared language and conceptual maps (Thompson, 1993; van Dijk, 1996). 
Van Dijk (1993:31) explains that people engage daily in communication about ethnic 
minorities and race relations and ‘In this way, they acquire the mental models, the social 
knowledge, the attitudes, and the ideologies that control their action, interaction, and 
dialogues with or about minorities’. Finally, what the imagined community lens allows 
us to appreciate is that conceptions of belonging, and hence ‘us’, are discursively 
produced and reproduced and the discursive construction of ‘us’ must also entail the 
discursive construction of difference (Wodak, 2002:146).
Discourse and the Power of Discursive Formations
Politics and language are intimately linked (Chilton, 2004:4, see also van Dijk, 2011; 
Hall, 1997). The ways in which we imagine political communities also take on 
discursive shape (Chilton and Schaffner, 2002:9). The creation of categories and 
dualities of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘right and ‘wrong’, included/excluded is dependent on 
language and the ways language reflects a broader ideological and political context (van 
Dijk, 2011). Discourses, according to Hall (1997:6 original emphasis) ‘are ways of 
referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or
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formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms 
of knowledge and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or 
institutional site in society’. Ideas about what constitutes ‘discourse’ and its importance, 
reach and impact on individuals and society undoubtedly vary according to the different 
ontological positions of theorists and researchers15.
In the context of this dissertation Hall’s (1997:6) definition of the discursive approach is 
useful. He states:
...the discursive approach is more concerned with the effects and consequences of representation- its 
‘politics’. It examines not only how language and representation produce meaning, but how the 
knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power, regulates conduct, make up 
or constructs identities and subjectivities, and defines the way certain things are represented, thought 
about, practiced and studied. The emphasis in the discursive approach is always on the historical 
specificity of a particular form or ‘regime’ of representation: not on ‘language’ as a general concern, 
but on specific languages or meanings, and how they are deployed at particular time, in particular 
places...
Moreover, the knowledge produced as a result of discourses is unavoidably value-laden 
and does not represent ‘objective’ knowledge (even as it ultimately comes to manifest 
as ‘natural’ or as common sense, see van Dijk, 2011). Discourses, in fact, construct and 
make real the object of knowledge they represent and, as such ‘Discourse builds objects, 
worlds, minds and social relations’ (Wetherell, 2001:16). So, discursive formations 
define ‘what knowledge is considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and 
what sorts of persons or ‘subjects’ embody its characteristics’ (Hall, 1997:7).
For Michel Foucault (2007:53), power is developed and exercised through the control of 
knowledge and certain discourses; where knowledge is produced in the form of 
‘discourses’, it produces particular types of minds and bodies or subjectivities. For 
Foucault a ‘discourse’ is a coherent and bounded area of social knowledge where we 
can come to know the world through a series of statements (Foucault, 2007:94). 
Moreover, in our attempt to gain knowledge about the world, our understanding is 
mediated by the ways in which we can come to know the world. Foucault, does not 
provide a definitive definition of discourse (Howarth, 2000:49). However, Howarth
1? There are a variety of definitions and approaches to the identification and study of ‘discourse’. For 
example, linguists and scholars in semantics approach discourses in different ways to those scholars who 
are more interested in the relationships between language, structure and agency (Howarth, 2000). 
Moreover, there are key differences between scholars in the ontological commitments amongst those 
studying the relationship between language, structure and agency. A key example is the difference 
between the critical realist position and the post-structuralist position vis-ä-vis structure and agency and, 
hence, the shape, power and influence of discourses (see, for example, Howarth, 2000; Cromby, 2002; 
Fairclough, 2005.)
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(2000:81) explains that Foucault’s contribution has been vital to appreciating the ways 
in which discourse and power are intimately tied. Howarth (2000:81) argues that 
Foucault ‘stresses the way discourses partly form social relations, identities and social 
object’. Further, Foucault ‘makes possible a relational and historical conception of 
discourse’ especially ‘the contingent relationships between discursive and non- 
discursive practices’ (Howarth, 2000:81).
Foucault’s notion of discourse is analytically relevant to this dissertation in so far as his 
interest lies not in unearthing ‘truth’ or the ability to ascertain whether statements 
‘correspondence to reality’ (Howarth, 2000:63) ‘but in the conditions in which their 
truth or falsity can be decided’ (Howarth, 2000:63). Moreover, Foucault’s genealogical 
approach, is more useful here than his ‘archeaological approach’, because, as Howarth 
(2000:72), citing Foucault, explains the ‘geneaologist produces ‘a form of history which 
can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects’ that 
necessarily involves the complex interaction of discursive and non-discursive practices’.
While Foucault actively differentiates his position from ‘traditional linguistic analysis’ 
(Howarth, 2000:51), his ideas have influenced a variety of discourse analysts including 
the work of Critical Discourse Analysts (CDA16). In particular, discourse analysis has 
been utilised in the study and critique of social inequality (Wodak et al, 2009; van Dijk, 
1992). Van Dijk (1993b: 31)17 explains that:
Discourse plays an important role in the production and reproduction of prejudice and racism. From 
the socialization talk of parents, children’s books, and television programs to textbooks, news reports 
in the press, and other forms of public discourse, white people are engaged daily in communication 
about ethnic minorities and race relations. In this way, they acquire the mental models, the social 
knowledge, the attitudes, and the ideologies that control their action, interaction, and dialogues with 
or about minorities.
Moreover, according to van Dijk (2001b:300, original emphasis), we should approach 
questions of inequality ‘by focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production and 
challenge of dominance ’. He defines dominance as ‘the exercise of social power by 
elites, institutions or groups, that result in social inequality, including political, cultural, 
class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality’.
As such, the approach to discourse theory and analysis taken here is in line with 
Howarth’s approach to discourse (2000:128), which is not focused on linguistic
16 For information on CDA see van Dijk, 2011.
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analysis, but on elucidating the ways in which ‘political forces and social actors 
construct meanings within incomplete and undecidable social structures’ (Howarth, 
2000, 129). Howarth (2000:129) explains that ‘this is achieved by examining the 
particular structures within which social agents take decisions and articulate hegemonic 
projects and discursive formation.’
The study of the expression of negative views of ‘Others’ or discriminatory discourses 
have been undertaken extensively in the last twenty years (see for example Wodak, 
2002; Wodak et al, 2009; Hall, 1997; van Dijk, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 
2000a). The research subjects have been diverse (prejudice and discrimination based on 
‘race’, language; legal status, such as illegal immigrants, refugees; asylum seekers; and, 
more recently, ‘culture’) and research has spanned continents (predominantly Europe 
and USA, but some limited but significant studies in the Australian context, see 
Poynting et al, 2004; Manning, 2006; Lygo, 2004; Dunn, 2004, 2005, Dunn et al, 2007).
Collectively, this research has unearthed significant data on the prevalence and 
embedded characteristics of racialised discourses or ‘structural racism’ in a variety of 
Western countries. However, since the 1980s (Miles and Brown, 2003:61; see also 
Barker, 1981), there has been a marked shift away from traditional racist categorisation 
to a ‘new racism’ (or cultural racism, see Meer and Modood, 2010; Miles and Brown, 
2003; Barker, 1981). Every and Augoustinos (2007:412) argue ‘The expression of 
negative views of others coupled with discursive strategies used to present these views 
as ‘not racist’ has been referred to as ‘new’ or ‘modem’ racism, which denies being 
racist, in contrast to ‘old-fashioned racism’, which was less ambiguous in terms of its 
racist agenda’. While research in this area is yielding significant data in regard to 
discriminatory political discourse, there has been a growing body of research targeting 
attitudes towards Muslims and Islam in particular, especially since the events of 
September 11, 2001 (Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Esposito, 2011). Work in this area is 
particularly useful as many of the theories on anti-Muslim sentiment have only been 
adumbrated by scholars of race and racism (Miles and Brown, 2003).
Discourses and the Making of the ‘Other’: Racism, Orientalism 
and Islamophobia
Research into the formation and dissemination of negative idea about the ‘Other’ has 
received considerable attention by scholars in various contexts (see, for example, 
Guibernau and Rex, 2010). In particular, Wodak and van Dijk (2000) have used
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elements of discourse analysis to examine racist parliamentary discourses in the 
European and North American context. In the Australian context, research continues to 
reveal evidence about how discriminatory attitudes and behaviours continues to affect 
the lives of many Australians (not least indigenous Australians, but also other 
minorities, such as Muslims, see Dunn, 2004; Dunn, 2005; Dunn et al, 2007; Dunn and 
Nelson, 2011).
Discourse analysis has also been used to highlight discrimination and anti- 
Muslim/Islamic discourses in the media in a number of countries (see, for example, 
Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Poynting et al, 2004; Manning, 2006). 
However, a number of different analytical and theoretical approaches have been used in 
identifying and classifying anti-Muslim sentiment specifically (‘racism’, ‘new racism’ 
and ‘Islamophobia’ in particular, see Meer and Modood, 2010), due principally to the 
diversity of its manifestations.
Although in recent times the term ‘Islamophobia’ has been popularly used to describe 
various acts of discrimination and prejudice toward Muslims and Islam, scholars have 
increasingly scrutinized the neologism in order to give it more theoretical weight and, 
hence, more purchase in explaining the rise and impact of anti-Muslim discourse and 
actions (see Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2010; Esposito, 2011). Moreover, although 
anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe and North America is clearly a pre- 9/11 
phenomenon, as many scholars have argued (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; Allen, 
2010; Esposito, 2011; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Said, 2008; for the Australian context 
see Aslan, 2009; Dunn et al, 2004; Dunn et al, 2011; Dunn et al, 2011), in a post-9/11 
context, anti-Muslim sentiment has increased exponentially, manifesting in diverse 
ways, including: physical assaults on people who appear to be Muslim and are not, such 
as Sikhs; negative representation of Islam and Muslims in the media; the negative 
representation of Islam and Muslims by elites; and the use of Muslims and Islam by a 
number of governments as justifications for a variety of new laws (Poynting and Mason, 
2008). This diversity has translated into a diversity of explanatory theories and methods 
for empirical analyses. While many exist, in the context of this research three broad 
categories are particularly important: racism/cultural racism; Orientalism; and 
Islamophobia as ideology.
IS Although there was discrimination toward Muslims prior to the events of 9/11 it would be erroneous to 
suggest that a ‘continuation’ of a phenomenon exists (See Allen, 2010).
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Racism
‘Racism’ as an analytical lens remains useful as scholars continue to identify evidence 
of traditional forms of discrimination, based on supposed biological differences (Miles 
and Brown, 2003; Dunn and Norman, 2011; Reisigil and Wodak, 2001). However, there 
has been a growth in ‘new racism’ (Miles and Brown, 2003; Barker, 1981; Romm, 
2010), which is differentiated from ‘old racism’, because ‘new racism’ is based on 
subtle acts of discrimination that often do not rely solely on biological and/or ‘colour’ 
differences as the basis for discrimination (Romm, 2010:2). Within the broad area of 
‘new racism’, ‘cultural racism’ has emerged as a form of discrimination which is used 
against ‘visible’ immigrant minorities in Western societies (Meer and Modood, 2010). 
‘Cultural racism’ is based on actual, or perceived, ‘cultural’ traits, rather than 
discrimination based exclusively on biological traits. Indeed, Meer and Modood 
(2010:77 see also Modood, 2005) argue, in the British context:
While biological racism is the exclusion and unequal treatment of people on the basis of their 
physical appearance or other imputed physical differences, saliently in Britain their non ‘whiteness’, 
cultural racism builds on biological racism a further discourse which evokes cultural differences from 
an alleged British, ‘civilised’ norm to vilify, marginalize or demand cultural assimilation from groups 
who also suffer from biological racism.
The relevance of this shift in definition, as well as its effects on ‘multicultural’ policies 
in Australia, is examined in Chapter 5. However, it deserves some attention here 
because ‘cultural racism’ has been insufficient in explaining the presence of ‘old 
racism’ (discrimination based on phenotypes) in rhetoric and behaviour toward 
‘Muslims’ (or people that physically appear to be ‘Muslim’). ‘Cultural racism’ has 
emerged as a more acceptable form of discrimination, a form that seemingly sanctions 
discrimination against ‘Muslims’, because of the popularised idea that Muslims share a 
retrograde religion and/or ‘culture’ (Meer and Modood, 2010; Modood, 2005; Dunn et 
al, 2007; Dunn and Norman, 2011). Indeed, a combination of both types of racism has 
been evident in the motivations behind the physical violence targeting ‘Muslims’ that 
has waxed and waned in parts of Western Europe, North American and Australia 
(Allen, 2010; Aslan, 2009) since at least the events of 9/11. These actions, together with 
the ‘denial of racism’ (Dunn and Norman, 2011), continue to position ‘racism’ as a 
useful and important analytic tool.
Research into the conceptualisation of, and attitudes and actions towards, Muslims in 
Europe broadly indicate that anti-Muslim sentiment encompasses ‘signs of race, culture
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and belonging’ (belonging referring to ‘ethnic origin’ as well) and is not ‘reducible to 
hostility toward a religion at all’ (Meer and Modood, 2010:71). According to Meer and 
Modood (2010:71), this is in line with traditional discrimination in Western societies 
that proceeds not purely on the basis of belief, but of ‘perceived membership of an 
ethno-religious group’ (such as Catholics in Northern Ireland and Jewish communities 
throughout history). In this way, Meer and Modood (2010:71) argue that there are 
‘obvious similarities between forms of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment that 
remain under explored’19. The authors suggest that anti-Semitism is relevant to 
understanding Muslims’ racialisation, because, like Jews, but unlike ‘blacks’ or 
‘Chinese’, the racialisation of Muslims is based not on the invocation of biology, but on 
‘radical ‘otherness’ and the perception and treatment of individuals in terms of physical 
appearance and descent’ (Meer and Modood, 2010:76). The authors explain that 
Modood’s previous definition of anti-Semitism continues to be relevant ‘a form of 
[ethno-] religious persecution which became, over a long, complicated, evolving but 
contingent history, not just of cultural racism but one with highly systematic biological 
formulations’(Meer and Modood, 2010:76).
As such, the parameters of race and racism and the ways Muslims are ‘othered’ 
depends, not only on contemporary formulations of belonging and non-belonging, but 
also on the historical ideas about ‘Others’ that continue to inform the creation of 
contemporary ‘Others’ (see also Miles and Brown, 2003; Allen, 2010). However, while 
this necessarily means that Australia does not completely share the various European 
ideas of ‘Others’ (Australian specific ideas of ‘Othering’ are treated in Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7), some have argued that the mediatisation of society means that there is also a 
basis for sharing prejudice and discrimination (van Dijk, 1991, also Thompson, 1990; 
Allen, 2010).
For example, research into the violence toward Muslims in a variety of Western 
societies points to periods of increased violence following events such as 9/11, the 7/7 
bombings in London and the Bali bombings in the Australian context (Allen, 2010; 
Esposito, 2010; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Aslan, 2009; Poynting et al, 2004), attributed 
by some to an increase in media representation of ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’" . The
19 Also see Gottshcalk and Greenberg (2008) and (2010) for their research into Muslim cartoons in the 
American media.
20 Poole (2002:20) remarks that the number of news stories on Muslims and Islam in Britain witnessed a 
noticeable increase in a short period after the September 11, 2001 attacks in America.
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perception of the Muslim as ‘Other’ was widespread and was not confined to one 
geographical location.
Moreover, researchers have noted that victims of the assaults have been picked by the 
perpetrators due to their signs o f ‘Muslimness’ or perceived following of Islam (mostly 
women wearing the hi jab, but also men with long beards and turbans see Allen, 2010). 
Meer and Modood (2010:78) contend that ‘....cultural racism draws upon physical 
appearance as one marker amongst others’ and, as such, ‘racialisations should not be 
solely premised upon conceptions of biology in a way that ignores religion, culture and 
the like’. Moreover, Meer and Modood (2010) point to discourses in the media which 
essentialise Muslim appearance, group Muslims into a handful of ethnicities (Arab, 
Pakistani etc) and attribute wholesale violence and intolerance as essential to Muslims 
and Islam. This, the authors claim, means that race, culture and faith are constantly 
conflated, or the differences ignored, as Muslims are seen to choose their religion and, 
hence, charges of racism can be ignored by governments or at worst derided as cries of 
victimhood by Muslims (Allen, 2010).
Consequently, the ways that religion, race and ‘ethnicity’ are made interchangeable has 
given rise to what Meer and Modood (2010:83) claim to be ‘sufficient ambiguity so as 
to further license the attribution to all Muslims of pejorative group characteristics’. Such 
analytical clarity, in coming to understand the many shapes and guises anti-Muslim 
sentiment takes, is crucial in appreciating how precisely it manifests. The recognition 
that race, religion and ‘ethnicity’ are theoretically different, and yet the relationship is 
much more intermeshed empirically, means that we can look to how each is impacted 
by, and impacts on, views about minorities, not least Muslims, in Western societies. 
However, the focus on race (whether conceived in biological or ‘cultural’ terms), as 
well as local variants about what constitutes the ‘Other’ (how much biological or 
cultural determinants are relied on to differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’) can obscure 
analytical problems with both biological-based racism and cultural racism. Thus the 
reliance on ‘racism’ as an explanatory lens obscures the international nature of anti- 
Muslim sentiment.
Orientalism
As ideas about race, ethnicity and religion are clearly confounded in the modern 
context, their inter-relationships have been centuries in the making (Miles and Brown, 
2003). So, while some scholars (Allen, 2010:34-35) would argue that today’s
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Tslamophobia’ is not directly related to the ‘Crusades’, other scholars argue that a form 
of interdiscursivity and intertextuality exists that continues to, in different ways, re-use 
language and imagery that is associated with Islam from previous centuries (Miles and 
Brown, 2003).
Edward Said’s Orientalism (2003) is viewed as a seminal work on the representation of 
the ‘Eastern’ ‘Other’; a representation that naturally included, but is not limited to, the 
representation of Islam and the ‘Muslim’ ‘Other’. Throughout the work, he 
demonstrated the historical production of discursive representation of the Muslim 
‘Other’ in the ‘Western world’. His work began the interest in, and the study of, the 
representations of Islam in the ‘West’ (Poole, 2002:28), a field of study that has grown 
exponentially in a post-9/11 context. Said (2003:2) defines Orientalism as a ‘style of 
thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient, 
and most of the time, the Occident’, in which Western culture and societies are 
essentially and inherently superior to Eastern ones (Said, 2003:2) and as a ‘corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient’ (2003:3). Said developed his argument by 
analysing mostly academic texts from the British and French post-Enlightenment 
traditions, as well as modern Anglo-American texts that purported to know something 
about the Orient and its inhabitants.
Said (2003:3) loosely used Foucault’s concept of discourse, which emphasizes a focus 
on knowledge and power as key analytical constructs. As such, Orientalism aimed to 
explain how a mostly European idea of a knowable and coherent ‘Orient’ became the 
dominant view of what the Orient is politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically and imaginatively; what Said describes as ‘the affiliation of knowledge 
with power’ (1997:xix).
Said’s work“ has been used by various researchers as an analytical lens in their research 
on the place of Muslims and Islam in the West, particularly on the treatment of Muslims 
and Islam in the media. Both Poole (2002; see also Poole and Richardson, 2006) and 
Manning (2006), for example, used Said’s Orientalism as both an analytical and a 
methodological lens in their investigations of the treatment of Muslims in the media, 
while other researchers have used it as an analytic lens in understanding somatic 
triggers and attacks against British Muslim converts (Zebiri, 2010).
21 There have, of course, been critics of Said’s Orientalism (see for example Varisco, 2007), however 
their criticisms have not lessened the scholarly legacy of Orientalism and researchers have continued to 
use Said’s work, including Orientalism as conceptual, analytical and methodological lenses.
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The impact of Said’s Orientalism, and the subsequent use of, and elaboration on, the 
original concept by various authors (see, for example, Almond, 2007) continues, not 
least because Islam at the ‘international’ level continues to inform local contexts, 
especially as violence in the world impacting on Muslims continues to be viewed as 
something inherent to Muslims and Islam (Cesari, 2004:21; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010). 
References to the crusades and to Islam being stuck in the ‘dark ages’, together with 
other references that view Islam and Muslims as backward and static, continue to appear 
in the media and in elite discourses in Europe and North America (Cesari, 2004; Cesari, 
2010; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2010), as well as in Australia 
(Aslan,2009).
However, although Said’s Orientalism has greatly influenced research into the treatment 
of Muslims and Islam in the Western media, research into the media’s portrayal of 
Muslims and its repercussions have also used discourse analysis and other approaches, 
not necessarily involving an ‘Orientalist’ lens (reflected in the growing preference for 
the more workable concept, Tslamophobia’). This development reflects criticisms of the 
Orientalist framework, which see it as ignoring complexity and obscuring local nuance 
and being couched at an international level of analysis which makes it less useful in the 
analysis of local contexts. However, perhaps one of the most limiting aspects of the 
‘Orientalism’ lens is the reduction and negation of Islam ‘into something of an abstract 
anomaly, the consequence of which was ‘erasure” (Sayyid, 1997 in Allen, 2010:141). 
In this context, there has been a growing body of work focusing on Tslamophobia’ as a 
useful neologism that focuses upon the global and the local level (Sayyid and Vakil, 
2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2010; Allen, 2010).
Islamophobia
The startling reach and varied manifestations of discriminatory acts and negative 
attitudes toward Muslims in a variety of countries has prompted many to identify it as a 
phenomenon and name it Tslamophobia’; a highly contested phenomenon (for 
extensive treatments of the various definitions and approaches to examining 
Islamophobia, see Esposito and Kalin, 2010; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2010). The 
multifarious nature of anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe, North America and Australia 
has included, and continues to include, physical violence meted out to people who 
exhibit ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ ‘characteristics’, negative media representation of Islam 
and Muslims as terrorists and negative representation by members of governments 
across ‘Western societies’. Although there has been growing body of evidence that anti-
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Muslim sentiment has been increasing, to various extents in different parts of the West, 
the precise definition of Islamophobia continues to be contested (Esposito, 2011; Say) id 
and Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2010).
For almost a decade the most heavily cited definition of Islamophobia was coined by 
the Runnymede Trust, an independent research and social policy agency, which 
established the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia in 1996 (Allen, 
2010; Runnymede Trust, 1997). This definition and its re-articulation in a subsequent 
report in 2004 has been used as an authoritative definition of Islamophobia by a variety 
of researchers (Poole, 2002; Aslan, 2009; Esposito, 2011). The initial report defined 
Islamophobia as ‘The shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and 
therefore to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997:1; Allen, 
2010:54; Aslan, 2009). Whilst the report was one of the first to attempt to define and 
name a ‘new phenomenon of increasing voracity’ (Allen, 2010:54), it came to be 
heavily criticized for essentialising Muslims and Islam and for, putatively, identifying 
and only incorporating ‘mainstream’ Muslim voices (see Allen, 2010 for a complete 
analysis of the Runnymede report and see Runnymede Trust, 1997 for the full report).
Since the publication of the report, there has been an upsurge in scholarship on 
‘Islamophobia’ and, as such, various definitions of Islamophobia have been put 
forward. Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) analysed the portrayal of Islam and Muslims 
in political cartoons in the USA and describe Islamophobia as reflecting ‘a social 
anxiety towards Islam and Muslim cultures’ (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008:5 original 
emphasis). They suggest that Islamophobia does not arise from any direct unfavourable 
personal experiences with Muslims, and it is not an individual fear, such as 
arachnophobia. Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008:5) suggest that:
...this phobia results for the most part from distant social experience that mainstream American 
culture has perpetuated in popular memory, which are in turn buttressed by a similar understanding 
of current events. This anxiety relies on a sense of otherness, despite many common sources of 
thought.
Particularly writing about the US, the authors contend that individuals come to accept 
and internalise the negative stereotype of Muslims and Islam perpetuated in the media 
and in political discourse, and these depictions eventually become an integral part of the 
social and individual memory that generates Islamophobic attitudes. Gottschalk and 
Greenberg’s definition resonates with others who stress that ‘Islamophobia’ should not 
be viewed as a ‘pathology’ (Meer and Modood, 2010). Similarly, Aslan (2009:5-6)
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defines Islamophobia as ‘...a contemporary form of cultural racism that refers to the 
marginalisation and exclusion of Muslims based on their cultural and religious 
differences’. She posits that ‘...Through Islamophobic lenses, Islam is viewed as a 
violent and aggressive political ideology, rather than a genuine religion, that supports 
terrorism and threatens the Western societies and their democratic and liberal values’ 
(Aslan, 2009:6).
Various elements of the definitions of Islamophobia presented above are often repeated 
in the research on Islam and Muslims in Western societies (see Sayyid and Valkiri, 
2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011). Moreover, empirical evidence has been collected by a 
variety of government and non-government research bodies and individuals since at 
least the events of September 11, 2001, which indicates that physical assaults on people 
who appear to be ‘Muslim’, and the role of the media and elites in circulating negative 
and invidious representations of Muslims and Islam, are real, dispersed across 
geographical locations and problematic (HREOC Isma Report, 2004; Aslan, 2009). This 
empirical evidence has been used by scholars as indicating the presence of 
Islamophobia. Allen (2010:131), however, argues that this empirical evidence points to 
the ‘products’ of Islamophobia and do not actually define the concept - a distinction 
expanded upon below.
The problematic aspect of previous definitions of Islamophobia is that the multifarious 
nature of the phenomenon means that attempts at describing it have only touched on 
some aspects and not others and have inadvertently relied on reductionist conceptions of 
Islam and Muslims in order to make sense of its multifarious nature. Amongst other 
analytical inconsistencies in attempts to define Islamophobia, Nielsen (in Allen, 
2010:53) points to the ‘unsystematic shifting between markers of ‘Islam’- as an abstract 
and complex web of ideas, concepts and beliefs- and ‘Muslim’-referring to a person or 
people whose lives are informed and shaped to varying degrees by those same ideas, 
concepts and beliefs’. What is more, in many instance a search for the ‘true’ Islam has 
been underway in order to demonstrate the invidious nature of anti-Muslim sentiments 
(Said, 1997). This results in a situation where negative stereotypes are hopelessly 
countered with positive stereotypes, a futile process that does not address the very 
binaries that are problematic (Allen, 2010:130; see Hall, 1997:263).
Consequently, in his monograph Islamophobia (2010) Chris Allen attempts to present a 
more thorough theoretical basis for the existence of Islamophobia and to give a
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definition of the phenomenon he hopes will aid future research in the area. Initially, 
Allen (2010) presents a historiography of anti-Muslim sentiment generally, and in the 
British context specifically, and a critique of the limitations of the oft-cited Runnymede 
report on Islamophobia, before presenting his own theory. His main criticism of 
previous work on Islamophobia seems to focus on the absence of a clear theoretical 
basis for Islamophobia. He argues that general discrimination and violent assaults 
toward people who ‘look Muslim’, as well as negative representation in the media, are 
constantly identified in the research as evidence of Islamophobia. However, he argues 
that there has to be a systematic definition of Islamophobia that presents a justification 
for its differentiation from other theories of ‘racism’, as well as some exposition of why 
it is bad.
Allen (2010: 125) stresses that previous definitions of Islamophobia have focused on 
the ‘products’, rather than the phenomenon, and therefore ‘the motivation, cause, 
product and consequence have been indistinguishable’. By ‘products’ Allen (2010:125) 
means the various incidents and events identified by a variety of agencies and individual 
researchers that purport to demonstrate the existence of Islamophobia, including 
physical assaults on people who ‘look’ Muslim, as well as other acts of discrimination 
that may, or may not, be targeting Muslims specifically, but are possibly motivated by 
other factors (such as skin colour. See Chapter 7 for research in Australia). Allen 
(2010:140) argues that ‘product’ and phenomenon have been distinguished, but the 
theoretical and analytical clarity needs to be taken further in order to come to a 
definition of Islamophobia that does not rely solely on the ‘products’. The definition of 
Islamophobia as ideology as presented by Allen (2010) is described in a later section in 
this chapter. However, it is important to note here that Islamophobia as ideology is 
distinguished from the ‘products of Islamophobia’ for the purposes of analytical clarity. 
Allen (2005) argues that acts of discrimination highlighted by various agencies and 
research bodies (see Chapter 7) against people may or may not be directly motivated by 
negative ideas about Islam and Muslims (Islamophobia) and may be motivated by 
conceptions o f ‘race’ or other negatively evaluated stereotypes.
Moreover, Allen (2010:140) also reframes Islamophobia in order to accommodate a 
‘non-essentialised’ concept o f ‘Muslims’. He argues (Allen, 2010:140):
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This would mean being able to accommodate the inherent diversity of ‘Muslims’, whether in their 
practice, race, ethnic heritage, or indeed any other marker of difference that might occur, whilst also 
accommodating those ‘Muslims’ that have been earmarked ‘problematic’. In addition, no 
apportioning of blame or attributing certain Muslims with any lesser status of legitimacy must occur. 
The religion of Islam and its theological tenets would also require similar accreditation... Islam 
cannot be deployed as a common denominator beneath which all Muslims can be conveniently 
unified... what is being suggested here is that any conceptualization must accommodate the reality 
and diversity of Muslims and Islam, and not merely reduce all to an imposed or self-grandiose ‘true’ 
or ‘authentic’ Islam that would appear far from existing.
In defining Islamophobia, Allen (2010:159) retraces some already established 
theoretical ground in order to draw out those necessary theoretical concepts that mark 
the difference between Islamophobia as a concept that relies on ‘anecdotal evidence’ 
and Islamophobia as a concrete concept with strong theoretical underpinnings which 
can shed light on existing empirical evidence. He correctly points to the theoretical 
concepts that have been used by other scholars and which can explain the existence of 
the ‘products’ of Islamophobia (stereotypes, visual triggers etc): stereotyping; 
representation; semiology; and racism. He explains the relevance and drawbacks of 
these theoretical concepts that relate to ‘Islamophobia’, but he also explains how, and 
why, these theoretical concepts are not in themselves sufficient to explain what it is 
Islamophobia. For example, much of the research on Islamophobia, undertaken by 
various researchers, has used the concept and evidence of stereotypes as proof of 
Islamophobia. Allen (2010:141) argues that understanding what stereotypes do is not in 
itself enough to explain Islamophobia.
Allen (2010:148) also considers the concept of ‘representation’, as set out by Hall 
(1997), and finds that, while Hall’s definition is not overly useful in the way it neatly 
differentiates between the different types of representation, the ways in which 
representations are received and digested by recipients is relevant. In order for 
representations to be received and digested, there have to be shared meanings and 
conceptual maps that are able to decode signs (see also the work of Hall, 1997:13 on 
this particular issue). The relevance of this to Islamophobia is explained by Allen 
(2010:146) as being in the very ways that Muslims and Islam are popularly conceived. 
He explains that ‘societal concepts o f ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ already clearly exist and are 
‘...much more complex and comprise a myriad range of ways to cluster, organize, 
arrange and classify these concepts and their associated meanings into established and 
shared meanings and conceptual maps’ (Allen, 2010:146). These same shared meanings
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and conceptual maps get translated into common language where the concepts and ideas 
are correlated with certain language, words, terminologies and visual images.
Allen (2010:148) uses this concept of signs and representation to give credence to the 
visual triggers identified by various researchers that have prompted attacks on people 
who appear ‘Muslim’. However, he explores the concept of semiology further in order 
to advance his theory of Islamophobia. Allen (2010:148) uses the hijab as an example 
of the loaded nature of signs. He states that the hijab became the primary sign or 
product following the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and that the hijab 
‘embodied’ a meaning that identified those wearing it as Muslims and, as such, as 
coming from the same religion as the perpetrators of 9/11. Allen (2010: 148) argues that 
this linking was:
...feeding into and drawing upon that pool of meaning and knowledge pre-existent to 9/11 about 
Islam and Muslims-meanings that included interpreting Islam and Muslims as anti-Western and anti­
feminist, incompatible and asymmetrically opposed to the ideas and values of the West, fixed as 
being distinctly Other and different- that was in turn also being supplemented and inflated by the 
meanings emerging from the volatile post9/ll climate, thus resulting in Muslim women becoming 
the primary targets for retaliatory attack and abuse.
Using elements of semiology, Allen (2010) explains that the hijab became the signifier 
and gave meaning to, and made known, Muslim women and Muslims ‘in certain frames 
of reference’ (Allen, 2010:149). When Islam and Muslims are made known through a 
signifier, whether positive or negative, the process of signification ‘classifies into 
distinct societal categories that have homogenizing characteristics and qualities’ (Allen, 
2010:149). Allen (2010:149) further states that signs can be visual, verbal, audio, 
textual or linguistic and can manifest ‘in a myriad of forms that can be either isolated or 
collaborative from a whole series of interlinked and sometimes incompatible 
combinative and cumulative representations’. As such, similar processes may be at play 
when ‘less readily identifiable social identifiers and signs are employed also, including 
those visual and linguistic signs where neither ‘Islam’ nor ‘Muslim’ is directly 
identifiable’ (2010:149).
Allen (2010:150) argues that similarities can be identified between the textual signifier 
‘fundamentalist’ in the media and the visual signifiers ‘hijab’ or ‘niqab’ generally. 
Further, he notes that signification operates on two levels ‘the level of denotation where 
consensus of meaning exists, and connotation where meaning connects to broader 
historical, socio-economic, cultural, religious and other meanings’. He explains that the
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hijab attains its meaning from the religion of Islam, as well as the understanding and 
practices of Muslim women ‘both of which had various discourses and meanings 
already attributed to them, albeit real or constructed’ (Allen, 2010:150). As such, when 
the hijab was acknowledged as a signifier for both Islam and Muslim women it 
‘reinforced and reinvigorated those pre-existent meanings already associated with both 
of these entities at the same time as embodying and being further enhanced by the 
contemporary and fast emerging meanings, discourses and so on of the time’ (Allen, 
2010:150). He continues, ‘So whilst Muslims may contemporarily be given meaning 
though violence, terrorism, and atrocity, particularly in the context of 9/11, such events 
and associated meaning would simultaneously link into and be contextualized by the 
atavistic meanings of Islam and Muslims that been common currency 
historically’(Allen, 2010:150).
Allen’s (2010) use of the concept finds resonance in the work of Gottschalk and 
Greenberg (2008; see also Gottschalk and Greenberg 2010), in their study of the 
depiction of Muslim and Islam in American political cartoons. As the political contexts 
changed, so did the signifiers and the content of the cartoons reflected this change, 
drawing from contemporary and historical understandings of Muslims and Islam. 
Ultimately, this process of signification, whether through negative or positive 
associations, negates the difference and diversity that is inherent in Islam and amongst 
Muslims.
However, although aspects of semiology might shed some light on why Muslim women 
were chosen as victims of physical assault, Allen (2010:150) contends that ‘the 
signification process is both pragmatic and influential but not necessarily explanatory.’ 
He also stresses that the ‘The signs (products) must be therefore necessarily separate 
from the meaning that they give rise to (the phenomenon), both of which are quite 
separate and different from the potentially ensuing consequences if indeed there are 
any’ (Allen, 2010:150).
Further, while many scholars have situated Islamophobia within theories of racism, 
Allen (2010) questions approaching Islamophobia as a type of racism, as this then begs 
the question: what type of racism might it be? He revisits ‘New racism’ (Barker, 1981) 
and ‘cultural racism’ in an effort to establish their relevance and he posits that racism is 
not broad enough itself to explain Islamophobia, while ‘culturalisation’ (or ‘cultural 
racism’) strengthens homogenous, ‘cultural’ conceptions of Islam and Muslims.
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However, Allen (2010:211) finds relevance in Miles and Brown’s (2003) theories on 
racism and suggests parallels between Miles and Brown’s (2003) idea that racist 
phenomena consist of three key areas and the threefold component that previously 
defined Islamophobia: the process or phenomenon; the signs, visual identifiers and/or 
products; and the resultant and consequential factors and processes. The three aspects of 
racist phenomena that Miles and Brown (2003 cited in Allen 2010:211) identify are:
1) a political programme or ideology that becomes largely interdependent with the notion and 
ideology of nationalism as well as providing knowledge and meaning about other both new and 
existing relations of power and meaning;
2) a set of prejudices, opinions and attitudes that may be held by either individuals, groups, 
communities or society, or indeed a combination of these;
3) a set of exclusionary practices as a result of prejudice and discrimination in employment, housing 
and other socio-economic spheres as well as subjugation to violence as a tool of exclusion.
Allen (2010) uses these three key aspects of racist phenomena in developing his own 
definition of Islamophobia. Numbers 2 and 3 clearly find resonance in Allen s earlier 
theoretical explorations. However, it is the ‘ideology’ component that Allen (2010:167) 
suggests needs better conceptualisation and definition. He uses Thompson’s (1990) 
neutral theory of ideology to move away from historically-rooted definitions of 
ideology, which have focused on the state, towards a concept of ideology that is better 
situated to deal with today’s ‘mediatised’ world. Allen (2010:167) states this neutral 
conception of ideology is useful:
Here ideology is conceived both singularly and variously in terms of systems: systems of thought, 
belief and so on, or even just systems of signifiers or symbols-symbolic symbols- any or all of which 
pertain to influence or impact upon social action, interaction and response as well as shaping and 
determining that understanding and meaning and the associated attitudes that significantly allude to a 
previously referred to concept, the social consensus...Neutral conceptions are therefore designed 
entirely for the contemporary and refer to new relationships of interaction, power and meaning, most 
importantly those that relate to ‘the thought of the other, the thought that someone other than 
oneself...’, operable though the intersection of symbolic forms with relations of power and the 
interaction between ingroup and outgroup.
Using this definition, it is symbolic forms that give ideological meaning. Symbolic 
forms do not need to be based on anything ‘real’, in fact they are produced and 
constructed by a variety of individuals, groups and/or institutions and must be 
disseminated to, as well as recognized and decoded by, others, irrespective of whether 
they are real, accurate, erroneous or illusory. What is important for Allen (2010:189) is 
that, unlike previous conceptualisations of Islamophobia and the notion that such 
discrimination is based on an ‘unfounded’ view of Islam and Muslims, Islamophobia as
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ideology functions irrespective of whether the symbols are ‘real or unreal’, where the 
ideological meaning that is disseminated about Muslims and Islam incorporates ‘that 
which is real and that which is not’. Therefore, Islamophobia does not emerge as a 
‘false doctrine’, that is dependent upon misunderstandings and inaccuracies 
promulgated about Islam and Muslims. So, Allen (2010:168) explains, it becomes 
unnecessary to refer to, or ‘stress, the ‘true’ or ‘real’ Islam.
In addition, the signs themselves are not necessarily ideological and, as discussed 
earlier, neither could they be identified as Islamophobic ‘Instead it is the meaning, that 
which is disseminated in order to serve or sustain particular relations and processes of 
meaning and understanding, that is ideological’ (Allen, 2010:169).
In summary, Allen (2010:188) outlines what Islamophobia is and what it is not. He 
explains:
...what is established about that ‘certain identifiable phenomenon’ is that it employs a multitude of 
products through which meaning about ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ is disseminated and through which 
both are identified, irrespective of where such products and their disseminative meanings are true or 
untrue, accurate or inaccurate, discriminate or indiscriminate. Such products can be either separate or 
interlinked, acquiring myriad forms that incorporate the visual, verbal, linguistic, textual, 
representational and associative, functioning at times without necessarily even being expressly 
focused upon Muslims or Islam, or even identifying them directly but instead providing meaning 
though the shared languages and conceptual maps that already exist in the public and private spaces 
across the different social strata: shaped not only by contemporary interactions and events but also 
historical and atavistic myths and legacies, whether real or imaginary, that reinforce, reinvigorate and 
re-awaken both passive and active meanings. These same shared language and conceptual maps, 
whilst having similar transferable and transitory disseminative meanings, are contextualised by the 
social, political, economical, geographical and theological constrains within which they either were 
or are produced, sometimes taking on a range of different national, linguistic, religious and other 
dimensions and connotations that are at times unique, and at others concurrent and concomitant.
Ultimately, Allen (2010) makes two new and significant contributions to furthering 
research into Islamophobia. One is to explicate how Islamophobia functions as an 
ideology. Second, he provides a new definition of Islamophobia. Islamophobia as 
ideology and its modes of operation are discussed at greater length in Chapter 8, as it 
will be used as an analytical lens for the analysis of parliamentary discourse on Muslims 
and Islam in Australia. However, it is worth noting here Allen’s (2010:190) definition 
of Islamophobia as ideology:
Islamophobia is an ideology, similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other similar 
phenomena, that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in 
the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which it has historically, although not necessarily as 
a continuum, subsequently pertaining, influencing and impacting upon social action, interaction,
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response and so on, shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and attitudes in the social 
consensus-shared languages and conceptual maps-that inform and construct thinking about Muslims 
and Islam as Other. Neither restricted to explicit nor direct relationships of power and domination but 
instead, and possibly even more importantly, in the less explicit and everyday relationships of power 
that we contemporarily encounter, identified both in that which is real and that which is clearly not, 
both of which can be extremely difficult to differentiate between. As a consequence of this, 
exclusionary practices-practices that disadvantage, prejudice or discriminate against Muslims and 
Islam in social, economic and political spheres ensue, including the subjection to violence-are in 
evidence. For such to be Islamophobia however, an acknowledged ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ element- 
either explicit or implicit, overtly expressed or covertly hidden or merely even nuanced though 
meanings that are ‘theological’, ‘social’, ‘cultural’, ‘racial’, and so on, that at times never even 
necessarily name or identify ‘Muslims’ or ‘Islam’- must be present.
The shift in analytical perspective introduced by Allen (2010) does more than present 
some analytical clarity in the study of Islamophobia. The requirement that any 
understanding of Islamophobia must occur in the context of the environment in which is 
thrives means that Islamophobia in Australia is implicated by the wider socio-historical 
context of the ‘Other’ in Australia.
The next section outlines the methods used in this dissertation. It details the criteria, 
data collection and analytical framework used to analyse the discourse on Muslims and 
Islam in the Australian House of Representatives 2000-2006 (inclusive).
Method
This section describes how the research for this dissertation was undertaken. The aim is 
to detail the approach used to highlight the relevant socio-historical/political context in 
which the ‘Other’ is situated in Australia and how this is interrelated to the ways in 
which Parliamentarians in the Australian House of Representatives spoke about 
Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2006.
Australian Socio-Historical Context
Investigating and demonstrating the socio-historical context in which the ‘Other’ has 
been, and continues to be, envisaged in Australia is a challenging task. Thompson 
(1990) advises that the creation of criteria for such a task is both difficult and necessary 
(see also Howarth, 2000:136“ ). A number of approaches can be pursued, as well as a 
range of areas that can be focused upon. Indeed, it has been the case that immigrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers and local ‘Others’ have been negatively implicated in a
22 Howarth (2000:136) explains that ‘there are two intersecting areas of investigation that call for special 
attention within discourse theory’. The first is ‘formation and dissolution of political identities’ and the 
second is ‘the analysis of hegemonic practices which endeavour to produce social myths and collective 
imaginaries’.
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plethora of national debates in Australia that have included Australian nationalism, 
multiculturalism, citizenship and social cohesion, as well as population planning and 
control, religion, the economy and immigration debates (see Clyne and Jupp, 2011). 
Debates on these issues have been waxing and waning and highly contested since at 
least Federation. However, contested as they are, the debates have not only generated 
government action is terms of policies and law (for example ‘assimilation’ and 
‘Multiculturalism’), but have also come to form socially-based, ‘shared language’ and 
shared ‘conceptual maps’ that communicate the normative commitments needed for 
understanding the place of the ‘Other’ in Australia.
Of the many areas to choose from, this dissertation focuses on three key areas, 
Australian nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship. First, while the normative 
commitments in these very general areas have changed over time, they continue to 
demonstrate a ‘sedimented effect’ (expanded upon below), which means that 
contemporary conceptions of ‘us’ continue to have elements of Australia’s extremely 
racialised conceptions of belonging. This is reflected in official definitions and policies, 
focusing on ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’, as well as the use o f ‘ethnicity’ as a marker 
that has often confounded and limited conceptions of ‘them’. Second, these areas have 
attracted considerable government intervention to define and control, not only entry into 
Australia, but also issues of immigrant incorporation and definitions of who belongs in 
Australia. Finally, these three areas were used, since at least 9/11, particularly during 
the Howard Governments, to argue against the presence of Muslims in Australia 
(Poynting and Mason, 2007). These arguments were accepted by people from all walks 
of life as evidenced in political debates and citizen-initiated moratorium on Muslim 
immigration to Australia, as well as in survey results that demonstrate the levels of 
antipathy toward Muslims in Australia (Chapter 7).
The normative commitments inscribed in Australian nationalism, multiculturalism and 
citizenship have, over time, changed, as Australia’s immigration history contains a 
number of policy, institutional and paradigm shifts that have substantially altered the 
character, politics and public representation of nationalism, multiculturalism and 
citizenship. However, whilst dramatic change to the character, politics and public 
representation of immigrants, immigration and immigrant incorporation has taken place 
in Australia, it has produced a ‘sedimented effect’ (to follow Dunn, 2005:31-32 who 
applies Judith Butler’s notion of ‘sedimentation’ to Australian nationalism; see also 
Howarth, 2000). In the context of Australian nationalism, Dunn (2005:32) uses the
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‘sedimentation’ analogy to conceptualise national identity as ‘an amalgam of acts, 
statements, and representations that are constantly reiterated’ and where the subject is 
burdened by an accumulated history of normative national identity construction’. 
Further, Dunn (2005:32), in his study on barriers to mosque building in Australia, 
explains:
these normative national constructions were sedimented during a century of the White Australia 
Policy and with the more recent assimilationism associated with Anglo-Celtic hegemony. These 
normative nationalisms retain considerable ground-level comprehension, support, and disciplinary 
power.
A similar analytic approach is used in this study to illustrate the limits of formal 
definitions of belonging in Australia. However, two major substantial differences 
present themselves. The scope of the analysis in this dissertation is much broader than 
was conducted by Dunn (2005). Instead of focusing solely on Australian nationalism, 
this dissertation canvasses the major normative constructions of Australian nationalism, 
multiculturalism and citizenship (as devices of ‘social cohesion’ and belonging). 
Further, in order to understand the impact these ‘normative commitments’ have on 
constructing the location of Muslims in Australia, it is necessary to analyse the 
discourse of elites, which here is focused on the textual analysis of discourse on 
Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives between 2000 and 2006.
Parliamentary Discourse
Van Dijk (2000) suggests that there is merit in researching parliamentary discourse, 
largely because it gives access to ‘elites’; those who occupy positions of socioeconomic 
advantage, influence and power (see also Bayley, 2004 for the merits of analysing 
parliamentary debate). Van Dijk (2000) argues that elites are highly influential in issues 
such as immigration, because they are responsible for drafting and administering 
immigration policies and laws, and are close to the media. According to van Dijk (2000: 
15-16), if elites discriminate against certain vulnerable groups (minorities and 
immigrants) ‘the consequences are considerable’ and the ‘Other’, as a result, can be 
prevented from entering the country, getting a job, find housing etc. So, Van Dijk 
(2000:16) explains that ‘...the role of leading politicians, journalists, corporate 
managers, teachers, scholars, judges, police officers and bureaucrats, among others, is 
crucial for the (un)equal access to material or symbolic resources in society’.
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Van Dijk (1993c: 94-95) has published considerably in the area of parliamentary 
discourse, especially focusing on the reproduction of racism. He explains that ethnic 
and racial inequality are produced and reproduced through discourse and 
‘communicative events’. He argues (van Dijk 1993c:94-95) that such discourse is not 
merely text and talk and cannot be thought of as ‘marginal’. Such text and talk, he 
argues ‘are at the heart of the polity, society, and culture’. Furthermore, van Dijk 
(1993c:96) posits that talk and text about ethnic minorities or ‘non-Western peoples’, as 
he describes them, by people from the ‘majority’, or ‘more generally people in the 
West’, could be engaging in the production and reproduction of ‘white, Western group 
dominance, in communicating stereotypes and, more generally, in the reproduction of 
social, cultural or political hegemony’.
The Data
The data considered in Chapters 8 and 9 is from the Australian Hansard, a written 
record of parliamentary proceedings. The focus of this research is on the House of 
Representatives (Lower House) between 2000 and 2006 (inclusive). There were two 
reasons for choosing these years. First, these years were punctuated by a number of 
internationally significant events that directly implicated Muslims and Islam, not least 
the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the 7/7 bombing in London and the Bali 
bombings (2002 and 2005). Prior to the events of 9/11, negative representation of 
Muslims and Islam was evident in a variety of countries (Poole and Richardson, 2006; 
Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010, Aslan, 2009). However, after 
the events of 9/11, media representation, as well as general ‘knowledge’ about Islam 
and Muslims, was heightened and in some places media representation increased 
dramatically (Poole, 2002). Second, these same years witnessed the continuation of 
domestic debates about Australian nationalism, immigration and belonging that began 
in the late 1980s (Aslan, 2009). It is therefore likely that these years also yield the most 
data on Muslims and Islam, as well as on discursive representations o f ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Data Collection and Analysis
There were five stages in the analysis of the data gathered from the House of 
Representatives between 2000 and 2006. Electronic versions of Parliamentary speeches 
were sourced from www.aph.gov.au, referred to as ‘Hansard’. The first stage of data 
gathering involved collecting and downloading all available PDF files for the House of 
Representatives between 2000-2006 from Hansard (corrupted data/files could not be
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used). On average, each year yielded 50 PDF files (each file corresponds to a 
parliamentary sitting). In total more than 300 PDF files were downloaded and analysed 
using the latest NVivo software (software for qualitative discourse analysis,).
The first stage of analysis using NVivo was a form of ‘content’ analysis which involved 
identifying all exchanges between parliamentarians using the following key words: 
Islam; Muslim; unAustralian; culture; terrorism; Arab; values; citizenship; refugees; 
multicultural; and ethnic. All the PDF files (parliamentary sittings) were thoroughly 
scanned for every incidence of the key words. The broad search for the key words was 
undertaken to identify the areas in which Islam and Muslims might be implicated, even 
if the words Muslims and Islam were not used directly. This reflects Allen’s (2010) 
insight that Islamophobia can operate without directly naming Islam or Muslims. 
Separate folders were created for every key word in order to collect data closely relating 
to specific words. This first stage of analysis generated a prodigious amount of data, 
which is illustrative of the extent of the general discourse on Islam and Muslims found 
in the Australian Parliament. Consequently, the main focus of subsequent analysis 
concentrated on two key headings: ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ (all data gathered under other 
headings including citizenship, multiculturalism etc. were no longer considered for 
analysis).
The second stage of analysis focused on the exchanges between parliamentarians about 
Islam and Muslims in particular. Preliminary analysis of this data yielded five 
significant areas in which Islam and Muslims were discussed: terrorism; regional 
security; trade and foreign affairs (including discussion regarding Israel and Palestine, 
Afghanistan and Iraq); refugees and asylum seekers; and Islamic communities in 
Australia. This indicated that Muslims and Islam featured strongly and in a variety of 
contexts in Australian parliamentary discourse.
This data was then used to investigate the ways in which Muslims and Islam were 
talked about and it revealed that the treatment varied little across the years under
23 For example, while the exchanges in parliament on refugees was not necessarily focused on the 
religion of the refugees and asylum seekers, most refugees and asylum seekers that have been arriving on 
Australian shores for at least the last decade have predominantly been Muslims and/ or from ‘Muslim 
countries’ (Aslan, 2009). While Muslims and Islam are not directly the target of discrimination against 
refugees and asylum seekers, Islam and Muslims are directly implicated in the discourse on refugees and 
asylum seekers (also known as illegal entrants, queue jumpers, boat people etc). The criminality of 
refugees and asylum seekers cannot be divorced from the facts about refugees and asylum seekers, in 
recent time, being Muslims and coming from ‘Muslim countries’ mostly originating from Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Numerous commentators have linked the rhetoric against refugees and asylum seekers with 
anti-Muslim sentiments or Islamophobia (see for example Aslan 2009:135; Manning, 2006; Crock et al, 
2006; Aly, 2007; Poynting et al, 2004) in Australia.
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investigation and that the discourses could be loosely organised into five categories: 
terrorism; negative discourse about Muslims and Islam in the World; negative stories 
about Islam and Muslims in Australia; stories in defence of Islam and Muslims; and talk 
that defined Islam. The speech samples corresponding to the five categories were used 
in the fourth stage of analysis described below. Once again, this process of 
categorisation yielded far too much data than can be analysed for this dissertation. The 
decision was made to choose some illustrative excerpts from each of these areas without 
explicit use of the categories.
The fourth stage of analysis of parliamentary discourse involved using Allen’s (2010) 
Islamophobia as ideology framework in order to ascertain which ideological ‘modes of 
operation’ were evident in the discourses on Muslims and Islam in the years under 
analysis. The results from the fourth stage of analysis are found in Chapter 8. The 
analysis of parliamentary debate in this dissertation is not concerned with ‘truth’ claims 
about Islam or Muslims. Thus, this dissertation shares Allen’s (2010:165) approach to 
Islamophobia as ideology, which is concerned with ‘demonstrating and highlighting 
how these forms establish and sustain ideas, meaning, relations, and most importantly, 
the power between the different and competing groups’.
The fifth stage of analysis involved identifying which atavistic fears (Allen, 2010) about 
the ‘Other’ were discernible in the ways that MPs spoke about Islam and Muslims. The 
discourse on Muslims and Islam in the House of Representatives was analysed for 
content that specifically illustrates conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, that work with, and 
through, the ‘ideological modes of operation’ (Allen, 2010), which rely on a specifically 
Australian socio-historical understanding of the ‘Other’. There are specific Australian 
signifiers which convey meaning about Australian identity that reflect the definitions of 
the ‘Other’ canvassed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 in this dissertation. There are five areas in 
which the discourse about Islam and Muslims are discussed by MPs: Asian invasion; 
excesses of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism; productive diversity; immigrants; 
and ‘dying race’. These five areas reflect the Australian preoccupation with the ‘Other’ 
more generally. The aim of this final stage of analysis is to investigate how talk about 
Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives includes atavistic ideas 
about the ‘Other’ that were not first developed with Muslims and Islam in mind, but are, 
nonetheless, used by MPs to disseminate negative meaning about Islam and Muslims 
and to bolster their ideas about the negative impact Muslims are having on Australia. 
The findings from this stage of analysis are founds in Chapter 9.
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Conclusion
This chapter explored three key methodological concerns: ‘imagined communities’; 
discourse theory; and Islamophobia as ideology. The chapter canvassed some 
methodological concerns that are crucial to understand the factors that influence the 
political membership of vulnerable populations (discourse theory) and Muslims in 
particular (racism, Orientalism and Islamophobia as ideology). Although racism and 
Orientalism continue to have tremendous academic currency, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, Allen’s (2010) ‘Islamophobia as ideology’ was chosen as the key analytic 
tool for the analysis of parliamentary debate on Islam and Muslims. Further, the 
‘projects of belonging’ (Yuval-Davis 2011) are useful to understand how immigrant 
‘Others’ in Australia have been, and continue to be, defined. Nationalism, 
multiculturalism and ‘citizenship as social cohesion’ are amongst the many ‘projects of 
belonging’ which various Australian governments and scholars have focused on over 
the past few decades. Therefore, these three areas impact directly on definitions of 
belonging for ‘Others’ within Australia and are the three key areas of the 
social/culture/political context of this study. The next chapter is the first chapter of Part 
One: Social and Historical Contexts.
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PART ONE: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS
Chapter 4: Legacies of Exclusion in Australian
Nationalism
Introduction
This chapter introduces Part One: Social and Historical Contexts and begins with the 
White Australia Policy as a symbol of Australia’s aspirations at the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century. The chapter argues that, while it would be disingenuous to suggest 
that the White Australia Policy manifests today in its entirety, a few significant aspects 
of the ideas inscribed in it about who belongs in Australia, and who does not, remain. 
To do this, the chapter explains nationalism, its ambiguous, yet influential, use in 
mobilising ideas about social cohesion on the basis of exclusion, and how it was still 
mobilised in some respects during the period of the Howard Government in Australia. 
The chapter identifies the continued significance of aspects of the White Australia 
Policy in the delineation of who can come and belong in Australia and who cannot.
The concept and practice of nationalism in modern Western liberal states has steadily 
been reinvigorated, even as the concept and practices of the nation-state have come 
under pressure from ‘globalisation’, transnational activities and increased ‘ethnic’ and 
cultural diversity, resulting from mass immigration (Benhabib et al, 2007:1). Although 
the influences of globalisation cannot be underrated, at least two distinct, yet 
interrelated, issues continue to privilege the importance attached to the nation-state and 
nationalism: the importance of political attachments (Benhabib et al, 2007): the 
categorisation of people into ‘racial’, ‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic’ categories; and the 
continuing legacies of such categorisations (Guibernau and Rex, 2010; Miles and 
Brown, 2003).
In Australia, archaic fears based on race, and the culture of ‘Others’, continue to inform 
nationalistic discourses; who is excluded from entering the nation and who can claim to 
belong within the nation once inside as ‘citizens’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000). 
Australia is not unique in being caught at the crossroads between the ‘old world’ and the 
‘new world’, and in facing a state of ambivalence in regard to creating and maintaining 
credible and persuasive national identities. However, much of the fears linked to 
diversity in Australia, has led Australian politicians, particularly during the Howard 
Government, to cling to archaic understandings of nationalism and belonging (Tavan,
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2009:125). Australia’s history of controversial immigration policy, particularly its 
White Australia Policy, was still evident during the Howard Government (Tavan, 
2009:125), although it was officially ended with the introduction of the revised 
Migration Act 1958, which abolished the controversial dictation test and removed overt 
references to race as a barrier to immigration to Australia (DIAC, 2009a).
Three key aspects of the White Australia Policy continued to shape understandings of 
who can come and belong in Australia: 1) the desire for a racially homogenous society; 
2) fear of invasion; and 3) state control in these areas (Tavan 2005:111; see also Jupp 
2002:6 who suggests that this has been immigration policy for the last 150 years). 
Manifestations of these three key aspects of the White Australia Policy were evident in 
the way that the Howard Government dealt with refugees/asylum seekers, their 
insistence on the integration of migrants (primarily Muslims) and their insistence on 
disseminating Australian values throughout society at the national level.
What is Nationalism?
The nation-state, nationality and nationalism are usually seen as modern phenomena 
(Smith, 2003; Guehenno, 2000). Indeed, the term nationalism is believed to have been 
first used as late as the 19th century (Smith, 2003). According to Kalantzis (2000:101) ‘a 
“nation” is the organisation of human groups into large culturally homogeneous units 
whose geographical extent is coterminous with the borders of the state’ (see also 
Gellner, 1997a). The concept of the ‘nation’, however, is contested and scholars, over 
time, have substantially debated the history and the shape of the ‘nation’ (for more on 
this see Smith, 2003; Smith, 2006; Brubaker, 1992; Brubaker, 1996; Brubaker, 2004; 
Gellner, 1997a, Guehenno, 2000). Moreover, whether ethno-cultural ‘nations’, as we 
know them today, existed before the creation of the ‘nation-state’ is contentious 
(Brubaker, 2004).
Broadly, the debates about the origins of nationalism and ethno-cultural nations can be 
split into three camps: the primordialists; the modernists; and the constructivists 
(Brubaker, 1996). While the primordialists have argued that ethno-cultural groups (in 
way of ‘nations’) have always existed (Smith, 2006), modernists view nationalism as a 
modem phenomenon, one logically attached to the formation of nation-states; where 
‘the nation is a modern idea, and the call for nationalism was the engine for the 
processes of decolonization’ (Guehenno, 2000:1). Conversely, constructivists view 
groupings, particularly nations, as socially ‘constructed, contingent and fluctuating’
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(Brubaker, 1996:13). However, the shape and essence of nationalism is arguable, and 
some (such as Smith, 2003) argue that nationalism is ‘real’ in that it represents the 
expressions of the ‘spirit of a nation’. Further, scholars such as Anderson (2006) have 
argued that nationalism is simultaneously both imagined and real; nationalism is 
imagined in that it is not necessarily based on ‘real’ ethno-cultural ties, but these 
imaginings have ‘real’ consequences.
Nationalism can be described as both ideology and the expression of the aspirations of a 
nation-state. However, the nation-state is a composite of two distinct, yet frequently 
overlapping, units: the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’. Together, these units form the 
internationally accepted unit of international politics; the nation-state. A state, however, 
is the political and ‘organising’ (Gellner, 1997:6) unit, which, through the sovereignty 
bequeathed upon it internally by the polis and externally by international political 
treaties, exercises power within a given geographical territory. In modern times, a 
state’s legitimacy is said to be derived from its citizens. However, this has not always 
been the case. In the past, legitimacy was derived from the monarch or the ruling 
aristocracy, who exercised power over their subjects (Huntington, 2006:147).
Additionally, recent trends in globalisation have given rise to arguments by some 
scholars about the decline of the nation-state and the impact this has on issues of 
sovereignty (Guehenno, 2000; Joppke, 1998). Issues concerning the free flow of capital, 
information and labour (though the freedom of the latter is heavily restricted in 
comparison to the first two, see Castles and Davidson, 2000) and issues of immigration, 
climate change and refugees have problematised notions of the fixed sovereignty of 
nation-states (Joppke, 1998). These issues seriously problematise the idea that states can 
act autonomously and that the very legitimacy of states rests solely with its own citizens 
(Bosniak, 2006:3). More importantly, it has become non-feasible to project the image of 
the nation as composed of one, over-riding, identity, based on homogeneity of ethnicity, 
race, culture, class, sexual orientation, or a combination of these (Benhabib et al, 2007).
It is not necessarily the case that a ‘nation’ and a ‘state’ exist simultaneously. Indeed, 
there are nations without a state of their own (Guibernau, 1997) and it is not always the 
case that state boundaries neatly encapsulate a ‘nation’ which is linguistically, culturally 
and ethnically homogeneous24. Moreover, Gellner (1997a:55) argues that the historical 
formation of the state and the emergence of nationalism were independent and that the
24 For example India and Pakistan
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‘existence of politically centralised units, and of a moral-political climate in which such 
centralized units are taken for granted and are treated as normative is a necessary though 
by no means a sufficient condition of nationalism’ (1997:55). He contends that 
‘nationalism’ is not necessarily a natural phenomenon and nations and states have r.ot 
always been congruent. Similarly, Brubaker (1996:16) contends that, by rhetoricady 
confusing the state with nationhood, we are taking the existence and shape of the 
nation-state as a given entity by analysing nationhood only within the context of the 
nation-state.
For Baumann (1999), the ‘nation’ necessarily signifies an exclusive ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity (whether ‘organic’ or imposed) that centres on the uniformity of race and 
ethnicity. Moreover, Gellner (1983) argues that cultural homogeneity is a prerequisite 
for the modern state to function effectively. Regardless, whether this is empirically true 
or it is simply a tool for political control is tangential, as nationalism is very closely tied 
to the evolving identity of a nation, and of a people, and is heavily dependent on a 
fantasy of ‘sameness’ in order to function as a single narrative of ‘the people’ (Smith, 
2003). Because nation-states create borders and nationalism perpetuates the ‘theory’ 
that it is natural for one to live only with one’s own kind (Gellner 1997a:7), nationalism 
itself is bordered. Put simply, though nation-states may never have been, and never will 
be, homogenous entities with linear narratives of nationhood, the way nationalism is 
politically mobilised within nation-states significantly contributes to images of who 
belongs to the nation and who does not. Benhabib et al (2007:3) explain that ‘No matter 
how historically contingent national identities may be they are all too easily naturalised 
or otherwise taken for granted by the people who are caught up in them’.
How Nation-States Include and Exclude
Given the historical improbability of rigidly marrying nations and states together, it is 
uncommon to find, at least in modern conceptions of the nation-state, ethnic, cultural 
and linguistic homogeneity (May, 2011). However, this empirical reality does not imply 
that nationalists do not envisage nationalism based on cultural, racial and linguistic 
homogeneity as necessary and desirable (Gellner, 1997a:7; see also White, 1981). 
Indeed, it is part of the project of the traditional nation-state constantly to exclude 
people deemed to be undesirable on the basis of race, culture, language, religion (or a 
combination of these), in order to reaffirm what constitutes a nation (Guibemau and 
Rex, 2010). In modern nation-states, however, religious, cultural and racial diversity is 
an empirical reality. It is therefore necessary, if nationalist projects are to fulfil their
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objectives of achieving a ‘national culture’, for governments to nation-build and 
develop ideals of nationalism that will downplay individual differences in favour of 
collective means of identification (Benhabib et al, 2007).
This entails defining the nation as a community bound together by a common culture, 
tradition, language, religion, or some combination of these. Depending on the historical 
processes informing particular nation-states, these sources of identification have proved 
to be conflicting. For example, in post-colonial ‘settler’ states, such as Australia and 
Canada, the influence of the British (as well as the French in Canada) traditions have 
certainly been inherited and have greatly influenced the nationalist trajectories of these 
countries (Castles and Davidson, 2000). While Australia has silenced the Aboriginal 
voice in its visions of nationalism by relying heavily on British, and later American, 
influences (White, 1981; Castles and Davidson, 2000), Canada has had to contend, with 
both its own indigenous populations (which constantly expose a lack of homogeneity) 
and the French heritage and traditions found largely in Quebec (Kymlicka and Norman, 
2000; Keating, 1997).
Where definitions of the ‘nation’ as a community based on culture, ethnicity and 
language have been too narrow, these have, as could be expected, excluded members of 
the community that do not fit comfortably within the definition (this is the case for 
every ‘nation’, see Castles and Davidson, 2000; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). 
Indigenous populations (internal to the state) and immigrants and refugees within (or at 
the borders of) states are usually the groups which challenge predominant definitions of 
the nation and nationalism (Joppke, 1998). In particular, immigrants ‘constitute a 
disturbance to the mythic stories [that] states are alleged to contain single nations’ 
(Shapiro, 1999:40, cited in Elder, 2007:144).
It is significant to note that modern ideals expressed by the nation-state often move 
beyond an ‘ethnos’ and become ‘post-ethnic’ (Baumann, 1999), thus utilising forms of 
civic nationalism, in contrast to those based on race, ethnicity or culture. However, even 
notions of civic nationalism have been criticised for harbouring ideas of homogeneity 
and/or ethnocentrism (see Chapter 2). Moreover, Western liberal nation-states have 
simultaneously been portrayed (internally by their own people and externally as 
members of the international community) as a post-ethnic ‘super-ethnos’, which often 
mythologises the predominance of a particular ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’, at the expense of 
the inherent diversity usually found empirically within the borders of the nation-state.
73
So, Baumann (1999:31) notes that the nation presents itself as both ‘post-ethnic’, in that 
‘it denies the salience of old ethnic distinctions and portrays these as matters of a dim 
and distant prestate past’ and as ‘superethnic’, in that ‘it portrays the nation as a new 
and bigger kind of ethnos’.
The tension between presenting the state as post-ethnic, and thus ethnically neutral, and 
encouraging the need to create a ‘civic’ nationalism, which, together with the 
mythologies and ‘founding stories’ that privilege certain cultures and ethnicities over 
others (Wimmer, 2002), acts as a socially cohesive force within the nation, is evident in 
all nation-states; not least in Australia. However, even as ‘civic nationalism’ has 
captured the imagination (Levey, 2008), the act of privileging certain ethnicities or 
cultures over others has necessarily meant that racism and nationalism were intimately 
connected. Indeed, Balibar (1991:37) demonstrated that racism and nationalism depend 
on each other for their existence. Miles and Brown (2003:6), expanding on the work of 
Balibar (1991), explain:
In other words, the ‘nation’ will inevitably identify itself with the ‘race’, because historical, cultural, 
political and other distinguishing factors of a ‘nation’ are ultimately subsumed under the idea of 
‘race’. This inevitably leads to a nationalistic purism, an ideology that ‘we’ must not be contaminated 
by ‘them’ (whether ‘they’ are German Jews in the 1930s, Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s, or asylum 
seekers in early twenty-first century Europe), but this is contradicted by the supemationalistic ethos 
of racism - hence Balibar’s ‘blind pursuit’. At the same time, the ideology of nationalism, under the 
influence of racism, develops into an ethnocentric conception of humanity and, where the national 
unit is powerful enough, a programme of cultural imperialism. Importantly, racism is implicitly 
defined as an excess of nationalism, therefore dependent on nationalism for existence-as-such...
Through the delineation of groups (whether described as ‘ethnic’ groups, ‘races’ or 
cultures’) the ‘Other’ is also created. The representation of the ‘Other’ has a long and 
diverse history in Europe. It was a diverse and varied discourse that represented non- 
European populations as inferior in a variety of ways, based on somatic and cultural 
characteristics ‘such as European representations of the Muslim world, which 
extensively utilised images of barbarism and sexuality in the context of a 
Christian/heathen dichotomy’ (Miles and Brown, 2003:52). For Miles and Brown 
(2003:51):
The process of representing the Other entails a dialectic of representational inclusion and exclusion. 
By attributing a population with certain characteristics in order to categorise and differentiate it as an 
Other, those doing so establish criteria by which they themselves are represented. In the act of 
defining Africans as ‘black’ and ‘savages’, and thereby excluding them from their world, Europeans 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were representing themselves as ‘white’ and ‘civilised’.
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The subject that is considered ‘Other’ is not a fixed subject and in different periods 
different groups were considered as ‘Others’. For a long time in Europe’s history, the 
‘Muslim world’ was the primary subject of Othering, but was later joined by different 
parts of Africa, the Americas and Asia. Moreover, the representation of the ‘Other’ is 
also neither fixed nor permanent in its representation of specific others. The 
representations themselves have changed over time, in keeping with changing historical, 
social, economic and political contexts ‘of those producing and reproducing the 
representations’ (Miles and Brown 2003:39). This necessitates that the characteristics 
attributed to the ‘Other’ also change. For example, Miles and Brown (2003:40) argue 
‘The African’s skin colour remained a constant feature of European representations, but 
savagery and bestiality have not’. Contemporary representations of the ‘Other’, 
therefore, are not simply a continuation of past representations, but an amalgam of 
atavistic representations and contemporary needs.
It is doubtful that nation-states can arrive at one ideal form of nationalism that 
transcends time. Indeed, the constant creation and recreation of peoplehood relies on 
choices made about who is to be included and excluded. According to Wimmer 
(2002:2), who is to be included and excluded is based on a number of interrelated 
factors that form a ‘peoplehood’: the people as a sovereign entity; the people as citizens 
and the people as ethnic community. The stress on each of these factors differs from one 
state to another. Consequently, nationalism is a project that is constantly questioned, 
problematised and continuously reformed (White, 1981). The manner in which a nation­
state defines its aspirations or its sense of nationalism can be identified in the policies 
and institutions it (re)creates, in order to determine who should be included and 
excluded from the nation. Issues of immigration, whether involving ‘economic’ 
migrants or refugees (especially in recent times), have been sites of great anxiety 
concerning nationhood, ethnicity and control (Castles and Miller, 2003). Policies of 
immigration, therefore, have given rise to forms of inclusion and exclusion based on 
race, ethnicity and culture. Although immigration policies in a variety of different 
Western states have changed over time to reflect labour needs or humanitarian 
obligations, nationalisms based on legacies of homogeneity of race and ethnicity and 
uniformity of culture persist today (Joppke, 2005). Nevertheless, where homogeneity 
could not be sustained, ideas about cultural compatibility have generally replaced ideas 
about racial homogeneity (see Chapter 5).
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Australian Nationalism: An Overview
Nationalism in Australia has had a diverse and interesting history (White, 1981; Hudson 
and Bolton, 1997; Elder, 2007). Indeed, Australian nationalism, in its multiplicity, had 
fragmented beginnings. Instead of a single nationalism, the many contending visions of 
Australia and Australian identity gave rise to counter-nationalisms that emphasised 
some aspects of Australia as the ‘true Australia’ over others (White, 1981; Dixson, 
1999; Hudson and Bolton, 1997). While some contending imaginings included the 
quintessential Australian as situated in the ‘bush’ and defined by ‘mateship’ (Elder 
2007:115; White, 1981), others found their voice and identity in the ‘mother country’ 
(Britain), the Battlefields and the ANZAC legend, or in attempts at identifying a 
uniquely Australian culture and an ‘Australian way of life’ which was in direct 
opposition to British colonial culture (White. 1981; Joppke. 2005). Still, others 
emphasised a qualified version of Australia’s indigenous history as very much a part of 
what makes Australia ‘Australian’ (White, 1981). In this way, any attempt at identifying 
a singular Australian nationalism is an immense, undesirable and probably impossible, 
task.
Australian nationalism, although at times reflecting real lives and real experiences, is a 
constant political project that reflects the suitable fictions of the times. White (1981: ix) 
identifies three overlapping forces that have influenced the ‘invention’ of Australian 
nationalism:
Firstly, national identities are invented within a framework of modem Western ideas about science, 
nature, race, society, nationality. Not only is the very idea of national identity a product of European 
history at a particular time, but each addition to the Australian identity has reflected changing 
intellectual needs and fashions in the West...The second influence moulding ideas about Australian 
identity is the intelligentsia, or that class of people - writers, artists, journalists, historians, critics - 
most responsible for its definition. As the composition and influence of that class changes, so does 
their image of Australia... This brings us to the third influence on images of national identity: those 
groups in society who wield economic power. National identities emerge to serve a social function. 
While the intelligentsia create the images, they do not work in a vacuum. The most influential images 
are those which serve the interests of the broader ruling class, on whose patronage the intelligentsia 
rely. Every powerful economic interest likes to justify itself by claiming to represent the “national 
interest” and identifying itself with a “national identity”.
While ‘forces’ behave in complex ways to ‘weave the fabric of the nation’, and it is 
beyond the scope of this study to address this complexity entirely, the national identity 
portrayed by the ‘ruling class’ (White, 1981: ix) can be seen in the way national identity 
is deployed in the making of the nation’s parameters, or borders (both physical and 
symbolic). The creation and deployment of government policies and institutions with
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regard to immigration and immigrants demonstrates the ideals of national identity 
(Castles and Miller, 2003; Castles and Davidson, 2000). As such, a brief consideration 
of some of the policies initiated by the various Australian Governments since 
Federation highlights which identities were included as part of the nation’s identity and 
which were excluded on the basis of race, ethnicity and culture.
Borderwork
There is ample evidence to demonstrate how race and ethnicity have played key roles in 
establishing who is (or could be) Australian and who is not (Jupp, 2002). 
Notwithstanding the treatment of Indigenous Australians since Britain claimed Australia 
as part of its empire (and indeed the legacy of the treatment of Indigenous Australians 
Trainor,1994; Birch, 1989; White, 1981), race and culture were major obstacles for 
immigrants wishing to migrate to Australia for settlement purposes, or for work 
Immigration policy was implemented in Australia after 1901 through a process of strict 
state control, which purposefully desired to nation-build on the basis of ‘xenophobic, 
racist and insular traditions’ (Jupp, 2002:6), in order to retain a ‘pure’ culture.
In building the Australian nation, and with the hope of displacing the convicts“' and 
indigenous populations already in Australia, the British government assisted immigrants 
from certain parts of the empire (namely England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales) to come 
to Australia (White, 1981; Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 2007a; Jupp et al, 2007; Castles et al, 
1992). Other immigrants who were non-Europeans were not assisted by the government 
and, indeed, were, more often than not, barred from entering Australia. Jupp (2002:18) 
argues that assisted passages for British migrants were ‘a form of social engineering 
designed to keep Australia British... and to keep Australia white’.
When migrants were not assisted by the government, only white immigrants (mostly 
British immigrants who were not coloured)“ , were encouraged to migrate to Australia. 
The desire was to build a white Australia and, while this required increasing the extent 
of white immigration to Australia, it also necessarily meant the restriction, if not the 
outright banning, of other immigrants (namely Asian immigrants) from entering the 
country (Elder, 2007:118). Of course, the relationship between British colonisers and
2:1 Convicts were viewed as having a mark of deviancy and criminality (Elder, 2007).
26 Even though the British Empire included Asian countries such as India and Singapore, ‘British 
subjects’ from these countries were not allowed in Australia because of their race (Jupp, 2002).
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the indigenous people of Australia created the first stark sense of ‘us and them’“ , based 
on race and the creation of a ‘white’ Australian identity in direct opposition to ‘black’ 
indigeneity, although this is not the focus here.
At Federation in 1901, Australia was on the path toward becoming a nation-state, 
although formally Australia only became a nation-state retrospectively in 1939 through 
the passing of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act of 1942 (Hudson and Kane, 
2000:2; Castles et al, 1992). When the states in Australia federated in 1901, the 
Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was the first piece of significant 
legislation to be passed. This Act became informally known as the White Australia 
Policy and it came, for many scholars and commentators, to symbolise Australia’s 
burgeoning view of itself, and its aspirations, immediately preceding federation; it was a 
crucial aspect of the conceptualisation of the nation at federation.
The White Australia Policy
‘White Australia’ was an aspiration that became Australia’s immigration policy and an 
articulation of its national identity from the 1890s“ onwards (Walter, 1992). According 
to Tavan (2005), White Australia as an ideology was heavily attached to the formation 
of the Australian Federation in 1901 in that it was implemented (especially) by the 
Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (informally known as the White 
Australia Policy - this remained in force until it was replaced by the Migration Act in 
1958, see Jupp, 2002). The Act aimed ‘to shield Australian workers from the vagaries of 
cheap Asiatic labour, and protect national sovereignty against a potential Asiatic 
invasion’ (2005:8). Moreover, according to Joppke (2005: 43) ‘the White Australia 
Policy was the very fulcrum of Australian nation building and self-definition. The 
perceived need to exclude Asian immigrants was the driving force behind federating the 
six Australian colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia’.
Through the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, Australia initiated a process of 
controlling the shape and character of its population and communicated to itself (and to 
its Asian neighbours) a strong desire for a ‘homogenous population of British subjects’ 
(Galligan and Roberts, 2004:52; Jones, 2000). It was viewed as ‘crucial to the 
establishment of a Liberal-democratic society, and a prosperous, free, white British
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'  Of course substantial diversity existed between convicts and free settlers, the military and private 
citizens etc.
28 Others claim it started in 1980’s (Jupp 2002: 8)
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nation. Material and social well-being, it was presumed, depended on a fundamental 
homogeneity of race and culture’ (Gurry and Tavan, 2004:127).
Additionally, Jayaraman (2000:136) explains that ‘During the 1901 debate in the federal 
Parliament on the Immigration Restriction Act, it became clear that the overwhelming 
majority of members of all political parties wanted the complete exclusion of non- 
Europeans from permanent settlement in Australia’. However, Windschuttle (2005) 
maintains that to stress the racial premise of the Immigration Restriction Act is to ignore 
the myriad of politicians who were opposed to the Act on racial grounds. He argues that 
the Immigration Restriction Act, though coloured with racial discrimination by ‘a 
minority’, was in fact ‘introduced for economic and cultural reasons, not primarily 
because of racial prejudice’ (Windschuttle, 2005:131). However, most scholars disagree 
(see Jupp, 2002). In fact, since it was deemed to be against British policy to overtly 
discriminate on racial grounds (Windschuttle, 2005:133), the Act itself did not mention 
‘White Australia’ or race (Jupp, 2002:8). Rather, a language dictation test and physical 
(racial) traits were used as a means of discriminating against non-European migration to 
Australia (Tavan, 2005).
The Immigration Restriction Act enabled the government to exclude any non-European 
person who 'when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out at dictation and sign in 
the presence of the officer, a passage of 50 words in length in a European language 
directed by the officer' (Immigration Restriction Act 1901 ; see also Tavan, 2005). In 
1905 this was changed to 'any prescribed language' and from 1932 the Test could be 
given during the first five years of residence, and any number of times (Jupp, 2002; 
Davidson, 1997a).
It was clear that the dictation test was used to exclude certain migrants (Davidson, 
1997a; Galligan and Roberts, 2004). Moreover, in the name of social cohesion and 
harmony, immigration officers at the time were required to ‘judge the degree of “blood” 
in the veins of applicants for settlement’ (Jupp, 2002:9), based on the way they looked. 
Jupp (2002:9) likens this to the purely racist Nazi and South African thinking and posits 
that ‘It was claimed by ministers and their apologists that to bring into Australia anyone 
who looked different would provoke social unrest in a totally homogeneous white 
British society’. The stress on the relationship between race, culture and social 
cohesion can be deduced from the myriad of speeches and commentaries presented by
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politicians and commentators during the implementation of the White Australia Policy 
(Tavan, 2005).
In her book, The Long, Slow Death of White Australia, Tavan (2005) discusses at length 
the reasons behind the success of the White Australia Policy between federation and the 
Second World War. Tavan (2004:111) primarily points to the fear of the ‘Other’ as the 
basis for the success of the White Australia Policy and the belief that state intervention 
was necessary to maintain social cohesion. Fears included deeply-held beliefs 
concerning racially-inspired fear and hostility founded on ‘social-Darwinist 
assumptions’. These assumptions included: ‘perceptions of national identity founded 
upon race and racial homogeneity’; ‘fear of invasion by external aggressors’ and ‘a 
strong social-liberal faith in the state’s ability to create a cohesive and prosperous 
society through a program of active intervention in civil society’ (Tavan, 2004:111; 
Tavan, 2005; see also Elder, 2007; Jupp, 2002).
As such, there were a myriad of factors influencing the acceptance, if not the 
encouragement, of a White Australia Policy. However, though immigrants experienced 
restricted entry into Australia, a combination of what Honig (2003) calls, in the 
American context, xenophobia and xenophilia were evident at the time. While ‘Asiatics’ 
were represented as inferior, and as such attracted xenophobic attitudes29 from the wider 
‘Anglo-Australian’ population, non-European immigrants were also increasingly 
needed and wanted for their cheaper labour (Fitzgerald, 2007) and even for their 
fashions (Elder, 2007).
Whichever way immigrants were viewed, Australia was internally portrayed as a liberal 
society that would be corrupted by ‘illiberal’ people. Curthoys (2003:31) draws 
parallels between the treatment of a ship named Afghan carrying Chinese migrants in 
April 1888, when the government of the day intervened to prevent passengers from 
disembarking and attempted to pass legislation quickly in order to make the immigrants 
illegal, though the majority of them were legal, and the Howard Government’s 
treatment of refugees during the Tampa affair in 2001.
29 Indeed the literature on the treatment of the mainly non-European Chinese labour force during the 
Gold Rush prior to federation and the prevalent racism at the time is ample and the details cannot be 
treated here (For more on this see Fitzgerald, 2007; Jupp, 2002; Jupp et al, 2007; Elder, 2007).
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Demise of the White Australia Policy
After World War Two, the numbers of British and Irish immigrants to Australia 
dropped substantially (Galligan and Roberts, 2004:54) and mass migration by non- 
British Europeans became common after 1948. Similarly, Jones (2000:176) states that 
‘The preference for British settlers was greatly weakened by the massive influx of 
refugees from a wide range of European countries and by a large number of assisted 
and unassisted settlers from Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and 
elsewhere’, this included immigrants who were the ‘darker shades of white’ (Hage, 
2003:55).
In 1947, the fact that British immigrant numbers were decreasing forced the Chifley 
Labor Government to expand the immigration program to include a wider range of 
European immigrants (many of them refugees) as part of its immigration program, 
whilst retaining the essence of the White Australia Policy (Tavan, 2004:112). An 
increase in immigration was viewed as a necessity, as population levels in Australia 
were dropping. The desire to ‘populate’ in order not to ‘perish’ was one of the reasons 
the immigration doors were open to non-British migrants after World War Two. 
According to Ang (2003:61), ‘Seen from this perspective, the post-war immigration 
policy was primarily negatively motivated, inspired by fear and an urgent sense of 
necessity, rather than the positive envisioning of a new, more inclusive future’.
However, it was viewed as politically beneficial to maintain the preference for ‘white’ 
British immigrants to appease the fears of the wider Australian community (Tavan, 
2004). At the same time, the restrictions on non-European migrants were met with 
hostile criticism from both interest groups within Australia (Tavan, 2005) and 
Australia’s Asian neighbours, in the context of growing post-colonial sentiment and 
more humanitarian conceptions of the ‘Other’, prompted by the human devastation 
inflicted by Nazi Germany and World War Two in general (Jones, 2003:115).
Tavan (2004:112) identifies the myriad of environmental factors that foreshadowed the 
end of the White Australia Policy:
Overt discrimination against non-Europeans was becoming increasingly unacceptable in a world 
beginning to come to terms with the consequences of Nazi racial ideology, and where Asian and 
African nationalist independence movements were rejecting white colonial domination. The policy 
was at odds with Australia's attempts to strengthen economic and strategic ties in the Asia region 
after 1945. Growing numbers of non-European countries began to assert their displeasure at its 
offensive nature. The Chifley government's harsh treatment of non-European wartime refugees in the
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late 1940s spurred strong criticism in several Asian countries, including Malaya, Singapore, the 
Philippines, China and India. Within Australia, too, domestic criticism began to grow, spurred by the 
declining influence of racial determinist theories, and humanitarian and foreign policy 
considerations.
The dismantling of White Australia took almost six decades to accomplish, although 
some critics maintain that it is still alive and well in Australia today (for example, see 
Tavan, 2005; Jupp, 2002; Jayasuriya et al, 2003). Nevertheless, the formal dismantling 
of the White Australia Policy began in the early 1950s. Reforms included the decisions 
in 1956 and 1957 to make citizenship available to non-Europeans, not bom in Australia 
(Tavan, 2004:122), amid pressure to allow highly-skilled non-Europeans entry into 
Australia. Policy changes in 1966-67 altered the entry eligibility criteria for non- 
European migrants and increased the number of Asian migrants. This signalled a break 
from the ‘racial paradigms’ (Tavan, 2004:122) that represented the backbone of the 
White Australia Policy. However, Jupp, (2002:23) asserts that, although it was a shift in 
the racial basis of immigrant intake, and more immigrants from Asia were entering 
Australia in the 1960s, they did not receive assisted passage and ‘they were almost 
invariably English-speaking Christians and were often easily assimilated into existing 
cultural and behavioural practices and institutions and especially the churches and 
suburban society’. Jupp (2002) argues that, although criteria based on ‘race’ were 
relaxed, those based on ‘cultural’ characteristic remained largely unchanged.
Ultimately, the Whitlam Labor Government is credited with dismantling the final 
phases of the White Australia Policy with the introduction of the Racial Discrimination 
Bill in 1974 (Davidson, 1997a: 129, which became an Act in 1975), which formally 
implemented the United Nations ‘Convention to Eliminate all forms of Racial 
Discrimination’ (CERD) that Australia had signed in 1966. The Whitlam Government 
‘removed most vestiges of overt discrimination against non-Europeans and declared to 
the world that the White Australia Policy was dead’ (Tavan, 2004:122). According to 
Jakubowicz (2012a: 1), ‘It was this convention that played an important role in the first 
dismantling of the White Australia Policy controls’.
Attitudes Towards Non-Europeans: Invasion Complex and Exclusion
Throughout almost 60 years of the formal implementation of the White Australia 
Policy, it is apparent that certain prejudices based on race and culture were manifest. 
Although the Immigration Restriction Act itself did not contain language that was 
explicitly racial, or culturally and ethnically prejudicial, successive governments had
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wished to preserve an ethnically and culturally homogeneous polity that was 
predominantly British and White, and they were not afraid to say so (Jupp, 2002; Tavan, 
2005; Dunn and Norman, 2011). The prevention of an ‘Asian invasion’ and the 
assimilation of all migrants became primary preoccupations. Arthur Calwell, then 
Minister for Immigration, promised in 1946 that there would be ten British migrants for 
every other European (Davidson , 1997a:85) and this was echoed by numerous other 
promises by various ministers that the Australia nation would preserve its national 
identity as ethnically ‘white’ and culturally British and that through ‘assimilation’ 
immigration would not affect this (Hage, 2003:55).
Throughout the myriad of speeches presented by successive prime ministers, the overall 
promise was to maintain Australia’s white racial make-up and to fend off invasion from 
the ‘Asiatics’ (Davidson, 1997a:67). This fear of an ‘invasion’ was evident throughout 
the White Australia Policy era (Elder, 2007; Jupp, 2002) and Australia was seemingly 
gripped by fear that larger, more powerful, Asian nations, such as China, were patiently 
waiting to invade Australia (White, 1981). Indeed, according to Jupp (2002:7), ‘The 
arrival of thousands of Chinese on the Victorian goldfields in the 1850s ignited a fear 
which remained central to immigration policy for the next century’ and this ‘has not yet 
finally disappeared’.
There are numerous examples in Australia’s history where Australians were frightened 
of being invaded by Asians; the ‘yellow peril’ (White, 1981; Castles et al, 1992). 
However, there have also been ongoing fears of being ‘swamped’ (Hanson, 1996; 
Stokes, 2000:29), and therefore inadvertently invaded, by ‘Asians’. This fear was 
greater at some times than others, for example, during World War Two, given the 
possibility of a Japanese ‘invasion’ (Castles et al, 1992:23). As Elder (2007:126) points 
out, in more recent times, especially when ‘un-authorised’ refugees have landed on 
Australian shores, or, as in some cases, where they have not been allowed to land at all, 
the presence of refugees on Australian soil, or at Australian borders, has echoed these 
same fears o f ‘invasion’ (see also Marr and Wilkinson, 2004).
Assimilation
Even as successive waves of immigrants were allowed to enter Australia during the 
latter part of the twentieth-century and racial homogeneity was sacrificed for the 
national good, non-European immigrants ‘who could only secure [naturalisation] after 
three times as long in the country an anyone else’ (Jupp 2002:10), were expected by the
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government to assimilate into the wider Australian nation. While successive 
governments progressively bowed to internal pressures, to increase immigrant intake be­
labour purposes, under the mantra of ‘populate or perish’ (Hage, 2003:55), aid 
international pressure, to meet humanitarian obligations, ‘racial’ homogeneity wis 
sacrificed for what was viewed as cultural homogeneity through assimilation (see 
Castles et al, 1992; Jupp et al, 2007). Though the nation could no longer afford to look 
‘white’, Anglo-Australian culture would prevail through the policy of assimilation.
Calls for the ‘Other’ to assimilate were not restricted to immigration policy after 
World War Two, as internal ‘Others’, be they Indigenous' or Chinese, were always 
expected to assimilate. Zappala and Castles (2000:35) note that, until the 196(s, 
‘official policy was to base national identity on British heritage and to deal with 
diversity through assimilation’. However, assimilation is an often confusing term (Jupp, 
2002:22). It was physically impossible for many migrants to ‘assimilate’ in racial terns, 
so assimilation really meant the taking up of cultural and behavioural attitudes (Jupp, 
2002) .
While physically immigrants could not be ‘white’, Hage (1998, see also Hage, 2003) 
explains that ‘Britishness’ and ‘whiteness’ would become cultural attributes that in a 
way overshadowed race. So, when discussing the vestiges of the White Australia Policy 
and the policy of assimilation, Stratton (1999:177) argues:
Throughout this period, whiteness in Australia continued to be thought of literally in terms of 
colour, or lack of it. An equation was made between whiteness and assimilation... If one looked 
white, and could merge visually into the general population, then it was thought one could assimilate. 
In the pre- Second World War racial determinist period the logic to this was that whiteness equated 
with cultural compatibility. In the post-Second World War period, when race has been
thought of as a signifier of culture, the argument tended more to be in terms of the kind of people that 
Australians would ‘tolerate’. Of course, whom the population thought of as ‘looking white’ was 
gradually being transformed as numbers of darker, southern European people entered the country...
Put simply, assimilation meant that immigrants were ‘incorporated into society through 
a one-sided process of adaptation: immigrants [were] expected to give up their
30 The idea of the ‘Other’ was constantly fluctuating. While the Indigenous and the Chinese populations 
in Australia were certainly identified as ‘Other’ for reasons of ethnicity, the Irish Catholic minority were 
also viewed as ‘Other’, at least culturally.
31 According to Jupp (2002:22): ‘Policy towards the Indigenous minorities was very ambivalent. But by 
1937 it was officially agreed at the national level that they, too, should assimilate’.
32 According to Jupp (2002:22) ‘Non-Europeans, who were a small and declining minority, were also
discriminated against and were popularly regarded as incapable of assimilation, even when they
became Christians or spoke only English. They were unable to become naturalised and could not bring 
their relatives, including their wives, into Australia’.
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distinctive linguistic, cultural, or social characteristics and become indistinguishable 
from the majority population’ (Zappala and Castles, 2000:76; see also Davidson, 
1997a). According to Hage (2003:55-56), as immigration from non-British sources 
increased, the colour of non-British migrants varied to ‘darker shades of white’, which 
problematised the idea of a ‘white’ nation that was visually white. So, Hage (2003:55) 
states:
It was not possible to maintain the belief that Australia’s British culture and civilisation were a direct 
result of racial Whiteness and still argue that non- Whites could be made to assimilate into this 
culture. This is why assimilation created a fundamental split around the way this paranoia expressed 
itself. One part of the population adapted to assimilation by moving from a racial to a cultural 
formulation of their fears.
Thus, immigrants were expected to emulate Anglo-Australian culture and customs, to 
meld into the nation: successful assimilation occurred when you could not be noticed by 
others. Romaine (1991) points to a pamphlet that was issued to new arrivals in 1948 by 
the Australian Government which explicitly dictates when successful assimilation has 
occurred. Romaine (1991:4) explains that ‘It [the pamphlet] advised immigrants on how 
to get on with Australians and stressed assimilation. The end result was to occur on the: 
“day when fellow Australians stop looking at you because your manners or speech are 
different, you will you have been accepted as one of the community’” .
Yet, a major problem with cultural and behavioural assimilation was the presumption 
that majority culture was ‘uniform and self-evident’ (Jupp, 2002:22). It was assumed 
that non-British immigrants would, and should, assimilate to the dominant Anglo- 
Australian culture (Jones, 2000; Davidson, 1997a and 1997b). The same leaflet 
mentioned above, given to immigrants by the Australian Government in 1948, 
attempted to detail what assimilation could look like. According to Romaine (1991: 4), 
the pamphlet stated:
Australians are not used to hearing foreign languages. They are inclined to stare at persons whose 
speech is different. Some may laugh at you or make fun of your accent. Do not let this worry or 
annoy you. Also try to avoid using your hands when speaking because if you do this you will be 
conspicuous. Australian men never wear hair nets. They regard men who do as effeminate... Learn 
the habits and customs of the Australians and you will quickly feel at home in your new homeland.
So, the assimilationist model, instead of defining how an immigrant belongs in/to 
Australia, rested on at least three assumptions, that: (1) an Australian looked a certain 
way; (2) and/or acted in a certain way; and (3) had a distinctive culture that could be 
transmitted and indeed could be taken up by new immigrants (Hage, 1998). This then
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made the assimilationist policy ambiguous in practice, and indeed difficult to 
implement. Moreover, since assimilation became a cultural, rather than a racially 
specified, phenomenon, fear of immigrants became based on cultural attributes. There 
were the immigrants who could assimilate and there were other, ‘dangerous’ 
immigrants, namely ‘Asians’, who could not. According to Hage (2003:56; see also 
Parekh, 2000):
Thus the threat to Australia’s White culture was no longer non-Whites as such but non-assimilable 
non-whites. It was this developing shift of emphasis from race to culture that made assimilation and 
the White Australia Policy ideologically compatible in government circles and among those who 
supported the policy.
The assimilationist model came under severe criticism, especially in the 1960s, not least 
from the international community (Jupp, 2002). According to Jones (2003:115), there 
were a number of factors that necessitated the end of the policy of assimilation. The 
end of official colonialism of Third World nations, especially ‘decolonised Asian 
nations’, and pressure from the United Nations for change were important elements in 
changing the racialist attitudes towards immigrants (Jones,2003:115). In addition, 
Tavan (2005: 110) notes that, during the Menzies Government, people directly working 
with immigrants noticed inequality and ‘dissatisfaction among migrant groups’. 
According to Tavan (2005:110), these inequalities manifested in a variety of ways: 
‘higher than average poverty levels, high rates of physical and mental illness, high rates 
of return migration, and low rates of Australian citizenship’ (also see Grieg et al , 2003). 
Difficulties encountered by immigrants were viewed by many as a failure of 
assimilation. According to Tavan (2005:110),‘partly because they were not meeting the 
material needs of migrants; partly because assimilation demanded a level of cultural 
absorption that migrants would not or could not comply with; [and] partly because 
migrant groups had limited influence over settlement policies’.
Data indicating high levels of poverty and poor quality of life for immigrants (York, 
1996) betrayed the inadequacies of the assimilationist model (see also Jakubowicz, 
1989:7-8). The ‘assimilation’ model and its attendant government policies focused 
largely on the inability of migrants to access society’s resources and employment due to 
inadequate knowledge of English and the need to discourage immigrants’ putative 
propensity to form ‘ghettoes’ (Jakubowicz, 1989:2). Consequently, the assimilationist 
model of immigrant incorporation did not address some of the ‘structural issues’ 
(Jakubowicz, 1989:3; see also Davidson, 1997b) crucial to equitable treatment of
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immigrants. The progressive shift away from assimilation was due to a number of 
external and internal factors. Tavan (2005:110) contends:
By the late 1950s migrants from the European continent were gaining a stronger voice. In 1959, 
almost half a decade before ‘integration’ became the accepted doctrine of the Immigration 
Department, delegates at the annual Australian Citizenship Convention (ACC), a forum established 
in the 1950s to bring Australian community leaders together over issues of migrant welfare and 
settlement, overwhelmingly agreed that henceforth ‘immigration policy should aim at integration of 
new settlers rather than assimilation.
It became evident that the assimilationist policies were wanting because they ignored 
the settlement needs of migrants. Further, it became clear that settlement policies 
needed to ‘address themselves more directly to the material and psychological problems 
of migrants’ and in order to do so, the migrants themselves ‘needed to be given a greater 
voice in expressing their specific needs’ (Tavan, 2005:110).
Integration
In many ways, ‘assimilation’ for immigrants, or Indigenous Australians for that matter, 
did not work (see Davidson, 1997a; Hage, 1998; Stratton, 1998; Stratton, 1999, 
Jayasuriya et al, 2003; Castles et al, 1992). By the 1960s the difficulties with 
assimilation encountered by migrants started to emerge. This resulted in high numbers 
of migrant’s returning to their home countries, as well as material and social difficulties 
for the migrants who stayed (Tavan, 2005). The idea of ‘integrating’ immigrants 
became a less offensive strategy", as assimilation demanded that immigrants forgo their 
identities and cultures in order to live in Australia. Integration was viewed as a less 
racially and culturally discriminatory policy.
However, the policy of ‘integration’ is criticised by many for not presenting any real 
alternative to assimilation (Hage, 1998; Stratton, 1998; Stratton, 1999). Even as the 
assimilationist model was abandoned in favour of a more integrationist view of 
immigrant settlement, some scholars warn (Lopez, 2000) that viewing the change in 
such a linear, ‘progressive’ fashion underestimates the difficulties inherent in 
distinguishing assimilation and integration. Stratton (1999:178; see also Jones, 1999; 
2000) posits that integration is the indistinct successor to assimilation and suggests 
integration resulted only from the ‘failure’ to assimilate non-whites (see also Davidson, 
1997a). However, because assimilation focused on the process of levelling, in that 
everyone should be the same, Elder (2007:24) suggests that the Anglo-Australian model
33 Jakubowicz (1989) argues that policies were formulated for pragmatic reasons.
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is the basis for this ‘sameness’. Integration and its successor ‘multiculturalism’ were 
introduced precisely because ‘new Australians’ could not become ‘real Australians’ by 
simply assimilating (Elder 2001:116; see also Hage, 1998).
Indeed, integration differed from assimilation chiefly in the provision of services for 
migrants. According to Jupp (2002), access to education, work, medical treatment and 
information by way of radio and broadsheet for non-English speaking immigrants was 
often unsupported and difficult during the era of assimilation. The introduction of 
policies to alleviate the difficulties in accessing government services occurred in the era 
of multiculturalism. A brief history of multiculturalism will be provided in Chapter 5, 
however, here it is important to note that, while multiculturalism became about 
accepting, acknowledging and ‘tolerating’ difference and ‘diversity’, its early 
manifestations rested primarily on notions of equity and social justice that the White 
Australia Policy and assimilation completely denied.
However, while Australia was breaking away from the assimilationist model by 
providing extra services and/or making already available services more accessible to 
migrants, due to the increasing number of migrants from non-white backgrounds, those 
with similar religious and/or cultural backgrounds were still favoured. Stratton 
(1998:178) argues:
Between 1947 and 1969, mostly during the 1960s as the apparatus of the White Australia Policy was 
being dismantled, 17,000 Lebanese were allowed to enter Australia. These were almost all 
Christians. However, the 12,000 Lebanese who were allowed in the later 1970s after the ending of 
the White Australia Policy were mostly Muslims. The second group is the Turks. In 1967 Australia 
signed a migration agreement with Turkey and in the next four years about 10,000 Turks entered 
Australia. Now while the Turks were Muslims, Turkey has aggressively Westernised its culture since 
the days of Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) in the 1920s and 1930s. Taken together, the Christian 
Lebanese and the modem Turks suggest what was really at stake in the post-Second World War 
preoccupation with whiteness: a set of moral and cultural assumptions that would make easy 
assimilation into the unitary Australian culture.
From the 1970s onwards, subsequent Australian Governments attempted to ameliorate 
the difficulties associated with a diversified immigration program. The broadened 
immigration program enjoyed bi-partisan support (Castles et al, 1992) and, while there 
were bouts of opposition to Asian immigration during the 1980s and early-1990s, 
multiculturalism was regarded by many as an alternative model of nationalism to 
assimilation or integration, until the Howard Government in 1996 (Poynting, 2004).
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Indeed, Paul Keating34 (Galligan and Roberts, 2003:12) downplayed Australia’s British 
heritage by proclaiming that Australia was located in Asia and, therefore, should view 
itself in the context of its geographical location. It seemed for a time that the legacies of 
the White Australia Policy were increasingly irrelevant, both as immigration policy and 
as the symbolic backbone of Australian nationalism. However, a change of government 
in the latter half of the 1990s, and the beginning of the Howard Governments, indicated 
that the legacies of the White Australia Policy had simply been backgrounded.
Legacies of White Australia: The Howard Government
There has been a particularly significant change in Australia’s demographic profile 
since World War Two; Australia has doubled its population due to immigration (DIAC, 
2009b). Consequently, immigration matters have always been sources of contention 
throughout the Twentieth Century in Australia and immigration was, and continues to 
be, regularly politicised (Jupp, 2002). Fear of invasion by hoards of Asians was
o c
reignited in Parliament by Pauline Hanson' in her first speech in 1996 and was also 
evident in the Liberal Party’s stance on refugees and asylum seekers (Jupp, 2007a). 
More importantly however, the Howard Government, in power for over a decade, re­
instated many of the prejudices based on ‘fear’ and hatred of the ‘other’, echoing the 
White Australia Policy (Poynting and Mason, 2008). Three keys aspects of the White 
Australia Policy were foregrounded during the four Howard Governments: 1) an 
invasion complex; 2) assimilation; and 3) Government control.
The varying approaches to immigrant ‘incorporation’ implemented by successive 
Australian governments outlined above were primarily ‘pragmatic’ responses to 
changing demographics (Jakubowicz, 1989:7; see also Jupp, 2002). While many 
changes have also occurred a variety of scholars, focusing on different aspects of 
Australia’s relationship with immigration, have noted that some legacies of the White 
Australia Policy remain in the twenty-first century (Jayasuriya et al, 2003; Jayasuriya, 
2010). Some have argued that many changes in attitudes toward race and immigration 
have occurred and that to speak of the legacies of White Australia is to discount,
34 It is important to note however the Hawke/Keating government was the first to introduce mandatory 
detention for unauthorised arrivals (Jupp, 2002). It is not my intention to gloss over the fact that 
immigration policy was only transformed during the Howard government. Indeed aspects of the White 
Australia Policy that became evident during the Howard period were only backgrounded during other 
periods and were not as such ‘absent’.
35 Pauline Hanson was a member of the Australian Parliament 1996-1998. She was the leader of Pauline 
Hanson's One Nation (ONP), a political party with a populist, anti-indigenous and anti-multiculturalism 
platform that lasted from 1997-1999 (Ward et al, 2000:1). Pauline Hanson’s first speech was widely 
publicised and attracted international and domestic media attention.
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injuriously, these changes. Certainly, many view the White Australia Policy as ‘dead 
and buried’ (as A1 Grassby stated, see Tavan, 2005:239). However, as Ang (2003:52) 
contends, ‘while the legal and formal-political structures of the White Australia Policy 
itself are no longer in place, the mentality it nurtured is still part of the deep structure of 
Australian culture. Culture, after all, is much more resistant to change than politics and 
the law; culture is the longue duree of history’. Moreover, according to Jayasuriya 
(2003:2):
Others contend that while the institutional and legislative framework of a White Australia has been 
removed, considerable nostalgia remains for a time where there were fewer foreigners, particularly 
foreigners from non-European backgrounds. When viewed in this light, White Australia was not a 
policy or an outlook that Australians willingly relinquished, but was something they were denied, just 
as the progressive shift to multiculturalism was not so much a popular cause as an official command.
So although Australia’s demographic character has changed dramatically since WWII, 
and Australia is home to many people from diverse cultural, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds (and foregrounds), it remains the case that foreigners are feared and 
despised. Elder (2007) rightly argues that Australia has at least two stories in regard to 
immigration. One story reflects racialist and exclusionary policies, deemed necessary to 
keep out undesirables and to maintain racial and cultural purity in Australia. The other 
story is about the acceptance of immigrants after World War Two. While it cannot be 
denied that the second story is just as relevant as the first, the story of the fear of 
immigrants and their exclusion resurfaced in the Howard Government’s implementation 
of immigration policy and its characterisation of Australian identity.
Invasion Complex
A number of issues regarding immigration and Australian national identity came to 
underpin the Howard Government’s time in power. While actual immigration numbers 
increased during the Howard period (Batainah and Walsh, 2008:235), refugees and 
asylum seekers came to symbolise the negative side of immigration (Poynting and 
Mason, 2007). Indeed, a politics of ‘good immigrant/bad immigrant’ characterised the 
approach of the Howard Government; immigration policies for skilled immigrants, 
which attracted ethnically diverse applicants, were greatly encouraged, while members 
of the Howard Government, including John Howard himself, disparaged other new and 
old immigrants within Australia, especially refugees, asylum seekers and ‘Muslims’ 
(Poynting and Mason, 2007). Indeed, while the Howard Government continued to 
expand the immigration program, in keeping with the economic needs of Australia, it
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was also clear that, while immigration was not ‘the problem’, (Joppke, 2005), certain 
‘Others’ were viewed as a threat to Australia and to Australia’s national identity, and, 
as such, not welcome (see Chapter 7).
The Howard Government came to power in 1996 on the basis of a campaign that 
differentiated between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Manning, 2004). It was unclear who ‘they’ 
were, as they were largely characterised as ‘special interest groups’, which included, at 
various times, Indigenous Australians, feminists, ‘elites’ and the ‘politically correct’. 
Howard had talked about not kowtowing to the ‘ethnic lobby’ in Australia (Johnson, 
2000), but his views on immigrants eroding Australia’s national identity were most 
clear in the ways in which his Government reacted to, and treated, refugees and asylum 
seekers (Poynting and Mason, 2007; Poynting and Mason, 2008; Marr and Wilkinson, 
2004). John Howard also came to accept the fear of an ‘Asian invasion’ expressed by 
Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party (Johnson, 2007).
The refusal to allow 433 refugees who were picked up by the Norwegian vessel MV 
Tampa from an unseaworthy boat in August 2001 is a well-documented event (Marr and 
Wilkinson, 2004) which reflected the hysteria associated with the ‘invasion complex’ 
(see also Elder, 2007). The Australian Government did not allow any of the asylum 
seekers to land on Australian territory and John Howard insisted that: T believe that it is 
in Australia’s national interest that we draw a line on what is increasingly becoming an 
uncontrollable number of illegal arrivals in this country’ (Australian Senate, 2005).
This statement, and others like it, led the Australian population to believe that 
Australians were witnessing an increase in the numbers of refugee and asylum seekers 
wishing to come to Australia and that these refugees were a real threat to Australia’s 
sovereignty (Marr and Wilkinson, 2004). Indeed, it became popular to call refugees and 
asylum seekers boat people, illegals and queue jumpers and to characterise them as 
potential terrorists, criminals and as diseased and deviant (Marr and Wilkinson, 2004; 
Lygo, 2004; Manning, 2006; Pickering, 2005).
A few months later in November 2001, in the last weeks of the election campaign, 
another boatload of people were accused of ‘throwing children overboard’ in order to 
gain asylum. This prompted John Howard to state that T certainly don't want people of 
that type in Australia, I really don’t’ (ABC, 2004). As Maddox (2004: 10) explains:
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People like what, exactly, was not spelled out; he could hardly have supposed that every adult on the 
boat had thrown a child into the water—still less, on every approaching boat—but they had all 
become ‘people like that’. General allusions to the ‘illegal’ nature of asylum seekers’ arrival had 
given way to personal vilification, playing on the most emotional of bonds, between parents and 
children. In fact, it was Howard who was throwing children ‘overboard’-or, at least, shoving them 
out to sea.
Moreover, when claims that the refugees were throwing their children overboard were 
found to be false, commentators suggested that a politics of fear had been used by the 
Howard Government to win the election in 2001 (Lawrence, 2006).
It has been documented that Australia does not take in more refugees in proportion to 
population than other comparable nations (Crock and Saul, 2002) and that ‘Australia’s 
experience of irregular migration has "been modest and spasmodic compared to the rest 
of the world’ (Crock et al, 2006:4-5). However, the success of the Howard Government 
in the 2001 election was partly based on his Government’s ‘hard line stance on 
refugees’ (Lawrence, 2006) and on his enduring statement: ‘We will decide who comes 
to this country and the circumstances in which they come’ (Ross, 2004:105; see also 
Maddox, 2005), as well as the events of September, 11, 2001 (Crock et al, 2006:5), 
which came to associate refugees and asylum seekers with terrorists and terrorism. 
Following its electoral success (Neumann and Tavan, 2009), the Howard Government 
set about implementing further immigration reforms (Crock et al, 2006; Jupp, 2007a). 
The ‘Pacific Solution’, introduced in 2001, deemed refugees and asylum seekers 
arriving in boats on Christmas Island, and ‘nearby reefs’, as not having arrived on 
Australian shores, or more specifically in ‘Australia’s migration zone’, for the purposes 
of lodging an application for a visa. Refugees and asylum seekers were shipped to 
detention centres in the Pacific Islands, such as Papua New Guinea and Nauru, to be 
‘processed’ (Hodge and O’Carroll, 2006:35).
The variety and extent of the immigration laws passed by the Howard Government 
since 2000, as well as the continuation of these laws during the Rudd/Gillard 
Governments, have been extensively documented by a variety of scholars (see Crock 
and Saul, 2002; Crock et al, 2006; Marr and Wilkinson, 2004; Jupp, 2002 and 2007a). 
However, the importance of these changes here is the connection that a variety of 
scholars have drawn between Australia’s reaction to ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’, 
the government policies in regard to these immigrants and ideas about sovereignty and 
national identity. According to Crock et al (2006:4), ‘Australia continues to offer the 
third largest offshore refugee resettlement program in the world’, and immigration, from
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a variety of sources continues to be a necessary, if not vital component of nation­
building in Australia (Crock et al, 2006:4). Therefore, it is not merely an immigration 
issue; as it has been noted, border protection is not merely about justifiable security of a 
nation, but an act of delineating between an acceptable ‘us’ and ‘them’. According to 
Ang (2003: 64):
The notion of ‘border protection’ does not just have legal meaning: it has a powerfully emotive, 
cultural-psychological resonance, fundamentally informing the nation’s anxious efforts to maintain 
absolute control over who should be allowed into its territory... Howard clearly tapped into and 
sought to abet the spatial anxiety of mainstream Australia when he graced the 2001 federal election 
campaign with the slogan: ‘We determine who comes into this country and the circumstances under 
which they enter!’ In other words, the purpose of a hardening ‘border protection’ regime is the 
shoring up o f ‘fortress Australia’.
A number of issues, the events of September, 11, 2001 being but one major incident, 
came to cement the Australian variant of the ‘Other’ as Muslim.
Assimilation, Integration, Our Values and ‘Their’ Culture
The treatment of border security and the myriad of immigration legislation implemented 
by the Howard Government echoed the preoccupations with security during the White 
Australia era (Crock et al, 2006). Although they were not the only concern, Muslims 
came to be easily identified as potential threats to Australia’s sovereignty and its 
national identity; as potential terrorists in the guise of asylum seekers and refugees, as 
out of control youth or as burka-wearing menaces (Lygo, 2004; Manning, 2004 see 
Chapter 7). Maddox (2004:1) suggests that religion was becoming an important issue in 
the Howard years (and for the Howard Government) and Muslims were implicated in a 
variety of incidents in Australia and abroad (Chapter 7). ‘Muslims’ were implicated in 
‘ethnic gang rapes’ in Sydney in 200036, Muslim refugees and asylum seekers from 
Afghanistan and Iraq were arriving in leaky boats on Australia’s shores and the events 
of September 11, 2001 came to cement the view that the feared ‘Other’ is the ‘Muslim 
Other’ (see Chapter 7). Maddox (2004: 5) explains:
The story seemed tailor-made to build up the picture of asylum-seekers as ‘Them’, a ‘sort of people’ 
wholly alien to ‘Us’, treating their children in cavalierly self-interested ways ‘We’ could never 
comprehend or countenance. It was the latest twist in the line of inference and allusion which linked
36 In 2000 a group of ‘Australian youths of Lebanese-Muslim background took part in a series of gang 
rapes in the Bankstown area in south-western Sydney’ (Aslan, 2009:82). According to Aslan (2009:82) 
‘The perpetrators also insulted their victims with racial remarks such as “Aussie pig” and “You deserve it 
because you’re Australian’” . These assaults gained media attention in 2001 when the assaults were 
characterised as racially motivated attacks by Arabic, Muslim and Lebanese men specifically targeting 
and raping ‘white’ Australian women (Aslan 2009:83).
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Muslims, suburban teenage criminals, international terrorists, fundamentalist theocrats and desperate 
asylum seekers together as ‘Them’. Spelling out the connections could only have weakened a set of 
association that thrive between the cracks of conversations.
Simultaneously, internal measures also echoed policies of assimilation reflected in the 
waning years of the White Australia Policy. John Howard explicitly identified what he 
believed to be the characteristics of Australian national identity and Australian values 
(Johnson, 2007) which immigrants needed to accept. Indeed, Johnson argued 
(2007:195) that ‘Howard himself is using debates over values and national identity in 
ways that attempt to impose particular stereotypes of acceptable identity, beliefs and 
behaviour on citizens’. In his address to the National Press Club in Canberra on 
Australia Day 2006 (Howard, 2006:5; also cited by Johnson, 2007), Howard (2006:5) 
stated explicitly his understanding of the over-riding culture in Australia:
Most nations experience some level of cultural diversity while also having a dominant cultural 
pattern running through them. In Australia’s case, that dominant pattern comprises Judeo-Christian 
ethics, the progressive spirit of the Enlightenment and the institutions and values of British political 
culture. Its democratic and egalitarian temper also bears the imprint of distinct Irish and non­
conformist traditions.
Johnson (2007: 198) contends that Howard presented a form of civic nationalism in 
which the desirable ‘civic values are closely associated with the political values of a 
particular ethnic group’, when actual civic values usually imply post-ethnic or supra- 
ethnic common values shared by those who have a diversity of values informed by 
culture and ethnicity (Baumann, 1999). Johnson (2007:199) further posits that ‘Howard 
claims that he does not support assimilation but something in-between assimilation and 
separateness, which he most commonly refers to as ‘integration” . Johnson (2002:199) 
also contends that ‘arguably, a form of assimilation is taking place’. She explains that 
immigrants are expected to integrate into the values that Howard has identified as 
British and this is why Howard argues that Asians from former British colonies find it 
easier to integrate into Australian society.
Many of the comments also specifically targeted Muslim Australians, as they were 
viewed as the group least likely to assimilate in Australia (see the examination of 
Muslim Australian in Chapter 7). In an interview with the Australian Jewish News, John 
Howard (2006b), elaborated on his view that Muslims in Australia should integrate. He 
stated:
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It's about integration; it's about people more fully integrating. I'm for integration. My philosophy is 
that you take people from everywhere and when they come here they commit to overwhelmingly 
become Australian and they should become part of the mainstream, but obviously they retain a place 
in their heart for the culture of their home country. We understand that that's the way it's worked in 
the past. I think over the last 20 years or so, we've pushed out to the fringes of what I call more 
zealous multiculturalism than most. Some people have almost advocated a federation of cultures. 
Well you can't have that. We have an Australian culture, which is of course heavily Anglo-Saxon and 
Anglo-Celtic because we speak the English language. That doesn't mean to say it's the same as it was 
50 years ago, it's very different, but there are still elements of it which are heavily influenced by our 
linguistic inheritance.
John Howard was very specific in his views on what integration meant for ‘new 
Australians’. In the following excerpts he expresses the ambiguous ‘limits’ that are 
imposed on new Australians and their ability to ‘express their culture’. In September 
2006, on talkback radio, Howard (2006(c)) stated:
Fully integrating means accepting Australian values, it means learning as rapidly as you can the 
English language if you don't already speak it... And it means understanding that in certain areas, 
such as the equality of men and women... people who come from societies where women are treated 
in an inferior fashion have got to learn very quickly that is not the case in Australia.
Recent calls for assimilation and integration also suggested that immigrants should learn 
English as soon as possible and respect the equality of men and women, sentiments that 
also seemingly target the perceptions of misogyny in Islam.
However, Howard was able to call his vision of assimilation ‘integration’ because the 
difference was never made explicit. Non-white immigrants could not assimilate enough 
to look white, so they had to become ‘White’ (Anglo) culturally (Hage, 1998). 
‘Integration’ was only an approach to settlement services and was never about value and 
cultural diversity in the public domain (multiculturalism is discussed in the next 
chapter). The values to which Howard refers are values from the past. He (Howard 
2006a) explained:
We want them to learn about our history and heritage. And we expect each unique individual who 
joins our national journey to enrich it with their loyalty and their patriotism... Keeping our balance 
means we reform and evolve so as to remain a prosperous, secure and united nation. It also means we 
retain these cherished values, beliefs and customs that have served us so well in the past... Within 
limits, all Australians have the right to express their culture and beliefs and to participate in our 
national life.
On a Sydney radio station, Howard claimed that the new emphasis on Australian values 
was ‘not designed to keep anybody out. It's designed to include everybody, integrate 
everybody into the national fabric’ (Howard, 2006(d); see also Batainah and Walsh,
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2008). However, while the debate on values found its most vehement manifestation in 
the numerous speeches made by John Howard; it was also picked up by other prominent 
members of the Howard Government. For example, in 2005, Dr. Nelson, then Education 
Minister, was quoted in The Age (Grattan, 2005) as saying:
We don't care where people come from; we don't mind what religion they've got or what their 
particular view of the world is. But if you want to be in Australia, if you want to raise your children 
in Australia, we fully expect those children to be taught and to accept Australian values and beliefs. 
We want them to understand our history and our culture, the extent to which we believe in mateship 
and giving another person a hand up and a fair go. And basically, if people don't want to be 
Australians and they don't want to live by Australian values and understand them, well basically they 
can clear off.
Most significantly, and also echoing the need for the government to control the cultural 
condition of the nation during the White Australia Policy, amidst confusion about what 
it means to be Australian, the values debate also found its way into the education reform 
implemented by the Coalition in 2005. The Department of Education, Science and 
Training (DEST, 2005) implemented the National Framework for Values Education in 
Australian Schools, which prescribed Australian values to be taught to school children 
(Nelson, 2005).
Although overt discrimination based on phenotypes and somatic characteristics is 
outlawed by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and racial discrimination as 
government policy ended with the demise of the White Australia Policy, the ways in 
which ideas about nation and belonging were articulated by the Howard Government 
reinvigorated archaic ideas about who can legitimately belong. On numerous occasions 
during the Howard years, Australian citizens (new and old) were told that they were 
expected to ‘integrate’ into the Australian culture. According to John Howard, these 
values were exclusively ‘Judeo-Christian’ and British.
Conclusion
Given the multiplicity of contending images of Australian nationalism, a complex 
mosaic emerges as central to understanding what Australian nationalisms are about. To 
single out one narrative as the over-riding meta-narrative of Australian national history 
is to ignore the many contending narratives of Australian history. However, even while 
the focus of this chapter has been on the story of ‘immigrant Australia’, this story has 
come to symbolise, for many, the progress that has been made away from 
discriminatory and injurious immigration policies based on race, to a more tolerant
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Australia. For many, just as the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 came to symbolise the
o n
beginning of formal racial discrimination in Australia' , so the policy of 
multiculturalism came to symbolise the formal end to discrimination and the beginnings 
of ‘tolerance’ (Stratton and Ang, 1998; Hage, 1998). However, as suggested throughout 
this chapter, numerous scholars have argued that the White Australia Policy lived on in 
many of the ideas voiced by the Howard Government. Certainly, issues concerning race, 
ethnicity and culture have strongly informed Australian nationalism in the past and 
continue to do so today.
Throughout the period of the White Australia Policy officials focused on observable 
racial phenotypes in order to discriminate against certain immigrants (non-White 
immigrants). During this time, it was thought that ‘the maintenance of British 
hegemony and ‘white’ domination’ was desirable (Jupp, 2002) and homogeneity would 
guarantee material and social wellbeing. Three key areas characterised the era of the 
White Australia Policy: the desire for a racially homogenous society; fear of invasion; 
and state control in these areas (Tavan, 2004:111; see also Jupp 2002:6).
Although many changes have also been implemented by various Australian 
governments, these three key areas continue to frame Australian immigration policy. 
For example, in the post-White Australia Policy environment, a time where it was no 
longer possible for Australians to Took’ white (Hage, 1998), discrimination focused on 
cultural (and religious) attributes, making it necessary to instruct migrants on how to 
culturally assimilate. So, while racial phenotypes were no longer used officially, the 
Howard Government gave voice to a long-held belief that Australians are culturally 
‘white’. Moreover, the ‘invasion complex’ continued to speak to the Australian 
population through images of refugees, asylum seekers and ‘boat-people’. The Howard 
Government was extremely successful in reigniting the fear of invasion (Lawrence, 
2006). Finally, the idea that the Australian government has long been in charge of 
immigration and cultural maintenance lives on in the expectation that the national 
government should maintain social stability through a socially and culturally engineered 
immigration process (Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 2007a).
Multiculturalism as government policy was thought, by some advocates (Zubrzycki and 
Martin, 1977; Lopez, 2000), to be capable of ameliorating discrimination based on 
racial, cultural or religious attributes. Many advances were made under
37 This is not to discount over a century of racial discrimination prior to Federation particularly toward 
Indigenous Australians. The focus here however, is on ‘immigration’ and the related policy milestones.
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multiculturalism, especially in resourcing immigrant communities. However, 
demographic diversity was never able to legitimately pose a challenge to the official 
doctrine o f ‘White Australia’ as national identity. Perceptions of national identity came 
to rely on a cultural understanding of what it means to belong in Australia. If viewed 
through the prism of the last 100 years of Australian immigration policies, the Howard 
Government simply articulated the official perception of Australian national identity; an 
identity that was no longer understood as racially white, but has been made culturally 
white, and an identity that was never seriously challenged (Hage, 1998; Jupp, 2011).
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Chapter 5: Culture and Australian Multiculturalism
Introduction
This chapter argues that the ways in which ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ have dominated the 
multicultural policy framework in Australia necessarily means that only certain 
conceptions of belonging to Australia were given legitimacy. Definitions of culture and 
ethnicity continue to heavily inform belonging for ‘Others’ in Australia today and, 
consequently, limit the scope of belonging. This has created a dissonance, where there 
is ample space to legitimate exclusion of groups as not belonging in Australia, due to 
their cultural and religious differences.
Broadly, the myth of the homogeneity of the nation-state continues to be used as the 
basis for national unity and belonging. It continues to have powerful political purchase 
even in Australia where cultural homogeneity has been challenged by an increase in the 
intake of migrants from various cultures and religions. Indeed, at the turn of the 
millennium, Australia had witnessed over sixty years of consistently high immigration 
numbers in the hope of compensating for a declining population and fulfilling its labour 
needs; a trend that continues unabated (Markus and Dharmalingam, 2007). Immigrants 
were, over time, accepted from a variety of cultures and religious affiliations, which has 
resulted in unprecedented cultural and religious diversity in Australia (Hodge and 
O’Carroll, 2006). Consequently, this diversity has greatly challenged the myth of a 
single culture within a homogenous nation-state, even as Australian national culture is 
persistently portrayed in ways that ignore the empirical reality, which includes an 
indigenous population and a large percentage of Australians citizens from non-British 
backgrounds (Hage, 1998). Therefore, there is a marked dissonance between empirical 
reality and definitions of belonging to Australia that manifest most obviously in the 
ways in which immigrants are thought to be incorporated into the nation (Davidson, 
1997b).
The criteria for the acceptance and incorporation of immigrants in Australia varied 
according to the ideas and norms fashionable in certain periods. So, even as Australia 
diversified the ‘type’ of immigrants it accepted after World War Two (Davidson, 1997a; 
Castles et al, 1992), their reception, treatment and expectations varied and reflected 
specific ideas about belonging to the nation (Davidson, 1997a). Following its 
introduction in the 1970s, the concept of multiculturalism dominated ideas about 
immigration and citizenship. Multiculturalism, which espoused specific ideas about
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‘race’ and ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ (and hence ‘belonging’) for ‘Others’ in Australia, is 
the focus of the remainder this chapter.
The Significance of Culture
Culture has long been viewed as a necessary component of the successful organisation 
and regulation of societies (Thompson, 1990; Parekh, 2000). Broadly, culture is viewed 
as giving structure and meaning to the behaviour of people (Thompson, 1990). 
However, like ‘race’, the term ‘culture’ has been defined and redefined since its origins 
in the 18lh and 19th Centuries and has been closely tied to the formation of the nation­
state (Brubaker, 2004). Cultures came to be reified, essentialised and packaged as 
knowable wholes, so that culture could coincide with bounded borders. Consequently, 
nations came to be characterised as unique and separate, so individuals could only 
legitimately belong to one nation, and therefore one culture (Phillips, 2007:42; see also 
Gellner and Breuilly, 2008:134). Philosophical, anthropological and sociological 
understandings of culture have often competed to articulate definitions of culture that 
resonated with the prevailing philosophies, ‘technologies’ and ideas of the times (see, 
for example, Thompson 1990 and ‘mediatised culture’), therefore it is unsurprising that 
definitions of ‘culture’ are both reflective and constitutive of the context in which they 
operate.
The definitions of ‘culture’ were often broadened and narrowed at will. For example, 
‘dominant European linguistic convention’ treated culture and civilisation as if they 
were synonyms (Jenks, 2005:9 see also Thompson 1990). Edward Burnett Tylor (1871) 
equated culture with civilisation and defined culture as, ‘Culture, or civilization, taken 
in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, 
art, moral, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society’ (Tylor, 1871, quoted in Muller 2005:7 ).
In contrast however, Benhabib (2002:2) states that the Romantic period contrasted 
culture with civilisation. She explains that the German Romantics, such as Johan 
Gottlieb Herder, represented ‘Kultur’ as ‘the shared values, meanings, linguistic signs, 
and symbols of a people, itself considered a unified and homogenous entity...In this 
view an individual’s acquisition of culture involves a soul’s immersion and shaping 
through education in the values of the collective’. In contrast, civilisation particularly 
‘refers to material values and practices that are shared with other peoples and that do not 
reflect individuality’ (Benhabib, 2002:2).
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Franz Boas (1940) argued that culture was difficult to define, except in broad terms. He 
pointed to language, social organisation and religion as the largest and more important 
aspects of culture. However, he also attempted to explain that every ‘attempt to deduce 
cultural forms from a single cause is doomed to failure, for the various expressions of 
culture are closely interrelated’ (Boas, 1940:256). In addition, he claimed that ‘Cultural 
phenomena are of such complexity that it seems to me doubtful whether valid cultural 
laws can be found’ (Boas, 1940:257).
Not unlike the Romans, Boas used metaphors of animal and plant cultures to elucidate 
human cultures, but the complexity involved in defining culture was evident. In fact, the 
tradition of American anthropology, of which Boas was a founding member, has also 
been credited with defining modern conceptions of culture (Hegeman, 1999:8). Phillips 
(2007:42) argues that classical anthropological conceptions of culture approached 
cultures as:
Separate and distinct-so people were either in one culture or another. Each culture was presumed to 
form an internally coherent whole, regulated by a system of values, practices, and shared 
assumptions that outsiders might find hard to sympathise with or understand. In this conception, 
cultures were bounded.
However, anthropological definitions of culture in general have had a long history of 
ethnocentrism and the active denigration of cultures deemed ‘less civilised’ than 
European ones (see Phillips, 2007; Parekh, 2000).
Raymond Williams is famous for attempting to define culture sociologically. He 
described ‘culture’ as ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in the English 
language’ (Williams, 1983:87). Williams (1983:89) discussed the historically 
contingent definitions of culture and how culture came to be secularized over time. 
Overall, as Phillips (2007:42) contends, ‘Scepticism about culture is rife in the 
sociological and anthropological literatures, to the point where it has become 
commonplace to counterpose old and new ideas of culture, and criticise the former for 
treating cultures as if they were things’.
However, one key aspect of the anthropological definition of culture continues to 
influence ideas about culture. Lukes (2008:94) suggests that, while concepts central to 
the Herderian approach to culture have ‘often been discarded’, the idea of ‘conflicting 
and incommensurable values that are internal to different cultures... remains 
extraordinarily powerful in its appeal’. This, as Lukes (2008:94) further suggests, is
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exemplified in the view that ‘The national culture-like cultures of twentieth-century 
anthropologists- is typically seen as homogenizing within and to be defended again,t 
homogenization without- against assimilation or mongrelisation within a cosmopolitan 
or Westernizing ‘fusion’ of values’. The most obvious manifestation being in tfe 
conflation of culture, nation and nationalism, for even as modern nation-states do not 
neatly encapsulate homogenous cultures, this has not limited the use of ‘culture’ to 
delineate an entire people within the nation-state.
In this vein, Etienne Balibar (1995:179) argues:
The very word ‘culture’... acquired the strategic function that it has today at the precise moment that 
the nation form definitively won out over other forms of state in Europe, and began to becone 
generalized in the world. Thenceforth any collective appropriation of knowledge, rights or tradition 
has had to be thought of as ‘culture’
In her explanation of the modern definition of culture, Benhabib (2002:3) argues that 
‘...much contemporary cultural politics is an odd mixture of the anthropological view of 
the democratic equality of all cultural forms of expression and the Romantic, Herderian 
emphasis on each form’s irreducible uniqueness’ (see also Lukes, 2008:92-94). Thus, 
popular understandings of culture tend to take it for granted that cultural differences and 
cultural boundaries are easily identifiable and should be maintained. For example, 
Kymlicka (1995: 76-80) conflates culture with the nation-state. He presents a 
conception of culture in which he posits that the modern world is divided into what he 
calls ‘societal cultures’, whose practices and institutions cover the full range of human 
activities, encompassing both public and private life, where the ‘societal cultures are 
typically associated with national groups’ (Kymlicka 1995:75). Moreover, Kymlicka 
(1995) discusses at length the intimate relationship between freedom and culture and 
how national minorities should have access to their own culture. However, he also 
argues, given his definition of culture, that immigrants have agreed to waive their 
normal entitlements and, therefore, should integrate into the wider societal culture of the 
host country (Kymlicka, 1995: 216). As such, ‘culture’ is not an issue for them.
Because Kymlicka’s (1995:76) view of a ‘societal culture’ necessarily means a ‘culture 
which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of 
human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic 
life, encompassing both public and private spheres’, it is necessarily bound by the idea 
of ‘nation’. Indeed, Kymlicka (1995:76) explains that ‘These cultures tend to be 
territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language’. He contends that diverse
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societies, such as the United States, have successfully produced a ‘societal culture’ and, 
as such, share a ‘common’ culture that has successfully ‘integrated a rich array of 
groups’ (Kymlicka, 1995:77), that have differences in religion, ethnicity, race, class, 
gender and region of origin.
This definition of culture is seen to necessarily prohibit smaller minorities from 
achieving claims to culture, as they do not do so within the framework of the nation. 
Parekh (2006) criticises Kymlicka’s conception of culture and argues that cultures are 
important for everybody, and not just certain groups. Parekh (2006:142-143) outlines 
his working definition of culture:
Culture is a historically created system of meaning and significance or...a system of beliefs and 
practices in terms of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their 
individual and collective lives...Culture is articulated at several levels. At its most basic level it is 
reflected in the language, including the ways its syntax, grammar and vocabulary divide up and 
describe the world. Societies sharing a common language share at least some cultural features in 
common. And when a group of individuals acquires a wholly new language as many colonial 
subjects did, they also learn new ways of understanding the world. Culture of a society is also 
embodied in its proverbs, maxims, myths, rituals, symbols, collective memories, jokes, body 
language, modes of non-linguistic communication, customs, traditions, institutions and manners of 
greeting. At a slightly different level it is embodied in its arts, music, oral and written literature, 
moral life, ideals of excellence, exemplary individuals and the vision of the good life. Being 
concerned to structure and order human life, culture is also articulated in the rules and norms that 
govern such basic activities and social relations as how, where, when and with whom one eats, 
associates and makes love, how one mourns and disposes of the dead, and treats one’s parents, 
children, wife, neighbours and strangers,...Every culture is internally varied, speaks in several 
voices, and its range of interpretive possibility is often indeterminate.
While Parekh (2006) generally takes a non-essentialist approach to culture in his book 
Rethinking Multiculturalism, his definition of culture seems to suggest that all human 
endeavour takes place within the cultural sphere and he continues to describe ‘culture’ 
as a bounded and knowable whole, so ignoring overlaps across cultures (see also 
Phillips, 2007).
Further, even as ‘culture’ was often used as a synonym for ‘civilisation’ or contrasted to 
‘civilisation’ (Thompson 1990:124), a practice still prevalent today, especially in 
reference to, and usage of, Huntington’s (1997) ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis, modem 
definitions and use of ‘culture’ also closely align with the concept and practice of group 
identity. Benhabib (2002:1) argues that culture has also become ‘a ubiquitous synonym 
for identity, an identity marker and a differentiator’. Benhabib (2002:1) explains that the 
current condition, where culture has emerged as an ‘intense political controversy’, and 
which has led to the ‘culture wars’, has also led to the situation in which groups
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‘engaged in name of this or that aspect of their cultural identity have become contestants 
in the public sphere of capitalist democracies and are embroiled in characteristic 
struggles for redistribution and recognition’ (Benhabib, 2002:1). In this way, groups 
have made use of cultural categories to advance recognition and redistribution of the 
material resources within society; using cultural categories to advance political causes 
that might include cultural, as well as religious, economic, social and political 
dimensions. When minority cultures are juxtaposed with ‘mainstream culture’, a 
situation arises where the only way to extend claims of injustice are based on claims of 
culture. Indeed, this situation not only perpetuates the idea that cultures are identifiable, 
whole, bounded and knowable, but also suggests that cultural stereotypes reflect a core 
of the culture and cultures can be used to explain away material, social and political 
inequalities. Similarly, Phillips (2007:45) argues that drawing boundaries around 
cultures reflects ‘an outsider need to categorise and place people’, so to define ‘core 
practices and beliefs’ signifies ‘an internal struggle for power’.
Scholars within the discipline of Cultural Studies, such as Homi Bhabha (1998) and 
Stuart Hall (1997), have strongly opposed the consistent tendency to reify cultures (see 
Grieg et al, 2004:109; Phillips, 2007 for similar views). Instead, they emphasise that 
cultures are fluid and change over time through interaction with other cultures.
Similarly, research conducted (see Batainah, 2008) on Arab-Australian migrant’s 
experiences demonstrated that not only are the participants’ cultures internally 
heterogeneous, but people are affected by a number of local and global forces that 
contribute to their conceptions of culture. However, some (Parekh, 2006) have resisted 
the expansion of cultural categories on the grounds of cultural imperialism (in this 
context culture is viewed as part of the dominating machine). It is claimed that, seeing 
the processes of viewing cultures as open to malleability and endless change, gives 
credence to assimilationist policies toward minorities and denies recognition of 
legitimate cultural claims (Parekh, 2006).
The idea that cultures are static and knowable, or that culture should only be equated 
with civilisation, has certainly caused havoc in the way culture is conceived popularly 
(Lukes, 2008:98). Conceptions of culture, whether philosophical, anthropological or 
sociological, have never been neutral and have always, as evidenced by the 
contestations between definitions, been political. Proponents of the ‘clash of 
civilisations’ (Huntington 1997) thesis, for example, who espouse the bounded and
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essentialised idea of culture, also explain that different cultures are incommensurable 
and should not be allowed to corrupt ‘Western cultures’ (Phillips, 2007:56, likens this to 
the idea of ‘miscegenation’). Moreover, even when ‘culture’ is used in order to extend 
claims for resource redistribution and recognition, it is, nonetheless, the same processes 
of reifying culture and cultural identities that, simultaneously, give credence to 
negatively evaluated cultural differences.
People are thought of as belonging to one cultural group only, with very little overlap
T O
between cultures (Phillips, 2007:33) . The problems associated with this conception of 
culture are also tightly linked to understandings of race and ethnicity, giving rise to a 
situation where race, ethnicity, ethno-religiosity and culture are conflated, essentialised
T Q
and categorically attributed to certain groups . Indeed, while culture has certainly been 
hard to define conceptually, definitions of culture, race and ethnicity have informed 
multicultural policies (Modood, 2007).
Culture, Race and Ethnicity
Like ‘culture’, ‘race’ remains muddled with conceptions first coined in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries (Gilroy, 2000). While biological racism has been rejected by 
scientists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Gilroy, 2000), the ideas that 
inspired discrimination and prejudice against people with different physical 
characteristics remain pertinent today40 (Appiah and Gutmann, 1996; Gilroy, 2000; 
Miles and Brown, 2003). Race is an inherently political concept. It was designed to, and 
continues to, include, or exclude, and to categorise people based on the biological 
differences which it is claimed establish the characteristics of particular ‘races’ 
positioned along an hierarchy. Miles and Brown (2003:39) further explain the 
development of scientific claims for racism and how:
The idea of ‘race’ took on a new meaning in Europe with the Enlightenment and the development of 
science from the late eighteenth century (Banton 1987:28-64; see also Eze 1997). From this time, 
‘race’ increasingly came to refer to a biological type of human being, and science purported to 
demonstrate the number and characteristics of each ‘race’, and a hierarchical relationship between 
them. Thus it was claimed that every human being either belonged to a ‘race’ or was a product of 
several ‘races’, and therefore exhibited the characteristics of that ‘race’ or those ‘races’, and that the
38 Indeed, the idea and practice o f ‘segregation’ is testament to this idea (see Phillips, 2007:58).
39 For example Australians with an ‘Anglo-Celtic-Saxon’ background did not think of themselves as 
‘ethnic’ (Hage, 1998; Stratton, 1998).
40 Miles and Brown (2003:49) show that scientific discourses about ‘race’ are not quite dead. The 
connection with eugenics and the assertion made by some scientists that intelligence and race are 
examples of the persistence of scientific racist discourse.
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biological characteristics of each ‘race’ determined a range of psychological and social capacities ty 
which they could be ranked.
While it has become increasingly unacceptable since the 1970s to discriminate based oi 
‘race’ and the slave trade, the Nazi Holocaust, racial segregation in the United Stabs 
and apartheid in South Africa41 continue to act as reminders of the horrors of racnl 
categorisations, the 1980s saw the emergence of re-energised racist rhetoric, pary 
platforms and policy rationales in Europe and elsewhere that continue today (Modocd 
and Werbner, 1997; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000; Modood, 2005; Miles and Browi, 
2003).
Race and racism are contested concepts and there is very little agreement on whit 
constitutes racism. Is it still grounded in ‘phenotypical’ detenninants or are ‘somatif 
and ‘cultural’ discriminations also racism? Many scholars would agree that, although it 
is contested, racism is a shifting concept that is dependent on the historical, social aid 
political context within which it is found and is given concrete meaning in empiricil 
observation (Reisigil and Wodak, 2001; Miles and Brown, 2003:16). However, given 
the lack of any scientific evidence to support the idea of ‘race’ as an observable fact, it 
became more acceptable to distinguish people by their ‘culture’, and ‘race’ and ‘racisn’ 
were thought to have disappeared. As such, some scholars, influentially, came to defhe 
this kind of discrimination as ‘cultural racism’, ‘differentialist racism’ and ‘New 
Racism’ (especially Barker, 1981; Dunn and McDonald, 2004). Barker (1981:2!), 
commenting on the British Conservative Party view on immigration in the 1970s, 
specifically pointed to the human nature argument which presented humans as naturally 
contained within cultures with distinct a ‘home’ as an exemplary form of ‘New 
Racism’:42
Human nature is such that it is natural to form a bounded community, a nation, aware of its 
differences from other nations. They are not better or worse. But feeling of antagonism will be 
aroused if outsiders are admitted... Each community is a common expression of human nature; all of 
us form exclusive communities on the basis of shares sentiments, shutting out outsiders...
New racism certainly helps to make sense of the shifting emphasis within racism from a 
focus on phenotypes to a more flexible characterisation of undesirable ‘Others’. 
However, Dunn and MacDonald (2004), in a study of racism in Australia, strongly 
suggest that ‘...sociobiologically related understandings of race and nation remain
41 The Howard Government suspended the Racial Discrimination Act in 2007 in order for the Northern 
Territory intervention to take place. The UN has severely rebuked Australia for this (Alberici, 2010).
42 Phillips (2007:56) discusses the idea and practice of cultural segregation.
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linked to [t]he 'new racisms' of cultural intolerance, denial of Anglo-privilege and 
narrow constructions of nation’ (Dunn and McDonald, 2004:409). They argue that, 
while new racism seemingly targets ‘cultural attributes’, victims o f ‘racially’ motivated 
crimes are singled out because of the way they look, hence phenotypes continue to be 
used to single out ‘Others’. Therefore, while ‘New racism’ tends to focus on cultural 
intolerance, some have argued that it is neither new (Allen, 2010; Miles and Brown, 
2003), nor does it adequately define racism or take into account the persistence in the 
use of racialised markers to characterise ‘Others’.
However, Miles and Brown (2003:65-66) contend that racism is an ideology and, within 
it, there are different types/expressions of racism. Here, ‘racism’ is conceived as ‘an 
ideological phenomenon that works through a Self/Other dialectic’ (Miles and Brown 
2003:73; see also Reisigil and Wodak, 2001). They, therefore, support the distinction 
Taguieff (Taguieff in Miles and Brown 2003:66) makes between racisme inegalitaire 
(discriminatory or inegalitarian racism) and racisme dijferentialiste (differentialist 
racism). Miles and Brown (2003:65-66) see the former as referring to ‘hatred of the 
Other, a conception of a hierarchy or inequality of “races’” , and the latter to the 
appreciation of ‘Others’ as long as it observed that it is better ‘...for different ‘races’ to 
remain separate, develop separately, and thus, maintain their distinctiveness’. The 
former articulates an explicitly negative concept of ‘race’ and the latter articulates a 
concept of ‘race’ that continues to demarcate difference in the form of ‘Other’, who is 
incompatible with ‘us’ (see also Phillip, 2007). However broadly or narrowly race is 
defined, the ‘Other’ is consistently viewed as problematic.
Racialised categories of identification have been conflated with cultural and religious 
identity markers that continue to be tied to ‘traditional’ understandings of nation. The 
combination of ‘race’ (or the politics of certain phenotypes), culture and nation have 
given rise to the notion of ‘ethnicity’. Though it is difficult to ascertain what exactly 
‘ethnicity’ denotes (Banks, 1996), it is a construct that has been used throughout the 
Twentieth Century to identify the ‘Other’ (Miles and Brown, 2003; Brubaker, 2004) 
(this does not mean that ‘groups’ themselves have not used ‘ethnicity’ to demarcate 
themselves, see Ringer and Lawless, 1989; Benhabib, 2002). Ethnicity and race have 
also been used interchangeably, where the distinction becomes even less clear. 
However, in Australia the term ‘ethnicity’ seems to be associated with immigration and 
Stratton (1998:7) argues that ‘ethnicity entered the governmental lexicon in Australia at 
the same time that multiculturalism did, and that it came to be used in official
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multicultural-speak as a way of distinguishing different cultural groupings within the 
racial category defined as 'white”.
Stratton (1998:7) also explains that, since ethnicity is ‘closely aligned with migration’, 
it is used as a marker of cultural difference and is classified according to national origin. 
However, Stratton (1998:13) differentiates between different types of migrants, only 
some considered ‘ethnic’. He argues that that ‘English-Speaking-Bom’ migrants are not 
considered ‘ethnic’ and that ‘Those migrants who come from English-speaking 
countries, and who are themselves first-language English speakers, and those 
Australians descended from such migrants, do not tend to get identified ethnically’.
Thus, while the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’ have never been clearly defined, they are 
often used interchangeably with race, culture and religion in order to denote a 
homogenous group. The term ‘ethnic community’ has certainly been used in Australian 
multicultural policy to denote distinct communities associated with various languages 
(Jupp, 2007a). Indeed, internal heterogeneity within these ‘ethnic communities’ has 
only recently been formally recognised and, even today, there is much confusion and 
conflation between culture, ethnicity and religion. Indeed, terms like ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘race relations’ are government-created constructs that continue to rely on the conflation 
of culture, religion and ‘race’. Miles and Brown (2003:52) explain that the use of race 
as a legitimate marker continues to be pervasive. They posit that, in a variety of 
contexts, people continue to identify ‘Others’ by referring to phenotypical features (skin 
colour) which are viewed as significant markers of difference. Moreover, ‘race’ 
continues to be used as a marker of this putative difference and states continue to, in a 
variety of ways, legislate using ‘race’ as a marker. The idea of ‘race’ continues to have 
great popular currency even as its basis in science has been largely eliminated.
Religion and Culture
Religion has generally been viewed as the reified manifestation of culture and, as such, 
is thought of in many quarters as the unshakable core of culture. In fact, Eliot notes 
(1948:15, 30, quoted in Parekh, 2006:378) that ‘No culture has appeared or developed 
except together with a religion’. This view has been debated by scholars who suggest 
that viewing religion in this way does not take into account religion as a social 
phenomenon (Baumann, 1999: 69). Moreover, it is often taken for granted that religious 
allegiance is viewed as a component of, and is often subsumed by, ethnic identity 
(Jacobson, 1997:238). Jacobson (1997:238-239) argues that this cannot simply be
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assumed as ‘in some circumstances members of a social group might believe that its 
religious and ethnic dimensions offer different, and in some ways contradictory, modes 
of self-definition’. When religion is recognised however, it is usually shunned in favour 
of secularism and religious identity is relegated to the private sphere. As Modood 
(2000:187) claims, ‘Most theorists of difference and multiculturalism exhibit very little 
sympathy for religious groups... there is usually a presumption in favour of secularism’. 
Indeed, when religion has been recognised in Australia this has occurred in the context 
of culture. During the era of the White Australia Policy religion was a secondary factor 
as preference for British migrants assumed that they were at least ‘nominally Christian’ 
(Jupp, 2011:136) and would therefore pose no religious threat. Jupp (2011:136-137) 
contends that ‘(r)eligion was not one of the measures used to determine the status of 
immigrants’ and:
Some Muslims were accepted as ‘white’, including several Albanian families in the 1920s and others 
from the Balkans. A small number of Muslims, who had established residence before 1901, were 
allowed (like resident Chinese) to enter and leave under a permit system.
However, preference for certain ‘races’ meant that Christianity was automatically 
favoured and that according to Jupp (2011:137), ‘Religious variety only became 
significant with the ending of the White Australia Policy between 1966 and 1972... 
Physical appearance and descent had been central, but many Asians of ‘mixed race’ and 
Christian religion were admitted in the 1960s’. During the early years of 
multiculturalism (see Galbally report43, 1978, which we return to later in this chapter), 
‘religion was not emphasised’ (Jupp, 2011:138). Indeed, official definitions o f ‘culture’ 
excluded religion. Jupp (2011:138) explains:
The official definition of ‘culture’ as somehow excluding religion naturally influenced public policy 
towards ‘ethnic groups’. These were defined in terms of national origins, language and citizenship, 
replacing the racial basis officially used for most of the century before the 1970s.
Jupp (2011:139) believed that Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis (1997) 
and its emphasis on cultural/religious cleavages was relevant to the way Australians 
came to view the role of religion. Indeed, he states that ideas about Muslims greatly 
influenced the retreat from multiculturalism in a number of Western societies, including 
Australia. Further, Jupp (2011:141) argues that ‘From 9/11 onwards, the management of
43 Migrant Services and Programs: Report of the Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for 
Migrants 1978 was written by Frank Galbally and became widely known as the ‘Galbally Report’.
109
diversity shifted ground in most democracies from concern with language and welfare 
services to anxiety about religion, values and loyalty’.
Australia’s focus, up until the ‘War on terror’, was not overtly concerned with exclusion 
based on religious grounds and there was a distinct preference for governments to 
manage religious diversity through ‘integration’ (Jupp, 2011: 143). Religion, until !he 
events of 9/11, was relegated to the margins of political debate and Australia, like other 
Western societies, continued to ignore the importance of religion in politics (Maddox, 
2005). Like other ‘Western democracies’, Australia continues to conceive itself as 
secular, with clear demarcations between ‘Church and state’ (Jupp, 2011:145). 
However, in 2011, marking a significant shift in Australia’s relationship with religion, 
the Australian Human Rights Commission (Bouma et al, 2011:3-4) indicated tiat 
Australia exists in a religious world and that religion is important to people. They 
argued that religion touches on almost every aspect of life:
Beliefs, whether religious or anti-religious or a-religious, may contribute to defining a person’s 
identity, their reasons for living, their relationships with the material and transcendent aspects of the 
universe, their ways of living and ways of interacting with others...freedom of religion and belief 
encompasses many areas of human life; for example, the right of Indigenous Australians to practise 
their spirituality amid competing land claims, and how Australian courts manage and accommodate 
religious diversity while upholding the law. Freedom of religion and belief arises in the operations of 
governments, human rights bodies, civil society, and the judicial process.
Freedom to practice religion is safeguarded by ‘section 116 of the Australian 
Constitution, which prohibits the Federal Government from making any law 
establishing any religion’. However, the Human Rights Commission (Bouma et al, 
2011:3) rightly argues that Section 116 of Australian Constitution arguably provides 
limited protection, as the Constitution does not impact ‘on the legislative powers of the 
states and territories, which have more responsibility than does the Commonwealth for 
social regulation that may affect religious practice’. This necessarily means that the 
state should remain religiously neutral. However, this does not mean that citizens must 
remain religiously neutral.
Aside from section 116 of the Constitution, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)44 
provides some limited protection against discrimination on the basis of religion. If a
44 One outcome of the presence of marked diversity and the failure of assimilation was the introduction 
of anti-discrimination laws. In Australia, by the 1970s racial discrimination was a major concern anc the 
Whitlam Government introduced the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. The Whitlam Government is 
credited with: ‘accepting] that physical appearance or non-European origin [was] not a suitable basis on 
which to exclude people from the Australian community’ (Jupp, 1996:6). The Whitlam Government’s
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religious group can also be classified as an ‘ethnic’ group, the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 (Cth) may cover direct and indirect discrimination and vilification under its 
racial hatred provisions (HREOC, 2006). However, a report by the Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC, 1998:23) argued that ‘the level of 
protection afforded to the right to freedom of religion and belief in Australia is 
relatively weak compared to a number of other comparable countries’. In 2011, the 
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission continued to research the 
implications of the lack of protection at the federal level (see Bouma et al, 2011).
Of course, certain religions have been particularly associated with certain ‘ethnic 
groups’ in Australia. For example, Islam is held to be a religion of the Middle East, yet 
a significant number of adherents to Islam in Australia are not ‘Middle Eastern’, but 
come from a variety of countries (Saeed, 2003:1). Yet, discussions, whether in the 
media, Parliament or academic publications, treat Muslims as a coherent community - 
even though Islam has many sects and a variety of cultural manifestations (see Chapter 
7). Further, fieldwork conducted by Jacobson (1997) points to a preference by some 
second-generation British Pakistanis to differentiate between religion and ethnicity. In 
this particular study Jacobson notes the respondents’ preference to foreground their 
religious identity and stresses that Islam plays a more significant part in the formation 
of their identities (Jacobson, 1997:239). This phenomenon has also been evident in 
other locales including a study conducted after 9/11 in America. Peek (2005) considers 
how events such as 9/11 impact on identity formation amongst second-generation 
Muslim Americans and in this case how this event has shaped religious identity. Peek 
(2005) found that religious identity is important to second-generation Muslim 
Americans and indeed can be a primary source of identity. Whilst religion has often 
been subsumed under the study of ethnicity and culture the fact that individuals are 
actively choosing to make their religious identities central to their concept of self means 
that religious identities need to be approached differently and as distinct from ‘culture’.
achievements toward multiculturalism have also been succinctly summarised by Price (1976 in Foster 
and Stockley 1988:26-27) as: [the government]...introduced the new points system, extended the 
assisted passage scheme to all races, abolished discrimination in Trans-Tasman travelling, reduced the 
five-year naturalization period to three, made things easier for non-European students, allowed free 
overseas travel by Aborigines and abolished all race statistics and special records of non-European 
migration.
I l l
Islam is simultaneously discussed as a religion and as a ‘culture’, yet religious and 
‘ethno-religious’ identities (Modood, 2000:187), such as those created around Islam, are 
viewed as capable of threatening the secular nature of liberal democracies. Modood 
(1998:95) claims that ‘there is a theoretical incompatibility between multi-culturalism 
and radical secularism. That means that, in a society where some of the disadvantaged 
and marginalised minorities are religious minorities, a public policy of multiculturalism 
will require the public recognition of religious minorities, and the theoretical 
incompatibility will become a practical issue’. To pit Islam as a religious ideology 
against liberalism and secularism, and to categorise Muslims as religious deviants, as 
has been the case in the last decade (see Chapter 7), is to deny the rationale behind 
multicultural policy -  implemented, as will be discussed below, as a measure towards 
achieving social justice.
The process through which categories are created and implemented necessarily dictates 
the way policies are developed and mobilised. The way in which culture is defined 
necessarily shapes our understanding of how people from diverse cultural backgrounds 
can interact and whether immigrant settled countries like Australia can afford to rely on 
reductionist approaches to understanding culture. To conceive of cultures as 
essentialised and reified necessarily implies a ‘billiard ball’ approach to culture and 
cultural interaction; a definition of culture which cements the idea that cultural 
relativism is inevitable and that some cultures are incompatible (Huntington, 1997). 
This definition of culture dictates that people, knowingly, either belong to one culture or 
another. However, to deny that cultures are important to people is to hark back to a 
time of forced assimilation.
Benhabib (2002:4) clarifies the limitations of such conceptions of culture by outlining 
their ‘faulty epistemic premises’, which she terms the ‘reductionist sociology of 
culture’. She rejects the following premises:
1) that cultures are clearly delineable wholes; 2) that cultures are congruent with population groups 
and that a noncontroversial description of the culture of a human group is possible; and3) that even if 
cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one correspondence, even if there is more than one culture 
within a human group and more than one group that may possess the same cultural traits, this poses 
no important problems for politics or policy.
So while cultural recognition is vital for wellbeing (Taylor, 1994:36), Phillips (2007:45) 
argues that drawing boundaries around cultures reflects both an internal and an external 
struggle for power and control. Outsiders need to categorise and ‘place’ people (see
112
Hage, 1998 for more on space and domination) and insiders need to define ‘core 
practices and beliefs’. Additionally, there seems to be great confusion in societies like 
Australia (Dunn et al, 2004; Dunn and Nelson, 2011) about the nature of ‘racism’. 
While it has become common, under ‘New racism’, for people engaging in ‘racism’ to 
deny that they are racist (because they argue they are not referring directly to 
phenotypes or the racial hierarchy that characterised racism in the twentieth century see 
Every and Augoustinos, 2007), they are none-the-less engaging in racialised 
understanding of culture, religion and nation. ‘New racism’ then signifies a shift away 
from traditional racist rhetoric and behaviour toward cultural discrimination. However, 
‘culture’ continues to be marked by phenotypes, dress (religious or otherwise) and ‘third 
world looking’ (Hage, 1998) people.
Because definitions of culture, race and ethnicity continue to be contentious and 
continue to be debated, the debates themselves (if not arguably the actual concepts) are 
characteristically political. Therefore, simply recognising cultures without engaging 
with the political and social ramifications of a multi-cultural society necessarily denies 
full recognition of citizens (Modood, 1998a). As such, our conceptions of culture and 
the importance of culture are burdened by ideas fashioned in previous centuries. In this 
regard, one of the primary confusions is race and the link, if any between ‘race’, culture, 
religion and ‘ethnicity’. Countries that have implemented policies of ‘multiculturalism’ 
have certainly drawn links between all four definitions in order to neatly encapsulate 
people within manageable categories. These very links are directly implicated in the 
politics of belonging.
Culture and Multiculturalism
One of the major topics of debate in the past few decades has been the increase in 
immigration to Western countries. The increase in ‘foreign’ cultures within Western 
borders has given rise to questions about how such diverse cultures could be 
accommodated within the polity (Levey, 2008). Foreigners who reside in Western 
societies, as permanent residents or as citizens, have also upset much of the thinking 
about the ways in which cultures function and how diverse cultures can be 
accommodated, while preserving the ‘majority culture’ (Levey, 2008:13).
In the aftermath of World War Two, a number of Western nation-states, including the 
United States of America, Canada and Australia, competed for more immigrants and, 
consequently, experienced an exponential increase in immigration levels (DIMIA, 2001;
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Kymlicka, 2001:152). In the Australian case, the drive for more immigrants was largely 
due to population and labour concerns, although other factors, such as ‘security’, were 
also given as reasons for increases in immigration (DIMIA, 2001; see also Davidson, 
1997a; Castles et al, 1992). Due to the immigration policies discussed in the previous 
chapter, immigrants came primarily from Europe. However, by the 1960s and 70s 
immigrants increasingly arrived from Asian countries. The increase in the number of 
people with different ‘racial’ and ‘cultural’ backgrounds within Australian borders, as 
well as other immigrant-receiving countries (Joppke, 2005), became significant enough 
to present new challenges to any myths of homogeneity and for the incorporation of 
immigrants into the existing polity.
In order to reconcile different cultures within the one nation-state, countries like 
Australia decided to face these new challenges primarily through assimilating (Broom et 
al, 1977) new and existing migrants into the national framework. This approach showed 
little, if any, appreciation for the role that culture plays in the lives of people. The 
assimilation process was largely implemented through the national language (English), 
the broader education system and the valorisation of the ‘values’ and the culture of the 
‘host’ society, with marked antagonism toward cultures held by immigrants (whether 
new or established, economic or refugee (see Davidson, 1997a; Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 
2007a; Kymlicka, 1997:47; Joppke, 2005; see also previous chapter) or the indigenous 
populations. Kymlicka (2001:153) describes this process as the ‘Anglo-conformity’ 
model of immigration’. It is a process in which ‘immigrants were expected to assimilate 
to existing cultural norms, and, over time, become indistinguishable from native-born 
citizens in speech, dress, leisure activities, cuisine, family size, identities and so on’.
However, like other nations facing the challenges of an overwhelmingly culturally 
diverse polity, Australia also realised, by the 1960s, that the formal implementation of 
the policy of assimilation as a way of incorporating immigrants was not working, as it 
was based not on racial homogeneity, but rather on the maintenance of cultural 
homogeneity (York, 1996). As such, assimilation was no longer a preferred government 
policy (Hage, 1998; Greig et al, 2003), especially because many migrants could not 
‘racially’ assimilate, nor were they amenable to ‘shedding’ their cultures. This lack of 
assimilation further cemented the idea that some immigrants are ‘nonassimilable types’ 
(Parekh, 2006:5; Davidson, 1997a; Jupp, 2002).
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Consequently, by the late 1960s and 70s the ideals of multiculturalism became more 
prominent as fewer migrants were willing to assimilate at the expense of their own 
cultures, and assimilation was impossible for those who looked and behaved in ways 
that were too different (this was mostly the case for non-white/non-British immigrants 
and Indigenous peoples, Davidson, 1997a). Assimilation was also seen as an unjust 
practice and it attracted international, as well as local, criticism, as the policy of 
assimilation denied individual liberties and promoted inequality (York, 1995; York, 
1996; Grieg et al, 2003). Indeed, for many migrants, assimilation exasperated the 
already difficult adjustment processes, as well as encouraging higher rates of return 
migration by people to their countries of origin. This defeated the economic aims of 
immigration for Australia (York, 1995; York, 1996).
However, in Australia ‘cultural’ factors were viewed as key determinants of the success 
of assimilation. Those who were ‘culturally’ more suited to Australia were seen as able 
to assimilate (Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 2007a; Hage, 1998; Stratton, 1998), while those from 
‘other’ cultures were deemed to be culturally ‘handicapped’. Jupp (2007b: 17) explains 
that, in order for government to justify immigration to the population at large they had 
to simultaneously disseminate propaganda telling migrants to assimilate and appeals to 
the rest of the population to view immigrants as ‘just like us’, stressing the main 
difference was ‘...not appearance but of language, religion and custom’.
The policy of ‘multiculturalism’ was introduced when it became obvious that 
assimilation was not working and that, as a result of the immigration program, there 
were increasing numbers of people from cultures other than the British. Moreover, the 
stark reality was that the majority of immigrants continued to speak their own languages 
and practice their own cultures and full assimilation did not eventuate even for second- 
generation immigrants (Davidson, 1997a; Jupp, 2002).
Multiculturalism has proven to be difficult to define as a plethora of publications in the 
field have necessarily broadened the term to include normative, as well as substantive or 
empirical, approaches. Indeed, any search for multiculturalism yields publications from 
a diversity of disciplines and fields of study. None-the-less, according to Parekh 
(2006:6), the words ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ mean two different things. 
The first refers to the presence of more than one culture (as minorities) within the 
boundaries of the nation-state. The second terms refers to the ‘nonnative response to 
[this] fact’. Further, Inglis (1996:16) attempts to clarify what is meant by
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multiculturalism by distinguishing between, three distinct, yet overlapping, ‘referents’ 
of multiculturalism. She described them as ‘the demographic-descriptive, the 
ideological-normative and the programmatic-political’. In this way, Inglis (1996:16) 
usefully distinguishes between the different ways multiculturalism has been used in the 
wider public debates and discussions surrounding multiculturalism.
However, various ideals and agendas are attached to multiculturalism, which do not 
necessarily coincide with empirical reality. Put simply, theorising multiculturalism, and 
even multiculturalism as government policy, has not always reflected the actual 
circumstances, needs or desires of citizens. For this reason, multiculturalism has 
attracted much attention since its introduction into the political vernacular of Western 
states in the 1960s and 70s (see, for example, Davidson, 1997a; Jayasuriya, 2003; 
Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000, Hewitt, 2005).
Moreover, like contested terms in general, there are also vastly different meanings and 
normative endeavours attached to the term multiculturalism, both in theory and practice. 
Consequently, the term ‘multiculturalism’ encompasses at least four main areas: 1) the 
empirical reality of the presence of multiple cultures; 2) government policy in relation 
to immigrant and refugee integration; 3) a shift in nationalist discourse; and 4) 
philosophical developments around the rights of ‘Others’. At the same time, indigenous 
peoples’ relationship with their colonisers are sometimes studied under the rubric of 
multiculturalism (for more on this see Kymlicka, 2001), however it has been claimed 
that indigenous Australia have been reluctant to identify with multiculturalism, 
precisely because it seen as an as an ‘ethnic’ and therefore ‘immigrant’ issue (Dunn et 
al, 2010:20)45.
While multiculturalism came to embody difference, especially the plurality of 
difference, in fact it focused solely on ‘cultural’ differences. According to Parekh 
(2006:2):
Multiculturalism is not about difference and identity per se but about those that are embedded in and 
sustained by culture; that is, a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people 
understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective lives. Unlike 
differences that spring from individual choices, culturally derived differences carry a measure of 
authority and are patterned and structured by virtue of being embedded in a shared and historically
45 The rejection of the logic of cultural pluralism by Indigenous Australians is premised on their status as 
original inhabitants and as such their culture(s) should be accorded special status and not simply viewed 
as one culture amongst many.
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inherited system of meaning and significance... Multiculturalism, then, is about cultural diversity or 
culturally embedded differences (original emphasis).
Governments can deal with a multicultural society, either through embracing 
multiculturalism and making it a major aspect of national identity and the policy 
framework, or by assimilating ‘cultural’ ‘minorities’ into the dominant national 
framework, or a combination of both strategies (Meer and Modood, 2007). Whichever 
way nation-states decide to deal with minorities, the fact that the population is ‘multi­
cultural’ cannot be denied. According to Parekh (2006:6):
A multicultural society, then, is one that includes two or more cultural communities. It might respond 
to its cultural diversity in one of two ways, each in turn capable of taking several forms. It might 
welcome and cherish it, make it central to its self understanding, and respect the cultural demands of 
its constituent communities; or it might seek to assimilate these communities into its mainstream 
culture either wholly or substantially. In the first case it is multiculturalist and in the second 
monoculturalist in its orientation and ethos. Both alike are multicultural societies, but only one of 
them is multiculturalist.
Consequently, because multiculturalism is about culturally-embedded differences, and 
what Taylor (1994) has termed the state’s responsibility to extend recognition and 
respect to the unique identity of the individual or group (the politics of recognition), it 
has been, and still is, a highly contested term. Since its introduction, ‘multiculturalism’ 
and its many definitions have attracted debate, mostly due to its all-encompassing usage 
by a variety of commentators and scholars.
Within the debates about multiculturalism, one of the main issues that has attracted both 
scholars and popular commentators is the relationship between multiculturalism and 
modem nationalism (Gutmann, 1994; Kymlicka, 2001). Due largely to the tight linkage 
of multiculturalism to issues of immigration, refugees and their settlement (Davidson, 
1997a), multiculturalism has attracted heavy criticism from those who claim 
multiculturalism as a ‘Trojan horse’ (Schmidt, 1997).
In his critique of multiculturalism, Barry (2001) contends that multiculturalism is 
premised on cultural relativism and that the argument that all cultures are essentially 
equal is plainly false. Similarly, after the presentation o f ‘immoral’ cultural practices as 
evidence of the failure of multiculturalism, Schmidt (1997:40) contends:
...if America were to fully accept the multiculturalist doctrine of cultural equality, it would 
undoubtedly have the effect of drastically diluting its present national and cultural pride. Such a 
posture in all likelihood would dismantle the nation's 300-year-old culture and its worldwide
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influence. It would end America. Indeed the Trojan horse of multiculturalism is more than a minor 
nuisance in the life of America's culture.
This line of argument against multiculturalism is not uncommon and has been echoed in 
the theoretical debates against multiculturalism46, as well as in the political rhetoric by 
those who view ‘cultural relativism’ as a danger to nationalism and social cohesion in 
Australia (see Chapter 6). Parekh (2007), in his reply to Barry (2001), states that Barry’s 
dismissal of culture as tangential is erroneous as ‘culture matters for human beings. It is 
tied up with their pride, self-respect and even identity’ (Parekh, 2007:350).
Similarly, some scholars have argued that treating cultures as ‘equal’ necessarily means 
that there is ‘a deep and growing tension between feminism and multiculturalist 
concerns to protect cultural diversity’ and that ‘feminism and multiculturalism’ are not 
necessarily ‘easily reconciled’ (Okin 1999a: 10; see also Okin, 1999b). Okin (1999a: 10) 
argues that there is tension between practices condoned as part of the maintenance of a 
commitment to group rights for minority cultures and equality for women, who under 
certain cultural circumstances are denied equal rights. Okin (1999a: 10) uses ‘the French 
accommodation of polygamy’ to illustrate the concerns with the tension between 
feminism and multiculturalism.
In contrast, Anne Phillips in her book Multiculturalism without Culture (2007) suggests 
that, while cultures can, and do, harbour sexist and unequal treatment of women, 
feminism and multiculturalism are not necessarily antithetical, as they both try to 
redress inequality. However, she also notes that, even while some cultures harbour 
patriarchal and oppressive practices, this discussion has also been misused by those who 
have used ‘cultural’ practices like female genital mutilation and polygamy as a means to 
denigrate cultures wholesale. She states (2007:3):
Multiculturalism became the scapegoat for an extraordinary array of political and social evils, a 
supposedly misguided approach to cultural diversity that encouraged men to beat their wives, parents 
to abuse their children, and communities to erupt in racial violence
The important point that Phillips (2007:25-27) makes is that most opposition to 
multiculturalism derives from viewing cultures as bounded and projecting stereotypes 
of liberal and illiberal cultures that distinguish between Western and non-Western 
cultures. She suggests strongly (2007: 24) ‘that the failure to problematise culture has 
contributed to a radical otherness that represents people as profoundly different in their
46 See Lukes, 2003 for a thorough analysis of the implications of diversity and cultural relativism.
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practices, values and beliefs. This in turn has enabled critics of multiculturalism to 
represent it as more intrinsically separatist...and to represent cultural differences as a 
major source of political instability’. In this vein, most attempts at discrediting 
multiculturalism treat cultures as bounded entities and treat multicultural policies as 
giving rise to actual cultural pluralism, where cultures are viewed as reproducing 
themselves in relative isolation (See Okin, 1999b for the varied responses to her original 
thesis). The next section will discuss the idea and policy of Australian multiculturalism, 
itself premised on what Lukes (2008:95-96) terms the ‘mosaic views of cultures as 
monochrome unities with sharply defined borders’ (See also Benhabib, 2002).
Australian Multiculturalism
Immigration continues to have profound social and economic impacts in Australia. A 
reply by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(DIMIA, 2005) to a discussion paper produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
(ABS, 2005) indicates that immigration to Australia remains imperative for internal 
economic reasons:
Without immigration, it is projected that the number of Australians of workforce age would begin to 
decline in little more than a decade. To help address the skills shortages that already face us, 
including in regional Australia, and the projected longer term decline in natural growth, the 
Government has announced an increased Migration Program of between 130,000 and 140,000 places 
for 2005-06, some 70% of which will be for skilled migrants and their families. This will be the 
largest skills stream on record.
Moreover, although Australian demographic characteristics have changed markedly 
since World War Two, the last two decades have witnessed dramatic changes. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has been publishing snapshots of Australia’s 
social trends every five years. In their 2003 publication, the ABS indicates that the data 
gathered from census questions regarding ancestry since 1986 demonstrate dramatic 
growth in ancestries originating in South and East Asia. In comparison to the data 
gathered in 1986, the ‘Chinese, Vietnamese and Indian ancestries more than doubled] 
in number by 2001’ (ABS, 2003). Moreover, ‘Lebanese ancestry also increased rapidly 
over the period, by 76%’. Further, data gathered by the ABS indicates growing diversity 
in respect to ancestry of Australian citizens. The report stated:
In 2001, the two most common ancestries of the Australian population were Australian47 (reported by 
6.7 million people) and English (reported by 6.4 million). The third most common was Irish (1.9
47 The category ‘Australian’ is a new addition to the census categories of ancestry- this category may 
also disguise 2nd and 3rd generation immigrant ancestry
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million people), followed by Italian (800,000), German (742,000), Chinese (557,000) and Scottish 
(540,000). A further six ancestries were each stated by between 150,000 and 500,000 people - Greek, 
Dutch, Lebanese, Indian, Vietnamese and Polish. In total, more than 160 ancestries were separately 
identified, many of which were relatively uncommon (70 were each stated by less than 2,500 people).
The data gathered by the Australian Bureau of Statistics indicates that Australia is a 
culturally diverse society. However, cultural diversity within the Australian population 
is not new, as post-World War Two immigration to Australia diversified the type of 
immigrant allowed into Australia (Jupp, 2002), not to mention diversity in economic 
fortunes, social status, ‘race’, sex and religion found in Australia at Federation (see 
Thompson, 1994). The more recent phenomenon however, has been a rise in non- 
Christian immigrants with religious affiliations once categorised as ‘Other’.
ABS statistics show that change in religious affiliation is evident in Australia since 
1901. The ABS (2008a) indicates that ‘Australian society in 1901 was predominantly 
Anglo-Celtic, with 40% of the population being Anglican, 23% Catholic, 34% other 
Christian and about 1% professing non-Christian religions’. However, data gathered in 
the 1996 and 2001 censuses indicate a changing profile for religious affiliation (ABS, 
2006). For example, ‘Followers of religions other than Christianity have shown the 
largest proportional increases since the 1996 census. The number of persons affiliated 
with Buddhism increased by 79%, with Hinduism by 42%, Islam 40% and Judaism 
5%.’ The ABS (2006) data further indicates that the majority of affiliates to non- 
Christian religions are relatively younger than those affiliating with Christianity.
Moreover, the ABS (2006) claims that waves of immigration have contributed 
considerably to the diversity of religious affiliation in Australia stating that ‘More 
recently, immigration from South-East Asia and the Middle East has expanded Buddhist 
and Muslim numbers considerably, and increased the ethnic diversity of existing 
Christian denominations’. The ABS (2008a) further indicates that the majority of the 
affiliates to non-Christian religions are relatively younger than those affiliating with 
Christianity. More recently, a report published by the Australian Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission (Bouma et al, 2011:4) emphasised:
So, Australia is partly a Christian country, partly a multifaith country, and partly a secularist country. 
This can make speaking or generalising about religion in Australia complicated. As this report shows, 
many religious and spiritualist voices mingle with secularist and humanist voices, with little 
unanimity on issues.
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While the demographic snapshots produced by the ABS (2006; 2008b) indicate growing 
diversity in ancestry and religious affiliations, conceptions of culture in Australia 
remain framed in ways that privilege what is often referred to as the ‘majority’ or 
‘mainstream’ culture (Joppke, 2005:20). This approach to the identification of 
‘majority’ and ‘minority’ ‘cultures’ and the continued reference to ‘mainstream’ culture 
by various Australian politicians (especially John Howard see previous chapter) 
reproduces inequality (Grieg et al, 2003:Chap 6) and compounds putative difficulties 
seen to be inherent in recognising and ‘tolerating’ ‘other’ cultures and religions. 
Consequently, while ‘ethnic selectivity’ (Joppke 2005:20) is no longer practiced overtly 
in immigration policies in Australia (Joppke, 2005), there is a marked difference, as 
Joppke (2005:20) explains, ‘...between the state’s minimalist “by default” preferencing 
and a maximalist “by design” preferencing of the majority culture- if the former 
inevitably occurs, a license for the latter does not necessarily follow’.
‘Approaches’ to diversity and the State’s response to ‘ethnically’ and ‘racially’ 
diversified immigration has been a preoccupation in Australian government and 
academic circles since the broadening of the immigration program after World War 
Two. However, since the introduction of ‘multiculturalism’ in Australia as an 
alternative paradigm to previous immigrant settlement approaches, the predominant 
‘Australian’ culture was undisputedly placed as the culture which immigrants should 
aspire to join (Hage, 1998; Stratton, 1998).
By the 1960s and early 70s various changes occurred, both in the international and 
domestic political spheres, to halt blatant ‘racialist’ attitudes and policies toward 
‘Others’ (Markus, 2001:17). This trend was not confined to Australia and other liberal 
states such as Britain, Canada and the United States of America also changed their 
immigration policies (Joppke, 2005). Up until this point, immigrant integration in 
Australia rested on the successful assimilation of immigrants, which entailed 
immigrants ‘shedding’ their culture and taking on the British or ‘Australian culture’. 
Empirically, assimilation was implemented largely at the institutional level, primarily 
though educational institutions and employment (Jupp, 2002). Immigrants would still 
practice their own cultures in the private sphere and amongst themselves in their ‘ethnic 
communities’ (Hage, 1998, Jupp, 2007a). However, the various government policies 
which were oriented toward the assimilation of immigrants did not sufficiently deal 
with the settlement problems for migrant groups, which started to emerge, due largely to 
the ‘levelling’ mechanism of the policy of assimilation. These problems included a lack
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of access to government information, employment, housing, education, health and 
welfare (Jupp, 2002; Greig et al, 2003:213). In light of these sorts of problems and in 
the context of the growth of civil rights movements in the United States of America and 
multiculturalism in Canada (Lopez, 2000), integration was viewed as a more realistic, 
and just, long-term policy. Integration was introduced in Australia when assimilation 
clearly failed to fulfil the visions of homogeneity (Foster and Stockly, 1988) and when 
it was felt that the maintenance of social cohesion was better facilitated by integrating 
immigrants. Consequently, integration and its successor ‘multiculturalism’ were 
introduced into the political vernacular in the late twentieth century as an alternative to 
policies which ignored the presence and the importance of culture for individuals and 
groups within the state’s borders.
As such, while any discussion of multiculturalism must be put in context, in the case of 
Australian multiculturalism, government policy and publications have clearly provided 
the sources of information about what multiculturalism might mean in terms of what 
Inglis (1996:16) calls the ‘ideological-normative and the programmatic-political’ 
aspects of multiculturalism. In Australia, since the introduction of the term 
‘multiculturalism’, subsequent government policies and key government figures equated 
cultural expression and access to culture with issues of equality and social justice (Grieg 
et al, 2003: 114). In this way, multicultural policies were introduced to remedy issues 
of inequality of access to society’s resources and introduce equality of opportunity for 
minorities who were characterised as non-English speaking, or more precisely from 
non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB) (See Davidson, 1997a; Jupp, 2007a for 
discussion on this term and its significance). Some authors believe that 
‘multiculturalism’ was also introduced in Australia in the hope that it would extend to a 
form of post-national identity (Stratton and Ang, 1998).
However, the date of the advent of formal multicultural policy in Australia is contested. 
Some agree that the Australian Government declared Australia to be multicultural in 
1973 (Jones, 2000:177, Jupp, 2001:259 Grieg et al), after more than six decades of the 
formal implementation of the ‘White Australia Policy’. So, Jupp (1996:6) explains that 
the policy of multiculturalism ‘followed a decade when attitudes and policies were 
coming to grips with new realities rather than being based on previous experience with 
British immigration’. This new reality included the larger number of non-British 
(‘darker’ see Hage, 2001) Europeans entering Australia after World War Two and an
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increase in Asian immigrants to Australia (as immigrants and as refugees) in the 1970s 
and 80s.
In contrast, Stratton (1999:178) argues that the shift from assimilation to integration was 
not logical and chronological. He argues (1999:178; see also Jones, 2000) that 
integration is the indistinct successor to assimilation:
It is of the utmost importance to remember that the advent of official multiculturalism had absolutely 
nothing to do with the official ending of the White Australia Policy, which happened around the 
same time. What linked them were the Whitlam government’s progressive social liberalism
and the historical shift in Western thought from a reductive emphasis on race to a more relativistic 
emphasis on culture. The assumption, which appears every so often, that multiculturalism was 
somehow designed to manage the increasing racial diversity in Australia, is itself a mistaken 
consequence of racialist thinking.
Prior to the establishment of the Institute of Multicultural Affairs, assimilation and 
ethnic affairs in general were dealt with by the Department of Immigration. There was a 
marked absence of institutions that were especially created in order to deal with 
settlement issues for new migrants. Indeed, The Good Neighbour Movement which ‘had 
been created from existing charitable agencies to assist migrants’ (Jupp, 2007a: 13), and 
which was entirely ‘dedicated to assimilation’ (Jupp 2007a:24), was one of only two 
bodies established to deal with settlement issues for migrants, the second being the 
Department of Immigration. Both the increase in non-British migration to Australia and 
increased dissatisfaction with assimilation by immigrants challenged these two 
institutions of assimilation. In this way, symbolic immigration control at the border also 
translated to immigration control within Australia. Once inside as citizens, the 
Immigration Department continued to influence the lives of migrants.
Many credit A1 Grassby (Federal Immigration Minister in the Whitlam Labor 
Government) with borrowing the Canadian term ‘multi-cultural’ and introducing it into 
Australia (Lopez, 2000; see also Castles et al, 1992; Markus, 2001; Grieg et al, 2003). 
Grassby used the term ‘multiculturalism’ in his speech in 1973, entitled 'A Multi- 
Cultural Society for the Future' (Grassby, 1973; see also Stratton, 2000; Foster and 
Stockley, 1988; Stratton and Ang, 1998; Grieg et al, 2003). Grassby spoke of the 
challenges to the Australian nation and the repercussions of the increase in immigration 
for the future. He identified the inequalities facing migrants in way of education and 
socio-economic opportunities. However, Grassby did not use the word 
‘multiculturalism’ in his actual speech outside of making some references to the 
American melting-pot approach, which he did not consider suitable for Australia. He
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did however refer to the nation as a family and, through this symbolism, communicated 
that, although diverse, Australians could come together in a common cause.
However, aside from the reference to multiculturalism made by Grassby (1973) in his 
speech, the way in which Australia adopted its own version of multiculturalism is 
contested. Lopez (2000) argues that the shift toward multiculturalism in public policy 
during the Whitlam Government succeeded, despite great opposition from those who 
supported other approaches to dealing with the problems of integrating migrants. Lopez 
(2000) attributes the success of multiculturalism as state policy to multicultural 
lobbyists who ‘vigorously and strenuously [promoted] it’ (Lopez 2000:188), rather than 
to widespread support. Other commentators also note that multiculturalism was imposed 
on the Australian population at large and was not organic, but was an ‘elitist’ policy that 
created relationships between members of government who were supportive of 
‘multiculturalism’ and ethnic community leaders (See Jupp, 2007a for discussions on 
this topic; see also Galligan and Roberts, 2004).
Lopez (2000:38-39) argues that multiculturalism was developed between 1966 and 
1975 ‘by a small number of academics, social workers and activists initially located on 
the fringe of the political arena of migrant settlement and welfare...’. These academics 
included Jerzy Zubrzycki and Jean Martin, who subsequently came to define the main 
themes of multiculturalism in the report Australia as a Multicultural Society, which they 
produced on behalf of the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council in 1977. Jupp (2007a:82) 
argues that the definition of multiculturalism produced by Zubrzycki and Martin (1977) 
in their report has been ‘handed down through committee reports for the next twenty 
years, amended but never repudiated’. The report (Zubrzycki and Martin, 1977:2-3) 
explained:
Like most other societies, Australia is composed of a majority population from a roughly 
homogeneous ethnic background and a number of minority populations; the established institutions 
reflect and confirm the various interests, ways of life, values and world views of the majority. We use 
the term Anglo-Australian for this majority population and culture, though recognising of course that 
this term embraces class, regional, religious and other kinds of internal differentiation. We describe 
as 'ethnic' the people who form the minority populations of non-Anglo-Australian origin and their 
institutions; apart from the Aborigines, the overwhelming majority of ethnics in Australia are 
migrants or the children of migrants. Where language differences between ethnics and Anglo- 
Australians are particularly relevant, we use terms like 'of non-English speaking origin' or 'non- 
English speakers'. The term 'migrant' appears only where the fact of 'migrancy' as compared with 
'ethnicity' is significant for the matter under discussion.
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Additionally, the report outlined the three main dimensions of multiculturalism 
(Zubrzycki and Martin, 1977:2-14):
1) Social cohesion or the ‘social good’;
2) Equality or ‘equal access to social resources’-belonging to an ethnic group should not preclude a 
person from accessing social resources;
3) Culture Identity or ‘sense of belonging and attachment to a particular way of living associated with 
the historical experience of particular groups of people.
The Whitlam Government has been credited by some with the formal advent of 
multiculturalism in Australia. However, Markus (2001:26) contends that the Whitlam 
Government’s contribution was largely in rhetoric. It was the Galbally report, produced 
in 1978 during the Fraser Liberal Government, that consciously outlined the policy of 
multiculturalism and, as such, shaped multicultural policy through the recommendations 
it made, which were largely implemented by the Fraser Government (Markus, 2001:26- 
27; see also Jupp, 2007a; Lopez, 2000; York, 1996).
Jupp (2007a:84) contends that the guiding principles found in the Galbally Report have 
been used as guiding principles for all subsequent policies on multiculturalism in 
Australia. The Galbally Report elaborated on the important dimensions articulated by 
Zubrzycki and Martin (1977). The Galbally report (1978:1-2) stated:
In developing our recommendations, we have adopted the following guiding principles: (a) all 
members of our society must have equal opportunity to realise their full potential and must have 
equal access to programs and services;(b) every person should be able to maintain his or her culture 
without prejudice or disadvantage and should be encouraged to understand and embrace other 
cultures;(c) needs of migrants should, in general, be met by programs and services available to the 
whole community but special services and programs are necessary at present to ensure equality of 
access and provisioned) services and programs should be designed and operated in full 
consultation with clients, and self-help should be encouraged as much as possible with a view to 
helping migrants to become self-reliant quickly.
Moreover, the Galbally Report (1978) identified English language deficiency and 
structural difficulties in attaining English language proficiency as the key deterrents to 
ethnic integration in Australia. It concluded that ‘the migrants who have the greatest 
difficulties are those who arrive here with little or no understanding of the English 
language and who remain at a disadvantage because of that’ (Galbally, 1978:2). It was 
reported that, as a result, migrants suffered hardships in employment and social contact,
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with woman, the elderly and young children most prone to disadvantages resulting from 
language barriers.
The Report, endorsed by Fraser (Fraser, 1978) in his speech to Parliament and published 
in various languages, saw the solution to problems faced by ethnic communities 
primarily in terms of the establishment of stronger ties with ethnic community leaders, 
in order to allow for better access to government services, including in health, welfare, 
employment, education and law. The report indicated that the creation and 
strengthening of existing, community-based organisations was a necessary move and 
that ethnic communities, with the help of government funding, could help themselves. 
In addition, disparate organisations, including government bodies, voluntary agencies 
and ethnic groups, needed to coordinate to better deliver services to migrants in need. 
Jupp (2007a:85) explains that ‘The central importance of the report lay in its recognition 
that ‘...ultimately ethnic groups themselves must take on the task of advising 
government of the needs and priorities of migrants and ensuring that ethnic cultures are 
fostered and preserved’. In this way, immigrants who were not necessarily conscious of 
belonging to distinct ethnic groups had to actively mobilise into ‘ethnic communities’48 
in order to extend their claims.49
Consequently, it was the Galbally Report that initially framed multiculturalism in 
cultural terms. Grieg et al (2003:115) suggest that the Galbally Report ‘viewed the 
identification and promotion of cultural identity as a key factor in the success of 
multiculturalism [where cultural] identity stresses the importance of preserving one's 
mother tongue, kin ties, ethnic customs and religion and their relation to the formation 
of an individual's sense of identity’.
As such, the Galbally Report emphasised that the denial of culture to immigrants would 
be against the long term interests of Australia. Moreover, Jupp (2007a:85) viewed the 
recommendation of the Galbally Report as a real step toward acknowledging the needs 
of migrants and a major move toward dissolving the barriers to access society’s 
resources. Jupp (2007a:85) contends:
4S This is contrary to the recommendations made by Zubrzycki & Martin (1977) who clearly highlighted 
that immigrants should have input as individuals as-well as community members.
49 The Galbally Report also pointed to a lack of communication as a barrier and recommended funding 
for the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), ethnic radio and interpretation services for information 
dissemination. The Report also recommended the creation of the Institute of Multicultural Affairs: 
‘which would engage in and commission research and advise government bodies on multicultural 
issues’. The AIMA was established in 1979 (see Jupp, 2007a:85 for a discussion of the Report).
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The Galbally report goes well beyond a new structure for migrant welfare delivery in its discussion 
of multiculturalism and the media. The report ‘rejects the argument that cultural diversity necessarily 
creates divisiveness. Rather we believe that hostility and bitterness between groups are often the 
result of cultural repression (para 9.7). If multiculturalism was to succeed it needed an educational 
program, the fostering of cultures and languages, the development of relevant knowledge, greater 
effort by the Australian Council, and cultural agreements with other societies. These themes were to 
be repeated for the next thirty years with modest results...
However, the Galbally Report can also be viewed as having cemented a formal account 
of Australian culture that gave pride of place to the very egalitarian myth that 
Thompson (1994) argues is part of the problem. For example, Stratton (2000:24) 
asserts that:
...the effect of the organising principle of the policy was to construct a formal organisation of 
Australian culture which distinguished between a core and a periphery. The core culture was that 
which was considered to exist already in Australia, what had been formed through the pressures of 
Anglo-conformity, and which, mythically though, was thought to have 'always' existed. The 
periphery cultures were those of the European and Levantine migrant groups who had been allowed 
into Australia from the time of Arthur Calwell's broadening of the White Australia Policy in the 
period following the end of the second world war.
Framing multiculturalism in terms of acknowledging cultural diversity and the right of 
immigrants to practice their cultures was indeed an important step in shifting the 
rhetoric of belonging away from assimilation. The very act of delineating ‘ethnic’ 
group categories is itself a political act (Stratton, 2000). The fact that groups were 
largely categorised as either English-speaking or non-English-speaking further 
identified which groups were ‘ethnic’ and which groups were not. For instance, Stratton 
(2000:23) suggests that ‘Those migrants who come from English-speaking countries, 
and who are themselves first-language English speakers, and those Australians 
descended from such migrants, do not tend to get identified ethnically’. It thus became 
more acceptable to differentiate people according to their ‘culture’, rather than their 
‘race’. However, the creation of the category ‘ethnic’ continued to demarcate people 
according to their race, as well as their culture. The creation of the category ‘ethnic’ 
also created a conscious delineation between a knowable, and stable, ‘core culture’ and 
an identifiable ‘ethnic culture’. Through the processes of the recognition of the cultures 
of other people within society, it was deemed that the ‘right to practice culture’ was 
imperative for the wellbeing of individuals and the creation and maintenance of social 
cohesion.
While Australian multiculturalism has been defined and redefined, Jupp (2007a:85) 
suggests that its 1977 definition has been consistently used in government policy.
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Similarly, Grieg et al (2003:114) explain that ‘Multiculturalism is an important 
development because, in all its manifestations since the 1970s, it has linked the value of 
preserving cultural identity with a concern for equality or social justice’. This was 
clearly articulated in the Galbally Report. However, it was the 1977 report Australia as 
a Multicultural Society, written by Jerzy Zubrzycki and Jean Martin (1977), which laid 
the foundations for the guiding principles of Australian multiculturalism. Indeed, the 
report established the terminology which came to be used in all subsequent reports and 
policy papers on Australian multiculturalism and it clearly establishes the differentiation 
between the wider Australian culture and ethnic minorities.
The report (Zubrzycki and Martin, 1977: 3-4) highlighted ‘three key social issues’: 
social cohesion; equality; and cultural identity (described earlier). It also established the 
link between equality and cultural identity:
The crux of our argument is that Australia is already a society of multiple cultural identities, or a 
multicultural society, and that equality can best be promoted (perhaps can only be promoted) through 
policies that harness it to cultural identity’ (emphasis in the original).
However, by the late 1980s another definition of multiculturalism gained currency. 
Indeed, the foundation Director of the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA), Dr. Peter 
Shergold, decided that the OMA would focus on the ‘economic benefits of a culturally 
diverse society and how those benefits needed to be advanced through government 
policy’ (Jakubowicz, 2012b: 1). As such, the economic dimensions of multiculturalism 
were emphasised, as well as cultural maintenance and equity (see Jakubowicz, 2010b). 
In the Forward to the book The Challenge of Diversity, published by the Office of 
Multicultural Affairs in 1989 (Jupp, 1989), Peter Vaughan, then Director of the Office 
of Multicultural Affairs, highlighted the ‘three dimensions of multicultural policy’ as 
defined by the Commonwealth Government. They are important enough to be re-stated 
at length here:
• Cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and 
share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;
• Social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the 
removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture and religion, language, gender or place of 
birth;
• Economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively the skills and 
talents of all Australians, regardless of background
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Thus, in addition to the three themes of multiculturalism presented by Zubrzycki and 
Martin (1977) and the Galbally Report, ‘economic efficiency’ also became a key theme 
in Australian multiculturalism, especially after the FitzGerald Report was produced in 
198850. It aimed to ensure that Australia’s immigration policy focused on economic 
issues. The Report claimed that the number of people wanting to immigrate to Australia 
was too high and that it was necessary to screen applicants for suitability. Suitability 
was judged based on a number of factors, including age, English language proficiency 
and skill, but the underlying focus was on accepting economically viable immigrants; 
those who can contribute to the Australian economy, whilst also putting the least 
demands on Australian society. Although the FitzGerald Report (1988) was not directly 
concerned with multiculturalism, it made reference to Australia’s culture and 
citizenship.
The New Agenda for Multicultural Australia (DIMA, 1999) articulated the potential 
divisiveness of diversity and the need to articulate multicultural policy as a policy for 
social-cohesion. ‘Civic duty’ was added to the list, where civic duty: ‘obliges all 
Australians to support those basic structures and principles of Australian society which 
guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity in our society to flourish’ 
(DIMA, 1999). Indeed, the report only echoed fears found throughout Australia’s 
history, that ‘diversity’, especially ‘racial’ and ‘cultural’ diversity, was always, to 
different degrees, viewed as threatening (Jupp, 2011).
In the Update to the 1999 New Agenda for Multicultural Australia: Strategic 
Directions for 2003- 2006, entitled Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity 
(DIMIA, 2003), the ‘economically productive’ aspect of multiculturalism was re-stated. 
So, ‘Productive diversity’ is identified as the fourth principle which underpins 
Australian multiculturalism. It is stated that ‘All Australians benefit from productive 
diversity, that is, the significant cultural, social and economic dividends arising from the 
diversity of our population. Diversity works for all Australians’ (DIMIA, 2003:6). In 
this way ‘diversity’ is viewed as ‘lucrative’51.
The major themes of multiculturalism in Australia can be ascertained from the various 
reports produced since Australia as a Multicultural Society (Zubrzycki and Martin,
50 It must be noted that the FitzGerald report came at a time of re-heightened debate about Asian 
immigration and a re-ignited fear of an Asian invasion.
51 This view of multiculturalism also coincided with an increase in ‘skilled migration’ quotas to focus on 
attracting ‘skilled labour’ or economically viable immigrants (Markus, 2001).
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1977). Three recurring themes emerged from ‘the many statements of multiculturalism 
over the past twenty-five years’ (Grieg et al, 2003:115): the value of preserving cultural 
identity; the importance of attaining social equality; and the importance of maintaining 
social cohesion and economic efficiency, given numerous reports post-1988 have 
stressed the preference for economically viable immigrants; and the need to capitalise 
on Australia’s diversity (DIMIA, 2003:8).
The recognition of ethnicity and ethnic communities as part of wider multicultural 
policy has been recognised by some as a positive step in coming to terms with the 
existence of a plurality of cultures in Australia. The recognition that immigrants cannot 
simply ‘shed’ their culture in order to acquire a ‘new’ one and that different cultures are 
not viewed as inferior can also be viewed as a positive step away from fne ‘White 
Australia Policy’ and assimilation. The Galbally Report (1978) produced during the 
Fraser Government suggested ways in which the barriers preventing immigrants from 
access to society’s resources can, and should, be remedied through English language 
training, the involvement of ethnic community leaders in discussion, training for those 
working with ethnic minorities and the enhancement of communication between 
government and immigrants. The Report led to the creation of ethnic schools, 
translation services, migrant resource centres, the Australian Institute of Multicultural 
Affairs and ethnic radio and television (Jupp, 2002).
It is argued however, that, while the provision of these services certainly went a long 
way in instrumentally bettering the lives of many migrants, there have also been 
limitations and obstructions worthy of note. According to Jupp (2007a:90):
Australian multiculturalism is best understood as an aspect of immigrant settlement policy. It grew 
out of concern with settlement rather than with cultural maintenance, which has largely been left to 
the ethnic communities. While it officially validated such maintenance against assimilationism, from 
the Galbally report in 1978, through the access and equity strategies of the 1980s and on to the 
agendas of 1989 and 1995, the central focus has been on alleviating problems faced by non-English- 
speaking immigrants.
As Jupp (2007a) explains, cultural maintenance has never been high on the agenda in 
government policy. While immigrants from other cultures were no longer expected and 
forced to assimilate to the problematic ‘Australian culture’, they have always been 
expected to integrate. The only compromise was that immigrants could maintain their 
cultures in the private sphere. Cultural pluralism was never viewed as a realistic, nor 
desirable, outcome of immigration and it was assumed that second generation
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immigrants would naturally integrate and would come to identify with the ‘majority’ 
culture (Joppke, 2005). Moreover, problematically, ‘ethnic community’ groups were 
defined according to the language they spoke and immigrants in general were 
characterised as either from an English-speaking background or from a non-English- 
speaking background (or NESB) , thus the primary stress has been on the ability, or the 
lack of ability, to speak English. This has certainly overshadowed other important 
aspects of cultures that have been left mute, such as religion, and has certainly collapsed 
any differences between ethnic groups, or indeed between individuals within ‘ethnic 
groups’. Jupp (2007b: 17) contends that Australian multiculturalism has been a process 
of social engineering ‘to prevent and contain conflict without recourse to crude 
coercion...underlying it was a broad philosophy that carefully chosen human beings 
could be settled within a stable and prosperous society’.
Australian Multiculturalism as government policy has also been criticised by some 
because it is viewed as extending very little to both ‘ethnic groups’ and to ‘mainstream’ 
Australians. For example, Davidson (1997b) contends that multiculturalism has not 
allowed for political participation by minority groups and that ‘It is not flippant to say 
that a multicultural Australia incorporated souvlaki and dragon dances but not the legal, 
political and ethical voices of its myriad NESB [non-English-speaking-background] 
newcomers’ (original emphasis, Davidson, 1997b:77). Similarly, it is arguable that what 
is called ‘multiculturalism’ refers to the diversity of cultural existence and is premised 
on cuisine, dance and art (what Jupp, 2002:24 calls the ‘Pasta and Polka’ 
multiculturalism53; see also Castles et al, 1992; Hage, 1998).
Moreover, it is stressed by some that the public sphere has only one over-riding culture 
(Levey, 2008; Joppke and Morawska, 2003) and in the Australian context it is the 
Anglo-Australian one, as defined by politicians and commentators54. In his influential 
book White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Nation, Ghassan 
Hage (1998) argues that Australian multiculturalism has always granted a privileged 
status to white Anglo-Celtic Australians. He argues that white Anglo-Celtic Australians 
have always enjoyed a form of ‘governmental belonging’ that positions them as
52 The term CALD- Culturally and Linguistically Diverse is used by The Federation of Ethnics Councils 
of Australia -it also ignores religious diversity.
53 Pasta and Polka multiculturalism primarily describes the process where minorities are welcome to 
‘practice’ their cultures in the private sphere, with occasional ‘celebrations of multiculturalism’ in the 
public sphere.
54 Nationalism and national identity in Australia is fragmented. While some claim that Australia’s 
institutions are Anglo-Australian and there is a clear Anglo-Australian culture (Levey, 2008) others 
argue that multiculturalism should be the overall identity in Australia (Stratton and Ang, 1998)
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managers with the right to exercise their ‘govemmental/managerial attitudes’ vis-ä-vis 
Aboriginal Australians and ethnic minorities. Hage (1998:121) also argues:
In the context of Australian multiculturalism, the point being made is not simply that the discourse of 
enrichment places the dominant culture in a more important position than other migrant cultures. 
More importantly, this discourse also assigns to migrant cultures a different mode of existence to 
Anglo-Celtic culture. While the dominant White culture merely and unquestioningly exists, migrant 
cultures exist for the latter. Their value, or the viability of their preservation as white Australians are 
concerned, lies in their function as enriching cultures. It is in this sense that the discourse of 
enrichment contributes to the positioning of non-white Australians within the white nation fantasy.
Indeed, it has been argued that ‘multiculturalism’ was for ‘ethnics’ only and it was 
never a policy that was consciously extended to include Australians from the ‘majority 
culture’, precisely because it was about managing ethnic cultures (Markus, 2001). This 
criticism was repeatedly levelled against policies of multiculturalism throughout its 
history (see Lopez, 2000; Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 2007a; Jupp, 2007b).
In referring to analysis conducted by Lopez (2000) and their own analysis of the 
numerous reports and policy papers produced by a variety of public agencies in 
Australia, Grieg et al (2003:117) note that the political and migrant issues are kept 
separate. This is largely communicated in official documents on multiculturalism 
through the stress on ‘social cohesion’ (this will be taken up in the next chapter). It is 
noted in almost every major document on multiculturalism that immigrants have the 
right to practice their own cultures within defined limits. As the Director of the Office 
of Multicultural Affairs Peter Vaughan (in Jupp, 1989) noted in his ‘dimensions’ of 
multiculturalism, the first is ‘the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits 
to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and 
religion’. By 2003, and as ‘ethnic’ cultural practices were increasingly viewed 
suspiciously, ‘defined limits’ came to be replaced with ‘subject to the law’.
Australian multiculturalism has formally replaced assimilation as a policy for the 
incorporation of immigrants into society (Jupp, 2002). However, claims that ‘Australia 
is the most multicultural country in the world’, often used in the opening address to 
gatherings with ethnic associations, belies the extent, aside from the demographic fact, 
to which Australia is multicultural. Some scholars have optimistically argued that 
Australia has embraced multiculturalism as an idea for a national identity that is 
uniquely Australian (Stratton and Ang, 1998). In a similar vein, Jayasuriya (2003) has 
argued that Australian identity should be centred on the principle and practice of 
multiculturalism. However, given that various Australian governments have shied away
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from presenting Australia’s diversity as a meaningful reflection of Australian 
nationhood, it is not surprising that Castles et al (1992) conclude that Australia does not 
need a new ideology of nationhood and that we should aim to be ‘a community without 
a nation’.
All policy initiatives spring from theoretical understanding of the world. Which theories 
actually dominate and are implemented depend on a myriad of factors, including 
influential champions within government. The state of academic and popular debates on 
multiculturalism and debates about the incorporation of immigrants generally indicate 
that multiculturalism continues to be a topical issue (Hewitt, 2005), even as some 
contend that we ought to transition to a ‘post-multicultural’ Australian politics 
(Jakubowicz, 2011).
In respect to multiculturalism in Australia, a few academics and influential political 
leaders saw that assimilation was not the key to a socially cohesive society. Neither was 
integration a just compromise, without institutional restructuring and the creation of 
credible policy initiatives that would work toward broadening equity and fairer 
distribution of material resources for all in society, regardless of cultural background.
However, the definition of culture relied upon by policy makers has meant that the 
policies of multiculturalism have necessarily experienced a certain trajectory - one 
which is arguably irresolute and has achieved little in changing negative attitudes 
toward ‘Other’ cultures and therefore achieved little in preventing or even ameliorating 
discrimination. Australian multicultural policies simply never explained the imperatives 
of culture for all people, not just ‘ethnics’. There are a number of consequences of 
defining cultures as knowable and bounded.
The juxtaposition of majority culture and minority cultures has meant that both the 
majority and minority cultures are codified and knowable and that people either belong 
to one or the other culture. In Australia people are popularly either characterised as 
‘Anglo-Celtic/Saxon/Judeo-Christian’ (as the exact identification is disputed), ‘ethnic’ 
or Indigenous. Moreover, the creation of bounded cultures has led to the creation of 
stereotypes o f ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ culture, which have respectively been assigned, in 
at least the last decade, as either ‘Western’ or ‘non-Westem’ or ‘Islamic’. Additionally, 
failure to identify the social and political nature of ‘culture’, and hence to problematise 
all cultures (not just ‘ethnic’ cultures’), has contributed to ‘radical otherness’ (Phillips, 
2007:24) Moreover, the cultures of ‘Others’ are generally imbued with racialised
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identity markers; in Australia is has been presented as a scale of ‘Whiteness’ (to borrow 
form Hage, 1998). The majority culture is imagined as both symbolically and culturally 
‘white’, while other ethnic groups in Australian society vary in their whiteness 
according to their cultural attributes (it can be argued that the further the culture is from 
British culture the less ‘White’ it is considered).
Further, as ethnicity is a marker of migration, so minority groups are viewed as 
‘ethnics’, while the majority culture is viewed as unquestionably non-ethnic (Stratton, 
1998). However, even as ‘ethnicity’ is a product of immigration, ‘ethnic communities’ 
are thought to be primordial entities that must be managed within the space of the 
nation. Part of the management process has been the creation of ‘ethnic community’ 
leaders through which, historically, ‘ethnic claims’ have reached the government55 
(Tabar et al, 2003).
Characterising ‘Others’ using cultural criteria has necessarily meant that religious 
divides are created along ‘cultural’ lines. The majority culture is characterised as 
predominantly Christian, while ‘ethnic’ communities have ‘other’ religions that have 
the potential to challenge Australian secularism (Bouma et al, 2011). However, even as 
the majority culture in Australia is characterised as Christian, the nation-state is 
characterised as secular and the privileged position of Christianity in society is 
simultaneously affirmed through institutions of the stateMl and denied as radical 
secularism demands that no religion be given privileged status by government (as does 
the Australian constitution). Further, there is no clear law against religious vilification 
in Australia. Indeed, in 1998 the Human Rights Commission recommended that the 
government should enact a ‘federal Religious Freedom Act covering all aspects of the 
right. The Act should make discrimination and vilification on the ground of religion and 
belief unlawful’ (HREOC, 1998:111).
Conclusion
As a set of government policies initiated by the Fraser Government in the 1970s, the 
actual definition of multiculturalism has changed little over time. While aiding in
55 Tabar et al, (2003:1) argue that the management of the ‘gang crisis’ in Sydney in 1998 precipitated the 
negative views regarding ‘ethnicity’. ‘Ethnicity’ was de-valorised and came to be substituted with 
‘community relations’ in line with John Howard’s shift away from multiculturalism.
56 For example the Australian parliament is opened with Christian prayers every day.
Further, Christian celebrations such as Christmas and Easter are approved by state legislation and 
recognised for workers. Christianity is taught in public schools and Chaplains are government funded 
(Bachelard, 2010). See Bouma et al, 2011, for more on religion in Australia.
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creating more egalitarian conditions for the advancement of non-White or NESB (non- 
English speaking background) immigrants, the actual definition has framed 
multiculturalism in narrow, and arguably ineffective, ways. Moreover, religious 
diversity has received little mention in multicultural policies and has indeed been 
subsumed into the discourses on culture and cultural diversity when convenient (Gobbo, 
2004). Islam, for example, has been subsumed under the rhetoric of ‘culture’, 
positioning Islam not as a diverse religion (like Christianity), but rather as a cultural and 
religious monolith. This is problematic, as the conflation of cultural and religious 
practices necessarily masks the multi-cultural nature of many religions, such as Islam 
and Christianity, and further problematises discourses on the justifiable exclusion of 
religious identities on secular grounds (Modood, 2007).
Multiculturalism as government policy has certainly experienced a ‘retreat’ in Western 
countries that adopted different forms of multiculturalism since the 1970s; this has to do 
with contemporary links between culture, terrorism and social cohesion. As such, while 
this chapter has argued that the definitions of culture and cultural groups have meant 
that multicultural policies in Australia have not gone far enough in dealing with the 
political and social realities of a multicultural polity, these same definitions of culture 
brought about the retreat from multiculturalism in favour of social cohesion premised 
on a shared citizenship. The next chapter analyses the growth in the discontent with 
Australian multiculturalism, not because it failed to encapsulate the complexity inherent 
in a multi-cultural society, but because it was viewed by many in Australia, including 
the then Prime Minister, John Howard, as extending too much to ‘ethnic groups’, at the 
expense of the ‘mainstream’ and social cohesion in Australia.
135
Chapter 6: From Multiculturalism to Citizenship
Introduction
The 1980s witnessed the beginnings of the discontent with Australian multiculturalism. 
Its opponents were not concerned with multiculturalism’s failure to encapsulate the 
complexity inherent in a multi-cultural society, but accused multiculturalism of eroding 
social cohesion. This chapter argues that the way in which social cohesion has been 
defined and mobilised in Australian political discourse against multiculturalism and 
ethnic/cultural diversity necessarily rests on the ‘traditional’ view of social cohesion, 
premised on homogeneity and shared identity; a premise that has been deployed since 
Federation (Jupp, 2007b; Jupp et al, 2007; Clyne and Jupp, 2011).
Australian multiculturalism became, at the symbolic level, a descriptor for Australia’s 
demographic diversity and presented a possible new lexicon of cultural inclusion, even 
if it was simply embedded in the recognition that Australia is a land of immigrants and 
multiculturalism is a ‘lived reality’ (for a discussion on the symbolism of 
multiculturalism, see Stratton and Ang, 1998). However, by the 1980s multiculturalism 
was increasingly criticised for eroding social cohesion in the ways it valorised 
‘differences’, at the expense o f ‘common bonds’ - commonality being one of the points 
consistently stressed by ‘multicultural’ policy in the 1980s (Joppke, 2004; see also Jupp, 
2002, 2007a, 2007b).
Multiculturalism in Australia rested on two key principles: access and equity (Greig et 
al, 2003). The main aim of multicultural policy was to aid immigrants in accessing 
material and language resources in order to become ‘full’ members in Australian society 
(Jupp, 2002). The secondary aim of Australian multiculturalism was to advance 
recognition of the importance of cultural maintenance for immigrants (Zubrzycki and 
Martin, 1977). It was deemed necessary to allow immigrants, under the rhetoric of 
‘justice and equity’, to retain their cultural practices within limits specified by the state 
(and encouraged to practice their culture largely in the private sphere, Hage, 1998). 
Poynting and Mason (2008:231) explain that multicultural policies were demanded by 
immigrant communities in the context of ‘equity of participation in Australian society, 
as well as recognition of their cultures as equally to be valued and maintained’, and not 
as ‘a strategy to disrupt and supplant a more radical anti-racist movement’. 
Consequently, how multiculturalism came to be extended to be something for ‘all
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Australians’, as government definitions have often suggested, and not something 
specifically targeting ‘ethnic’ groups, has never been elucidated (Joppke, 2004: 244).
As such, it was to be anticipated that John Howard and Geoffrey Blainey , two of the 
most outspoken opponents of multiculturalism in the 1980s, began what became a 
twenty-year campaign to render Australian multiculturalism redundant; a campaign 
which symbolically culminated with the removal, by John Howard, of the word 
multiculturalism from the Department’s58 name in 2007. Popular understanding of 
multiculturalism ceased to be about access and equity, or even a new national identity 
for Australia, and became about extending too many benefits to ‘ethnic minorities’ at 
the expense of ‘mainstream’ Australia (Batainah and Walsh, 2008:230; Jupp, 2002; 
Jupp, 2007a); about cultural relativism and political correctness and denigrating 
‘mainstream’ Australian culture (Galligan and Roberts, 2004).
The remainder of this chapter discusses the shift from the policies and rhetoric of 
multiculturalism to an increased emphasis on citizenship as the cohesive force in 
Australia, particularly under the Howard Government. It traces some of the incremental 
policy shifts that saw multicultural policy at the federal level take a back seat to the 
rhetoric of citizenship and the introduction of a citizenship test for new migrants.
What is Social Cohesion?
Fears of diversity eroding social-cohesion and the integration of immigrants in Western 
societies is viewed as one of the most pressing issues in Europe (Hogan-Brun et al, 
2009:1; Holtug and Mason, 2010). Recent trends indicate that claims that immigration 
and diversity threaten national identity and threaten social cohesion have ‘moved from 
the far-right periphery to the centre of European politics’ (Holtug and Mason, 2010:407; 
see also Fekete, 2009). Fears of diversity and the putative correlation between ‘ethnic’ 
diversity and erosion of social cohesion have given rise to nationalistic and exclusionary 
political discourses which privilege a definition of social cohesion which equates with 
homogeneity and assimilation (Fekete, 2009). As such, recent preoccupations with
57 Professor Geoffrey Blainey is a conservative Australian historian who achieved popular notoriority 
after his address to the Rotary Club in the town of Warmambool on March 18th, 1984 (Markus, 2001:63). 
He later expanded upon his ideas in a newspaper article and a book published later in the year. Professor 
Blainey was highly critical of multiculturalism, believed in the rapid ‘Asianisation of Australia’ and that 
Asian immigration to Australia was too high (Markus, 2001:63-64). He argued in his book All for 
Australia (1984) that Australia was being invaded by Asian immigrants. Blainey later became a 
syndicated coloumnist and was able to widely disseminate his ideas about immigration. His views are 
seen to have been significant in shaping the concepts and ideas of the New Right (Markus, 2001:66).
58 Department of Immigration and Mulicultural Affairs.
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social cohesion have been distinctly combined with a focus on immigration and the 
resulting increase in ethnic diversity. Therefore concerns with social cohesion have 
focused on the putative erosion of ‘feelings of togetherness’, lack of integration of 
ethnic minorities in western society broadly and a concentration on ‘Muslims’ in 
particular as embodying all negative consequences of immigration: radicalization, and 
cultural/religious practices incompatible with western norms and values.
Australian society has never witnessed an absence of ‘social cohesion’ due to 
immigration in the way other countries claim (Jupp, 2007b; Weinstock, 2008). 
Poynting and Mason (2008:235) point to the fact that ‘...there were no anti-immigrant 
riots in Australia between the Kalgoorlie riot of 1934 and the Cronulla riot of November 
2005’. They also emphasise that multiculturalism ‘has been central in the relative 
success of ethnic affairs policies in Australia over the period in which they have been in 
place’. It was in the 1980s, amid a general climate of heightened anxiety about ‘race’, 
immigration and the economy (Markus, 2001; Lopez, 2000), that multiculturalism first 
came under attack for undermining social cohesion (echoing the White Australia Policy 
and the preoccupation with maintaining social cohesion in a ‘diverse’ environment). 
However, it was during the Howard Governments after 1996, with Howard’s trademark 
stress on ‘Australian values’, that it became clearer what social cohesion had come to 
mean in modern Australia and which groups in society were seen as undermining social 
cohesion (the primary candidates singled out as eroding social cohesion in Australia are 
‘Asians’ and ‘Muslims’; see also Poynting and Mason, 2008). The ways in which social 
cohesion is defined has determined which ‘bonds’ should be privileged over others and 
how ‘other’ bonds are regarded as a danger to social cohesion.
One of the key markers of social cohesion emphasised in a description of Australian 
society is the lack of serious civil strife. From this point of view, Australian society has 
always been, essentially, socially cohesive. Yet, during the early years of Federation, 
the Australian Government predicated social cohesion on the maintenance and forceful 
creation of a racially homogenous polity (Jupp, 2007b). The desire to maintain social 
cohesion in Australia was clearly evident in the rationale of the White Australia Policy 
(discussed in Chapter 4). Thus, and despite a lack of serious civil strife, Jupp (2007b: 15) 
suggests that a preoccupation with social cohesion in Australia is not new. Social 
cohesion, it was presumed, was not simply based on colour. As Jupp (2007b: 15) 
contends, the stress on ‘Ethnic homogeneity was not just for “whites” or “Europeans” as
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much of the current literature holds, but for the British. Those who were not British 
were regarded as exceptional and as possible threats to social cohesion’.
Even though Australia succeeded in maintaining a largely ‘racially and ethnically’ 
homogenous polity, due to its restrictive immigration policy, especially prior to the 
relaxing of immigration entry requirements following World War Two, threats to social 
cohesion were feared from the ‘Irish catholic, radical politics and labour organisations’ 
(Jupp, 2007b: 15). Nevertheless, serious unrest never eventuated and it has been argued 
that the ‘federation of stable parliamentary systems was maintained in an ethnically 
homogenous society until the 1950s... [and by] a society dominated by a single 
ethnicity since then’ (Jupp, 2007b: 15). As such, it can be argued that since World War 
Two, unsubstantiated fears of the erosion of social cohesion have primarily stemmed 
from immigration by ‘certain’ people to Australia.
Hage (1998) has argued that fear of the erosion of Australian core values and culture 
due to increased immigration reflects a concern with a particular sort of immigrant; 
those who Hage (1998:116) describes as ‘third-world-looking-migrants’ and who 
Perkins(2007:1) describes as immigrants who are visibly ‘different’. This differentiation 
between immigration in general and immigration of ‘third-world-looking’ people has, 
time and again, prompted a need to reassert an Australian nationalism, based on the pre- 
World War Two mythologies, a time when Australia and Australians have been 
identified as ‘White’. It is thus a certain understanding of social cohesion that underlies 
much of the discourse on social cohesion initiated by John Howard and Geoffrey 
Blainey in the 1980s in Australia and continuing throughout the periods of the Howard 
Government (1996-2007).
Although, some have suggested that the recent use of the term ‘social cohesion’ has 
been code for ‘Islamophobia’ (Bouma and Ling, 2007:80), the meaning of social 
cohesion in both academic circles and government policy remains ambivalent and 
imprecise (Jupp, 2007b). There has been a marked distinction between popular 
discourse on social cohesion, policy focus by various governments and normative 
political theory. Popular discourse has focused on the negative outcomes of diversity 
and has linked social cohesion with immigration. These concerns have concentrated on 
the threats diversity putatively poses to such things as the welfare state, community 
bonds and security. The policy focus has concentrated on diversity and immigration and 
governments have responded by tightening citizenship requirements and initiating
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policies which attempt to ‘integrate’ immigrants into society. Finally, political and 
social theory has also shown marked variation in the ways scholars have approached 
social cohesion resulting in the different definitions and varied terms used (social 
cohesion, social inclusion, social capital etc).
Markus and Kirpitchenko (2007:21) argue that social cohesion (and its variants -  see 
also Durkheim’s Solidarism in Dürkheim and Simpson, 1947) ‘has a long tradition in 
academic enquiry and occupies a central place in discussion of the role of consensus and 
conflict in society’. While ideas of how to build and maintain social cohesion in society 
go back to the Greeks and the Romans (see Russell, 2005:89), recent concerns have 
centred on the effects of globalisation and immigration. In its broadest sense, 
globalisation, or the increasing movement of capital, goods and services, and more 
recently people, across national borders, has challenged the traditional domain of the 
nation-state. As such, this challenges the concept of the nation within the nation-state 
(see Chapter 4), making it difficult to construct an essentially ‘national’ identity, where 
the polis is increasingly ‘racially’ and ‘culturally’, and therefore ‘ethnically’, diverse.
Nonetheless, in the absence of an effective model for achieving social cohesion in 
multi-cultural states, underpinned by a view which regards multiculturalism as divisive, 
rather than cohesive, consensus has been the rationale for a return to the idea of a 
homogenous national identity in an attempt to avoid conflict. Unfortunately, the 
avoidance of conflict, presumably achieved through a sense of ‘oneness’, assumed by a 
particular national identity, privatises conflict, while fabricating a consensus which 
purports to be social cohesion. In essence, it is assumed that social cohesion can be 
achieved by imposing a sense of commonality, even when no such commonality exists. 
Indeed, the imposition of commonality through a presumption of ‘universalism’ may 
actually reduce social cohesion (Husband and Alam, 2011:224).
It is in this way that highlighting one or two aspects of a disputed concept such as social 
cohesion can lead to the scapegoating of whole communities. Indeed, Beauvais and 
Jenson (2002:2) suggest that choosing to focus on one of the following constituent 
elements of social cohesion can lead to framing social cohesion in a particular way, 
even when some of the elements may be dependent on each other, while others are 
freestanding:
1. Common values and a civic culture,
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2. Social order and social control,
3. Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities,
4. Social networks and social capital, and
5. Territorial belonging and identity.
Internationally, attempts to monitor social cohesion tend to focus on how/why it might 
be lacking, rather than on how it is created. For example, social cohesion is one of the 
OECD’s Social Indicators (2009), but it is defined using indicators that might point to a 
lack of social cohesion, rather than offering a definitive explanation of what social 
cohesion might actually mean (see also Jupp et al, 2007). So, the OECD (2009)59 points 
to indicators such as suicide rates, job satisfaction, number of prisoners, bullying and so 
on, rather than focusing on ethnicity, or the consequences of an ‘ethnically divided 
society’. Others see social cohesion (or the lack of) as involving economic disparities, 
social unrest, discrimination and exclusion (Grieg et al, 2003), but again do not stress 
ethnic diversity as a primary cause of the erosion of social cohesion. Given factors such 
as criminality and poverty, that might point to a lack of social cohesion, have no proven 
‘ethnic’ links (Poynting et al, 2004; Collins et al, 2011; Collins and Reid, 2009b ), this 
means that blaming immigrants or specific ethnic communities for a lack of social 
cohesion in society is extremely misleading.
However, for many, social cohesion rests upon a framework of shared values, where 
ethnic and cultural homogeneity are key features in the prevention of ‘conflict’ (see 
Jupp, 2007b) and therefore, some scholars (Putnam, 2007) have approached the study of 
social cohesion from this angle. This definition of social cohesion persists today where 
events in the last decade, especially the events of 9/11 (Husband and Alam, 2011), but 
also events in Europe, and to a lesser extent Australia, such as the ‘ethnic gang rapes’ in 
200060 and the Cronulla riots in 2005, have associated immigration with violence 
(Collins, 2007:61). Instances of terrorism or ‘ethnic unrest’ have come to confirm that 
‘immigrant minorities inevitably bring conflict to their host country, threatening social 
cohesion and dividing the nation, particularly where these immigrants include 
minorities from Asia, the Middle East and Africa’ (Collins, 2007:61; see also Jupp, 
2007b; Poynting and Mason, 2008).
59 OECD data does not include Australia.
60 See Aslan, 2009 for information on the Australian media’s two-year focus on ‘ethnic’ gang rapes 
which occurred in 2000 and concentrated on the Lebanese community in Sydney.
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Recently, Robert Putnam has controversially drawn some correlation between ethnic 
diversity and social cohesion. In his 2007 article, Putnam argues that ‘In the short to 
medium run... immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit 
social capital’ (2007:138). In 2006 and 2007, newspaper articles, both in Australia and 
abroad, used Putnam’s research to claim that ‘Ethnic diversity “breeds mistrust’” 
(Wilson, 2006; Jonas, 2007). However, the conclusions that Putnam (2007) reaches in 
his controversial article questions the very essence of the definitions used to ascertain 
social cohesion. This article and its implications are examined later in the chapter. For 
the moment however, it is important to acknowledge that the very idea that diversity 
erodes social cohesion is still contested, but prevalent.
The positions on social cohesion held by such organisations as the OECD and others 
(such as the Council of Europe and European Union) agree that factors such as 
unemployment, poverty, income inequality, social exclusion and exclusion from the 
‘information society’ are key threats to social cohesion. This approach has led to a form 
of consensus on the economic factors that threaten social cohesion, yet very little 
consensus as regard political and cultural factors (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002:3).
This lack of consensus has led researchers to define more accurately what a diverse, yet 
socially cohesive, society might entail; these definitions have emerged through the 
policy discourse in Canada and some parts of Europe (Marcus and Kirpitchenko, 
2007:21). Canadian researchers Beauvais and Jenson (2002) undertook a review of the 
social cohesion literature for the Canadian Policy Research Networks. They emphasise 
that the term ‘social cohesion’ is contested and is best considered as a ‘quasi-concept’; 
yet the way social cohesion is defined necessarily informs policy direction and its 
definition can cause more problems than it attempts to isolate and solve. For example, 
Beauvais and Jenson (2002: i) explain that, since the 1990s, the concept of social 
cohesion has been approached from a variety of angles. In the 1990s, social cohesion 
was ‘mentioned almost exclusively in the context of a lack, a missing element in social 
life’ (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002:1). However, by 2002, the concept had been further 
refined to define social cohesion as a cause, or a consequence, of other aspects of social, 
economic and political life (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002:5). The authors suggest that, 
while the ‘social cohesion as shared values’ approach remains in the literature, one of 
the earliest ways of analysing social cohesion was to see it as threatened by external 
economic factors, such as globalisation, and this appears to persist.
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Diversity is therefore viewed as a key element in the social cohesion discourse and 
Beauvais and Jenson (2002:10) contend that the Australian Government has adopted 
this view61. Broadly, the authors suggest that, in the European approach, the stress on 
diversity as a ‘pillar of social cohesion’ builds on the notion that ‘integration of 
immigrants and national minorities’ is the key to social cohesion. This approach seeks 
to ‘[identify] policies that will promote inclusion’. In this context, Beauvais and Jenson 
argue (2002:10) that ‘diversity refers to a pluralism of values, life styles, cultures, 
relations and languages across and within European societies’.
Beauvais and Jenson (2002:11) also note the cautionary advice found in the literature on 
conflating social cohesion with nationalism:
For those who identify diversity as an important factor, cultural policy is often the key tool available, 
both for counteracting negative effects and achieving positive ones. As Benjamin Hempel (1999: 4) 
writes in Does Canada Compare? Social Cohesion and Cultural Policies in Australia, the United 
States and the European Union: The role of the concept of social cohesion in cultural policies is some 
ways double-edged. As a conceptual framework for government initiatives in culture, it is clearly 
related to the goal of achieving greater unity among increasingly diverse (supra-) national citizenry. 
At the same time, it should not all be seen as synonymous with the purpose of strengthening a clearly 
defined monolithic (supra-) national identity. Focusing on social cohesion must essentially imply that 
government policies act to ensure the continued integration of various marginalized groups into the 
civic community.
However, one of the key contributions of the Canadian policy approach to social 
cohesion is that the term is defined as a process, rather than an end in itself. Whilst there 
are still dangers of viewing social cohesion in a nostalgic fashion (looking to the past 
for instances of harmony), Beauvais and Jenson (2002:32) explain that, even as a quasi­
concept, social cohesion can still be useful as a policy framework. They also emphasise 
that the way social cohesion is approached can determine how useful it can be and 
indicate some initiatives taken by the Council of Europe in order to highlight how 
different approaches to social cohesion can yield better results. According to Beauvais 
and Jenson (2002:32) the Council of Europe decided to ‘develop a strategy for social 
cohesion rather a strategy for combating it’.
In Australia, ‘social cohesion’ has also been defined in a myriad of ways 
(Nieuwenhuysen, 2007:1), due largely to the interdisciplinary approaches taken to
61 Beauvais and Jenson (2002:10) also site UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the governments of 
Canada and Australia as ‘The institutions that are particularly likely to treat social cohesion as a 
dependent variable, while putting the accent on diversity...Here, too, there is an emphasis on the effects 
of globalization and other large trends, as well as on government actions and strategies’.
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define social cohesion62. Thus, Jupp’s (2007b: 10) definition of social cohesion is broad 
and primarily focuses on how social cohesion can be maintained, rather than created:
Social Cohesion is maintained by a sound economy which distributes goods and services equitably 
(but not equally); which negotiates different interests and pressures through a generally accepted 
network of laws and institutions; which is protected against hostile forces from without and within; 
which has a basic, but not exclusive, stock of values and traditions; which resolves political issues 
without violence; which develops and extends the individual and collective rights of citizen; where 
citizens have equal civic and human rights; where governments manage society within a concept of 
the common good; and where there is a high level of trust between citizens and the authorities.
In recent years, much of the focus in Australia has been on the maintenance of social 
cohesion in the face of immigration (Marcus, 2009). Kevin Andrews, Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2007) in the Howard Government (1996-2007), outlined 
the Australian Government’s initiative on social cohesion (Andrews, 2007). He suggests 
that Australia has always been a socially cohesive society, primarily due to the way the 
government has managed immigration, implying a strong link between orderly 
immigration processes and social cohesion. However, he also points to ‘overseas 
events’ as ‘impacting on Australia’s stability, marginalising some groups and eroding 
social cohesion’ (2007:45). It is worth repeating here the four elements that Andrews 
argued had contributed to social cohesion in Australia. From these four elements it 
becomes clear what definition of social cohesion is assumed (because he actually does 
not define it). For the sake of brevity the four elements are paraphrased into three 
elements below:
1. Immigration and indigenous diversity have always been part of the Australian 
environment, therefore diversity ‘is an everyday part of Australia, not a 
challenge to it’ (2007:46).
2. Migrants and their children have contributed in many areas in Australia 
including building infrastructure, establishing industries and contributing ‘in the 
areas of art, philosophy, literature, sport, medicine and science’, as well as
62 For example ‘Social Inclusion’ became popular in 2007. During the 2007 Federal Election campaign 
the concept of ‘Social Inclusion’ was highlighted as a concern and in December 2007, the Social 
Inclusion Unit (SIU) was established in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The SIU ‘is 
responsible for coordinating a whole-of-govemment approach to social inclusion’ (SIU, 2009:1) which 
did not focus on immigrants, refugees or immigration. The SIU has been vested with developing, sharing 
and coordinating efforts to ‘embed social inclusion approaches across agencies and jurisdictions’ (SIU, 
2009:1). The SIU also ‘provides secretariat support for the Australian Social Inclusion Board (ASIB), 
which provides advice to Government on policies and programs that enhance social inclusion’ (SIU, 
2009:l).The Australian Social Inclusion Board was established in May 2008 ‘to advise Government on 
how to achieve better outcomes for the most disadvantaged in our community and report on our progress 
in building a socially inclusive community’ (ASIB, 2010:1).
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having significant overseas networks. ‘Migration is recognised as the foundation 
of modem Australia’s economic and social success’ and immigration continues 
to be important for Australia’s future development (2007:46).
3. Australia’s immigration program is ‘demonstrably well regulated’. The 
government works closely with a wide range of organisations to ensure that 
immigration continues to respond effectively to Australia’s skill and 
employment needs. Andrews suggests that Australia happily meets its refugee 
obligations, but that migrants must pass character and security checks. Further, 
he states that ‘Measures are in place to prevent illegal immigration from 
undermining the integrity of the immigration program. Australia continues to 
lead the world in border security systems... Australia’s careful approach to 
managing immigration has played a key role in maintaining public support for 
an immigration system that serves the national interests’ (2007:46).
Consequently, immigration and increased cultural and ethnic diversity seem to be the 
focus of the social cohesion discourse in Australian policy (Markus, 2009). even 
though, as mentioned earlier, Australia has, comparatively, witnessed very few 
instances of ethnic violence or unrest. Hence, the shift from multiculturalism, as an 
enabler of social cohesion, to citizenship (discussed below), as a socially cohesive 
institution, has been driven by a number of factors that are directly, or indirectly, related 
to immigration. However, the shift away from multiculturalism as a dominant ideology 
that acknowledges, and has historically embraced, a limited form of diversity was in the 
process of being dismantled before the events of 9/11 and before the popular link 
between terrorism and ethnic diversity. This earlier shift away from multiculturalism 
and the growing anti-multicultural sentiment, a little more than a decade after its formal 
implementation in the 1970s, is an indication that, whilst multiculturalism introduced a 
language of social cohesion despite ‘diversity’, the ideas informing racial and cultural 
incommensurability were largely left unaffected by multicultural policy. Indeed, the 
‘desire for immigrants to integrate’ in order to maintain social cohesion has remained 
the status quo (Poynting and Mason, 2008).
The Contested and Fragile Nature of Multicultural Policy
Australian multicultural policies enjoyed bipartisan support and some iterative 
successes during the Whitlam and the Fraser Governments (Lopez, 2000), but 
multiculturalism was strained under the Hawke/Keating Labor Governments (1983- 
1996) (Poynting and Mason, 2008; Galligan and Roberts, 2004), even as both Bob
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Hawke and Paul Keating supported various definitions of multiculturalism. This history 
has been expertly documented by a variety of Australian scholars (Lopez, 2000; Jupp, 
2002; Jupp, 2007a; Galligan and Roberts, 2004; Hage, 1998; Foster and Stockley, 
1988). It will therefore not be repeated here. However a few significant changes are 
highlighted here in order to demonstrate the nature of the fragility of multicultural 
policies in Australia.
During both the Hawke and Keating Governments, multiculturalism was persistently 
attacked by academics and commentators who saw it as a threat to social cohesion 
(Lopez, 2000 for a discussion of the attacks by academics and commentators). From the 
mid-80s until the election of the Howard Government in 1996, the focus of debates 
centred on ‘Asian’ immigration. The debate on Asian immigration, specifically the 
accusation that Australia was being invaded by Asians and that Asians were ‘taking our 
jobs’, took place within a climate of ‘critical youth unemployment’ (Poynting and 
Mason, 2008:235) and ‘virulent exchange over Aboriginal claims for land’ 
(Jakubowicz, 1985:5). This is not insignificant, as Aboriginal land rights and Asian 
immigration to Australia have both reignited fears about the erosion of Australian 
identity.
In 1984, Geoffrey Blainey exemplified this fear of Asian immigrants by suggesting that 
Australia should resist an Asian invasion and, to do this, multiculturalism needed to be 
rejected and core Australian values (Anglo-Saxon values) reasserted (Jakubowicz, 1985; 
see also, Blainey, 1984:55). Blainey (1984 159-160, 1988) is identified as the most 
vehement defender of the status quo in Australia, suggesting that ‘multiculturalism 
ignores the truth and Australia's fortunes will suffer if this type of immigration policy is 
allowed to destroy our sense of cohesion and our pride in the past’. According to 
Poynting and Mason (2008:235) in 1984, Blainey ‘conducted a widely reported and 
influential tour addressing conservative audiences, occasionally with white supremacist 
connections, warning that too many immigrants from too different cultures congregating 
too densely made ordinary Australians fearful and uncomfortable and could lead to 
violence’.
At the same time, the Hawke Government reframed the ideas behind the special services 
extended to immigrants to remedy issues of access and equity. The Hawke Government 
articulated the desire that the Access and Equity policy would ‘[ensure] government 
could deliver to all citizens, while maintaining some support for ethnic organizations’
147
(Jakubowicz, 2003:5). More importantly however, in 1986 the Hawke Government 
announced the closure of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs and its 
replacement with an Office of Multicultural Affairs within the Department of 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA). This shift was viewed as an active measure 
taken by the Hawke Government ‘to remodel the multicultural program as something 
within government, rather than something criticising government inaction’ 
(Jakubowicz, 2003:5). This organisational shift also brought back the historical 
connection between the Immigration Department and ‘ethnic affairs’ (Jupp, 2002).
Additionally, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), a service initially recommended 
by the Galbally Report under the Fraser Governments (1975-83) to provide the 
communication component of ethnic inclusion and participation, was threatened by a 
possible merger with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) (Foster and 
Stockley, 1988:244). Further, the Hawke Government threatened to close the Human 
Rights Commission and made budget cuts for TESF (Teaching English as a Second 
Language) programs at the end of 1986 (Foster and Stockley, 1988:36; Jakubowicz, 
2003). Budget cuts and the closure of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs 
were viewed as steps toward dismantling multiculturalism (Foster and Stockley, 
1988:36; Castles et al, 1992).
After the Hawke budget cuts aroused much antipathy from supporters of 
multiculturalism (Jakubowicz, 2003:5), the Government sought to reaffirm its 
commitment to multiculturalism by establishing the Office of Multicultural Affairs 
(OMA) (Jupp, 2001:784). During the Hawke Government, the Jupp Review of Migrant 
and Multicultural Programs and Services had proposed the establishment of an Office 
of Ethnic Affairs. The Australian Council of Multicultural Affairs was also established 
at this time. In contrast, the FitzGerald Report (1988), also produced at this time, was 
damning in its views on multiculturalism. The Report suggested that immigration and 
multiculturalism should be distanced, due to the conflation of multiculturalism with 
ethnic activism. According to Joppke (2004:245-246), ‘The bottom-line of the report 
was that public support for immigration depended on separating the latter from 
‘multiculturalism’, which was widely rejected for its association with ethnic activism’. 
Further, after the FitzGerald Report (1988), immigration became couched in terms of 
the productivity dividend of immigration and the productive capacity of migrants - 
skilled migration to Australia being the primary focus that would benefit ‘all 
Australians’. Moreover, by 1989, amidst public fear of an ‘Asian invasion’ by boat
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people, the concept and practice of mandatory detention was introduced by the Hawke 
Government; an issue that was to continue and to escalate throughout the Howard 
period (Jupp, 2007a: 198).
While the changes to multicultural institutions and policy during the Hawke 
Government can be viewed within the context of burgeoning anti-multicultural 
sentiment espoused by academics such as Geoffrey Blainey, Galligan and Roberts 
(2003:12) explain that the move away from multiculturalism primarily occurred during 
the Keating Labor Government. However, Keating’s vision of multiculturalism also 
extended to a new national identity, an identity that favoured a republic and broke with 
tradition. So, Jones (2003:116-117) suggests that a ‘new nationalism’ was being 
promoted during the Keating era, a national identity which ‘celebrated ethnic diversity, 
favoured a republic, emphasised Australia’s role as a part of Asia, and tended to 
denigrate parochial Australian values and living patterns, which were characterised as 
dull, conformist, materialist and essentially worthless’. Conversely, Galligan and 
Roberts (2003:12) assert that ‘Multicultural policy, according to Keating, was based 
squarely on liberal democratic values and had become essentially a restatement of 
Australian political values’. The authors suggest that Keating chiefly treated 
multiculturalism the way John Howard subsequently did, where Howard ‘...effectively 
marginalised multiculturalism as an issue by keeping some of its paraphernalia while 
emphasising common political values and national unity’ (Galligan and Roberts, 
2003:12).
However, the two Prime Ministers came to implement their vision of unity in markedly 
different ways. Jones (2003:116-117) contends that Paul Keating’s emphasis on the 
republic, ethnic diversity and Australia’s place as a part of the Asia Pacific, coupled 
with his tendency to ‘denigrate parochial Australian values and living patterns... 
managed to alienate much of the older Anglo-Celtic population, as well as those for 
whom the republic was part and parcel of an aggressive nationalism that was not 
particularly tolerant of ethnic and cultural diversity’. On the other hand, John Howard, 
whilst capitalising on the emerging discontent with the Keating Government, 
differentiated the Liberal/National Coalition from the Labor Party by siding with 
Australia’s ‘mainstream’, and not with what Howard termed ‘special interest’ groups 
(Stratton and Ang, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Poynting and Mason, 2008; Maddox, 2004). 
Indeed, one of the main themes that emerged in the 1996 election, which saw Howard 
become Prime Minister, was his assurance that the Coalition Government ‘would
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govern for “all” Australians...[and] would represent the “mainstream”, unlike Labor, 
which represented “special interests’” (Johnson, 2000:18).
Tellingly, Howard had voiced his own concerns about multiculturalism well before he 
became Prime Minister. Howard defied convention, as Opposition Leader in 1988, by 
breaking the ‘bipartisan position on Aboriginal affairs, immigration and 
multiculturalism’ (Markus, 2001:85; see also Jupp, 2007a). During a radio interview in 
1988, Howard stated that:
I am not in favour of going back to a White Australia policy. I do believe that if it is in the eyes of 
some in the community, it's too great, it would be in our immediate term interest and supportive of 
social cohesion if it were slowed down a little, so that the capacity of the community to absorb was 
greater. (Markus, 2002:1).
Moreover, during his speech to the joint Liberal and National Parties in 1988, Howard’s 
antipathy towards multiculturalism was evident when he argued that multiculturalism 
was not inclusive of all Australians. Indeed, his 1988 speech foreshadowed the Howard 
Government’s treatment of multiculturalism once it came to power. Galligan and 
Roberts (2004:89) summarise Howard’s stance:
Intent upon shoring up his leadership and embarrassing the Labor government, Howard was a 
staunch believer in traditional Australian values. At a National Press Club address he branded it ‘a 
confusing, even aimless concept’ and an ‘aimless divisive policy’. Multiculturalism was part of a 
more widespread national malady of apologising for being authentically Australian, Howard told the 
Queensland division of the Liberal Party's annual convention at Surfers Paradise. ‘We’re apologising 
to the Aborigines about our past, we’re apologising to this or that section in the community for 
having offended them and in the process we’re apologising for our history and our identity as 
Australians’. Howard pushed for a number of policy changes: one was for an adjustment of the mix 
of migrants; another was for a ‘One-Australia’ post-arrival strategy where Australian culture and 
values took precedence over cultures of origin.
The oft-quoted first speech by Pauline Hanson in Parliament in September 1996 (Leach 
et al, 2000; Hage, 1998; Hanson, 1996) is generally viewed as the quintessential 
‘mainstream’ cry against Asian immigration and multiculturalism which in many ways 
Howard shared and later incorporated into the Liberal agenda (Ang and Stratton, 1998; 
Johnson, 2000; Markus, 2001; Poynting and Mason, 2008). Hanson argued that 
Australia was being ‘swamped’ by Asians and that multiculturalism should be 
‘abolished’. More specifically she stated (Hanson, 1996):
We now have a situation where a type of reverse racism is applied to mainstream Australians by 
those who promote political correctness and those who control the various taxpayer funded 
‘industries’ that flourish in our society servicing Aboriginals, multiculturalists and a host of other
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minority groups. In response to my call for equality for all Australians the most noisy criticism came 
from fat cats, bureaucrats and do-gooders....for too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of 
any debate [on immigration and .multiculturalism] by the major parties. I and most Australians want 
our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in 
danger of being swamped by Asians. Between 1984 and 1995 40% of all migrants coming into this 
country were of Asian origin. They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not 
assimilate. Of course I will be called racist but if I can invite who I want into my home then I should 
have the right to have a say in who comes into my country. A truly multicultural country can never 
be strong or united.
According to Johnson (2007:196), ‘Howard (1997) acknowledged that both he and 
Hanson were “tapping into” the Australian community’s: “rejection of the politically 
correct and distorted view of Australian history”’. By 1998, the Howard Government 
adopted many of One Nation’s platforms and Poynting and Mason (2008:237) point out 
that ‘the Howard government’s Border Protection Bill (1999) and new “temporary safe 
haven” visa regulations introduced the same year... were actually borrowed from 
Pauline Hanson’s policies’. Moreover, they note that ‘By the time of the 2001 election 
campaign, Hanson’s ‘I can invite who I want into my own home’ became Howard’s 
election slogan: ‘We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come’ (Poynting and Mason, 2008:237).
Many of the events at this time have been documented and analysed by numerous 
scholars (see Hage, 1998, Stratton, 1998; Markus, 2001; Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 2007a). 
More importantly however, Jupp (2002:2) points to some of the immediate effects of 
the Howard Government coming into power:
The immediate political effect was the abolition of most national agencies for multiculturalism and 
the threat, and in one case the reality, of withdrawal of funding for others. Terms such as 
‘multiculturalism’ and ‘social justice’ were excised from the public agendas at least until 1998, as 
was the expression ‘non-English speaking background’...
Consequently, multiculturalism as public policy occupied a tenuous and seemingly 
fragile position. Jupp (2007a:88) explains that one of the issues which was never 
resolved was the establishment of a Multicultural Act in the same vein as the Canadian 
Federal Multicultural Act 1988. Jupp (2007:88) states that ‘(while) Multiculturalism 
had previously had a legal basis in the 1979 AIM A Act this had been repealed by Labor 
on the abolition of the institute in 1986, revealing how fragile such legislation could be. 
Although strongly supported by the Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Councils 
(FECCA), it was decided not to pursue new legislation. Multiculturalism had become 
too controversial by 1990 to ensure unanimous parliamentary approval’. By 1990,
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multiculturalism had become a contentious issue, so much so that many, including some 
of the architects of multicultural policy in Australia, wanted to abandon the ‘ugly word’ 
(Galligan and Roberts, 2004:91; Lopez, 2000).
John Howard clearly demonstrated an antithetical view of Australian multiculturalism 
by swiftly dismantling multiculturalism in favour of an integrationist policy towards 
migrants. This dismantling reflected Howard’s explicit view that the term 
‘multiculturalism’ was divisive and that an Australian ‘culture’ should be the glue that 
holds Australian society together. Ang and Stratton (1998:24) explain:
As soon as he gained governmental power he abolished the Office of Multicultural Affairs, severely 
slashed the migrant intake, and tightened up English proficiency requirements for new migrants. His 
dislike of the very word ‘multiculturalism’ is so great that he seems to want to scrap it from the 
national vocabulary. For example, in preparing a joint parliamentary resolution against racism in 
October 1996 (which was instigated by the increasingly loud calls for an official, high-level 
denunciation of Pauline Hanson) he insisted on deleting the word ‘multiculturalism’ from the text.
In 1997, a Government-commissioned discussion paper entitled Multicultural Australia: 
The Way Forward (National Multicultural Advisory Council, 1997) was published. In it 
the National Multicultural Advisory Council called for public input on how to 
reconceptualise multiculturalism to include ‘all Australians’. While the publication 
recounted the main tenets of multiculturalism favourably, it viewed multiculturalism as 
passe and in need of an overhaul for the new millennium. The paper asserted that some 
people regarded multiculturalism negatively (1997:8):
Others are uncomfortable with the term ‘multiculturalism’, doubt the worth of continuing with it, or 
feel threatened by it. They see the policy of multiculturalism as contributing to a general sense of 
uneasiness in the community and a cause of unacceptable separateness within the nation. These 
people say that the policy has given undue emphasis to the maintenance of cultural difference and the 
interests of individual groups rather than those of the Australian community as a whole. They see 
multiculturalism as a negative and divisive feature of today's Australia.
However, it also argued that there were those who believe that multiculturalism has not 
achieved enough (1997:8):
Some people argue that without settlement and multicultural policies, migrants would become 
marginalised minorities. For them, multiculturalism is more than recognition of ethnic diversity. 
They see a need for significant government involvement in a variety of settlement and multicultural 
programs to encourage full and productive participation by newcomers and other Australians in all 
aspects of Australian society.
It was clear however that the discussion paper was advocating the end of Australian 
multiculturalism, not a genuine attempt to reframe it. Although much of the dismantling
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of multicultural institutions and policy by the Howard Government occurred prior to 
2001, by November 2006, the Howard Government was looking for an alternative word 
to ‘multiculturalism’ (Hart, 2006). This search for a new term was accompanied by an 
increase in integrationist policies, the removal of certain members of the Council of 
Multicultural Australia and the dissolution of those ethnic councils deemed to be out of 
step with the Government’s idea of a shared national identity (Batainah and Walsh, 
2008). It was argued that ‘integration policy’ should replace the ‘vague’ term 
‘multiculturalism’; what Poynting and Mason (2008) refer to as the ‘new 
integrationism’.
When the term ‘multiculturalism’ was officially dropped from the name of the 
Commonwealth Immigration Department portfolio in January 2007, and replaced with 
the word ‘citizenship’, it became clear that the two different aspects of Australian 
multiculturalism would once again be separated: high immigration, Australian 
demographic diversity and the funding of ‘ethnic communities’ were to continue as 
usual within the newly named department, but Australian multiculturalism as a national 
preoccupation was no longer useful.
The Council for Multicultural Australia, a Federal initiative designed to promote 
‘community harmony and the benefits of cultural diversity for all Australians’, ended 
with the completion of its second three-year term on 30 June 2006 (Karvelas, 2008). It 
seemed at the time that multiculturalism would continue to be a project sponsored 
primarily by state governments. However, John Howard (2007a) denied that the 
creation of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship meant that multiculturalism 
was defunct and insisted that the focus had only shifted in response to ‘what the 
Australian people want’:
The desired progression is that an immigrant becomes an Australian, as simple as that. I think the 
title of the new department expresses the desire and the aspiration, and that is that people who come 
to this country, who immigrate, immigrants, become Australians. That’s what the Australian people 
want.
A distinct shift from ‘multiculturalism’ to citizenship as the basis for a ‘shared identity’ 
marked Howard’s four terms in government (Batainah and Walsh, 2008; see also 
Johnson, 2007). Symbolically, the change in name of the Department was the 
culmination of decades of attacks on multiculturalism as a possible alternate national 
identity. The significance of the elimination of the word ‘multiculturalism’ was the final 
step in a long process of the dismantling of a series of multicultural policies first
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initiated in 1973. The dismantling of the various institutions that housed multicultural 
policies is twofold. Firstly, multiculturalism acted as a discourse which symbolised the 
triumphant overcoming of the racism of the White Australia Policy. So, Stratton and 
Ang (1998:25) claim that:
Multiculturalism in Australia has operated as an ideological discourse designed to provide 
Australians with a favourable, flattering, even triumphant representation of the national self in two 
respects. First, in historical terms, it tells the Australian people that with the adoption of 
multiculturalism the nation has discarded an important part of its shameful, racist past. Secondly, in 
symbolic terms, it presents the people of Australia with a public fiction that they live in a 
harmonious, tolerant, and peaceful country where everyone is included and gets along. Again and 
again, for example, public figures, including John Howard (1997) himself, have announced with 
pride that “Australia is one of the most successful multicultural societies in the world”. And in so far 
as this image is held up as a mirror to the Australian population as a whole it operates as an 
ideological project which interpellates all Australians to be proud of this "astonishing success" and to 
rejoice in their own imaginary “unity-in-diversity”.
This has meant that, in many ways, multiculturalism is taken for granted as a lived 
reality and, as such, is no longer a political issue that needs to be politicised. 
Consequently, multicultural policy is no longer useful (although it has been argued by 
many that it may not have been useful from the start, see previous chapter).
Secondly, and more importantly, however, the dismantling of multicultural institutions, 
the refusal by Prime Minister John Howard to use the word ‘multiculturalism’ and the 
implication that multiculturalism is ‘divisive’ ignores the social and political 
significance and the persistence of cultural diversity - the implication being that racial 
and cultural incommensurability is not of any great significance to society but is a trait 
of only ‘certain’ cultures and ‘certain’ people. The targets of these accusations were 
initially ‘Asians’, but, more recently, it has been people from the Middle East and 
Africa, and in particular ‘Muslims’ (Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos, 2011:142).
Muslims in Australia are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter; however, the 
next section examines how the shift from Multiculturalism to a stress on citizenship and 
social cohesion became primarily an issue about particular immigrants, mainly 
Muslims, and their refusal to integrate. The significance of this focus on Muslims rests 
primarily on the vague definition o f ‘social cohesion’ discussed earlier in this chapter.
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The Retreat from Multiculturalism: Terrorism and Social 
Cohesion
Multiculturalism as Australian government policy was attacked on a number of fronts in 
the 1980s and the 1990s; however, terrorism was not the reason. By 2001, government 
in several European countries which previously employed some aspects of multicultural 
policies began to noisily retreat from multiculturalism, citing lack of integration of 
certain immigrants, issues of social cohesion and ‘security’ as reasons (Weinstock, 
2008). ‘Multiculturalism’ was specifically blamed for harbouring non-integrated 
immigrants who became, in a post-September 11 environment, potential security threats 
(Fleras, 2011). Indeed, ‘non-belonging’ for Muslims in Western societies became such 
as issue as to provoke ‘integrationist’ agendas precisely targeting Muslims (Mile sand 
Brown, 2003; Weinstock, 2008; Poynting et al, 2004). By 2005, especially after the 
London bombings, the security threat became even more problematic as governments 
questioned their own citizen ‘Others’- as the threat of terrorism was seen to emanate 
from the midst of their very own citizens that were simultaneously ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Western’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Consequently, although anti-Muslim sentiments 
preceded the events of 9/11 (Allen, 2010; Aslan, 2009), the Islamic dimension to the 
various terrorist activities in the West cemented the already present idea that Islamic 
minorities living in the West were culturally incommensurable, were not ‘integrating’ 
into ‘mainstream’ society ,were potential terrorists and therefore threatened social - 
cohesion(Meer and Modood, 2009b:2).
However, prior to 9/11 and the London bombings (7/7) in 2005, multicultural policies in 
a number of countries were blamed for encouraging the creation of closed-off, ethnic 
communities that were not integrating into ‘mainstream’ society, and therefore 
threatening social cohesion (Weinstock, 2008). For example, British multiculturalism 
has purportedly ‘creak[ed] under the weight of allegedly: “culturally unreasonable or 
theologically alien demands’” (Modood, 2006:34 cited in Meer and Modood, 2009b:4). 
In addition, British multiculturalism was blamed for British youth from ‘Pakistani’ 
origins engaging in terrorist activities in 2005 (Meer and Modood, 2009b:2).
Other European countries, such as France and Germany, known for their lack of formal 
multicultural policies, but also known for their large ethnic minorities, have variously 
successfully passed and initiated new laws to ban the wearing of religious symbols, 
including the hijab, in public offices and public schools. All European countries 
mentioned here have also resorted to introducing ‘civic’ policies with the intention of
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heightening integration for migrants and mitigating segregation or the refusal to 
integrate by immigrant minorities (For a discussion of various policy changes across 
Europe see Weinstock, 2008).
In Australia, the fear of too many Asian migrants was hotly debated in the 1980s, and 
again in the mid-1990s, when large numbers of Asian migrants were viewed as 
potentially upsetting social cohesion. The ‘Cronulla riots’(discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter ) were the closest thing to ‘ethnic’ riots that Australia has witnessed in 
decades, although some have suggested that the riots were an indication that Australian 
multiculturalism was not working (Collins, 2007:67 ). As in other Western nations, fear 
of terrorism in Australia, as a result of immigration, emerged in the new millennium, 
though there have not, to date, been any ‘successful’ terrorist attacks in Australia. 
Further, the dismantling of multicultural policies in Australia occurred before any of the 
terror activities of this decade took place (see Collins, 2007). As such, Australia’s 
immigration policy in the new millennium was not driven by ‘terrorism’ on home soil 
or any clear ‘security threats’. However, after the 9/11 attack in the US and the London 
7/7 bombings in 2005 much of the rationale for Australia’s immigration policy and the 
pressure on existing Australian Muslim immigrants became linked to fears of terrorism 
(Poynting and Mason, 2008). Howard’s insistence on immigrant integration in Australia 
became directed at Muslim immigrants, now citizens (Nicolacopoulos and 
Vassilacopoulos, 2011) (although there have not been any clear and identifiable 
problems with Muslim integration in Australia).
The Howard Government’s Vision for Shared Identity
During the Federal Election in 1996, ideas about an Asian invasion and too many 
concessions to migrants at the expense of Australia’s ‘mainstream’ population became 
popular sentiments expressed by John Howard and Pauline Hanson. According to 
Markus (2001), Howard resorted to using the issues of race to differentiate the Liberals 
from the Labor Party. Markus (2001:86-86) posits that ‘On a number of occasions he 
argued that Labor policies were contrary to the long-term national interest. He promoted 
a vision of “One Australia”, of “one nation and one future”, based on rejection of a 
treaty with Aboriginal people, a halt to Aboriginal land claims, and a commitment to 
skill-based immigration’ (see also Johnson, 2007:197).
The shift from a focus on multiculturalism to a focus on citizenship marked the basis for 
a new framework for social cohesion (see Jupp et al, 2007). This approach attempted to
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overcome the perceived inadequacies of both assimilationist strategies, which over­
emphasised conformity, and multiculturalism, which ‘exaggerated the maintenance of 
diversity’ (Galligan and Roberts, 2004: 73). Indeed, in his Australia Day speech in 
2006, Howard (2006e) claimed that ‘Australia had now successfully rebalanced national 
identity and ethnic diversity’. Moreover, Howard created a further distinction between 
‘mainstream’ Australians and the rest of the population when he claimed that Australian 
values were based upon ‘a mix of Judeo-Christian ethics, the spirit of the Enlightenment 
and British political institutions and culture’. This was a way to depoliticise the question 
of national identity and to present it as a matter of fact (Nicolacopoulos and 
Vassilacopoulous, 2011). He argued that Australia’s identity was based on Anglo-Celtic 
Christianity and the ANZAC spirit, insisting that not only new immigrants, but also 
current citizens with immigrant backgrounds, should learn to speak English and 
integrate (Howard, 2006a).
In September 2006, on talkback radio, Howard (2006(b)) refined these views:
Fully integrating means accepting Australian values, it means learning as rapidly as you can the 
English language if you don’t already speak it... And it means understanding that in certain areas, 
such as the equality of men and women... people who come from societies where women are treated 
in an inferior fashion have got to learn very quickly that is not the case in Australia.
On September 2nd 2006, Prime Minister John Howard (Howard, 2006f) wrote an article 
in the Daily Telegraph, entitled: I t ’s Sense not Discrimination, to explain to the 
Australian public what integration is and who is not willing to integrate. It is worth 
quoting here at length:
Australia has been greatly enriched by immigration and most people who have come to this nation 
have happily integrated with the community .They have willingly embraced the Australian way of 
life. They have become part of the fabric of the nation and have helped make Australia the great 
country it is today. I have said many times that people who come to this country -no matter where 
they are from- should become part of the Australian community. For new migrants, that means 
embracing Australian values, accepting our culture, being able to speak English if it's not their first 
language and understanding that men and women have equality. But it is an undeniable fact that 
some who have come here are resisting integration. There are pockets of this resistance in different 
migrant groups but it is perhaps most visible at this time in a small section of the Islamic community. 
A small minority of this community, and other groups that reject integration, regard appeals for them 
to fully integrate into the Australian way of life as some kind of discrimination. It is not. It is 
commonsense and, importantly, it is also a powerful symbol of a new migrant's willingness and 
enthusiasm about becoming an Australian. It is difficult to get anywhere in this country without 
learning English. It's the common language of Australia and is, quite simply, a passport to the future. 
Simple tasks like securing a job and making new friends would be so much harder in Australia 
without a working knowledge of English. Treating women as equals is an Australian value that 
should be embraced. Australians generally do not tolerate women being treated in an inferior fashion
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to men. There are some societies that do not treat women equally. Migrants from those societies must 
be fully prepared to embrace Australian attitudes towards women. We are an egalitarian nation that 
prides itself on the concept of a fair go, our equal treatment of men and women, our parliamentary 
democracy and free speech. Embracing these values and other Australian ideals is vital for new 
arrivals. All new arrivals. But it is self-evident that some people are resistant to Australian values. 
There are small sections of some communities, including the Islamic community, that are resistant to 
integration. As I have said on many occasions, 99 per cent of the Islamic community of Australia has 
integrated into, and is part of the Australian community. They have added great value to our society 
and are making a valuable contribution to the nation. Australia's Islamic community is also worried 
about the attitude of this tiny minority. Most of the Islamic people I know are as appalled as me by 
the failure of some within the community to integrate. It is up to all of us to try to overcome the 
resistance.
Earlier the same year, Peter Costello (Barlow, 2006; Gordon and Topsfield, 2006), the 
Treasurer and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, addressed the conservative think tank 
the Sydney Institute and attacked ‘mushy misguided multiculturalism and explained that 
the citizenship pledge should be a ‘big warning sign’ to Muslim who want to live under 
Sharia Law’ (Barlow, 2006). Mr. Costello further warned that Australian values were 
‘not optional’ and those who did not share these values should have their citizenship 
revoked (Gordon and Topsfield, 2006). He also likened the practice of taking your 
shoes off before entering a mosque to respecting Australia’s values. He further 
explained that ‘Before becoming an Australian you will be asked to subscribe to certain 
values. If you have strong objection to those values don’t come to Australia’ (Barlow, 
2006).
In the same vein, Andrew Robb (2006), Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, delivered a speech at the Australian National 
University where he pointed out that some Australians believed that multiculturalism 
was a doctrine that put allegiance to an original culture ahead of national loyalty. The 
address noted that this was the first time that an alternative doctrine had been articulated 
by government as part of the wider debate on Australian values (see Phillips and Smith, 
2000; Dyrenfurth, 2007). Robb (in Hey wood, 2006:1) claimed that shared values 
formed the core that bound Australians together:
A shared identity is not about imposing uniformity. It is about a strong identification with a set of 
core values, whilst permitting a large measure of personal freedom and ‘give and take’... A 
community of separate cultures fosters a rights mentality, rather than a responsibilities mentality. It 
works against quick and effective integration.
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The Shift to Citizenship as a Source of Social Cohesion
In September 2006, the Government released a discussion paper entitled Australian 
Citizenship: Much More Than a Ceremony. The paper was designed to frame 
consultation with the Australian public on the merits of introducing a formal citizenship 
test for new migrants and providing a clear indication of the primacy and the re­
institution of ‘citizenship’ as the bond for Australian identity. The Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Andrew Robb 
(2006:5), explained in the foreword that ‘Australia has successfully combined people 
into one family with one overriding culture, based on a set of common values’. The 
Howard Government deemed the citizenship test necessary in order to successfully 
integrate migrants in Australia, ‘to ‘protect the Australian way of life” and ‘to reinforce 
the fact that Australian citizenship was a privilege not a right’ (Tavan, 2009:125). The 
following are aspects of the rationale for citizenship testing presented by DIMA (2006) 
in their discussion paper:
1) A formal citizenship test could be an important part of the process of assisting people to fully 
participate in the Australian community as it would provide a real incentive to learn English and to 
understand the Australian way of life (para.24).
2) To successfully pass such a test it would be important that people have a level of English which 
allows them to participate through education and employment. It could also be a mechanism to 
provide assurances that the applicants for the test understand some common values such as:
• our respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual
• our support for democracy
• our commitment to the rule of law
• the equality of men and women
• the spirit of a fair go, and
• mutual respect and compassion for those in need (para.26)
3) If a formal citizenship test were to be introduced, it could provide the mechanism through which 
we can be assured that new citizens have sufficient English and knowledge of Australia to maximise 
the employment and other economic opportunities which benefit the individual and Australia 
(para.33).
4) Such an understanding will assist social cohesion and successful integration into the community 
(para.27).
Throughout the document English language proficiency is repeatedly stressed as an 
integral part of citizenship testing. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the unremarkable 
nature of citizenship testing, the discussion paper emphasised that citizenship testing 
was already required in other Western nations, such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Canada and the Netherlands (DIMA, 2006:9-10).
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A number of organisations responded to the discussion paper. The Refugee Council of 
Australia (2006) argued that the citizenship test would make it more difficult for 
refugees, the group most in need of citizenship, to gain it. Further, the Refugee Council 
explained that the stress on English language proficiency both discriminates against 
non-English speaking refugees and incorrectly connects passing a citizenship test with 
successful integration. Similarly, the Curtin University of Technology Centre for 
Human Rights Education (Fiske et al, 2006) highlighted four main areas of 
disagreement with the proposed changes. Firstly, it argued that positioning citizenship 
discourse within a language of ‘privileges and responsibilities’ (2006:1) is a notable 
shift from previous language stressing ‘rights and responsibilities’. Fiske et al (2006) 
argued that this shift in language has the ability to undermine Human Rights in 
Australia. Second, Fiske et al (2006) questioned the link between language proficiency 
and citizenship and argued that this privileges people from English-speaking countries 
and discriminates against refugees (amongst other vulnerable groups). Further, Fiske et 
al (2006:2) argued that, if this measure is to be used as a screening devise for off-shore 
immigrants, then this is ‘a return to the White Australia Policy’. Thirdly, the authors 
argued that the proposal to test a migrant’s knowledge of Australian history and values 
(values being a subjective matter), in addition to the shift in language stressing 
‘privileges’, is ‘assimilationist’. The authors contend that it is ‘a new era of 
assimilation, one based upon a preference for English speaking Anglo culture’ (Fiske et 
al, 2006:2). Fourthly, the authors suggested that, within the wider political and social 
climate in which the test is proposed, the proposed changes are ‘highly likely to be used 
to target Muslims and Middle Eastern immigrants’ (2006:3).
The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2006) also responded to the 
discussion paper and shared similar concerns with other responses. The HREOC 
submission however also stressed that, if the citizenship test were to be introduced, 
safeguards should also be put in place to protect vulnerable groups in society. The 
submission noted that, within the current social and political climate, ‘African and 
Middle Eastern communities’ are at risk of being singled out. Moreover, the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission highlighted that, contrary to the aims of the 
proposed citizenship test, the test itself poses a potential risk to social cohesion in 
Australia (2006:para.26). The Commission (2006:para.23) explained:
In this climate there is a risk that the introduction of a formal test on English language and
‘Australian’ values will have the effect of further marginalising these groups rather than encouraging
social cohesion. For instance, it may send a message to the broader Australian community that
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certain migrant groups and refugees do not value the Australian way of life or understand its values 
and hold values that are different to the rest of Australian society... The potential risk of increasing 
social disharmony and divisiveness is directly contrary to the stated aims of introducing the 
citizenship test.
Despite protests and submissions by a variety of organisations, the summary report 
produced by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) 
indicated that 60% of individual respondents supported a citizenship test (Tavan, 
2009:125) and this was viewed as sufficient to implement the changes. However, Tavan 
(2009:126) points to the fact that ‘more than two-thirds of the organisations that 
responded were opposed to it’. Nevertheless, on 11 December 2006, Prime Minister 
John Howard and Andrew Robb announced that the Australian Government would 
introduce a formal citizenship test. In March 2007 the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 
was passed by the Australian Parliament and came into effect on 1 July 2007. The new 
citizenship legislation amended residency requirements for migrants; extending 
residency to four years (double the previous two years) before a migrant was eligible for 
Australian citizenship. Further, it increased the exemption age for passing a basic 
English test (from fifty to sixty years of age). Kevin Andrews, then Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, believed that increasing the time limit to four years before 
migrants could apply for citizenship would allow migrants sufficient time to develop an 
understanding and appreciation of Australian values. He also asserted that Australian 
citizenship ‘is a privilege, not a right’ and, as such, citizenship is linked to Australian 
national identity and Australian values (Tavan, 2009).
Consequently, envisaging the links between immigration, national identity and 
citizenship in Australia as tightly coupled, in the manner which the Minister of 
Immigration and Citizenship explained, makes it difficult to distinguish between 
national identity and citizenship. Indeed, the immigrant reality of the Australian 
population and the common understanding of citizenship and ‘citizenship rights’ 
(common as they are not enshrined in the Constitution) have served to exacerbate the 
confusion. Regardless, there is a need to consider, in Australia’s ethnically and 
culturally diverse polis, the relationship between migration and citizenship legislation. 
As Davidson (1997a: 150) states:
the relationship between migration and citizenship has always been recognised in Australian 
legislation and institutional practice. Indeed, the administration of citizenship rules has always been 
by a subsection of the Commonwealth Department o f Immigration... To consider Australian 
citizenship in isolation from migration laws is almost impossible although it should be quite 
independent.
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Indeed, Australian citizenship has only been formulated in relation to immigration. 
Australian citizenship was created through the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948, 
and came into effect on 26 January 1949 (Klapdor et al, 2009:1). Prior to 1949, 
Australians were British subjects, but citizenship in Australia became a key issue after 
the post-war migration program which was introduced in 1945 (DIAC, 2009b: 1; Betts 
and Birell, 2007). According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(2009:1), immigrant arrivals in 1945, ‘amongst other factors’, ‘led to the creation of a 
federal immigration portfolio in 1945’ (see also Jupp, 2002).
Klapdor et al (2009:1) explain that, as others scholars in Australia have shown (See 
Davidson, 1997a; Jupp, 2002; Jupp, 2007a; Castles et al, 1992), Australian citizenship 
has developed together with immigration since Federation. The relationship is 
exemplified in government approaches toward citizenship laws which also reflected 
immigration policies. In keeping with Australia’s ever-expanding immigration program, 
Australian citizenship was amended ‘over 30 times’ and has reflected changes in 
‘...immigration policies, immigrant source countries, settlement philosophies and 
notions of national identity...’. Australian citizenship was progressively made easier to 
acquire in order to facilitate Australia’s population and economic concerns. The Howard 
Government’s approach to citizenship was the first, since the White Australia Policy, to 
make citizenship more difficult to acquire (Klapdor et al, 2009; Jakubowicz, 2009).
English Language as a Basis of Social Cohesion
As discussed in Chapter 4, the rise of the nation-state brought with it homogenising 
factors that were deemed necessary for the administrative needs of the state (see also 
Hogan-Brun et al, 2009). The ‘National Language’ is viewed as one of the primary 
instruments with which the state can mark its boundaries, create its identity and control 
its population (Hogan-Brun et al, 2009:2). Undoubtedly, language proficiency aids in 
the economic and social advancement of people and the desire for new immigrants to 
attain language proficiency is viewed as a desirable policy initiative by almost all 
governments (Hogan-Brun et al, 2009). Proficiency in the national language is most 
often viewed by policy makers as facilitating economic, social and political interaction, 
which are all deemed necessary for issues of access and equity for migrants (DIAC, 
2011; Davidson, 1997a: 123).
However, language policies, like policies generally, are created to fit the political needs 
of the time. As such, Liddicoat (2009:189) argues that ‘Language policies express ideas
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which are linked to ideological processes and reveal the perceptions and evaluations of 
realities in the sociocultural contexts in which they are constructed. They ratify and 
transmit the ideologies which they contain by defining and encoding what is valued by 
policymakers’. Language policies reflect the concerns of the day and can, and do, 
change according to political needs. In the last decade language attainment and 
proficiency for migrants have become central concerns for governments and policy­
makers in the EU (Hogan-Brun et al 2009), as-well as Australia (Liddicoat 2009). 
Social-cohesion is viewed as threatened by cultural diversity, exemplified by 
multilingualism, and the perception that immigrants threaten social-cohesion through 
their refusal to embrace both the national language and national values (Clyne and Jupp, 
2011). Language policies amongst the majority of EU members have tightened and have 
been made more difficult for migrants, requiring higher levels of language proficiency, 
as well as the ability to demonstrate knowledge about the society and its values63 (see 
also Weinstock, 2008). Language policies then are not simply about ensuring access and 
equity for immigrants, but governments can, and do, use language requirements as a 
form o f ‘gate-keeping’.
Various implicit and explicit language policies have played very important gate-keeping 
roles in Australia, especially in regard to immigration, and the importance of language 
as a marker of national identity has oscillated. Throughout Australian history, the level 
of English proficiency required for both entering the country and gaining citizenship has 
varied drastically, although it was always maintained that ‘English is the national 
language and lingua franca’ (Clyne 201 1:56).
Language requirements for citizenship
Language requirements for naturalisation in Australia have always existed in one form 
or another (Klapdor et al, 2009). Proficiency in English and long periods of residency 
were seen as markers of belonging (Davidson, 1997a: 118). However, like immigration 
policies in Australia, and indeed like settlement policies for immigrants once in 
Australia, language requirements also changed. By 1969, ‘residence requirements were 
reduced from five to three years for aliens who could read and write English’ 
(Davidson, 1997a:88). Moreover, ‘by 1984, the Nationality and Citizenship Act was 
changed to ‘reduce the language requirements of ‘adequate English’ to a ‘basic 
knowledge of English’. ‘Basic English’ was understood as ‘competence to respond in
63 These requirements are not preserved for pre-naturalisation; in some EU countries these tests are
required before entry into the country (See Hogan-Brun et al 2009).
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simple English to questions about personal particulars and a capacity to answer ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to questions about responsibilities and privileges of citizenship’ (Davidson, 
1997a:89; see also Betts and Birrell, 2007). By 1994 even the requirement for ‘basic’ 
English ended for most immigrants and those who were still obliged to learn English 
were informed that:
You must be able to speak and understand basic English for citizenship but you do not need to be 
able to read and write English...When a husband and wife apply for citizenship together, only one 
need to have a basic knowledge of English... If you need help in learning English, you can attend 
English classes held in Australian cities and larger country towns (Davidson, 1997a: 19).
English language proficiency was viewed as a marker of belonging and the demand for 
English language requirements for citizenship were justified on the grounds that 
immigrants could not access their political and legal rights without knowledge of 
English. However, it was strongly argued that knowledge of English did not guarantee 
civic participation and that ethnic minorities who did not have ‘adequate’ English 
language skills (as determined by government) were indeed politically active (the ethnic 
press was used as an example, Davidson, 1997a; see also HREOC, 2006 and their 
response to the citizenship test) and that the English language requirements for the 
attainment of citizenship were put in place to exclude ‘persons whose political views 
were not acceptable to the Government’ (Davidson, 1997a: 121).
The ‘new’ citizenship requirements introduced by the Howard Government in 2007 
were clearly only the latest manifestation of the desire to maintain a hegemonic 
Australian identity that identified with pre-federation Australian identity (Johnson, 
2007). The new citizenship requirements re-emphasised the problematic aspect of 
diversity and presented the English language as a marker of loyalty and belonging 
within a mono-cultural understanding of Australian identity.
The citizenship test however, went further than any since the ad hoc testing undertaken 
during periods of the White Australia Policy in that Howard’s version not only tested 
‘basic English’, but also ‘values’. The citizenship test is justified in terms of ensuring 
the participation of new immigrants in Australian society, allowing them to exercise the 
rights and duties of citizenship. It was explained that:
An understanding of the Australian way of life, our practices, customs, laws and values; and a 
practical command of English will better equip migrant and refugee settlers to build new social links 
and make a meaningful commitment to Australia (DIMA, 2006:11).
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At the 2007 Australia Day citizenship ceremony at Commonwealth Park, Howard said 
that migrants must learn English and embrace Australian values. He stated, ‘I think 
most Australians think it's very important that we embrace as our common method of 
communication with each other a single language, and that is the English language, 
because citizenship and interaction is impossible unless we can effectively communicate 
with one another’ (Howard, 2007).
The citizenship test has been controversial since its inception and the testing apparatus 
has been scrutinised and changed (Tavan, 2009). However, both the rationale for the 
test and the attitudes toward diversity have changed dramatically since multiculturalism 
was first introduced as official policy in 1970s (Jakubowicz, 2009). The citizenship test 
was viewed as upholding ‘Australian values’, which John Howard claimed are about 
social cohesion and which he deemed necessary for the successful integration of 
migrants. However, as Jakubowicz (2009) argues, ‘multiculturalism’ was neither found 
in the new ‘Australian values’, nor in the new rhetoric around citizenship.
‘Foreign’ languages in Australia
Different language policies were favoured at different points in Australia’s immigration 
history, although, until the introduction of multiculturalism as policy in the 1970s 
‘Australia’s language policy was implicit, negative and ad hoc. That is, there was no 
codified policy, and it was mainly a policy in which languages other than English 
played no role’ (Clyne, 2011:57). During the White Australia Policy, English language 
tests were a requirement, as proficiency in English was seen to be a desirable quality of 
certain races (see Chapter 4).
However, between the abandonment of the ‘Dictation Test’ introduced during the White 
Australia Policy and Howard’s introduction of the language test as part of the 
citizenship test for new migrants in 2007, there were other language policies that dealt 
with diversity in Australia and the change in emphasis over time has been well 
documented by Liddicoat (2009). It is not the intention to cover this history here, 
however a few significant aspects are highlighted.
During the ‘assimilation’ period, immigrants were ‘required [to] learn English very 
quickly and to stop using their first language, especially in the public domain’ (Clyne, 
2011:56). As the policy of assimilation grew out of favour and ‘integration’ and
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‘multiculturalism’ policies were introduced, more reasonable and increasingly more just 
policies toward English language requirements were introduced.
During the shift to ‘multiculturalism’ in the 1970s and early 1980s, the English 
language component was still viewed as important and instruction in English language 
was seen as ‘an essential part of any integration policy in Australia’ (Clyne, 2011:56). 
However, multiculturalism also initially celebrated multilingualism and ‘also 
propagated the position that at least for a transitional period, services (information, 
interpreting and translating) need to be available through community languages’ (Clyne, 
2011:56).
The Galbally report (1978) was the first report to directly concern itself with Australia’s 
existing cultural diversity and the first report to ‘direct’ multicultural policies 
(Liddicoat, 2009). It focused on social cohesion and diversity and suggested that 
diversity should be ‘interwoven into the fabric of our nationhood’ (Galbally, 1978, in 
Liddicoat, 2009:190). What is more significant however, is that multilingualism was 
viewed as central to multiculturalism and the report argued for the enhancement of 
Australia’s ‘general language resources to develop intercultural understanding’ 
(Liddicoat, 2009:190).
Since the Galbally report (1978), there have been various other documents on language 
policies for Australia. These policies have emphasised certain aspects of Australian 
identity, more than others. For example, the Multicultural education policy introduced 
the Multicultural Education Programme (MEP) in 1979 (Liddicoat, 2009:192). The 
MEP was concerned with the teaching of community languages and intercultural studies 
and was aimed at promoting an understanding that ‘Language learning and intercultural 
understanding would foster social cohesiveness and tolerance to overcome the potential 
problems of a culturally and linguistically diverse society’ (Liddicoat, 2009:192). The 
MEP, however, worked within a particular understanding of culture and intercultural 
understanding and this was relevant to the ways language policies were conceived and 
implemented.
The way multiculturalism has been approached in Australia has framed multiculturalism 
as something for immigrants and its relevance for other Australians, be they ‘Anglo- 
Saxon’ or Indigenous Australians, has never been made clear (see Liddicoat, 2009; see 
also Aslan, 2009). Australian multiculturalism was always conceived in a way that 
characterised individuals as belonging to their culture, whilst simultaneously
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participating in the mainstream ‘Australian culture’. So, individuals were characterised 
as ‘multicultural or monocultural’ and intercultural participation ‘was therefore 
unidirectional-immigrant group members participated in the mainstream culture but the 
mainstream group maintained its monoculturality’ (Liddicoat, 2009:192). Liddicoat 
(2009) explains that this has direct relevance to language policies in Australia in that the 
importance attached to language and multilingualism was closely linked to the approach 
taken in understanding the implications of diversity (mostly negatively framed).
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed shifts in views about diversity, which also translated to 
changes in immigration criteria and in language policies. The previous chapter also 
explained how an economic dividend came to be attached to Australian multicultural 
policies. Language policies also moved away from a focus on internal diversity and the 
maintenance of social cohesion and moved ‘to an increasingly international specifically 
economic focus’ (Liddicoat, 2009:193).
The National Policy on Languages, which was presented two years earlier than the 
National Agenda for Multicultural Australia (OMA/AACMA 1989), articulated ways in 
which language and cultural knowledge could be utilised to enhance economic and 
international ties. While English as a second language for immigrants was stressed, ‘A 
language other than English for all’ was also initiated at this time. Although it would 
seem that multilingual education was increasingly becoming something for all 
Australians, Liddicoat (2009:192) explains that, although the NPL set broad policy 
objectives which included a focus on four primary contexts: ‘economic activity, 
equality and social inclusiveness, external relationships and educational enrichment’, 
only the first two, the economic and equity contexts, were vigorously pursued in policy 
initiatives. This meant that language policy continued to be framed as relevant to 
Australia’s immigrants primarily and that language diversity, promotion and 
maintenance where still important for immigrants. Liddicoat (2009:193) explains that 
‘Broadly speaking, these contexts highlight a social vision in which productivity and 
citizenship share equal emphasis...’
In 1989, the National Agenda for Multicultural Australia (OMA/AACMA, 1989) 
clearly set out the economic context of multiculturalism and presented diversity as a 
possible problem of economic efficiency (Liddicoat, 2009:194). It also presented 
English language skills for migrants as economically beneficial in the ways in which 
these skills increased ‘participation of minority groups in education and employment’.
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Liddicoat (2009:194) explains that this resulted in the categorisation of languages 
hierarchically and so valued differently. It thus became clear that some languages were 
viewed as ‘economically useful’, while others were ‘viewed as a cost rather than an 
asset’ (Liddicoat, 2009:194). For example Liddicoat (2009:194) points to the languages 
of the major Asian economies (e.g. Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian and Korean) as being 
situated at the top of the hierarchy, followed by ‘useful’ languages like French and 
German.
The ‘economic’ aspects of diversity were soon articulated in the Australian Language 
and Literacy Policy (ALLP) and the National Asian Languages and Studies in 
Australian Schools Strategy (NALSAS), both initiatives introduced in the 1990s. The 
ALLP focused on language as a tool for the promotion of ‘tolerance’ and promoted 
language learning as a way of developing resources for economic gain. Language and 
knowledge about other cultures were seen to facilitate business, industry and trade. 
Similarly, the NALSAS focused exclusively on the economic benefits of language and 
‘fundamentally tied language and culture learning to developing human capital’ 
(Liddicoat, 2009:196).
In 1999, the New Agenda for Multicultural Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1999) strongly articulated a new approach to multiculturalism as something that could 
be ‘economically’ beneficial to Australia. The economic dividend was unequivocally 
encapsulated in the document, where cultural diversity was recognised as one of 
Australia’s ‘great social, cultural and economic resources’. English was viewed as 
Australia’s primary language and all other languages were seen as potentially 
productive in terms of trade. Productive diversity echoes ideas o f ‘economic efficiency’, 
but marks a move away from understanding multiculturalism in primarily social terms, 
to a more economically focused multiculturalism.
However, the commodification of ‘foreign languages’ has not resulted in the inclusion 
of the corresponding community language speakers in Australia. Indeed, as Liddicoat 
(2009) and Clyne (2011) argue, a ‘foreign languages’ industry grew that did not see 
Australia’s multilingual resources as an asset, but as potentially harmful to those who 
wish to learn a foreign language. Clyne (2011:59) argues that the approach to language 
learning and the commodification of languages in Australia has also missed a vital 
contribution that could have been made by those ‘speakers of community languages’ in 
Australia. Clyne (2011:59) laments that the beneficiaries of multiculturalism continue to
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be the dominant group and that ‘It appears that despite the commodification of certain 
languages, the dominant group wishes to be assured of power over those who speak 
those languages’.
The focus on English as the lingua franca in Australia, the steady marginalisation of 
multilingualism and the focus on a particular ‘ethnicised’ understanding of Australian 
values and identity was seen to climax in the introduction of the citizenship testing by 
the Howard Government in 2007 (Klapdor et al, 2019). The citizenship test and the 
articulation of Australian values in ways that were exclusionary (Clyne, 2011) 
witnessed the final marginalisation of cultural and linguistic diversity, in preference for 
a monocultural understanding of Australian identity. Clyne (2011:59) explains that the 
reintroduction of the concept of ‘foreign languages’ to describe language used within 
Australia by Australians ‘concurs with the post-2001 discourse around ‘Australian 
values’ which excluded people of ‘non-Anglo-Celtic backgrounds’ and reversed the 
policies of the past thirty years. This mono-dimensional position is also consistent with 
the representation of multiculturalism as being in conflict with integration, which is 
often confused with assimilation’.
Re-thinking Multiculturalism’s Demise and Social Cohesion
Australia has not experienced a lack of social cohesion because of its ‘immigrant’ 
population (Jupp, 2007b; Markus, 2009), yet fear of diversity eroding social cohesion 
has been a primary preoccupation since Federation. Various Australian Governments 
have initiated various ‘multiculturalism’ policies to develop and maintain inclusionary 
policies on an ad hoc basis, because it was deemed that ‘economic’ and ‘social’ barriers 
prevented immigrants from participating in full in Australia (Grieg et al, 2003) and that 
immigrant integration needed direct government intervention in order to maintain social 
cohesion. However, ‘racialised’ ideas about integration and social cohesion continued to 
inflect both ideas that drove multicultural policies, as well as those ideas against 
multiculturalism in Australia. This approach, it can be argued, has offered Australia a 
fragile sense of social cohesion that rests on the personal success, or otherwise, of new 
and old immigrants, from diverse cultural backgrounds, in integrating into the 
‘Australian way of life’. The ‘new integrationism’ (Poynting and Mason, 2008), which 
presents ‘integration’ as a targeted ‘ideology’ (Jakubowicz, 2009 ), rather than a broad 
‘settlement approach’, was implemented during the Howard Government over a ten year 
span, and has, in many ways, undone much of the progress initiated under the rubric of 
multiculturalism (Jakubowicz, 2009). Indeed, while serious ‘ethnic tensions’ have
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remained rare in Australia, cases such as the ‘Cronulla riots’ and the less publicised 
ethnic tensions in Sydney (Collins, 2007) still reverberate in society, due largely to the 
fear of the excesses o f ‘diversity’ (Clyne and Jupp, 2011).
Coming back to the research published by Robert Putnam in 2007,64 Putnam highlighted 
ethnic diversity as one of the leading causes of social erosion. This idea gave credence 
to the notion that ethnic diversity is a cause for concern. Indeed, difficulties in some 
major European cities and numerous terror attacks against ‘Western targets’ on Western 
soil attest to this fact. However, and more interestingly, Putnam (2007: 174) also argues 
that:
Nevertheless, my hunch is that at the end we shall see that the challenge is best met not by making 
‘them’ like ‘us’, but rather by creating a new, more capacious sense of ‘we’, a reconstruction of 
diversity that does not bleach out ethnic specificities, but creates overarching identities that ensure 
that those specificities do not trigger the allergic, ‘hunker down’ reaction... My argument here is that 
in the short run there is a trade-off between diversity and community, but that over time wise policies 
(public and private) can ameliorate that trade-off. Even while pressing forward with research to 
confirm and clarify these arguments, we must also begin to ask about their implications for public 
policy.
Putnam (2007) contends that a ‘shared identity’, found in a ‘shared citizenship’, is an 
important element in creating societal bonds and, in the short term, ‘diversity’ is 
harmful to social cohesion and societal trust. Which ‘wise policies’ governments should 
implement in order to ameliorate the ‘harmful’ effects of diversity remain unclear. 
However, diversity itself continues to be viewed as something which is ‘harmful’ and 
needs a political response; an idea that has seemingly captured many of the ideas behind 
the erosion of multiculturalism.
The way that citizenship rhetoric has replaced multicultural rhetoric (it is important to 
note that the two were never exclusively pursued) has overshadowed the reasons behind 
this move and has couched citizenship as an overall benign project that works to unite 
disparate identities. Many factors, other than ethnicity, affect the erosion of social 
cohesion6'^  and, indeed, citizenship and shared identity might fashion new bonds. 
However, with no agreed definition of what citizenship might mean, aside from a legal
64 The research for this article was conducted in 2000 in certain parts of the USA. It is significant to note 
that this research was conducted prior to the terrorist attacks in 2001.
Note: Putnam also endorses immigrant ‘assimilation’ and other criteria for the successful broadening of 
the ‘we’ of the nation
^  Putnam’s (2007) article struggles to make the definitive case that ethnicity is the major factor in social 
alienation. His article poorly dealt with economic disparities and other cleavages in society that account 
for social alienation and poor social capital- although to his credit Putnam qualifies this- though the 
argument still stands.
170
understanding, and the demise of multiculturalism as a champion of diversity (of sorts), 
it is unclear how a more ‘capacious sense of ‘we” (Putnam, 2007) can be achieved in 
diverse societies. Whether is it is called ‘multiculturalism’ or not, the political reality of 
diversity continues to demand some kind of political response from governments. As 
Meer and Modood (2007:4) aptly argue, the future of multiculturalism ‘pertains to the 
meaning and usage of the term itself.
Meer and Modood (2007:4) argue that ‘there are at least three such discernible 
contemporary positions’ that can be taken toward diversity. Although Meer and 
Modood’s (2007:4) three definitions listed below are extrapolated from the British 
experience they continue to be relevant to all diverse societies, including Australia. 
They are:
(1) an integration and social cohesion perspective that seeks to include minorities through a process 
of greater assimilation to majority norms and customs;
(2) an alternative, explicitly secular ‘multiculture’ or ‘conviviality’ approach that welcomes the ‘fact’ 
of difference, and stresses lifestyle and consumption based behavioural identities that are anti- 
essentialist in orientation and which invalidate ‘group’ identities in particular;
(3) a political multiculturalism that can to some extent incorporate the priorities of either or both of 
these positions, while also being inclusive of ‘groupings’, not least subjectively conceived ethno­
religious minority groupings (Modood, 2007c; 2008).
Meer and Modood (2007:4) contend that the last position is the one that has been 
persistently attacked in Britain. In the Australian case however, ‘political 
multiculturalism’ was never achieved (See Poynting and Mason, 2008). Indeed, the 
Australian experience has manifested in desire to exclude ethnic ‘groups’ from public 
participation by insisting on depoliticising belonging in favour of advancing an 
overarching commitment to a single Australian national culture.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined how Australia’s policies toward ‘diversity’ changed 
significantly under the Howard Government and how the change in name of the policy 
portfolio, from multiculturalism to citizenship, was a symbolic shift away from the 
ideals of some of the architects of multicultural policies in Australia (Clyne and Jupp, 
2011). By focusing on citizenship as an acceptance of a prescribed ‘ideal’ Australian 
citizen, the Australian state ‘devalorised’ multiculturalism by presenting it as a form of 
tribalism and continued to imbue diversity with negative connotations that do not reflect 
the Australian experience. This paved the way for the government to justify the
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redundancy of various multicultural and ethnic and religious councils and worked to use 
the social cohesion rhetoric as a weapon against multiculturalism and diversity in 
society.
Multiculturalism has a variety of different meanings and the continued celebration of 
Australia ‘as the most successful multicultural nation in the world’ is based upon one 
understanding of multiculturalism and that is multiculturalism as a demographic 
descriptor of the Australian people and Australia’s triumphant victory in finding ‘unity- 
in-diversity’ (Stratton and Ang, 1998:25). However, multiculturalism also has a 
normative dimension. It could be simply about recognising cultural differences, or more 
broadly ‘diversity’, but, more importantly, it should be about confronting and working 
through the difficulties associated with coming to terms with diversity and both 
perceived and ‘real’ cultural cleavages.
In using ‘other Western nations’ as the defence of the citizenship test and in (re)- 
establishing a ‘core’ Australian identity, Howard, and his Government generally, sought 
to narrow the sense of the ‘we’ and to link his new integrationist agenda with the 
putative need for social cohesion. The Howard Government also refused, like its British 
and French counterparts, to use the word ‘multicultural’, seeking to focus upon 
citizenship and social cohesion in a bid to valorise one narrow definition of ‘Australian’ 
culture over all others. Multiculturalism, which was originally devised to extend the 
notions of access and equity, was replaced by a different symbol, ‘citizenship’, which is 
characterised as enhancing social cohesion. This type of social cohesion does not have a 
basis in either theoretical or empirical reality. Indeed, social cohesion has never been 
officially lacking in Australia and, where it is lacking, it cannot be pinned to ‘ethnic 
diversity’, due to immigration. It is therefore the case that a shared national identity 
based on citizenship has proven no less ambiguous than multiculturalism. Neither term 
is in the Australian Constitution, nor guarantees equality or political freedom. What is 
clear, however, is that, where ‘multiculturalism’ was designed with the intention of 
identifying a space which immigrant ‘Others’ can occupy in Australia, the new 
‘citizenship’ was designed to ignore ‘difference and diversity’ and the political response 
this requires, in favour of immigrants ‘new and old’ integrating into one overriding 
‘Australian culture’.
Many of the ‘problems’ associated with diversity and the erosion of social-cohesion in 
Australia were blamed on Muslims. Muslims have come to represent all that is negative
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and harmful about multiculturalism and cultural diversity. The next chapter presents the 
context in which Muslims in Australia have been singled out as ‘problematic’. Their 
‘problematic’ status has meant that Muslims in Australia have received a 
disproportionate level of prejudice and discrimination from members of the public, as 
well as Australian politicians. Muslims were, and continue to be, generally characterised 
as a threat to Western civilisation and their belonging has been continuously questioned 
as a result. The Howard Government’s ideas about social cohesion went hand in hand 
with the securitisation of Muslim identities and their putative lack of belonging, the 
consequences of which are discussed in Part Two: Islam and Muslims in Australia.
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PART TWO: ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN AUSTRALIA
Chapter 7: Muslims in Australia 
Introduction
This chapter introduces Part Two: Islam and Muslims in Australia and identifies some 
of the key events, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which spotlighted Muslims and Islam 
in Australia as ‘problematic’.66 Part One discussed how the discourse of citizenship was 
strengthened to counter the perceived threat Muslims posed to social cohesion in 
Australia and Western societies (Jupp, 2011; Klapdor, 2009; Weinstock, 2008). All 
three ‘projects of belonging’, ‘Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship’, came to 
focus on Muslims as they were broadly viewed as incapable of belonging in Australia 
(Jupp, 2011; Aslan, 2009). Consequently, while the general ideas and definitions of the 
‘Other’ in Australia meant that definitions of belonging tended to be very narrow and 
largely exclusive, these same definitions about the ‘Other’ have worked to legitimate 
the view that Muslims are different and therefore ‘problematic’ in Australia. Following 
Dunn et al (2007), ‘Otherness’ is constructed as nefarious, inferior and non-belonging 
and Muslims are currently viewed as the ultimate ‘Other’ in Australia (Bouma et al, 
2011).
Debates over settlement policies for migrants in Australia have dominated since the 
liberalisation of immigration intake in the aftermath of World War II. ‘Assimilation’, 
‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ have all been ongoing preoccupations with how 
immigrants ought to be managed once in the nation. Many popular fears and panics 
associated with ‘integration’ came from those who believed that there were ‘certain’ 
people from other cultures with different values who had no hope of integrating (Hage, 
1998). This fear was not, and is at present not, a fear that is confined to Australia 
(Weinstock, 2008). Numerous Western societies have been preoccupied with 
immigration settlement issues since they too liberalised their immigration intake 
(Weinstock, 2008; Joppke, 2010). In the European context, each country has pointed to 
its local variant of the ‘Other’ as a problem affecting its ‘national identity’ and ‘social 
cohesion’ (Weinstock, 2008; Miles and Brown, 2003). However, a persistent ‘Other’ for 
Europe (Miles and Brown, 2003) which has become even more so after the events of 
9/11, are Muslims and Islam; an ‘Other’ that has also captured the Australian
66 These events, which have come to mark Islam and Muslims as not capable of belonging in Australia, 
are not intended to be exhaustive. See Aslan, 2009 for more details.
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imagination. Public debates about integration have focused on Muslims in the West 
(Weinstock, 2008; Collins, 2007; Dunn et al, 2007) in a way that is largely 
unprecedented, even if anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiment preceded the events of 
9/11 (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2010; Allen, 2010; 
Aslan, 2009; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011).
The ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, which has come to dominate as a framework for 
analysing the relationship between ‘Islam and the West’, was first introduced by Lewis 
in 1990 and later expanded upon by Huntington in 1993 (Aly, 2007:xiii; Huntington, 
1997). Although Huntington’s controversial thesis outlined multiple ‘civilisations’, the 
‘clash of civilisations’ as a worldview came to focus solely on the ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ 
world as a direct opposite to the ‘Western’ world; an opposite and threatening ‘Other’. 
The unrelenting popularity of this thesis, whilst discredited by numerous scholars 
(Allen, 2010; Said, 2003; Modood, 2007), demonstrates that it resonated in the West, 
especially after the first Gulf War (1990-1), and was exacerbated by the events of 9/11. 
The various ‘problems’ in the Middle East, as well as a number of events explained as 
‘Islamic terrorism’, came to foment the idea that Islam and Muslims are categorically 
different to ‘the West’ and that this difference is problematic.
Consequently, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis came to rationalise world politics and, 
as such, gave renewed vigour and urgency to the focus on the integration of ‘Muslim’ 
migrants in Western societies (Allen, 2010). Although Australia does not have a history 
of ‘unrest’ among its Muslim citizens, there has been, since the first Gulf War (Aslan, 
2009), growing anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment that has manifested in a variety 
of forms (Dunn, 2004; 2005). There is ample evidence to indicate that the ‘clash of 
civilisations’ thesis has come to inflect public debate in Australia since the events of 
9/11 (Aslan, 2009; Chapter 8). The remainder of this chapter informs the analysis of the 
parliamentary debates conducted in Chapters 8 and 9 by outlining the social and 
political contexts that directly implicate Islam and Muslims in Australia.
Muslims in Australia
Before demonstrating the forms that anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiments have taken, 
it is worth noting the heterogeneous nature of Islam and Muslims in Australia. The
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ABS (2008) indicates that there are roughly 340,000 Muslims67 in Australia. There is 
evidence to indicate that the earliest contact between Australians and Muslims occurred 
between Muslim Macassan fishermen from Southern Sulawesi (now Indonesia) and 
Indigenous people in northern Australia around the 1750s (HREOC Isma Report, 
2004:25). However, it was not until the 1860s, with the arrival of Afghan cameleers, 
that the earliest settlements by Muslims in Australia occurred (HREOC Isma Report, 
2004:25).
The White Australia Policy restricted the entry of Muslims after the 1920s and 
restrictions were eased in the 1960s (HREOC Isma Report, 2004:25). Prior to the 1980s, 
the majority of Muslims in Australia came from Lebanon and Turkey (Dunn, 2004). 
Today, Australia’s Muslims come from a range of countries, including the Middle-East 
and Turkey. The last three decades have witnessed increased diversity in the ethnicities 
of Australian Muslims, including an increase in the number of ‘Asian’ Muslims from 
India, Pakistan and Indonesia, as well as ‘European’ Muslims from Bosnia (Dunn et al, 
2007: 565; Saeed, 2003).
Moreover, there is marked variation in the way Muslim migrants have come to 
Australia. Throughout the last 100 years Muslims have arrived on Australian shores 
through a variety of visa categories (family reunion, assisted passage and skilled 
immigrant), as well as refugees and asylum seekers (Akbarzadeh and Saeed, 2001). 
More tellingly however, of the 340, 000 Muslims in Australia, roughly one third are 
Australian-born (Dunn et al, 2007:565; Saeed, 2003) and there are a growing number of 
new converts to Islam in Australia (Saeed, 2003: vi). There has also been great 
variation in the settlement experience of Muslim immigrants, as well as in their socio­
economic well-being (ABS, 2008b). Australian Muslims however, predominantly live 
in the metropolitan areas. Dunn (2005:30) suggests that there has been a remarkable 
concentration ‘of the Muslim presence in industrial and lower socioeconomic areas 
(though not entirely)’ of Sydney. Traditionally, Sydney has hosted the largest number of 
Muslims and mosques and remains the site of Islam‘s growth in Australia (Dunn, 
2005:30; ABS, 2008b). However, today Muslims and mosques can be found all over 
Australia (Saeed, 2003; Al-Momani et al, 2010).
67 This number could be larger as the ABS (2007) indicates that there are anomalies in the data gathered, 
as many residents who come from countries with high Muslim populations, such as Malaysia have not 
identified as Muslim in Australia.
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Further, the way Muslims have practiced Islam in Australia also indicates great 
variability. There are Ahmadiyya groups, Alawy organizations and Shia and Sunni 
associations; the latter being the largest (Dunn, 2005:30). Mosques have also varied in 
their affiliation with certain national groups. Some mosques have a ‘multicultural’ 
congregation, while others have more exclusive ‘monocultural’ congregations (such as 
mosques with largely Arabic-speaking or Turkish congregants). However, while there 
has been an over-riding tendency in research on Muslims to identify them in ethno- 
religous terms, many Muslims identify themselves in religious, rather than ethno­
religious terms (Peek, 2005; Modood, 1998b; Nielsen, 1987). While the concept of the 
‘Urnma’ has been a source of non-national identity for many Muslims (Nielsen, 
1987:384), in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks many Muslims in the West have chosen 
to foreground their religious identities (Peek, 2005).
Nonetheless, despite numerous scholars and public commentators demonstrating that 
Islam and Muslims are culturally, linguistically, religiously, educationally and 
economically diverse, they are persistently categorised as belonging to a single 
‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ community’ in Australia. Further, while national origin, cultural 
and sectarian diversity of Muslims in Australia has been slowly recognised, it still 
remains the case that the extent of the diversity amongst Muslims in Australia is poorly 
recognised (Dunn et al, 2007:565), with many automatically associating Islam with 
Saudi Arabia and the Middle-East (Poynting et al, 2004).
Muslims and the Media
Muslims and Islam have, historically, been portrayed negatively in the media (See Said, 
2003; Said, 1997; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2010). 
In his book Covering Islam (1997), first published almost twenty-one years before the 
9/11 attacks, Said reveals the extent of the negative (mis)representation of Islam and 
Muslims in the mostly American media. He notes that ‘instead of scholarship, we often 
find only journalists making extravagant statements, which are instantly picked up and 
further dramatized by the media’ (1997:xvi). Said’s Covering Islam exposes the loaded 
nature of generalizations (like Islam v West), as well as their easy deployment in the 
media discourse on Islam and Muslims that perpetuates the reductive and very negative 
stereotypes that further aggravate the perception of Islam and Muslims as alien to, and 
vastly different from, ‘the West’. Said (1997:28) explains that Muslims and Arabs are 
represented as either ‘oil suppliers or as potential terrorists’ and that ‘a limited series of 
crude, essentialised caricatures of the Islamic world are presented’.
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However, the televising of the terrorist attacks on the United States of America, 
coupled with linking the terrorists with Islam and the Middle-East since 9/11, has 
resulted in unprecedented negative media coverage of Islam and Muslims (Dunn et al, 
2007; Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006). The popular media is a key institution 
in regard to the representation of difference and the ability to ‘Other’ identities (Hall 
1997; Dunn et al, 2007; Poynting et al, 2004) and the media has undoubtedly been a key 
disseminator of negative ideas about and images of Islam and Muslims pre and post 
9/11.
Of course, Muslims have been in the media long before the events of 9/11 (Modood, 
2007; Aly, 2007; Manning, 2006, Said, 2003; Said, 1997; Dunn et al, 2007; Aslan, 
2009; Ata, 2010). While the coverage of Muslims in the media was more extensive in 
European countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, owing to the Rushdie Affair in 
Britain and the Headscarves Affair in France, as well as the first Gulf War (Nielsen, 
2004: vii), Muslims also featured in the Australian media linked to events such as the 
‘racial tensions’ which flared during the first Gulf War in the early 1990s (HREOC 
Isma Report, 2004; Aslan, 2009).Moreover, throughout the 1990s, Muslims featured in 
the media during the refugee debates and the public outcry over ‘immigrant youth 
criminality’ which focused on second-generation Lebanese-Australians (Collins and 
Reid, 2009a; Collins and Reid, 2009b; Collins et al, 2011; Aslan, 2009; Poynting et al, 
2004; Collins et al, 2000).
Broadly, extensive research has been undertaken to investigate the ways in which Islam 
and Muslims have been portrayed in the Western media (Said, 1997; Poynting et al, 
2004; Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; 
Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2010; Ata, 2010). Media content (especially in broadsheets) 
have been analysed by a number of scholars and the data have generally revealed the 
extent of the misrepresentation, sensationalisation and pejorative media portrayal of 
Muslims and Islam (for example, see Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Said 
1997; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Poynting et al, 2004). The 
research has been conducted in a variety of locations, including the UK (Poole and 
Richardson, 2006), USA (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2010) and Australia (Poynting et 
al, 2004; Manning, 2006; Rane et al, 2010). While local context heavily inflects the 
media output, in the current ‘mediatised world’ (Allen, 2010) content is globally shared 
and the same, or very similar, negative representations of Muslims and Islam have been 
disseminated in Western societies (Esposito, 2011; Allen, 2010).
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In the Australian context, Poynting et al (2004) draw on media coverage of Arabs and 
Muslims in Australia to demonstrate the extent of the demonization of Arabs and 
Muslims and the making of Arabs and Muslims into the contemporary Australian ‘folk 
devil’. Poynting et al (2004:251) explain:
...that the social imagining of the criminal in contemporary Australia increasingly involves the 
evocation of the Arab Other as a primary folk devil of our times: a figure which conflates Arabs, 
Muslims and Australians of Middle Eastern ancestry, and is grounded in an Orientalist pathology of 
crime, violence, barbarism and sexual rapaciousness’.
Similarly, a study conducted by Imtoual (2005:1) found that there is a ‘climate of 
hostility and negativity towards Islam and Muslims currently in operation in the 
Australian print media’. The author contends that there is general negativity toward 
Muslims and Islam and positive representations were scarce and overshadowed by 
representation of Muslims as terrorists, Muslim women as oppressed and Islam as a 
violent religion.
Recently, Rane et al (2010) have added considerably to the limited scholarship on 
Muslims and the Australian media. Their extensive analysis of the varied aspects of the 
Australian media and its treatment of Muslims encompasses both recent media portrayal 
as well as historical accounts that explain the shape, nature and extent of the media 
portrayal of Muslims in Australia. The varied aspects and range of analyses provided by 
Rane et al (2010) provide a dynamic picture of Muslims in the Australian media. 
However, the varied contributions in Rane et al (2010) continue to point to the negative 
representation of Muslims in the media.
The media representation of the 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent representation of 
Muslims in the media all over the Western world, created a monolithic and homogenous 
view of Muslims and Islam, as people readily and largely identified through their dress 
(hijab, burka, see Manning, 2006; Akbarzadeh, 2010) and united by their misogyny and 
hatred for freedom, democracy and the West (Manning, 2006; Mansouri and Percival- 
Wood, 2008). Moreover, the status of women in Islam became an important issue for 
both male and female politicians and commentators in Australia, with many debating 
the oppressive nature of the hijab (Akbarzadeh, 2010), the active use of the hijab by 
Muslims to subvert ‘Australian values’ (Yaxley, 2005), as well as the fertility rates of 
Muslim women and the fear that Australia will turn into a Muslim nation in 50 years 
(Peatling, 2006).
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Following media coverage of the first Gulf War (1990) and then of 9/11, there was a 
violent physical backlash in Australia, as elsewhere, against Australian Muslims and 
those perceived to be Muslim and/or Arab (Aslan, 2009). Even those who were neither 
Muslim nor Arab (such as Sikhs), attracted indiscriminate and violent retribution from 
members of the public based solely on their somatic characteristics, which were widely 
held to be ‘Muslim’ (Collins and Reid, 2009a:382; Poynting et al, 2004; HREOC Isma 
Report, 2004; Aslan, 2009). Many Muslims/Arabs/ people ‘of Middle Eastern 
appearance’ were physically and verbally abused within their communities. Bottles and 
rotten fruit were thrown at Muslim women drivers (Buggins, 2002), hijabs were torn off 
women’s’ heads, women in hijabs were run off the streets by vehicles and people of 
non-Muslim/Arab backgrounds were beaten on camera for being mistakenly identified 
as of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’. Attacks on Islamic mosques and schools were also 
common occurrences. Mosques were egged, smeared with human waste, sprayed with 
graffiti, firebombed and burnt down (Connolly, 2001; Buggins, 2002).
Moreover, negative ideas about Islam and Muslims were not only found in media 
coverage. Surveys undertaken in Australia as early as the 1980s indicate that ‘Muslim 
and Arab Australians were key ‘out-groups’, just ahead of Asian and Indigenous 
Australians (Dunn et al, 2007:572). In 2007, Issues Deliberation Australia/America 
conducted research on Muslim/Non-Muslim relations in the form of community 
consultations in Australia. The research team found, amongst numerous other findings, 
that there are ‘mutual misperceptions and lack of understanding’ between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Australia and that young Muslims in Australia are at risk of alienation. 
Further, the research indicated that there is a strong correlation between the language 
used by politicians and racism within the wider community and that negative 
representation in the media fuelled stereotypes and negative ideas about Islam and 
Muslims generally.
Similarly, Dunn et al (2007:571) analysed data taken from three public opinion surveys 
and found that the majority of responses pointed to ‘Islamophobia’ in Australia. In one 
survey, almost half the respondents believed that Muslims and people from the Middle 
East did not belong in Australia. The majority of respondents vaguely believed that 
‘Islam was a threat of some level’ and this ‘suggests that there is a strong level of 
unsupported (and unsubstantiated) fear of Islam’. Dunn et al (2007:571) found that:
Broadly speaking, most comments concerned the military threat posed to Australia by Islam (176
comments), and a second strain of opinion concerned cultural threats (76 comments). The former
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were dominated by references to terrorism, including many mentions of the Bali bombings in 2002 
and the 11 September 2001 terror events in the USA. In these comments, there was often an 
unquestioned assertion that Muslims are terrorists, although there was also an encouraging level of 
recognition of the media’s role in establishing these perceptions of threat.
The data also revealed that respondents feared that Muslims were taking over Australia, 
Muslims wished to convert non-Muslims and Muslims threatened Christmas. The data 
from the three studies analysed by Dunn et al (2007:571) indicates that Muslims are 
indeed ‘Othered’ in Australia, where ‘the constructions of Otherness (as threat, 
nefarious, inferiority and non-belonging) are central components of the contemporary 
racism faced by Australian Muslims’.
In a more recent study on religion in Australia, the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (Bouma et al, 2011:23) found that there are high levels of 
concern ‘that there is too much deference to religious minorities, especially the Muslim 
communities, at the expense of mainstream values, and that the shift to allegedly 
appeasing minority groups threatens core social values’. Indeed, the report indicates that 
there is a particular concentration on Islam and Muslims as representing the threatening 
‘Other’ and that Muslims and Islam are a source of anxiety in Australia. The report 
states (Bouma et al, 2011:24):
The fear expressed was that minorities could rule the majority, because, it was felt, there is no 
balance in present policies, and this enables new communities to challenge some of the norms of 
their adopted society. Few specific examples of these fears were given; however the hijab was 
mentioned in this context, as was sharia law, equality in gender relations, and any concessions to the 
gay lobby.
In addition to the consistent negative media portrayal of Muslims and Islam, the 
negative attitudes identified within survey findings and physical assaults on Muslims 
and people who simply appeared to be Muslim, Muslims were also specifically singled 
out by Australian citizens for immigration restriction. In 2007, 2008 and 2011 members 
of the Australian Parliament presented petitions on behalf of their constituents calling 
for a moratorium on Muslim immigration to Australia. The petitions indicated that 
ethnicity and culture were not an issue and, as such, the moratorium was not based on 
any kind of racism, but nonetheless Muslim immigration to Australia should cease (see 
Australian Senate Hansard 13 and 16 August, 17 September 2007, 12 February and 11 
March 2008). A more recent expression of the desire for a moratorium on Muslim 
immigration to Australia was voiced by ACT Senator Gary Humphries in the February
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2011, when he presented a petition to the ACT Parliament demanding a 10 year 
moratorium on Muslim immigration to Australia (Senate Hansard 10 February 2011).
Some scholars and commentators have blamed the media for inciting hatred and for 
disseminating injurious representations of Muslims and Islam (Poynting et al, 2004; 
Dunn, 2005). The media and the news networks in particular have found Islam and 
Muslims to be extremely newsworthy (Aslan, 2009; Poole, 2002; Rane et al, 2010). 
Consequently, the media coverage about Islam and Muslims grew exponentially in the 
time after 9/11 (Poole, 2002). The media has also been blamed for inciting hatred and 
for inciting acts of aggression toward Muslims. Community leaders and members of 
Australia’s ‘Muslim community’ considered racial profiling by the police and the media 
as key to the increase in the number of physical and verbal attacks on ethnic minorities 
in Australia since September 11, 2001 (Rose, 2002:1). The police identification of boys 
charged with rape as ‘Lebanese’ and the use of labels such as ‘of Middle Eastern 
appearance’ or ‘being of Middle Eastern extraction’ were blamed for an increase of the 
threats and abuse towards Australian citizens who ‘fit’ the profile (Rose, 2002; see also 
Poynting et al 2004; Manning, 2006). However, some have argued that, while the media 
has undoubtedly played a key role in the ‘formulation and establishment of popular 
perceptions in the public sphere’ (Allen, 2010:96), there is no direct evidence to suggest 
that media representations of Islam and Muslims have resulted in aggression toward 
Muslims or ‘significant change in attitude’ (Allen, 2010:96).
Another key issue which emerged for Muslims in Australia involved opposition to 
mosque building. Indeed, anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments were very high on the 
issues of building and renovating mosques and Islamic schools. Here, the Australian 
media has played a key role in shaping and publicising some of the debates surrounding 
mosque building through coverage of the views of the residents of the areas and through 
the publishing of letters to the editor (Dunn, 2005).
Muslim ‘Problems’
Opposition to Mosque Building
Opposition to mosque building in Australia became an important issue in the 1980s and 
1990s, especially in Sydney, as Muslim numbers grew (Humphreys, 1989; Dunn, 2004; 
Dunn, 2005; Aslan, 2009). However, the last decade has seen opposition increase to 
mosques and Islamic schools across the country. Even though debates over mosque 
building have been recurring regularly since the 1980s, scholarly commentary on the
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phenomena has been scarce (for exceptions see Dunn, 2004; Dunn, 2005; Dunn et al, 
2007; Humphrey, 1989; Humphrey, 1991). In a post-9/11 environment, anti­
mosque/Islamic school opposition has attracted considerable media coverage. There are 
too many to list, so the following are some of the more infamous cases of opposition to 
the building of mosques and Islamic schools.
In November 2002, the Baulkham Hills Shire Council, motivated by resident 
opposition, refused development permission for a mosque in the north-western suburb 
of Annangrove in Sydney (Naidoo, 2002). Opposition to the mosque involved 
thousands of objections formally lodged with the Baulkham Hills Shire Council, 
thousands of letters, telephone calls to councillors, poster campaign and a public 
meeting (Cameron, 2002).
Baulkham Hills Mayor John Griffiths addressed a meeting of residents who opposed the 
construction, asking them to ‘get emotional’ about the issue in order to get what they 
wanted. He stated that the mosque provoked concern for ‘the girls and the ladies in the 
community’, insinuating the ‘rapacious’ appetite of Muslims. Moreover, the official 
concerns of the Annangrove residents were traffic congestion, fear of vandalism, fear of 
environmental degradation and the view that the proposed prayer centre was contrary to 
the shared beliefs, customs and values of the community in Annangrove. Residents also 
claimed that too few Muslims lived in the immediate area to warrant a mosque (Wells, 
2002).
In October 2007, a proposal for an Islamic School to be built in Camden, Sydney was 
lodged with Camden Council. While Camden does not have a high Muslim population, 
the education facility planned to draw students from neighbouring suburbs (Macarthur 
Chronicle, 2007). Camden Council received hundreds of submissions opposing the 
building of the Islamic school (Macarthur Chronicle, 2007). The Council reportedly 
received 284 submissions before several protest meetings took place with over 2000 
people attending. While, officially, the residents opposed the Islamic school for 
‘planning concerns’ , it was reported that the crowds were excited by claims that 
‘Camden would become like Bankstown’, ‘Muslims would not integrate’ and ‘Muslims 
had tried to take over the world’ (Macarthur Chronicle, 2007).
In 2008, plans to build a mosque and education centre in Hobson’s Bay, Melbourne 
were given Council approval. However, opposition was mounted by a number of 
groups, including the ‘Australian Protectionist Party’, which distributed thousands of
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anti-Islamic pamphlets. Residents (150 members of the Newport West Action Group) 
also raised objections similar to residents who have opposed mosques elsewhere in 
Australia, citing traffic volume, operating hours, noise and ‘neighbourhood character’ as 
central objections (Tzobanakis, 2008a; 2008b).
Opposition to mosques in Sydney had been common throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
and it would seem the last decade has cemented the fact that very few mosques and 
Islamic schools could be established without vehement opposition from surrounding 
residents (see Dunn, 2005). According to Dunn (2005:29): ‘Debates about mosque 
building in Sydney have been among the most prominent of the political tensions 
surrounding cultural diversity and land-use change in Australia...All of the thirty-odd 
mosques and Islamic centres proposed within Sydney (and major renovations) since the 
1980s have encountered community opposition and difficulties from municipal 
authorities’.
A common theme emerges across the numerous instances of opposition to mosques and 
Islamic schools in Australia. Although one would expect some diversity in the 
objections to reflect the varying geographical, social and economic contexts of the areas 
where mosque and Islamic schools have been built (or wish to be built), the objections 
repeat. While, officially, traffic, noise and environmental issues are presented as central 
to the objections, residents engage in anti-Islamic sentiment in arguing that an Islamic 
mosque or school is not in keeping with the character of the neighbourhood. They have 
claimed the neighbourhoods as ‘Christian’, quiet and safe, while also claiming that 
‘girls and ladies’ might be at risk, the chanting and the noise would be intolerable and 
the graffiti and vandalism that would accompany Muslims would render the 
neighbourhood unsafe. Residents claimed that the proposed Islamic school in Camden 
would be a ‘breeding ground for terrorists...There will be a surge of gang rapes, looting 
and attacking infidels’ (Murray and Tovey, 2009). Additionally, residents complained 
that ‘Christian’ character of the community would be damaged, where ‘prayer mats are 
unfurled in shops and girls would be assaulted because of what they wore’ (Murray and 
Tovey, 2009). Moreover, as Dunn (2005:30) points out, one of the key claims made by 
residents is that there were no local Muslims and that the mosque/school would be 
attracting Muslims from outside the immediate area (‘flooding’ the area with Muslims). 
Dunn (2004:334) refers to this ‘as a discourse of absence, which is related to a discourse 
of incompatibility. Cumulatively, the argument is that Muslims are not here, and
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therefore would not fit in. The latter depends upon an argument that localities (and the 
nation) are Christian (and not Muslim)’ (see also Dunn, 2005).
Cronulla Riots
In 2005, amidst more terrorist attacks in Bali, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), a racially motivated riot occurred in 
Cronulla, Sydney. On 11th December 2005, an estimated 5,000 people converged on a 
beach in Cronulla, Sydney after claims that lifesavers were attacked by ‘Lebs’ (Collins, 
2007). Text messages, which were widely circulated, called for vigilante action by 
outraged ‘Aussies’ to meet at Cronulla beach to ‘take back their beach’. The text of one 
message was reprinted in the Daily Telegraph, a Sydney tabloid with wide circulation: 
‘This Sunday, every Aussie in the Shire get down to north Cronulla to help support Leb 
and wog bashing day... Bring your mates and let’s show them that this is our beach and 
they are never welcome... let’s kill these boys’ (cited in Collins and Reid, 2009:384). 
People were arrested after 13 people ‘of Middle Eastern appearance’ were abused and 
assaulted by members of the crowd (King and Dan, 2005; see also Collins, 2007). 
During the riots Australian youth, who saw themselves as ‘White’ and local, draped in 
the Australian flag, demanded that Muslims and ‘Lebs’ ‘go home’ (Poynting, 2006). A 
number of days later, a retaliatory attack by males of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ 
sought revenge through vandalism in the suburbs surrounding Cronulla.
Home-Grown Terrorism
After 9/11 the Howard Government passed 48 ‘anti-terror’ laws (Carrick, 2011).68 A 
new law created every seven weeks between 2001 and 2007 (Lynch and Williams, 
2007:10), which created new criminal offences; increased detention and questioning 
power for the police and various security agencies; increased surveillance and 
monitoring and control of people’s movements without conviction and created sedition 
laws, as well as new powers for the Attorney-General to proscribe organisations deemed 
to be ‘terrorist’ organisations (see Lynch and Williams, 2007; HREOC, 2008).
Each subsequent terrorism event, such as the Bali bombings and later the London 
bombings, prompted the Australian Government to increase its anti-terrorism laws 
(Lynch and Williams 2007). The Government feared that the terrorist attacks
68 This is in reference to Commonwealth Laws. The states and territories have also passed numerous new 
anti-terror laws and in some cases: ‘They have even transferred some of their constitutional power to the 
Commonwealth for its use’ (Lynch and Williams, 2007:10).
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perpetrated by young English/Muslims in London on 7 July 2005 and the second wave 
of bombings in Bali were indications of a new breed of ‘home-grown terrorists’ within 
Western societies. The characterisation of the ‘home-grown terrorist’ centred on the 
image of the seemingly ordinary, but mildly disillusioned/disgruntled, Muslim youth 
who is brainwashed by extremist Muslims clerics69. The Australian Federal Police 
Commissioner at the time, Mick Keelty, claimed, during a radio interview on ABC, that 
they have seen extremist behaviours ‘from some people’ and that ‘to suddenly find 
people who have lived in the community, gone to university, been part of a sporting 
community, who suddenly decide to bomb their own city as suicide bombers ... it's just 
an entirely different landscape to that we were used to three or four years ago’ (Kerin, 
2005). This has certainly proved to be one of the key shifts which bifurcated attitudes 
towards Muslims in Western societies, turning attention away from global terrorism to 
the potential threat o f ‘home-grown’ terrorism (Aslan, 2009).
While the Bali and Madrid bombings were significant enough to resonate with 9/11, it 
was the London bombings that further cemented the view of Islam and Muslims as the 
‘danger within’ Australia. The London bombings tied moral panic about immigrant 
youth gangs from Islamic backgrounds with ‘home-grown’ terrorism, combining a 
variety of incidents in which Muslims were involved into one large picture of the 
Muslim ‘bogey’. After the London bombings, media coverage too turned its focus from 
international terrorism to the ‘home-grown’ kind (Poole and Richardson, 2006; Aslan, 
2009).
In 2001, 2002 and 2005 Muslim families and communities experienced dawn raids 
conducted by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) (Mazzocchi, 
2001; Canberra Times, 2002; AAP, 2005). During the ‘raids’ by ASIO, many Muslim 
and community representatives voiced their concerns regarding the treatment and 
representation of Muslims by the Government and the media (ABC, 2002). However, 
there was little sympathy for the Muslim community as ‘terrorism specialists’ were 
asked to comment on the events. One of the terrorism specialists Dr. Gunaratna, head of 
the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, suggested that 
the ‘fight against terrorists was also a fight against extremism’ and that we needed to 
‘create a moral ethic among the migrant communities against violence, against the use 
of violence to achieve political goals’ (Kearney, 2005). Similarly, Dr. Norman
69 See the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) National Action Plan to Build 
on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security initiative which began in 2005. Its plans included resources 
for the prevention of the radicalisation of Muslim youth in Australia. See also Jakubowicz, 2009.
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Friedman (international defence analyst) suggested that intelligence operatives need to 
infiltrate extremist Muslim circles to successfully combat terrorism (Nicholls, 2002) and 
that the cost of fully protecting Australia against terrorist attacks would be socially 
unacceptable (Nicholls, 2002).
Numerous popular commentators and scholars have argued that the anti-terror laws 
were unfairly targeting Muslim Australian citizens, as well as impinging on citizen’s 
rights more generally (Poynting and Mason, 2007). Ten years after the events of 9/11, 
some analysts begun arguing that the anti-terror laws, while successfully prosecuting 
some citizens convicted of contemplating and/or gathering materials for terrorists plot in 
Australia, impinge on citizen’s rights and create fear and suspicion of the Muslim and 
Arab communities in Australia (HREOC 2008:Sec.8). So, Williams (in Collerton, 
2011:2) argues that:
...the stringent nature of some of the laws can actually promote some of the radicalisation that leads 
to a terrorist attack...that’s because when you see very lengthy sentences handed down, members of 
the community can form a sense of grievance, of ostracisation and that can actually fuel the 
possibilities of extremism and recruitment by terrorists. And that’s why the laws need to be balanced 
out with other programs which enhance social cohesion....
Whether the anti-terror laws actually do, or do not, unjustly target the ‘Muslim 
community’ in Australia, Islam and Muslims are directly implicated in all facets of the 
anti-terror laws, their definitions and their implementation. As has been the case since 
the events of 9/11, a monolithic Muslim community in Australia has been framed as 
either harbouring terrorists and/or capable of turning to terrorism if aggrieved. In 
January 2006, Attorney-General Philip Ruddock spoke to a gathering of Muslims on the 
first day of Eid-al-Adha, at Sydney’s Lakemba Mosque, which boasts the largest 
congregation in the country. Mr Ruddock took the opportunity to remind his audience 
that they must obey the laws of the country (Poynting and Mason, 2008:238). Overall, 
there has been a perpetuation of the idea that Islam and Muslims are intrinsically 
deviant and ‘problematic’.
' Fundamentalist’ and ‘Moderate’ Imams
Political and cultural representation of Muslims in Australia by imams and members of 
the various councils in Australia has certainly been contentious. The fact that there are 
over 300,000 Muslims in Australia with marked difference in their approach to Islam 
necessarily points to a number of ‘Islamic communities’ which entails a decentralised 
approach to representation. However, while there are no clear processes for the election
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o f ‘legitimate’ and formal representation of Muslims in Australia, those who do claim to 
present, or are sometimes given the responsibility of presenting, Islam in Australia, have 
attracted much criticism from the Muslims they purport to represent, wider Australian 
communities and the Government. Both appointed and self-appointed Muslims leaders 
have regularly participated in media debates in the 1990s and particularly during the 
first Gulf War (Aslan, 2009) and since 9/11, often providing journalists with sound­
bites that give the overall impression that Islam and Muslims in Australia are a 
homogenous community. Indeed, Imams have been asked to represent their 
‘community’ on a regular basis, especially following negative events, where the 
loyalties and allegiance of Muslims in Australia have been questioned (Aslan, 2009). 
Muslim leaders in Australia serve a variety of functions that aid the putative 
engagement between Muslims in Australia and the rest of Australia (Tabar et al, 2003). 
So, Muslim leaders serve as the interface with government, and whenever the Australian 
government feels that it is necessary to engage with Muslims in Australia. Muslim 
leaders are viewed as capable of influencing Muslim public opinion and are, therefore, 
expected to reduce immigrant youth criminality within the community (Collins and 
Reid, 2009), act as bridges between Muslim and non-Muslim Australians and preach 
according to the agenda of the Government (pro-US, anti-terrorism etc, see Aslan, 
2009). Poynting and Mason (2008:239) argue that multiple factors influence the shape 
and relationship between ‘Muslim community leaders’ and various Australian 
governments. They contend that:
This incorporation of key Muslim community leaders needs to be seen within the context of the 
jockeying for public respectability, political influence, and government largesse, while maintaining 
intracommunity standing though representing and advocating for the real needs of their 
constituencies, which had characterised ‘ethnic leader’ multiculturalism in Australia since about 
1978.
Sheik Taj il-Din Al-Hilali, who was Australia’s Mufti until he resigned amidst 
controversy in 2007, is certainly one of the more contentious Imams in Australia70 
(ABC, 2007 see also Chapter 9). His views on Israel, September 11, 2001 and women 
have attracted great disapproval and condemnation from Australians generally. He has 
been quoted as saying that ‘September 11th was God's work against oppressors’ and, in 
a sermon in the Lakemba Mosque in the suburb of Sydney, Sheik Al-Hilali, to much 
outrage and condemnation, likened scantily clad women to uncovered meat, which, as a
70 Liberal Member of Parliament, Ian MacPhee dismissed ‘Sheik Tajeddin al Hilaly of Sydney’s 
Lakemba Mosque’ as a ‘a fundamentalist Islamic leader’ in his 1988 address to the Congress of the 
Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Councils of Australia (MacPhee, 1988:2)
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result of being uncovered, has no right to object to harassment from neighbourhood 
cats.
Imams and other ‘Islamic leaders’ in Australia have been urged, particularly by 
politicians, not to exacerbate the situation for Muslims by airing their opinions, even as 
the Imams are constantly asked to reassure the Australian Government and the broader 
public about the safety and peaceable nature of Islam (see Chapter 9). Indeed, the onus 
on Islamic leaders is to condemn terrorism, a requirement that is also asked of ordinary 
Australian Muslims (Aslan, 2009). Muslims communities have been repeatedly urged to 
condemn terrorism and were told that ‘True Muslim leaders are speaking out against 
extremism’ (.Australian, 2005). On September 11, 2005, members of the ‘Muslim 
community’ were invited by the Prime Minister to an ‘anti-terrorism’ summit in Sydney 
(ABC, 2005a). The President of the Affinity Intercultural Foundation, Mehmet Ozalp, 
claimed to have invited a variety of groups, including community leaders, the Islamic 
Council of New South Wales and delegations from various mosques in order to give the 
Muslim community a chance to ‘publicly denounce terrorism of all forms’.
In September 2005, following the 7/7 London bombings, and following comments made 
by ‘Muslim spokespeople’ which were deemed supportive of terrorism, the Australian 
Government set up a 14-member Muslim Community Reference Group which was said 
to have been ‘hand-picked’ by the Prime Minister to address Islamic extremism and 
promote tolerance (Duffy, 2006). ‘Islamic radicals’ were barred from attending by John 
Howard and he defended his stance on ‘Muslim radicals’ by arguing that the summit 
was to promote ‘moderate Islam’. Howard argued that he did not want radicals at the 
meeting, because it would give them a high-profile platform to air their beliefs (Corder, 
2005).
The advisory group lasted for one year before it was abolished by the Howard 
Government in favour of a more decentralised approach to community consultations 
with Muslim Australians. One of the key initiatives introduced after the abolition of 
the community reference group was the Conference of Australian Imams, which took 
place in mid-September 2006 (Edwards, 2006). It was thought that the Conference was 
necessary in order to seek ways to stop Imams, during Friday sermons delivered in
71 Parliamentary Secretary for Multicultural Affairs Andrew Robb stated that: ‘The issues are common, 
and we should be treating all of those that come to Australia, I think, in a similar way’ (Andrew Robb in 
Duffy, 2006). Mr Robb argued that: ‘It is important to review the operation of such bodies to ensure that 
they reflect current community expectation and are continuing to enhance our culture of inclusiveness 
and integration’ (Robb cited in Poynting and Mason, 2008:239).
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Arabic, exposing Muslim youth to radical ideas promoting terrorism and hatred for the 
West. Mosques and the sermons given by Imams on Fridays have attracted much 
scrutiny from the Australian Government and intelligence agencies that view mosques, 
Islamic schools and Islamic centres as potential hot spots for terrorist recruitment 
(Poynting and Mason, 2008). In fact, Imams have attracted so much interest from the 
media, Australian government and security agencies, that the sermons at Friday prayer 
have been monitored by security agencies (Nicholls, 2012).
As part of the elimination of Islam’s putative tendency to harbour and promote 
terrorism, the Howard Government implicated mosques and Islamic schools in the ‘war 
on terror’. Intelligence agencies targeted Islamic schools and mosques in an attempt to 
discourage the growth of home-grown extremists (Osborne, 2005). So, John Howard 
argued that ‘on top of trying to promote Australian values in Islamic schools, the 
government would monitor what was said in certain schools and mosques to ensure they 
did not foster terrorism’ (Howard in Osborne, 2005:1). Further, during a radio 
interview, Howard said that he was willing, to the ‘extent necessary’, to get inside 
mosques and schools to ensure that there was no support for terrorism (Osborne, 2005; 
see also Poynting and Mason, 2008:237).
Indeed, the Conference of Imams, with 100 imams, endorsed the Howard Government’s 
desire for Imam schools to be built to train Imams in Islam the ‘Australian way’. This 
included the promotion of Australian values, sermons to be given exclusively in English 
and for Imams to be accredited by a national board of Islamic leaders (Edwards, 2006). 
Moreover, the Conference participants, headed by Dr. Ameer Ali , endorsed the 
Federal Government’s proposed tests for citizenship and permanent residency. Dr Ali 
believed that accrediting Imams was integral to ensuring that extremist beliefs did not 
make their way into the Muslim community in Australia and that Muslims should cease 
complaining about being victimised (Edwards, 2006; see also Poynting and Mason, 
2008).
Conclusion
This chapter has not canvassed all the events that implicated Muslims and Islam since 
the events of 9/11. However, it has demonstrated that, since 2001, Muslims in Australia 
have been singled out as ‘different’, ‘problematic’ and, therefore, as the people least
72 Dr Ali was also the head of the reference group and was the President of the Federation of Islamic 
Councils.
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likely to belong in Australia. Issues of crime, terrorism and other unpalatable acts have 
been ‘racialised’ in Australia and have directly implicated Muslims, Islam, people of 
Middle-Eastern background and people who ‘appear’ to be of Middle-Eastern extraction 
(Poynting et al, 2004). Discourses about Muslims and Islam have found voice in almost 
all social and political contexts in Australia. Anti-Muslim sentiment was found 
generally in the media (Manning, 2006, Rane et al, 2010) but also in discourses at the 
local and national levels of politics.
Some have referred to the general view and treatment of Muslims in Australia as 
‘Islamophobia’ and, increasingly, the term has become the preferred label for the anti- 
Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments in Western societies (see Aslan, 2009). However, 
Allen (2010) convincingly argues that ‘Islamophobia’ has been insufficiently defined 
and has often been used as a broad definition for a number of discriminatory acts, some 
of which are clearly targeting Islam and Muslims and some that may actually be other 
forms of discrimination (racism, economic, class-based discrimination etc). Allen 
(2010) would define the numerous actions against Muslims and Islam found in this 
chapter as ‘products’ of Islamophobia and not necessarily Islamophobia. The next two 
chapters therefore outline and deploy Allen’s (2010) definition of Islamophobia in the 
analysis of discourse on Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives 
in the years 2000-2006.
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Chapter 8: Political Discourse
Introduction
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents Allen’s (2010) 
ideological modes of operation and their attendant strategies, before demonstrating their 
existence in parliamentary discourse in section two. Section three demonstrates how, in 
the process of ‘Othering’ Muslims, Australian MPs simultaneously disseminate 
Islamophobic ideological content and make implicit claims about Australian identity.
It is widely agreed that anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiments exist in some shape or 
other. Many acknowledge and have demonstrated how, prior to the events of 9/11, 
Muslim and Islam were represented as ‘Other’, with characteristics, temperaments and 
theological tenets that were viewed as alien, disliked and, in some instances, feared (see 
Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2010; Said, 1997; Sayyid 
and Vakil, 2010; Esposito, 2011). However, it has also been acknowledged and 
demonstrated that post-9/11 anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments were changed, 
exacerbated and became more widespread, and much more widely accepted, as 
normative and justified (Esposito, 2011; Sayyid and Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2010).
Due to the ubiquitous nature of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments, many 
researchers have chosen to identify instances of violence against those exhibiting 
‘Muslimness’, such as women wearing the hi jab and men wearing turbans (whether 
Muslim or not), and mosques, as well as focusing upon the prevalent negative media 
coverage of terrorism, Muslims and Islam and negative representation of Muslims and 
Islam by politicians as instances of ‘Islamophobia’ (Aslan, 2009). Allen (2010), 
however, convincingly argues that attacks on women wearing the hijab (physical, verbal 
or rhetorical), the use of metonyms of Islam and Muslims, such as ‘fundamentalist, 
radical, extremist, Islamist, jihadists’, by the media and politicians, as well as a variety 
of other instances of negative representation or reaction to Muslims and Islam, are 
‘products’ of Islamophobia, not instances of Islamophobia. Indeed, he argues that 
Islamophobia is an ideology that manifests differently in a variety o f ‘products’, but that 
the meaning of Islam and Muslims continues to be the same, regardless of the ‘product’. 
He argues that many of the ‘products’ of Islamophobia are shared in a post-9/11 global 
environment. However, many are also specific to local settings, where the meanings 
about Islam and Muslims find some kind of continuity across ‘products’ of 
Islamophobia. The meaning of ‘Muslims’ takes on relevance in terms of contemporary
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understandings about who/what Muslims and Islam are. This means that the signifiers 
will change with context to suit the prejudices and conceptions of the ‘Other’ in the 
local context, but the disseminated meanings will be the same.
It would be unsurprising and of little value simply to demonstrate that Australian 
Members of Parliament (MPs) engaged in anti-Muslim and anti-Islam discourse during 
the years 2000-2006. This chapter, then, demonstrates Allen’s (2010) concepts and 
theory of Islamophobia as ideology through analysis of Hansard and argues that 
Islamophobia as ideology is present in the ways that MPs represented Muslims and 
Islam during this period. In using Allen’s (2010) concept and theory of Islamophobia, 
the analysis demonstrates that anti-Islam and anti-Muslim sentiment exists in the 
parliamentary discourse analysed. Further, this analytic lens reveals the meaning and 
imagery disseminated by parliamentarians about Muslims and Islam in Australia. The 
remainder of the chapter outlines the process of ‘Othering’ Islam and Muslims by the 
way parliamentarians conveyed meanings of ‘us’, with an implicit characterisation of 
Australian identity that does not include Muslims and Islam.
Islamophobia as Ideology
Allen’s (2010) definition of Islamophobia as ideology was first presented in Chapter 3. 
In this section, Islamophobia’s modes of operation and their attendant strategies will be 
described before demonstrating their operation in the discourse in Parliament. Allen 
(2010:173) uses Thompson’s (1990) definition of ideology and its attendant modes of 
operation to posit that these modes of operation work to sustain and perpetuate 
Islamophobic ideological content.
Allen’s (2010) approach to defining Islamophobia as ideology acknowledges that, while 
the same negative meanings about Islam and Muslims are disseminated, communicated, 
represented and perpetuated in different ways (modes and strategies), ultimately the 
cluster of negative meanings that are disseminated, communicated and perpetuated 
remains the same.
Allen (2010) argues that the signifiers of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are not in themselves 
important; it is inconsequential whether the term ‘fundamentalist’ does not convey the 
real Islam etc, it is a metonym for Islam and Muslims and therefore, communicates 
certain meaning about Islam and Muslims. Thus, Islamophobia as ideology for Allen 
(2010:165) is concerned with ‘demonstrating and highlighting how these forms
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establish and sustain ideas, meaning, relations, and most importantly, the power 
between the different and competing groups. Truth and reality are therefore no longer 
entirely valid or relevant regarding Islamophobia when understood ideologically’. So, 
Islamophobia becomes ‘the meaning disseminated that subsequently shapes, determines 
and initiates actions, practices, discrimination and prejudices’, not an amalgamation of 
‘specific action, practice, discrimination or prejudice’ (Allen, 2010:190). Moreover, 
while signifiers carry and convey meaning about Muslims and Islam, they also have to 
resonate with the knowledge and conceptual maps shared in society. Consequently, the 
signifiers and meanings about Islam and Muslims that are disseminated also say a great 
deal about conceptions of inclusion and exclusion in Australia.
Meaning about Islam and Muslims
Allen (2010:100) correctly argues that the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ are rarely 
referred to in a neutral way. Indeed, all contemporary signs and signifiers that relate to 
Islam and Muslims communicate aspects of the same meaning about Muslims and 
Islam. Indeed, in many instances, the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ do not even need to 
be specifically used for the meanings about them to be understood, all that is necessary 
is a reference to their inherently perceived and made known ‘difference’ (Allen, 
2010:100). At the broadest level, the meaning given to Islam and Muslims is that they 
are "different’. This difference is viewed as "problematic’ and, hence, ‘challenging’. 
This means that Muslims come to embody notions of ‘Otherness’ and its attendant 
status of inferiority. This ‘difference’ has been viewed as threatening and incompatible 
with the norms of ‘Western civilisation’ and, consequently, a challenge to ‘our way of 
life’. As such, Islam is seen as a polar opposite of ‘the West’ and Islam is viewed as not 
sharing any values with any other culture or religion.
Further, in the contemporary post-9/11 environment Muslims have become understood 
in frames that both acknowledge and perpetuate an ongoing Otherness; one that is 
inherently foreign, alien and enemy and regularly interchanged with those populist 
notions of Muslims as ‘terrorists’ , fifth columnists etc. In this way, Islam and Muslims 
are represented as being the antithesis or ‘Other’ of ‘the West’, through having 
contrasting belief systems, characteristics, attributes, qualities and values. Further, these 
‘challenges’ to ‘our way of life’ are magnified by the prism of the events of 9/11 and a 
sense of justification has meant that such ideas about Islam and Muslims have enjoyed 
greater receptivity and have become normalized and rationalized. Undoubtedly, what
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follows is the belief that such ideas and attitudes about Muslims and Islam appear to be 
correct and necessary in order for the world to ‘make sense’ (Esposito, 2011).
Situating Islam as a polar opposite communicates the impossibility or implausibility of 
Islam being ‘Western’, ‘modem’ or ‘Australian’. This polarity suggests that Islam is 
primitive, irrational, violent, misogynist, sexist, scheming, disorganized, oppressive and 
barbaric. In addition, ‘Islamic culture’ is seen as misogynistic, justifying political and 
military projects and insisting solely on literalist interpretations of the Quran. These are 
all characteristics and values which inherently contradict ‘Western’ norms (Aly, 2007).
Further, much of the anti-Muslim and anti-Islam discourse focused on a differentiation 
between good/bad, moderate/extremist or radical Muslims and versions of Islam. This 
differentiation, at the most basic level, continuously reaffirms the idea that Muslims and 
Islam are inherently and normatively problematic and that stressing their ‘good’, 
‘moderate’ or other ‘positive’ characteristics is something of a necessity. However, as 
‘essentialised’ as Muslims and Islam become through this process of differentiation, 
Allen (2010:76) explains that the meaning associated with the idea of an ‘essentialised 
Muslim’ is not referring to a static and ahistorical definition of ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’. 
Contemporary meanings and definitions of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are drawn from what 
is deemed, contemporarily, to be acceptable ‘cultural, historical and theological 
expressions of Islam’. This depiction of the ‘essentialised Muslim’ has something to say 
about how Muslims should live their life, practice their faith, engage in society and hold 
‘acceptable’ world views.
Further, although, as previously stated, the ‘signifiers’ that communicate meaning about 
Muslim and Islam can change according to local context, there are a variety of 
references and allusions that are used to disseminate, communicate and perpetuate 
meaning about Islam and Muslim through a ‘multitude’ of ‘products’. For example, in 
the production, dissemination and perpetuation of meaning about Islam and Muslims, 
Allen (2010:156) suggests that a variety of incompatible and/or inconsistent references 
are used to give meaning about who/what Muslims are and what Islam is. An ‘amalgam 
of nationalities’ such as Arab, Pakistani etc. are often used; religion (Islam), culture and 
the conflation of both; and ‘militarism’, or the ‘recurrent reference to violence, 
militarism and terrorism’ (Allen, 2010:156) are often used interchangeably to define 
who Muslims are.
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Allen (2010:166) also suggests that meaning about Islam and Muslims is drawn from 
both historical and contemporary significations that constitute ‘a protean and shifting 
amalgam of historical atavism, mediatised stereotypes, embedded misunderstandings, 
mistruth and mistrusts, supplemented and empowered by social constructions and myths 
that emerge from contemporary events, interactions and association as well as 
representations and interpretations, culminating in a situation where Muslims and Islam 
are inherently different to ‘us” . Therefore, what becomes normalized is the idea that 
Muslims and Islam are inherently different, which reifies the perceptions and 
conception of Muslims’ ‘uni-dimensionally’.
This process, Allen (2010) explains, makes Muslims and Islam known through their 
signification and the meanings that this disseminates. Consequently, this means that the 
attributes assigned to Muslims and Islam homogenises Muslim and Islam as an 
undifferentiated ‘outgroup’. Muslims become burdened with characteristics, 
understandings, perceptions, capabilities and qualities that are typically negatively 
evaluated and which provide the ways in which Muslims and Islam become defined 
generally.
Consequently, the meaning about Islam and Muslim that is disseminated poses three 
major issues. Firstly, all those who possess some or all of the characteristics attributed 
to ‘Muslims’ can be subsequently identified through the same processes, despite the 
changing characteristics. For example, the physical, material, religious, cultural, racial 
and theological signifiers by which one might identify Muslims and Islam thus become 
the same markers though which meaning about them is disseminated (Allen, 2010:166). 
Secondly, the constructions which position Muslims and Islam as ‘Other’ are social and 
cultural constructions that are contextualised and framed by ‘a historical legacy that 
recurs re-emerges, reinvigorates and refines that which is given meaning for 
contemporary consumption, relevant for the here and now’ (Allen 2010:175). Finally, 
the same attributes and characteristics that are used to homogenise Muslims and Islam 
are also used to construct them as an undifferentiated ‘outgroup’, where they are 
simultaneously made known in negative ways and their presence acts to give shape and 
validity to characterisations of ‘us’ or the ‘ingroup’. Allen (2010:166) argues that this 
gives ‘authority and legitimacy through the unchallenged belief that the ‘ingroup’ is 
both superior and authoritative and by consequence, legitimately able to counter any 
competing or alternative claims, arguments or understandings that emerges from the 
outgroup’.
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As this is the nature of the meaning that is disseminated about Islam and Muslims, so 
Islamophobia as ideology is disseminated through some modes of operation and their 
attendant strategies. Allen (2010:184-185) notes that these modes, in themselves, are 
not ideological, but act as vessels for ideological meaning. Further, not all modes and 
their strategies need be present at all times and these modes are not exhaustive.
Ideological Modes of Operation
If Islamophobia is to be viewed ideologically, then, as Allen (2010:173) explains, it 
must operate ideologically, that is there are modes of operation that are concerned with 
the ways in which meaning is sustained and perpetuated. There are altogether five 
modes of operation which also contain a range of strategies that contribute to sustaining 
and perpetuating meaning about Islam and Muslims: Legitimation; Dissimulation; 
Unification; Fragmentation; and Reification.
A summary of each mode of operation is presented below, before examples from the 
discourses about Islam and Muslims from the House of Representatives (2000-2006) are 
used to demonstrate the presence of these ideological modes within this period. It 
should be noted however, that the analysis reveals that most of the modes and their 
strategies are evident in the parliamentary discourse analysed for this study. Therefore, 
the sections below will demonstrate a number of modes that are evident in speech 
excerpts, rather than attempting to show all modes in all excerpts. This necessarily 
means that not all the modes of operation will be highlighted in each excerpt (even if all 
are present) and not all relevant excerpts from the parliamentary discourse will be 
presented here, as the research yielded far too much data.
1) Legitimation: This involves how ideological content becomes perceived as 
reasonable, legitimate and justified, while sustaining meaning that ‘ensures that certain 
individuals, groups or communities remain the Other or outgroup’ (Allen, 2010:174). 
Consequently, through rationlisations and justifications, the perceptions that justify the 
place of the ‘Other’ come to acquire a sense of naturalness and normative order and 
function to order and ‘make sense’ of the world. For Allen (2010), legitimation 
resonates with the normative values found in society (social consensus) and further 
cements, reinforces and legitimates meanings that are already known and are currently 
‘in circulation about any given subject...’ (Allen, 2010:174). In this way, the process of 
legitimation ‘reinforces and codifies the ideological content behind symbolic forms in 
such ways that it is sustained’. Allen (2010:174-175) gives an example of legitimation
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where the views of those ‘in the know’, whether it be non-Muslims ‘Asians’, as in 
Allen’s British example, or other non-Muslim and Muslim experts on ‘Muslims’ and 
‘Islam’, are used to give credence to anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments.
Allen (2010:174) explains that legitimation has three strategies: rationalization; 
universalisation; and narrativisation. Allen (2010:174) defines rationalisation as the 
process ‘where a symbolic form constructs a chain of reasoning which seems to defend 
or justify a set of social relations or institutions, and thereby persuade an audience that it 
is worthy of support’. This can work when the presenter is substantiating his/her views 
through the rationalisation that someone better informed than they can substantiate their 
anti-Muslim sentiment. This not only rationalises the status of Muslims as the necessary 
outgroup, but also points to the threat that Muslims pose to the ingroup, ‘rationalizing 
the threat and subsequently the need for mistrust and fear’ (Allen, 2010:175).
The second strategy is ‘universalisation’: ‘where certain arrangements, either 
institutional or otherwise, are devised, implemented and acted upon in order to serve the 
interest of individuals or subgroups from within the ingroup, whilst being put forward 
as being legitimate and necessary in serving the interests of all in preference of the few 
who actually benefit’. Allen (2010) uses changes to security legislation following 9/11 
as an example of this strategy.
The final strategy of legitimation is narrativisation: ‘which is where meaning becomes 
embedded in contemporary symbolic forms that recount or reiterate that past and its 
atavistic meanings. Narrativisation therefore treats the contemporary as part of a 
timeless and cherished tradition, meaning-wise at least, where that which is 
disseminated about Muslims and Islam is such that it recounts a cherished, almost 
nostalgic tradition, past or legacy where today’s Muslims and Islam become known and 
understood in such way they are familiar to and normative of historical familiarities and 
norms’ (Allen, 2010:175). In this way, the current socio-historical context is ignored in 
favour of a perceived familiarity attached to meanings about Muslims and Islam from 
that past that continue to: ‘recur, recount and reinterpret the contemporary in order to 
maintain legacies of meaning, historical stories and atavistic myths that embody 
ideological content from where Muslims and Islam were historically Other’(Allen, 
2010:175-176).
2) Dissimulation: This involves: ‘the process through which meaning is established and 
sustained by being concealed, denied or obscured, or by being represented in a way
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which deflects from or glosses over existing relations or processes’ (Allen, 2010:176) 
(an example of this is where counter ideas about Islam and Muslims are obscured or 
‘smoke-screened’). Dissimulation contains three strategies: displacement;
euphemisation; and trope. The first strategy of dissimulation is ‘displacement’: ‘where 
symbolic forms are employed to identify and disseminate meaning to a subject in order 
that the connotations of that symbolic form- whether negative or positive, appropriate or 
inappropriate- become indiscriminately projected onto all those that might be associated 
or identified be means of that same subject, all of which can be an individual, group, 
community or inanimate object or concept, irrespective of appropriation or accuracy’ 
(Allen, 2010:177). In the context of Muslims and Islam, Allen suggests that this strategy 
is used to give meaning to Muslims as ‘Others’ who have undesirable traits. He uses the 
example of those few Muslim: ‘fringe figures... [who] embody all that is stereotypically 
anti-Western and stereotypically Other about Muslims in the social consensus, who are 
then represented in such ways that they become representative of all Muslims without 
differentiation, irrespective of legitimacy or accuracy’ (Allen, 2010:177). Allen 
(2010:177) also points to another function of displacement (the focus of much media 
analysis conducted by various researchers), where the use of appellations, such as 
‘fundamentalist’, ‘extremist’, ‘fanatic’ and ‘militant’, are inappropriately and regularly 
used out of original context or applicable to only a small number of Muslims and are 
employed as symbolic forms and come to indiscriminately be attributed and used to 
immediately conjure a connotative resonance with all Muslims as well as the tenets of 
Islam. This obfuscates the case that such appellation may only apply to an extremely 
small number only if at all (Allen, 2010:177).
The second strategy of dissimulation is ‘euphemisation’: ‘where, through a range of 
inferences, dialogues, actions or events, an outgroup is attributed with negatively 
evaluated meaning via symbolic forms, that whilst they may in actuality be largely 
negative, derogatory or detrimental to the outgroup, are identified by symbolic forms 
that elicit a seemingly wholly positive evaluation’ (Allen, 2010:177). Allen gives an 
example from the rhetoric on the war on terror which evaluates ‘us’ using positive 
language and ‘them’ with negative language.
The last strategy of dissimulation is ‘trope’ which, according to Allen, can be seen ‘...in 
the figurative use of language that encompasses such similar linguistic strategies as 
metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche’ (Allen, 2010:178). Here, the connection with 
displacement is apparent when text and language include symbolic forms such as
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‘fundamentalist’ and so on. Allen posits that metonymy is particularly relevant because 
of the use of negatively evaluated appellations despite them also being the known 
metonyms of Islamophobic ideological content. For Allen, another aspect of trope: ‘is 
the way in which either the whole or part of certain terminologies or concepts are 
conflated in order to reciprocally represent either the part or the whole, in much the 
same way that terms such as ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ have themselves taken on 
synecdochical meanings and understandings, where small, minority, fringe or rogue 
elements of a greater whole are indiscriminately conflated to sustain widespread and 
undifferentiated meaning, resulting in gross ‘misunderstandings and misrepresentations’ 
(Allen, 2010:178). Through this strategy stereotypical representations of Muslims and 
Islam become accepted as realities irrespective of how untrue or inaccurate.
3) Unification: This is a process: ‘where meaning is sustained ‘by constructing at the 
symbolic level, a form of unity which embraces individuals in a collective identity, 
irrespective of the differences and divisions that may separate them’ (Allen, 2010:179). 
This mode is closely aligned with the popular conception of ‘Islam as monolithic’ 
which permeates all understanding and meanings about Muslims and Islam. Unification 
is similar to processes of reductionism and essentialism, where ‘Islam’ becomes an 
identity marker that inappropriately and inaccurately subsumes all Muslims within in 
(essentialised by it). Consequently, the unifying aspect and its reductionist tendency 
loses or obfuscates the diversity, humanity and complexity that would otherwise 
naturally occur and where meanings about Islam and Muslims becomes homogenized 
and: ‘undergo a process of standardisation’ (Allen, 2010:179). Unification can, and 
indeed does, apply to positive as well as negative evaluations of Muslims and Islam, as 
both approaches reduce and essentialise identities. Unification’s second strategy is the 
‘symbolisation of unity’ where symbols are deployed as unifying all Muslims (for 
example the hijab).
4) Fragmentation: This process: ‘asserts that not only by unifying the outgroup can 
ideological content be disseminated but also through fragmenting and differentiating it 
as well’ (Allen, 2010:181). Allen explains that, although this may seem like it is 
contradicting the ‘unification’ mode, the same processes are underway in both modes, 
albeit in slightly different ways. The key aspect of fragmenting the outgroup into 
definite and constituent parts is subsequently earmarking one part as being evil and 
potentially, or actually, harmful and threatening to the position and safety of the 
ingroup, irrespective of whether such threats are genuine or not. For Allen (2010:182),
201
this mode of operation appears to resonate with the analysis of press coverage that 
indicates the repetitive deployment, not only of words like ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘extremist’ etc, but also of other descriptors, such as ‘moderates’ and ‘mainstream’. 
This fragments Muslims into:
. . .‘friendly’ or ‘good’ and ‘enemy’ or ‘bad’. Unsurprisingly, the ‘moderates’ became the acceptable 
face, seen to be practicing their religion in ways that are deemed acceptable to outsiders to the faith. 
In doing so however, the ‘moderates’ became essentialised and nonnative, a process that 
simultaneously fragmented those Muslims not being identified as such into a classification and 
identification that represented them as being in contention with or posing a threat to the ingroup 
(Allen, 2010:181).
The fragmentation and differentiating of the homogenous whole allows negatively 
evaluated meanings to be disseminated in the same way that similar meanings are 
perpetuated and sustained through the process of unification. Consequently, 
‘differentiation’ is a strategy of fragmentation: ‘where the diversity of characteristics 
and markers between different Muslims are over-emphasised and conflated to disunite 
and differentiate between them. Rooted again in essentialist processes, differentiation 
can be seen in the way symbolic forms such as ‘moderate’ or ‘mainstream’ are as 
equally value-loaded as such terms as ‘fundamentalist” (Allen, 2010:181).
The other strategy of fragmentation is the ‘expurgation of the Other’. This strategy 
operates through ‘the construction of an enemy, either within or without, which is 
portrayed as evil, harmful or threatening and which individuals are called upon 
collectively to resist or expurgate’(Allen, 2010:182). Allen (2010:182) explains this 
strategy by noting how Muslims and Islam are construed contemporarily as the enemy 
of ‘us’, ‘typically the ‘enemy within” , which is prone to violence and atrocity and 
presents a threat to ‘us’ and ‘our’ security. He sees this as the ‘expurgation of the Other’ 
at the highest level. Expurgation of the Other, however, can also been see when 
individuals become the personification of ideological content, as did Osama bin Laden 
at the international level, and are seen as individually able to affect the safety and 
wellbeing of ‘us’. Moreover, its operation can be seen at the local level, where various 
individuals (such as repetitively vocal Muslims in the form of sheiks, muftis etc.) are 
looked on as harmful and who should be expurgated.
5) Reification: This is the final mode that Allen presents. However as he notes, as per 
Thompson’s (1990) original emphasis, there may be other modes that are present, but as 
yet undefined. Reification is a strategy: ‘where meaning is represented in terms of
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transitory, almost continuous process that is largely permanent and mostly natural, 
largely existing independent of time constraints. Thus meaning becomes disseminated 
though what Thompson names a ‘quasi-natural’ process, eclipsing the social and 
historical nature of different events, actions and so on’ (Allen, 2010:183). This mode 
utilises meaning from history that ‘maintain a resonance within the contemporary or are 
embedded in the defining characteristics or psyche of the ingroup’ (Allen, 2010:183). 
Consequently, historical ideas and events are deployed to reinforce and reify, rather than 
replace, contemporary ideological content, so current ideologies and their context 
remain separate from, but nonetheless interlinked, with historical ones for the purposes 
of ‘deploying reference points of connotative meaning in order to further frame and 
contextualize’ (Allen, 2010:183).
The first strategy is ‘naturalisation’: defined as a social or historical creation, act or 
event that is either understood as, or perceived to be, natural or the inevitable outcome 
of the natural characteristics of the outgroup’ (Allen, 2010:183). In regard to Muslims 
and Islam, the most obvious characteristic that Allen points to is terrorism and the view 
that it is quite natural for Muslims: ‘because not only are they seen to be naturally 
violent, barbaric and incompatible with non-Muslims but so too is the Qur’an believed 
to endorse such: highlighting how Islam attains validity, albeit inaccurately, as the 
common denominator’ (Allen, 2010:183).
The second strategy is ‘etemalisation’: where ‘social-historical phenomena are deprived 
of their historical character by being portrayed as permanent, unchanging and ever- 
recurring’ (Allen, 2010:184). In this strategy, customs, traditions and institutions are 
portrayed as stretching back into the past and their origins are obscured. This results in 
obscuring the historical and contingent nature of socio-historical phenomena.
The final strategy of ‘reification’ is ‘nominalisation’ or ‘passivisation’, which are: 
‘strategies that focus attention on certain themes, ideas and events at the expense of 
others, where certain actions and events take precedence and dominate, strategically 
deleting others in the process, both contemporarily and historically’. Allen uses 
references to selective stories, such as the Crusades, as an example, where both negative 
and positive stories about Islam and Muslims are selectively highlighted or obfuscated 
in order to make meaning known about contemporary Muslims and Islam.
Allen’s (2010) modes of operation and their attendant strategies have been found, in the 
context of this analysis, to work together to disseminate negative meaning about Islam
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and Muslims. Indeed, the analysis of the discourses on Muslims and Islam in the House 
of Representatives reveals that the modes and their strategies are intertwined. In 
addition, as Allen (2010) highlights, Islamophobia as ideology is disseminated via a 
variety of signifiers that resonate with contemporary conceptions of Islam and Muslims, 
as well as historical atavisms. This is in addition to references that resonate across 
national contexts as well as those specific to definitions of the ‘Other’ found in local 
context. The next chapter will focus on those references and signifiers that are specific 
to Muslims and Islam in Australia. Before doing so however, the next section presents 
analysis of Islamophobic ideological content that broadly makes use of 
global/international signifiers of Islam and Muslims. The modes and their strategies will 
be highlighted in the parliamentary discourse as they present themselves.
Islamophobia in the House of Representatives (2000-2006)
Islam and Muslims where discussed in a variety of contexts in the Australian House of 
Representatives in the years analysed. As was briefly explained in Chapter 3, the 
contexts in which Muslims and Islam were discussed varied little across the years. 
Indeed, the context in which Muslims and Islam were represented was inconsequential 
to the meanings disseminated about Islam and Muslims. All examples demonstrated 
Allen’s modes of operation.
In 2004, Peter Dutton (Dickson, Qld LP, Hansard, 12 May, 2004) spoke in support of 
the Government’s Anti-terrorism Bill 2004. He also spoke about the desire of terrorists 
to destroy Australians simply because ‘we enjoy a Western style of life’. He said:
I think many Australians have, over the last decade or so, been quite blind to the terrorist threat that 
has been posed to this country. Thank God we have not seen any serious terrorism incidents on 
Australian soil. But of course the events of 9-11 and the tragic circumstances surrounding the loss of 
Australian life on the soil of Bali, one of our very close neighbours in Indonesia, has brought home 
over the last few years how vulnerable we will continue to be over the coming years in relation to 
terrorism and the attacks that those people make on our Western way of life. The Australian people 
are at risk for no greater reason than the fact that we enjoy a Western style of life. So, when we are 
trying to combat those extreme elements within the Muslim community and within other groups that 
are represented and which form them-selves into these terrorism groups, we need to be aware of— 
and I think that, quite sadly, the Australian people have realised it—the reality that faces us as the 
Australian people.
A number of issues stand out in this excerpt. Dutton clearly differentiates between 
Australians and non-Australian and between those who ‘enjoy a Western style of life’ 
and those who do not. This is a close variant on the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, where 
there is a discernible and homogenous ‘West’ and in this case ‘a Western type of life’,
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and others who are not part of this ‘Western type of life’ belong to ‘extreme’ Muslims. 
This type of representation, as Mills and Brown (2003:51) argue, works via ‘a dialectic 
of representational inclusion and exclusion’ which occurs through the attribution of 
certain characteristics to a ‘population’, ‘in order to categorise and differentiate it as an 
Other’ and, by doing so, ‘establish criteria by which they themselves are represented’. 
While Dutton does not explicitly convey what this ‘Western way of life’ includes, it 
does not seem to include Muslims and, as Australians are included in the ‘West’, so 
‘Muslims’ are not seen as being ‘Australian’. Further, it would seem that he does not 
include Muslims as being ‘Australian’ because his representation of Muslims, whether 
inside or outside Australia, reifies Muslims in such a way as to portray them as naturally 
prone to ‘terrorism’; a strategy, according to Allen (2010:183), o f ‘naturalisation’ where 
‘events are understood as a result of the natural characteristics of the outgroup’.
The characterisation of all Muslims as being problematic or potentially problematic is 
exemplified in a speech made by Kim Beazley (Brand, WA, ALP) in 2002. Beazley 
(Hansard, 17 September, 2002) pointed out that the ‘Chinese are convinced that they 
have a problem with Al-Qaeda and with separatism in the Muslim majority provinces in 
their west, and they are totally sympathetic towards the objectives of an international 
campaign against terrorism’. This excerpt demonstrates aspects of legitimation via the 
strategy of ‘rationalization’ and ‘unification’. Beazley points to the global nature of 
‘problematic’ Muslims, because ‘the Chinese’ are also ‘convinced’ of ‘the Muslim 
problem’ in their region. Further, this rationalises Beazley’s assertion that an 
international campaign against terrorism is warranted because terrorism is present 
wherever there are Muslims. This excerpt also demonstrates Allen’s (2010:179) 
‘Unification’ as a mode of operation for the sustenance and perpetuation of ideological 
meaning. Markers such as ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ can be used to symbolise a form of 
unity where there is none, but also where it can act as marker that gives meaning and 
unites all Muslims as one. In the excerpt above, Beazley’s reference to China’s Muslim 
majority province acts to cement the connection between terrorist acts and Muslims, but 
also evokes common understanding of an essentialised and standardized vision of 
Muslims as ‘terrorists’, and as ‘problematic’ wherever they are.
Unification, as well as other modes and their strategies, can be ascertained in the 
lengthy excerpt of a speech made by Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Vic, ALP) in 
June 2003 (Hansard, 3 June, 2003). It is worth quoting Danby’s speech at length here 
because it displays numerous references to Muslims and Islam, without directly naming
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Islam and Muslims, given his reliance on metonyms of Islam and Muslims. Danby, 
while speaking about the Criminal Code Amendment (Hizballah) Bill 2003, pointed to 
‘something that most people in this country will be absolutely unaware of. He said:
...and that is events in an Argentinean court last week. In 1994, a suicide bomber by the name of 
Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a member of Hezbollah, entered Argentina via the grey zone on the 
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area. He phoned his family in Lebanon and told them he would 
soon be ‘reuniting with his dear brother’, who was killed five years earlier in another suicide car 
bombing. Last week, on 27 May, almost nine years after the bombing, the Argentinean Judge Juan 
Jose Galeano signed four international extradition warrants relating to four Iranians suspected of 
organising this terrorist attack.... The most disturbing fact about this activity of Hezbollah—in 
Argentina, against Argentinean citizens, that killed 95 people—is that, according to Judge Galeano, 
the Iranian government appeared to be directly involved in this terrorist attack. According to the 
Argentineans, the decision was taken at the highest levels of the regime in Tehran on 14 August 1993 
during a meeting of the Iranian national security council, involving the most senior figure, the 
supreme leader, Ali Hoseini Khamenei; former President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; former 
foreign minister Velayati; and the head of the intelligence service in Khamenei’s bureau, Mohammed 
Hijazi. Naturally, Fallahian, the former Minister for Intelligence, also attended the meeting.... The 
results of the Argentinean investigation pose considerable complications for Australia, as they do for 
any Western country in the international sphere. For if Iran has provided support at the highest level 
for terrorist activity, it is more and more difficult for us to treat the Ayatollah’s regime in a way 
that is as dispassionate as we would like to be, given the fact that Iran is such an important 
country and a country that we as Australians would like to have good relations with...The Hezbollah 
debate led me to discover a recent report in the New York Times that Hezbollah from Lebanon was 
distributing a dehumanizing game to young people in Australia that encouraged them to participate in 
suicide bombing and attacks on Westerners. The game is called Special Force. It is produced by the 
Hezbollah and is aimed at propagating Hezbollah’s values, concepts and ideas, according to the 
designer of the game, Bilal Zain. This game is part of Hezbollah’s elaborate propaganda efforts to 
brainwash people and inculcate hatred of the people it perceives as its opponents. It is very disturbing 
that some of the current affairs television programs outlined some months ago that some young men 
in Sydney-and particularly one young person-were denied passports by the Australian government 
because the government had good reason to fear that they would become involved in those kinds of 
dreadful activities such as suicide bombing, even though they had been brought up in Australia. I lay 
the blame on Hezbollah for these kinds of games as part of its indoctrination. It is not idle speculation 
that this game, Special Force, was particularly developed by the Iranian government. As I said, the 
distributor and designer of Special Force said it was to be distributed here in Australia. After doing 
some research, I discovered that a company called Noorsoft is listed on its web site as the distributor 
of this particular Hezbollah game. Noorsoft is a subsidiary of the Computer Research for Islamic 
Science. If you look at Noorsoft’s web site, that becomes clear. What is the Computer Research 
Centre for Islamic Sciences? It in turn was established by the Iranian government in 1998 ‘under the 
supreme direction of His Highness Ayatollah Khamenei’, the person who unfortunately really runs 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Last week, some engaging moderates from the Iranian parliament 
visited this parliament. It is deeply disturbing to me to discover that the mullahs, led by a key 
hardliner like Ayatollah Khamenei, are using their control of the Iranian government to encourage 
extremists worldwide, including here in Australia. I believe the Iranian people have very different 
views from those who would like to export terrorism to countries friendly to Iran, like Australia. This 
was evidenced when speaking to the parliamentarians. It is evidenced every day by people who read 
about events in Iran and understand that the overwhelming bulk of the Iranian people, who vote for 
moderates like President Khatami and the vast majority of the people in the Iranian parliament, do 
not want this activity to be undertaken on behalf of their country. It is nonetheless a problem for all
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countries of goodwill like Australia in dealing with Iran. We have to somehow strike a balance 
between understanding what state sponsored terrorism, like that I have described, means for our 
country at the same time as wanting good relations with Iran and encouraging moderation in Iran.
A number of issues stand out in Danby’s speech and many of Allen’s (2010) modes of 
operation are present. It is evident that Danby draws information from various sources 
in order to justify and legitimate his concerns, as well as to demonstrate his objectivity 
and the factual nature of the case he has uncovered on behalf of the Australian people. 
For Danby, Iran, Hezbollah and the Argentinian case, as well as Lebanon, are all 
connected as a threat to Australia because of a computer game created by Hezbollah. 
Danby uses information from the New York Times to bolster his claim that young people 
in Australia are encouraged to participate in suicide bombings by playing a computer 
game. Further, Danby uses ‘current affairs television programs’ in Australia as 
authorities on young men in Sydney and their terrorist intentions, so linking Hezbollah 
to terrorism amongst young men in Sydney. Finally, he differentiates between 
‘moderate’ Iranians and Iranians who ‘would like to export terrorism’.
Danby’s speech clearly demonstrates ‘legitimation’ where he uses multiple ‘expert’ 
sources to construct a chain of reasoning which claims to justify Australia’s 
vulnerability to terrorism and rationalises Australia’s fear of Muslims and fear and 
hatred of Iran. Further, ‘dissimulation’ through the strategies of ‘displacement’ and 
‘trope’ are evident when Danby uses a series of internationally understood metonyms of 
Islam and Muslims, such ‘Iran’, ‘suicide bombers’, Hezbollah and ‘terrorism’, as well 
as symbols that resonate particularly in the Australian context (although they may have 
global reach as well), such as ‘Lebanon’, ‘young men in Sydney’ and his statement 
‘even though they had been bought up in Australia’ which resonates with perceptions of 
non-integration and non-belonging for these people.
These symbolic forms are ‘employed to identify and disseminate meaning to a subject 
in order that the connotations of that symbolic form- whether negative or positive, 
appropriate or inappropriate- become indiscriminately projected onto all those that 
might be associated or identified by means of that same subject, all of which can be an 
individual, group, community or inanimate object or concept, irrespective of 
appropriation or accuracy’ (Allen 2010:177). In this case, Iranians, Lebanese people, 
Muslims and young men in Sydney are all invoked to communicate negative meaning 
about Muslims and Islam in Danby’s speech.
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The use of ‘appellations’ by Danby, such as ‘suicide bomber’ in reference to the 
Argentinean case as well as the young men in Sydney works to ‘conjure up’ a 
‘connotative resonance with all Muslims as well as the tenets of Islam’ (Allen, 
2010:177). Moreover, ‘Trope’ can be ascertained in the symbolic language that Danby 
uses to connect local events with events at the international level, connecting youth in 
Sydney with Iran and Hezbollah. Indeed, Danby (Melbourne Ports, Vic, ALP) in June 
2003 (Hansard, 3 June, 2003) particularly points to the fact that, despite the boys being 
brought up in Australia, there is clearly something inherent in them or their religion that 
transcends their local context and which would lead them to ‘suicide bombing and 
attacks on Westerners’. This involved a process of ‘naturalisation’ of the negative 
character of the ‘outgroup’.
Finally, Danby engaged in ‘fragmentation’ when he differentiates between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ Iranians and between those Iranians who are ‘engaging moderates’ and those who 
want to ‘export terrorism’. As previously outlined, ‘fragmenting’ and therefore 
differentiating between elements of a putative homogenous whole still disseminates 
negatively evaluated meaning about Islam and Muslims. Danby further engages in 
fragmentation, through what Allen (2010) calls the ‘Expurgation of the Other’. Here, 
Danby uses Iran, but also members of the Iranian government, who are putatively held 
responsible for terrorism, and Hezbollah as ‘the enemy’. According to Allen 
(2010:182), this strategy operates through the construction of an enemy that ‘individuals 
are called upon collectively to resist or expurgate’. Allen (2010:183) further notes that 
Muslims and Islam are contemporarily identified as the enemy of ‘us’ who pose threats 
to ‘us’ and our security and are therefore presented as the enemy in need of expurgation. 
However, individuals, groups and communities, in this speech Iran and Hezbollah, can 
also become the personification of ideological content.
In a similar fashion, while supporting a motion presented by another MP on the Israeli 
Cabinet’s adoption of the road map to peace, Bronwyn Bishop (Mackellar, NSW, LP) 
takes the opportunity to conflate Arabs and Muslims and presents them as the folk devil 
that needs to be expurgated. Bishop claims that ‘the pathogen of Middle Eastern 
violence imperils nations across the West, including Australia’. She further stated 
(Hansard, 18 August, 2003):
This is not to say that Israel is the cause of this violence or its transmission. History reveals that the 
principal oppressor of Arabs remains Arab governments, that the most prolific murderers of Muslim 
children are Islamic soldiers and that the biggest thieves of Arab opportunity are to be found in Arab
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capitals. Reason tells us that the Arab predicament does not find its origin in Jerusalem, it springs 
from half a century of butchery, repression and stagnation. The road map is an opportunity that must 
be embraced by all.
In this excerpt, Bishop points to violence that is particularly Arab, Muslim and Islamic 
in origin and nature. She conflates Arabs, Muslims and ‘Islamic soldiers’ and presents 
them as oppressors, killers of children and unscrupulous thieves. She uses ‘reason’ to 
portray objectivity and the reliability of her account of Arabs and Muslims. Within this 
excerpt a variety of ideological content is disseminated. Bishop’s speech indicates that 
legitimation of ideological content is made known through the strategies of 
rationalisation and narrativisation. Firstly, she uses ‘Arab’ as a symbolic form that 
conjures stereotypes of violence, unbridled passions that are reinforced with the use of 
such terms as ‘oppressors, murderers and thieves’. She differentiates between a nation 
state ‘Israel’ and the inhabitants of the Middle-East, ‘Arabs’, the religion Islam and 
practitioners of the religion. She sees Muslims as an undifferentiated whole and 
rationalises Arabs, Muslims and Islam as the necessary enemy to peace, in the region, 
even as earlier in the speech she indicated it was a threat to the whole world including 
Australia. Further, Bishop refers to history as a guide to knowing our enemy today; a 
form of ‘narrativisation’ where the past about Arabs, Muslims or Islam is used to make 
them known today. As such, she points to a continuation of violence in the Middle East 
as something inherent to its inhabitants (excepting non-Arabs, such as Israelis). 
Moreover, the excerpt characterizes all Arabs, Muslims and Islam as violent and 
murderous etc. (a form of displacement). Further, through the process of unification 
Bishop essentialises all Arabs and Muslims and unites them in her characterisation of 
them as depraved.
On the topic of Australia and Indonesia and the spectre of terrorism, Andrew Southcott 
(Boothby, SA, LP) (Hansard, 4 December, 2002) uses ‘anecdotal evidence’ to view the 
Middle-East as the exporter of terrorism to ‘Asia’. He makes a distinction between 
‘Arabic speakers’ and the ‘vast majority of Asian Muslims’, who do not speak Arabic, 
in order to simultaneously draw a connection and differentiate between Middle-Eastern 
terrorism and ‘Asian Muslims’:
As we see the results and the successes of the joint investigation team between Australia and 
Indonesia, anecdotal evidence is emerging of how important the Afghan experience has been in the 
recruiting of people sympathetic to al-Qaeda in the region and in South-East Asia. The majority of 
South-East Asia’s estimated 230 million Muslims have tolerant and moderate views, but there is a 
strident anti-pluralist stream, most commonly coming out of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
which does have a minority appeal to the region’s Muslims. We have seen international recruitment
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in Afghanistan, in some cases dating back to the war against the Soviet invasion there, and more 
recently relating to the camps which al-Qaeda has been operating there since 1996. We find that 
many people who have been associated with bombings in the region have served in Afghanistan or 
trained there...Their leaders are handpicked, mostly educated in the Middle East. They speak Arabic, 
unlike the vast majority of Asian Muslims, and were already of a radical bent. A1 Qaeda’s Asian core 
is hand-picked from several hundred Jihad volunteers who fought in Afghanistan, including, inter 
alia, Central Asians, Chinese, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indonesians, Malaysians, Singaporeans, and 
Filipinos...
In this excerpt, Southcott is clearly differentiating between good or ‘moderate’ Muslims 
and ‘evil’ or bad Muslims who he identifies as headed by Middle East-educated Arabic 
speakers. He alarmingly argues that the ‘majority of South-East Asia’s estimated 230 
million Muslims have tolerant and moderate views’, while there is ‘a strident anti- 
pluralist stream, most commonly coming out of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan’ which appeals to ‘the region’s Muslims’. Southcott’s differentiation 
between ‘moderate’ Muslims and ‘those of a radical bent’, based on anecdotal evidence, 
emphasises a differentiation between ‘Middle Eastern Muslims’ and ‘Asian Muslims’, 
with Southcott attributing ‘radical’ attributes to the first ‘group’, attributes which he 
deems to be the exception amongst ‘Asian Muslims’. This process of fragmentation 
continues to disseminate the same negative information about Islam and Muslims and 
highlights the Islamic nature of ‘the problem’, so even as Southcott’s differentiation 
clearly situates ‘Middle-Eastern Muslims’ as the ‘outgroup’, which spreads its radical 
ideas like a contagion, he automatically communicates the common denominator of the 
problem o f ‘terrorism in the region’ as Muslims and Islam.
In a similar manner, Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Vic ALP) (Hansard 11 
September 2003) spoke on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack 
and drew links between terrorism in Israel, Al-Qaeda and ‘Al-Qaeda’s Indonesian 
franchise, Jemaah Islamiah’. Further, in his attempt to explain the motivation behind the 
terrorist attacks, he notes that they also kill Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as 
people from other ‘nationalities’:
Today is the anniversary of September 11, and the events of international terrorism continue apace 
coming closer and closer to our country. My constituent Tzippy Cohen fortunately survived the 
Hamas homicide attack on the cafe in Jerusalem last night....Al-Qaeda’s Indonesian franchise, 
Jemaah Islamiah, gave the reason for the attacks on Australians in Bali when Imam Samudra said: 
‘Australia’s ... aggression against East Timor ... removed it from Indonesia’.
In his confession earlier this year, he alleged that Australia had taken part in efforts to separate East 
Timor from Indonesia as part of an ‘international conspiracy by followers of the Cross’. Samudra’s 
statements reiterate bin Laden’s earlier audiotape, which stressed that Australian victims were picked
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partially because of Australia’s ‘despicable effort to separate East Timor from Indonesia’ and 
because of the ‘crusader forces’... These Islamic fanatics are not fighting for Third World liberation. 
They announce repeatedly that they are messianic organisations explicitly fighting to restore a pan- 
Islamic caliphate ruling throughout the world. They methodically kill people in the UN and non- 
Muslims, Muslims, Americans, British, Israelis, French or Australians for those reasons, not for any 
reasons that result from any of their victims’ policies towards them.
This extract from Danby’s speech clearly engages in what Allen (2010:178) terms 
‘dissimulation’, in particular the use of ‘trope’ and ‘displacement’, and represents all 
Muslims as violent terrorists and terrorism as ‘Islamic’ in nature. He rhetorically 
connects a ‘Hamas homicide attack on the cafe in Jerusalem’ with Al-Qaeda and its 
‘Indonesian franchise Jemmah Islamiah’. However, what is more pertinent to his 
representation of all Muslims as violent terrorists or potentially violent terrorists is his 
understanding that ‘These Islamic fanatics’ (...) ‘methodically kill people in the UN and 
non-Muslims, Muslims, Americans, British, Israelis, French or Australians for those 
reasons’. Danby identifies Muslims by their religion and their victims by their 
nationalities. Here, Muslim fanatics also kill ‘their own kind’ as they also kill people 
from ‘other nationalities’. This distinction between Muslims and people from various 
other nationalities reflects the idea that Muslims, unlike people from other nationalities 
which can also include members of others faiths including Muslims, Christian and Jews 
for example, can be identified by their religion only. Indeed, in this excerpt Muslims are 
excluded from belonging to ‘other nationalities’ but are characterised as being of the 
same kind as Islamic fanatics.
Espousing similar sentiments in his discussion of the Anti-terrorism Bill (No.3) 2004, 
Greg Hunt (Flinders, Vic LP) (Hansard, 4 August, 2004) describes his vision of Islamic 
terrorists:
In that context, I want to address the three great challenges which Australia faces in dealing with 
antiterrorism: firstly, al-Qaeda; secondly, establishing a sound democratic society in the Middle East 
in Iraq; and, thirdly, terrorism within our own region. In looking at the question of al-Qaeda, it is 
important to understand three key things: its ideology, its strategy and its methods. The ideology of 
al-Qaeda is a simple one in many ways. It is to create an Islamic caliphate across the globe. Over a 
100-year vision, it seeks to develop a world which replicates the society we saw in Afghanistan under 
the Taliban. It seeks a Taliban style globe. That is its express, clear and unequivocal objective. What 
is that society? It is a perversion of Islam. It has as much connection to Islam as the Oklahoma City 
bombers had to Christianity. That was a perversion of Christianity. Al-Qaeda is a perversion of 
Islam. It breaches all of the fundamental tenets of that great religion and it seeks to do so for the 
benefit of those who carry a particular ideology. That is what we face: a clear world view.
Its strategy, which is also well known, is to break down Western engagement with the Islamic world, 
as a first stage. Its strategy is to drive out Western engagement so as to seek to capture over the next
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30 years one of the four great Islamic countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Indonesia—within 
our own area. Whether it is the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, al-Qaeda or its affiliates in Saudi 
Arabia or in Pakistan, or Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia, what we see in each of those countries is an 
attempt to destabilise the governments, to cause either the countries to fragment or their governments 
to be replaced by a Taliban style, ultra extremist Islamic government. It is not about Islam— that is a 
false debate; it is about a sliver of extremists who are willing to use any actions, anywhere, to achieve 
their outcomes. Their outcomes are, very simply, a worldwide Islamic caliphate; that is what they 
seek to achieve. Their strategy is very clear: to break off and drive out Western links so as to 
establish a toehold or a base. In the same way that, from the poorest country in the world, 
Afghanistan, when they effectively had control of the government through the Taliban, they were 
able to launch attacks upon different parts of the world, now they seek to do that with the resources 
of a major state....For those reasons, I support completely the measures contained within the Anti­
terrorism Bill (No. 3) 2004. I commend the bill to the House and urge all members of this House to 
be ever vigilant to the fact that we face a challenge to our security at home, to our Australian people 
abroad and to our way of life. It is a challenge from people who care nothing for it but simply seek to 
impose a world that is anathema to everything we believe. For that reason, our task as legislators and 
Australian citizens is to say with unbending will that we will defend, protect and do everything we 
can to ensure that Australia plays a constructive role in the world as we see it in the first part of the 
21st century.
In this excerpt Hunt demonstrates a number of strategies for the dissemination of 
Islamophobic meaning. He communicates three overarching ‘challenges’ to Australia 
that all include Muslims or the ‘Islamic World’, which is a form of ‘displacement’. 
First, he legitimates his argument by presenting what he believes are al-Qaeda’s 
‘ideology, strategy and method’. Using a somewhat incoherent argument, Hunt adopts 
negatively evaluated metonyms of Islam and Muslims, such as ‘Islamic Caliphate’, 
Afghanistan and Taliban, to give meaning to the nature of the ‘problem’. Further, he 
communicates three overarching ‘challenges’ to Australia from all Muslims, or the 
‘Islamic World’, and identifies nation-states, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia 
and Afghanistan, as places where ‘Islamic’ extremists want to destabilise the 
government and replace it with ‘ultra-extremist government’. In this case Islam and 
Muslims are known through their ‘signifiers’, which is the negative representation of 
‘Islamic’ terrorists, but also ‘Islamic’ countries which are characterised as ‘weak’. What 
Hunt is communicating is that these ‘Islamic countries’ are not only problematic 
because they are Islamic countries, but also because they are deficient Islamic countries, 
which makes them a problem for ‘us’. Finally, Hunt consistently differentiates between 
‘Western engagement’ and the ‘Islamic world’, a characterisation that evokes 
Huntington’s (1997) reductionist clash of civilisations thesis.
A year earlier, on the anniversary of the Bali attack, Michael Hatton (Blaxland, NSW 
ALP) (Hansard, 15 October, 2003) used very similar language to Hunt. Hatton said:
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Those two fundamentalist terrorist organisations have at their base a warped and twisted Islamic 
philosophy directed towards the overthrow of Islamic governments in the Middle East in the first 
place. When al-Qaeda found that too hard, they then looked for countries with large Muslim 
populations where a civil government was in place—one informed with Western values and 
constructs, and democratic means, purposes and institutions. They sought to strike them down in as 
harsh a way as possible, not by attacking the military, the centres of power or the fundamental 
institutional base directly, but by attacking the poor people who happened to be holidaying on an 
island that provides a great deal of overseas income, not just to the island of Bali itself but to 
Indonesia as a whole. These people were victims of the terrorist mentality of two groups, one of 
which splayed off from the central core of al-Qaeda and is trained, nurtured, certified, encouraged, 
fostered and funded by al-Qaeda to do its best to spread their fundamentalist, warped approach to 
life, living and philosophy throughout the South-East Asian region...We know that 2,000 or 3,000 
people have been taught by or see themselves aligned to the Jemaah Islamiah organisation. 
Throughout the trials of the people who were responsible for perpetrating the massacres in Bali, we 
have seen not one skerrick of remorse for what they have done to their own citizens or to all those 
people who perished—the 88 Australians or the 202 people worldwide....It could happen to us at any 
time because the attack on Bali presages what could happen on this continent, as we know it has 
happened in the United States. It presages further action in Africa. It presages further action in 
Europe or anywhere in the developed world. For these groups, part of the crime of the developed 
world is that it is developed and that it assists developing countries to develop. They want to go back 
to a medieval period—in fact, that might be too advanced for them—to the period of the Dark 
Ages—
Mr Cadman—The 14th century.
Mr Hatton—They may want to go even further back than the 14th century, to the period of the 
darkest ages of man, where life and liberty were held in very little account, where a person’s 
subjection to an ideal was counted as a greater thing than the individual capacity of that person. They 
want to subject people to an iron heel and an iron rule that is entirely intolerant.
This is a great task that faces us. We must recommit ourselves, in memory of those people who have 
suffered through no fault of their own, to ensure that the groups that did this do not win and do not 
continue to propagate their false ideology throughout the Asian region and worldwide. We must 
ensure they do not come into a situation where they can perpetrate these outrages at will, either here 
in continental Australia or anywhere else in the world. Our citizens are citizens of the advanced 
Western civilisation which these groups seek to destroy...
Hatton’s speech clearly recirculates the same tropes used by other MPs when 
communicating their ideas about Islam and Muslims: ‘Fundamentalist terrorist 
organisations’: ‘Islamic philosophy’; ‘Islamic governments in the Middle East’; ‘Al- 
Qaeda’; and ‘large Muslim populations’. He also differentiates, as other MPs have done, 
between ‘Middle Eastern’ terrorism and the exporting of Middle Eastern ‘Islamic’ 
terrorism to a place where ‘a civil government was in place, one informed with Western 
values and constructs and democratic means, purposes and institutions’. This 
differentiation between ‘Middle Eastern Islamic states’ and Indonesia is a form of
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fragmentation, in which negative knowledge about Islam and Muslims in the Middle 
East, in particular, continues to be articulated.
However, as Allen (2010) pinpointed, the use of many varied signifiers to disseminate 
negative meaning about Islam and Muslims will also inevitably demonstrate 
inconsistencies. Usually, Indonesia is cast as ‘Australia’s largest Muslim neighbour’. 
However, in this instance, Indonesia’s Islamic credentials are downplayed in favour of 
casting it as ‘Western’ and ‘democratic’ and to demarcate it as modern, unlike the 
Middle-East generally, which is depicted here as the opposite of the ‘West’ and as 
retrograde. The characterisation of ‘our citizens’ as ‘citizens of the advanced Western 
civilisation’ unifies all citizens in Western societies and depicts all those citizens not 
from the West as necessarily opposite to ‘us’, which in this case situates ‘Others’ as 
‘backward’, of the ‘Dark ages’ and ‘intolerant’.
Negative representation of Muslims and Islam did not only invoke terrorism. Much of 
the talk about Muslims and Islam using frames of ‘us’ and ‘them’ involved in 
characterising a duality between Islam and Christianity. There was also emphasis upon 
evil perpetrated against Christians in ‘Islamic’ countries. For example, when speaking 
about the ‘Danish Cartoons’ and their depiction of the prophet Mohammed, Michael 
Johnson (Ryan, Qld LP) (Hansard, 8 February, 2006) expressed his dismay at the 
violence that has ‘engulfed many parts of the Muslim world’:
In the parliament today, I want to take the opportunity to place on record very strongly and 
unequivocally my personal condemnation of the recent acts of violence that appear to have engulfed 
many parts of the Muslim world—acts of violence and rage directed at the missions of foreign 
countries. I do this in my capacity as the federal member for Ryan and in my capacity as a citizen of 
this country. I want to condemn absolutely the sheer rage, threats of violence and the commission of 
terrorist acts against Western nations, Western interests and businesses in English-speaking 
countries.
...I want to state at the outset that I personally reject the judgment of the publishers in their decision 
to put into the community the cartoons as they were depicted and drawn. It served little purpose and 
had little value. ...While I do not condone the cartoons published by Danish newspapers, or other 
European newspapers equally, I say in the strongest language in the House of Representatives of the 
Australian parliament that there can never be any excuse for the extent and nature of the sheer, raw 
violence and rage we have seen in the last few days, especially in Lebanon.
The undercurrents that seem to be placing the Muslim world against the Judeo-Christian world are 
very disturbing to me. Whether or not I am correct, I personally sense a clash of views and beliefs 
brewing in the world at large—almost a clash of civilisation, if I can use that phrase, to give credence 
to the words of Harvard professor Samuel Huntington. More frequently than I would like, there 
seems to be a report every day and every week of new, real and physical outbreaks of violence or
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attacks that pit the Muslim world against the non-Muslim world; faith against faith. This is of deep 
regret to me and I am sure that all members of this parliament would share that deep regret.
Alternatively, there seems to be reports that hatred, violence and intolerance are the product of the 
Muslim world alone. That is not the case. Indeed, the overwhelming number of Muslims that I know 
personally are not of the view that hatred, violence and intolerance are of their faith. I might be 
misguided, but I suspect that many of my fellow Australians would share the same view. 
Communities and individuals alike in this country must never permit what we have seen to take root 
in any enduring manner in this country. (Time expired)
Here, Johnson rearticulates Huntington’s (1997) view that ‘Islamic civilisation’ is a 
cause of global conflict and violence. Further, he links ‘acts of violence and rage 
perpetrated by Muslims against missions of foreign countries’, in response to the Danish 
cartoons with ‘terrorist acts against Western nations, Western interests and business in 
English-speaking countries’. This, using Allen’s (2010) modes, is a form of 
‘displacement’ and ‘reification’, where all Muslims are characterized as violent or 
naturally capable of violence, as terrorists who demonstrate their irrational ‘sheer, raw 
violence and rage’. This is further exemplified by Johnson’s assertion that there are 
‘undercurrents that seem to be placing the Muslim world against the Judeo-Christian 
world’, where ‘a clash of views and beliefs are brewing in the world at large’. He then 
uses this to justify his unsubstantiated claim that more frequently than he would like 
‘there seems to be a report every day and every week of new, real and physical 
outbreaks of violence or attacks that pit the Muslim world against the non-Muslim 
world; faith against faith’. So, the Muslim world is characterised as ‘problematic’ and 
uncooperative. Finally, Johnson engages in ‘fragmentation’ when he distinguishes 
between the Muslims he knows and other Muslims who are perpetrating the violence. 
Although he seemingly acknowledges that the ‘Muslim World’ is not uniformly violent 
and intolerant, he continues to disseminate negative meaning about Islam and Muslims 
by ‘fragmenting’ the Muslim world and differentiating between the non-violent 
Muslims he ‘knows personally’ and the violent Muslims in the ‘Muslim world’. He then 
alludes to the Muslim ‘community’ and Muslim ‘individuals’ in Australia as capable of 
violence and posits that they ‘must never permit what we have seen to take root in any 
enduring manner in this country’.
Four years earlier, in May 2002 (Hansard, 15 May, 2002), John Murphy (Lowe, NSW 
ALP) asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs (upon notice 21 Feb 2002) whether he was 
aware that Muslims attacked Copts and the Church of the Virgin Mary in Egypt. His 
questions convey the extent of the animosity he thinks Muslims show toward the Copts,
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asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs ‘Did it take the local police over four hours to 
arrive at the scene and were Muslim villagers seen preventing the fire trucks from 
entering the village to extinguish the fire inside the Church?’.
Subsequently, in June 2002 (Hansard 19 June 2002) Murphy asked the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (upon notice 3 June 2002) how many persons were reported as killed in 
the Maluku region of Indonesia as a result of religious strife. He further enquired 
whether the Minister was able to answer how many Christians and Muslims died and if 
‘acts of (a) torture, (b) rape, (c) pillage, (d) enforced conversion to Islam, (e) genital 
mutilation and (f) other atrocities have been perpetrated on the Christian population in 
the Maluku region; if so, what are the details of the reported atrocities’. The Minister 
answered that the Indonesian authorities did not keep figures pertaining to religion and 
that ‘Human rights violations have been committed by all parties in the Malukus’.
Through his questions, Murphy is communicating well-rehearsed ideas about Islam and 
Muslims that depict Muslims as violent, scheming, oppressive and barbaric (Allen, 
2010). He characterises Muslims, in both the Coptic and Indonesian examples, as 
naturally hating Christians and harbouring the desire to annihilate, harm or convert 
Christians to Islam. Murphy is engaging in ‘displacement’, where meaning about certain 
Muslims in the Coptic or the Indonesian examples are conveyed in ways that implicate 
all Muslims as violent, barbaric and inhuman (stopping the fire truck from reaching the 
church, committing acts of rape, pillage, genital mutilation, acts which are often, in 
other contexts, attributed to Muslims and the tenets of Islam). The events of 9/11 
exacerbated the enduring ‘Otherness’ of Islam and Muslims that presents both Muslims 
and Islam as foreign, alien and the enemy. In discussing the hijab in the House of 
Representatives, Sophie Panopoulos (Indi, Vic LP) (Hansard, Sep, 2005) refused to see 
the hijab as having any theological merit that would make it comparable to other 
religious clothing, arguing:
Ancient social influences have morphed into rigid, unbending dogma. Therefore, when a modest call 
was made for Muslim girls to adhere to their taxpayer funded schools’ rules on uniforms, a veritable 
outcry ensued. I readily admit that there are varying views on the cultural and religious significance 
of wearing the veil, but the Koran does not prescribe the wearing of the hijab....Too many observers 
and commentators have simplified the recent debate on headscarves through comparing the hijab to 
the yarmulke, wimple, turban, nun’s habit or biretta. These are not equivalent constructs. To couch 
the debate in these terms simplifies the matter to the trivial. What is not mentioned is that none of 
these other articles represents the uncompromising retrograde curtailment of a woman’s rights as 
does the hijab. That is my opinion of the hijab and it is shared by many Muslim women. Many others 
may not agree, but it is my right to express an opinion...when a suggestion is made to remove from 
state schools a symbol of what is essentially, as one commentator puts it, ‘sexual apartheid’, the
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Labor sisterhood and the left- wing women’s movement cry foul. In a society that values free speech, 
the vitriol of a vocal minority in the debate on the hijab is worrying. As a female MP I am concerned 
about women’s rights in this country. There are those who subscribe to a belief system that devalues 
and degrades women and who accept a legal system that would relegate women back to the Dark 
Ages.... Why should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance cloaked 
under the veil of some distorted form of religious freedom? Why should our female leaders remain 
silent when the issue of the curtailment of women’s freedoms occurs? The militant, prescriptive 
forms of Islam are an unfortunate metaphor for sexual inequality. Elsewhere we have seen Muslim 
women struggle against an oppressive form of Islam.
Panopoulos presents the hijab as a ‘retrograde’ and ‘ancient social influence’ and 
dogma. In her view, it is not comparable ‘to the yarmulke, wimple, turban, nun’s habit 
or biretta’, which she argues do not ‘represents the uncompromising retrograde 
curtailment of a woman’s rights as does the hijab’. She differentiates between ‘Judeo- 
Christian’ religious artefacts and Islamic religious artefacts. Further, Panopoulos briefly 
mentions the ‘veil’ and the possibility that it has cultural and religious significance, ‘but 
the Koran does not prescribe the wearing of the hijab’. She uses her status as a female 
MP, personal knowledge of the ‘Koran’, the suggestion that ‘(e)lsewhere we have seen 
Muslim women struggle against an oppressive form of Islam’ and one obscure 
‘commentator’ who described it as ‘sexual apartheid’ as legitimating her claims that the 
hijab is not religious and is oppressive.
As such, Panopoulos characterises Islam as primitive, militant, misogynist, sexist and 
oppressive and Muslims as people who mistreat women. She also sees them as insisting 
on literal interpretations of the Quran by suggesting that ‘The militant, prescriptive 
forms of Islam are an unfortunate metaphor for sexual inequality’ and by alluding to 
‘those who subscribe to a belief system that devalues and degrades women and who 
accept a legal system that would relegate women back to the Dark Age’. She suggests 
that sections of the community and their alien religious practices should not be given 
the same religious freedoms others enjoy.
Conclusion
The use of Allen’s (2010) modes and their strategies as an analytical lens have clearly 
yielded results that demonstrate the presence of ideological content and the 
dissemination of negative meaning about Islam and Muslims in Australian 
parliamentary discourse. As Allen (2010:85) suggests, the events of 9/11 have 
reinforced an ‘Othering’ of Islam and Muslims that characterises Islam as inherently 
foreign, alien and an enemy. Further, ‘Islam’ is regularly interchanged with notions of 
Muslims as ‘terrorists’, ‘fundamentalists’ and anti-Western, amongst numerous other
217
metonyms. In addition, parliamentarians repeatedly use atavistic myths about Muslims’ 
natural propensity for violence, barbarity and intolerance, and as people who mistreat 
women, justify military projects and insist on literal interpretations of the Quran. At the 
same time, Islam is represented as primitive, irrational, violent, misogynist, sexist, 
intolerant, oppressive and barbaric. All of these characteristics are presented as 
anathema to ‘Western’ society and the norms ‘the West’ acknowledges as its own, 
which are civilised, non-violent, reasonable, enlightened and non-sexist.
Moreover, ideological content signifies, whether overtly or covertly, ideas about who 
‘we’ are not (in this case in juxtaposition to Islam and Muslims), but also a conception 
of who ‘we’ are. The frequent use of ‘the clash of civilisations’ thesis marks Australia 
as part of the ‘West’ and Islam and Muslims as part of the ‘Islamic world’, this polarity 
distinguishes between two putatively separate entities which do not seemingly share 
anything and do not have any overlaps. This is a characterisation that exacerbates the 
view that Islam and Muslims are foreign and alien to the ‘Western way of life’, and 
hence Australia. This chapter demonstrated that Islamophobia as ideology is present in 
the discourses analysed. Negative meaning about, and signifiers of, Muslims and Islam, 
along with the connections between Islam, Muslims and terrorism, were clearly 
disseminated by members of the House of Representatives. The next chapter 
demonstrates how the normative constructions in Australia (identified in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6) work to inform, cement and give local relevance to Islamophobia as ideology in 
Australia.
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Chapter 9: Islamophobia and Australian Fears of the 
'Other'
Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how Islamophobia also works with old and entrenched ideas 
about the ‘Other’ in Australia; ideas that were not first developed with Muslims and 
Islam in mind, but are nonetheless used to bolster ideas about the negative impact 
Muslims are having on Australia. These representations continue to legitimate Islam 
and Muslims as the ‘outgroup’ and perpetuates the dissemination of negative meanings 
about Islam and Muslims. Allen (2010:165-170) suggests that, like other ideologies, 
Islamophobia takes shape within the context in which it is operating and, therefore, it 
uses atavisms, metaphors and other explanatory tools which are particularly Australian 
or resonate with Australian preoccupations. This chapter demonstrates how specifically 
Australian signifiers convey meaning about Australian identity that reflect the 
definitions of the ‘Other’ canvassed in Chapter 4, 5, 6. There are five areas in which the 
discourse about Islam and Muslims are discussed by MPs: Asian invasion; excesses of 
cultural pluralism and multiculturalism; productive diversity; immigrants; and ‘dying 
race’. It should be noted however, that MPs make reference to, and use of, multiple 
categories in their representations of Muslims and Islam, hence these categories are not 
mutually exclusive. However, as will be highlighted, these five areas reflect the 
Australian preoccupation with the ‘Other’ more generally, but are also used to bolster 
claims about the ‘Muslim problem’ in this context.
Asian Invasion
The ‘Middle-East’ and ‘Arabs’ have been consistently pointed to as originators of 
violence and of anti-Western hatred and the Middle-East remains a central source for 
‘information’ about Islam and Muslims (Poynting et al, 2004). This vision of the 
Middle-East and ‘Arabs’ continues to find resonance in Australia and was certainly 
exacerbated by the events of 9/11 (Chapter 8). However, more pertinent to the 
Australian context is Islam and Muslims in the ‘Asian region’. For Australia, its close 
‘Islamic’ neighbours, mainly Indonesia and Malaysia, continue to be viewed as 
‘problematic’ in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. The stress on Indonesia 
and Malaysia as ‘Islamic’ countries continues to be a key source of fear and suspicion.
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There has been a renewed focus on Indonesia and Islamic terrorism in Indonesia, 
especially after the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005.
The Bali bombings re-ignited the need for politicians to stress the fact that Indonesia is 
the largest Muslim country in the world and right on ‘Australia’s doorstep’. 
Consequently, there were ample references made by politicians to Australia’s ‘Islamic’ 
neighbours and Islam in the region and to Australia being a prime target for invasion. 
Shortly after the events of September 11, Allan Morris (Newcastle, NSW ALP) 
(Hansard, 20 September, 2001) spoke at length about the Migration Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No.6) 2001, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia and the failure of 
the Government to stop the ‘real’ ‘queue-jumpers’. Morris felt it was necessary to 
discuss Australian immigration history in order to distinguish between the nationalities, 
and by implication the religion (made more overt later in his speech), of new refugees. 
He then implicates Muslims and Muslim countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, in 
Australia’s border security and points to the fact the Muslims do not need visas to visit 
Malaysia and this causes problems for Indonesia and possibly Australia:
I think there is an old saying that those who ignore history become victims of it. With immigration 
matters it is worthwhile looking at a bit of the history because there are lessons there to be learnt. 
What we have been seeing in recent months—in fact for about two years now—is effectively a fourth 
wave of people arriving by ship from various parts of the world. If we look back to the 1970s and the 
then Fraser government, the early boat people were from Vietnam—a direct result of the Vietnam 
War. The next lot of people were Chinese and Cambodians from southern China and Cambodia. 
What we are seeing now is a fourth wave from the Middle East—from Afghanistan, Iraq and, in 
some cases, Iran. The boat people are mainly from that part of the world.
When we say that these are different people, the question must be: what happened to the last ones? 
What happened to the first three waves? Why are they still not coming? The answer is that Labor in 
government actually addressed and resolved those issues. People need to look back at the role 
Australia played in bringing Vietnam into the modem Western world as a trading partner. We acted 
as an intermediary and we helped the Vietnamese people...
The current case is an incredibly complex set of circumstances involving our relations with some of 
our most important neighbours—two in particular: Malaysia and Indonesia. In recent months, I have 
been able to be in Indonesia and talk with Indonesian parliamentarians, including the current 
President and the previous President, about the circumstances between us and them. We discussed 
the boat people, refugee, asylum seeker issues, with all the key Indonesian parliamentarians, and let 
me tell you that we came back very positive, because Indonesia understands the problem. But part of 
the problem is with Malaysia as well. People of the Muslim religion are allowed into Malaysia 
without visas—so they are quite legally allowed to fly to Malaysia from anywhere in the world if 
they are Muslim—so the pressure is on Indonesia to allow them to come into Indonesia in the same 
way. That gives Indonesia a very difficult and complex internal problem, but it is one that must be
dealt with in conjunction with Malaysia, not in isolation.......... So we have virtually guaranteed that
Indonesians cannot take people back once they leave their country. That is what we have guaranteed
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in recent weeks. As for talking with Malaysia about their visa problem— which all the ASEAN 
countries agree is a problem— we talked about it via the airwaves again, not face to face, not as 
neighbours discussing a mutual problem, but as people telling them what to do... stuff—but it is 
spending nothing to make sure that the hundreds of thousands of overseas students who come here do 
not include people from the Triads in China or the terrorist gangs in the Middle East or elsewhere.
While the above excerpt is putatively about the ‘ boat people, refugees and asylum 
seekers’, it is specifically about Muslims coming to Australia as ‘boat people, refugees 
and asylum seekers’. As defined in the previous chapter ‘Legitimation is how 
ideological content becomes reasonably perceived to be legitimate and justified though 
sustaining meaning that ensure that certain individuals, groups, or communities remain 
the Other or outgroup’ (Allen 2010:174). Morris legitimates his views by recalling 
Australian immigration history and the solutions implemented by Australia, as well as 
how ‘a fourth wave of people arriving by ship from various parts of the world’ are 
characterized as ‘different’ to previous ‘boat people, refugees and asylum seekers’ and, 
hence, pose a different problem. Morris argues that ‘boat people, refugees and asylum 
seekers’ are all Muslims and, as a result, Indonesia and Malaysia are directly implicated 
in their arrival to Australia because of their religion. However, because Malaysia allows 
Muslims from all over the world free and easy entry, a problem Morris states is shared 
with other ASEAN countries, he argues that, if it were made more difficult for Muslims 
to enter Malaysia and Indonesia, so it would be more difficult for them to come to 
Australia and, therefore Australia would not have this ‘problem’.
This argument clearly demonstrates other strategies that communicate Islamophobic 
content. In this context, Muslims and the ‘fourth wave of boat people’ are conflated. 
Consequently, it would seem that all Muslims are potential ‘boat people’ for Australia, 
which reinforces the often-made assumption that ‘Islamic’ countries are inherently 
unstable and all refugees are Muslim. Indeed, in the Australian context ‘boat people’, 
refugees, asylum seekers and ‘queue-jumpers’ have all become metonyms for Muslims, 
since at least 2001, and, therefore, it is implied that the refugee problem is a ‘Muslim 
problem’ (Lygo, 2004).
Although talks about Australia’s ‘Muslim’ neighbours preceded the Bali bombings, the 
renewed focus on Indonesia in a post-Bali world provoked numerous exchanges about 
Indonesia and regional security. Indeed, the Bali bombing on 12 October, 2002 attracted 
much condemnation from MPs. While all MPs were emotionally stirred by the tragedy, 
some clearly articulated the tragedy within the framework of the ‘West v Islam’. For
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example, Sophie Panopoulos (Hansard, 16 October, 2002) ‘angrily’ addressed 
Parliament:
Many are asking why this evil attack happened. Unlike Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia has until 
now refused to accept and acknowledge that there are indigenous terrorist cells flourishing within its 
borders. The card of political extremism is also being played out in Indonesia. Vice-President 
Hamzah Haz has pandered to fundamentalist Muslims, claiming that there were no native terrorists in 
Indonesia and that the alleged extremists ‘only wanted to see that Indonesia has a religious society’. 
But there are known terrorist training camps in Indonesia, and fundamentalist Muslim terrorists have 
travelled in and out of Indonesia unimpeded. Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah 
Islamiah, advocates the importance of holy wars and has conducted a propaganda campaign in 
support of bin Laden, describing him as a ‘warrior of God’....Bali is the Western mecca of the 
Muslim world and an obvious and easy target. It is a Western holiday destination in the middle of the 
largest Muslim population in the world, with free and easy access for bombs and their components 
and for terrorists. If Bali had been geographically close to Canada, the high death toll would have 
been of Canadians. Equally, if it were geographically close to any Western nation, that nation would 
suffer the majority of casualties... The Sari Club was bombed because it was a venue known to be 
patronised by Westerners, and it is the values that are broadly embodied in Western civilisation that 
were the targets of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists. We value a secular society in which we are 
tolerant of different religions and of different belief systems. We strongly believe in the freedom of 
an individual to pursue their life’s ambitions and dreams according to what is important to them. We 
do not prescribe a righteous religious path for all to follow and we do not condemn to death those 
who disagree with us. We are tolerant and subscribe to the saying ‘live and let live’. We should be 
proud that intellectual, personal and political freedoms are the hallmarks of Western civilisation. It is 
these freedoms that have shaped our country and that have shaped our lives, it is these freedoms that 
have made Australia a prosperous and successful nation, and it is these freedoms that are under attack 
by Islamic fundamentalists who believe we are a decadent, immoral, ungodly society that is having a 
corrupting influence on the world and who blame us for the social and economic failure of their 
respective countries. Their propaganda pits the West as the fat cow, milking poor Islamic countries, 
yet the founder of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, inherited a family fortune that was built on extreme 
inequality between the ruling Saudi aristocracy and the rest...
In her speech, Panopoulos characterizes ‘us’ as moral, fair, free and dignified, and as 
part of ‘Western civilisation’, and she accuses ‘them’ of intolerance, murder, hatred, 
and of being the exact opposite of ‘us’. Panopoulos’ speech contains almost all of 
Allen’s (2010) modes of operation and the associated strategies to communicate and 
perpetuate Islamophobia as ideology. First, Panopoulos constructs a chain of reasoning, 
at times incoherent, that directly implicates Muslims and Islam in her explanation of 
why, and how, the events in Bali occurred. She argues that Indonesia refuses to accept 
that ‘indigenous terrorist cells are flourishing within its borders’, as well as pandering 
to ‘Fundamentalist Muslims’ when there are ‘known terrorist training camps in 
Indonesia’. This exposition continues to associate ‘fundamentalism’, ‘terrorism’ and 
Muslims and, consequently, is evidence of ‘displacement’, where her use of 
‘Fundamentalist Muslims’ and ‘Fundamentalist Muslim terrorists’ and ‘Islamic 
fundamentalist’ are used to convey, identify, and disseminate immediate knowledge
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about who she is referring to ,and the extent of the threat they are capable of- i.e. the 
events in Bali. Broadly, Muslims and the tenets of Islam then become indiscriminately 
implicated in her characterization of all that is evil and not ‘us’.
Other MPs also utilised the explanatory powers of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy; a 
dichotomy that is clearly ideological. For example, in March 2003 (Hansard, 19 March, 
2003), Robert Katter (Kennedy, QLD, Ind), while speaking about Australia’s 
involvement in Iraq, stated that it is ‘really about the defence of Australia’. He agreed 
with the Prime Minister that Australia needs to be allied with the United States for her 
own security. Katter canvassed an array of topics, delving into history and Australia’s 
involvement in WWII, current involvement in Iraq, Australia’s proximity to Indonesia 
and role in East Timor. He also mentions Islam and Muslims and conflates Muslims, 
Iraq and Saddam Hussein:
Winston Churchill made a very famous statement that we hear often: those who cannot learn from 
history are doomed to repeat it. In Australia here today we are once again picking a fight with and 
provoking a certain group of people in the world who are of Muslim persuasion. In so doing we are 
more than morally justified in going in. People here are acting in a way that can be interpreted as 
saying that there should be no interference in Iraq. We are talking about a man who has the deaths of 
maybe a million people or more on his conscience’... But my concern is not with Iraq. My concern is 
with Australia. If you keep provoking a certain group of people continuously and unrelentingly, you 
are building up a fund of hatred. The First World War was to get even for what the British had done 
in the Boer War concentration camps. The Germans very closely identified with the Dutch people, 
and 28,000 women and children died in those concentration camps. If you keep sticking it into a 
group of people continuously, you cannot be surprised when they try to get back at you.
Katter engages in ‘narrativisation’ when he contends ‘Once again picking a fight with 
and provoking Muslims’. He unifies disparate ‘Muslims’ by using the term in a 
symbolic way to identify the ‘Other’ as ‘a certain group of people in the world who are 
of Muslim persuasion’. He does not identify the group as anything other than Muslim; 
therefore he freely switches from discussions about the war in Iraq to Australia’s 
intervention in Indonesia. Moreover, in the excerpt below, Katter feels that it is 
necessary to recast present events through the prism of history, which is a form of 
‘narrativisation’ that points to the use of history as unproblematically capable of acting 
as an analytic lens for present problems. Katter legitimates his characterization of the 
‘us’ and ‘them’ dualism that he bases on religious grounds by speculating on how 
Indonesians think about Australia. He states, in relation to Indonesia and East Timor:
I think the intervention in East Timor was more than morally justified, but I can clearly see how a 
person in Indonesia would take very great umbrage at what occurred there. Some 230 million people 
are jammed onto six tiny little islands, and we take half of one of the islands off. From their point of
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view, they would say, ‘Why? Because these people are part European and Christian—that’s why.’ 
This would be very provocative to the people of Indonesia.
Finally, throughout his speech Katter repeatedly informed his audience that Australia 
needed to be protected by the United States of America, because Australia cannot 
protect itself from its neighbours. Echoing a century old preoccupation with the ‘Asian 
Invasion’, he stated that Australia needed protection, because we were an ‘empty 
country’:
Finally, with great passion I will put it to this House for the four-millionth time: you are living in an 
empty country. There is a golden boomerang which is highly populated; beyond that the other 84 per 
cent of this continent does not have many more people than were here when Captain Cook arrived. 
Let me be specific and say that about 660,000 people live in this empty continent—that is, on 84 per 
cent of the surface area of this continent...
The proximity of Indonesia to Australia and the fact that the majority of its population is 
Muslim is repeatedly a cause for concern for politicians. On a number of occasions 
Robert Sercombe (Maribymong, VIC, ALP) spoke of Australia’s need to focus on Islam 
in its immediate region. In February 2003, Sercombe (Hansard, 10 February, 2003) 
said:
I repeat that our largest nearest neighbour is the largest Muslim country in the world. Professor 
Ricklefs says that there is a battle for the heart and soul of that country going on at the moment in 
terms of Islamic traditions. We have to be doing everything we can to assist the forces of modem 
Islam, progressive Islam, to emerge as the key ideology and key faith of that country. By providing a 
participation in the George Bush-led crusade we may well significantly contribute to strengthening 
the other types of forces within that world and, in the process, I think, significantly damage our 
national interests.
Further, on the 20 March 2003 he spoke about the need for Australia to pay attention to 
the ‘Muslim World’ in our own region. On 27 March, Sercombe (Hansard, 27 March 
2003) spoke about the inevitability of the ‘clash of civilisations’ and pointed out that the 
Muslim nature of Indonesia makes it a potential threat to Australia:
Our primary responsibility needs to be the security of Australia and our own immediate region, not 
making contributions to a quagmire in Iraq which is likely to continue to destabilise the world into 
the near future. A number of years ago, an American academic called Samuel Huntington wrote a 
booked called The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. It gave a very 
pessimistic view of conflict in the 21st century. One of the great fault lines he saw emerging was that 
between the West and the Islamic world. We are now beginning to see, unlike in 1991 when the great 
majority of the Islamic world supported the intervention against Iraq, a situation where there is a 
view held very widely throughout the Islamic world that the clash of civilisations Huntington referred 
to is emerging in the context of the fighting in Iraq....That is an extraordinarily dangerous situation 
for the whole world, but it is particularly dangerous for a country like Australia. Our nearest
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neighbour— and most important neighbour, probably, from a security point of view— also happens to 
be the largest Muslim country in the world. We have a situation, as Australia has experienced in the 
tragedy of Bali, where there are some extraordinarily dangerous organisations. The great bulk o f 
Indonesian Muslims are people that identify with organisations such as that o f the former President 
Wahid, who are essentially moderate Muslims. They are Muslims who are concerned about ensuring 
a proper dialogue beh\>een cultures, not conflict. But war in Iraq and continuing destabilisation in the 
Middle East is precisely the sort of formula which is likely to give the Jemaah Islamiahs and their 
associates a significant kick along in a country that is of immediate security interest to Australia and 
of cultural, economic and social significance...
In both excerpts, Sercombe refers to Indonesia’s ‘Islamic’ credentials as a threat to 
Australia. He reminds his audience that it is the largest Muslim country in the world and 
is a security threat to Australia. He uses multiple ‘expert’ sources to legitimate his claim 
that there is a ‘battle’ in Indonesia for the ‘heart and soul of that country in terms of its 
Islamic traditions’ and that ‘the clash of civilisations’ describes the situation between 
‘us’ and the ‘Islamic world’. Finally, Sercombe suggests that Australia should intervene 
in order to ‘assist the forces of modem Islam’ arguing that it is reasonable to suggest 
that Indonesians can been differentiated between those who are ‘essentially moderate 
Muslims’, who are ‘concerned about ensuring a proper dialogue between cultures, not 
conflict’, and those like ‘Jemaah Islamiahs and their associates’.
A number of issues stand out in these two excerpts. Muslims are unified into a 
homogenous ‘bulk’ in Indonesia and are viewed as a direct threat to Australia because 
of their religion and proximity to Australia. Further, if Australia does not ‘assist’, all 
Indonesians will become potential security threats to Australia, because they are 
Muslim. This is a form of ‘displacement’ where meaning is communicated about 
Muslims and Islam that suggests that all Muslims have potential to be terrorists. Further, 
in this context Muslim and ‘Islamic world’ are used as markers that convey already 
predetermined meanings about Islam and Muslims, a process of ‘essentialising as well 
as ‘standardisation’. However, even as Sercombe viewed all Indonesians as ‘Muslim’, 
he also differentiated between good Muslims and bad Muslims. This is a process of 
fragmentation where the original emphasis remains, so that being ‘Muslim’ is 
problematic and needs a solution. Further, in the process of differentiating between 
‘moderates’ and non-moderates, Sercombe is also disseminating negative meaning 
about the Muslims that do not conform to an undefined or ill-defined category 
‘moderate’. Finally, in using the ‘clash of civilisations’ as justification for his 
characterisation of ‘us’ and ‘them’, Sercombe essentialises the ‘Islamic world’ and
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positions it as a polar opposite to ‘the West’, in which it is treated as ‘Other’, alien and 
incapable of sharing any values and norms with ‘the West’.
Culture and Multiculturalism
The previous section demonstrated how Muslims and Islam were presented as ongoing 
threats to Australia’s security. However, the threat to Australia was not only from 
without, but also from within. International incidents, such as the Bali bombings and the 
war in Iraq, and ‘Islamic’ practices in other parts of the world were unproblematically 
seen to be of direct relevance to Australia’s Muslims. The ‘Muslim community’ in 
Australia, and in particular ‘Sheik Al-Hilaly’ (who is seen as a representative of 
Muslims in Australia), are continually referred to as problematic.
One of numerous examples is Phillip Cadman’s (Mitchell, NSW LP) (Hansard, 15 
October, 2003) explanation of Islam, which makes use of the ‘Asian invasion’ concept 
as well as the internal threat to Australia. While discussing the Bali attacks, Cadman 
stated:
I believe that the heart of Islam is to conquer. There are many moderate Muslims who are wonderful 
people, but the heart of Islam is geographic dominance. We Australians need to understand that that 
is its heart. Whether it is the cutting edge or the moderate, there is the intention for geographic 
dominance. It is a worldwide religion—so is Christianity, for that matter. One seeks to conquer the 
heart and the other seeks to conquer territory. That is the difference. An open, democratic society 
such as we have in Australia, which has been under attack—or there have been indications of its 
being under attack—is a very easy target for geographic dominance such as we have in the region.
My mind goes to a case that is being heard in Melbourne—one of vilification brought by some of the 
most skilled lawyers in the land on behalf of the Islamic Council of Australia against a Baptist pastor, 
Daniel Scott. The claim is that he vilified Islam by some of his preachings. That man, by the way, is a 
convert from Islam. He has spent many years in Bangladesh, he certainly understands the preaching 
of Islam and he has expressed his views in opposition. There he is in court, funded by himself and his 
friends, defending the right to speak out against some of those most extreme practices, against the 
petrodollar-paid lawyers produced by the Islamic Council.
I compare that with the occasion some years ago when El Hilaly at Sydney University condemned 
the Jews of Australia in the vilest of terms—using the vilest of expressions. That man was never 
brought to book. Nobody ever confronted him, even though he was an illegal immigrant allowed by 
the then Australian government to stay on in Australia and has recently been let off from carrying 
weapons in his vehicle, so it is reported—let off from any charges whatsoever by the New South 
Wales government and the New South Wales Police. I just think it is passing strange that, on the one 
hand, in a society like ours we can have before the courts in Melbourne a pastor—a non-violent 
individual—who is experienced in the matters which he spoke about and who was not vilifying 
people but preaching against what he saw as some of the extremes of Islam. On the other hand, we 
have violent and abhorrent language expressed against individuals and, at a later stage, weapons of 
violence being found on a person and in his vehicle. That is a double standard. Something needs to be
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done to apply our laws without favour or fear and to uphold the standards and beliefs that have 
established this country. If we fail to do that, we run a great risk. I do not care what a person’s colour 
or creed is. If they vilify, others they have to be either condemned or allowed to speak out. There 
cannot be two standards. If they are going to carry weapons, there cannot be two standards...
In his speech Cadman broadly discusses and ties together the Bali bombings, Jemaah 
Islamiah, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Islamic Council of Australia, Sheik El Hilaly and 
petro-dollars as a metonym for Saudi Arabia and double standards in Australia. He 
refers to ‘Islam’ as a means to connect these disparate individuals and groups, thus 
using ‘Unification’, one of the modes of operation that Allen (2010) highlights in the 
dissemination of negative meaning about Islam and Muslims. Here, Islam is seen as a 
particularly violent religion that promotes ‘conquering’ (whether the conquering of 
people or land is uncertain) and ‘geographic dominance’. Further, although Cadman 
qualifies his definition of Islam by stating that there are ‘moderate Muslims who are 
wonderful people’, which would be classified as ‘differentiation through fragmentation’ 
in ‘the modes of operation’, he quickly negates this concession by stating that ‘Whether 
it is the cutting edge or the moderate, there is the intention for geographic dominance’, 
which once again directly unifies all Muslims and Islam as violent ‘conquerors’.
Cadman’s speech also displays ‘displacement’, and ‘euphemisation’, two strategies of 
‘Dissimulation’ (Allen, 2010). First, the extract presents all Muslims as ‘conquerors’, 
which is a form of ‘displacement’, where the actions (or intentions in this case) of a 
minority (if any, as Cadman’s claims are unsubstantiated) are used to give meaning to 
Islam and Muslims that characterises them as having undesirable traits and as direct 
threats to Australia. Further, Cadman differentiates between Islam and Christianity and 
presents Christianity as a benign religion that aims to ‘conquer hearts’, not territory, 
which is a form of ‘euphemisation’ and a positive self-assessment/presentation. 
Moreover, Cadman rationalises his characterisation of Islam and Muslims by making 
references to Australia being ‘an easy target for geographic dominance such as we have 
in the region’.
During his speech Cadman switches from discussing Islam and Muslims as conquerors 
in general and connects it to a court case in Melbourne. Here, he characterises the 
Islamic Council of Australia as being funded by petro-dollars and as a foreign element 
in Australia and not a legitimate part of Australia. Cadman’s connection of Islamic 
terrorism and the Islamic Council in Australia is a form of ‘displacement’, where all 
references to Islam and Muslims in his speech lead to the same conclusion (Muslims
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and Islam are negatively evaluated). In contrast, Cadman presents the ‘Baptist pastor’ as 
a legitimate member of Australia, who is unjustly attacked by the ‘Islamic Council’ for 
his legitimate views on the ‘extreme practices’ of Islam. He further grants the pastor 
legitimacy by stating that ‘he is a convert from Islam and has spent many years in 
Bangladesh, he certainly understands the preaching of Islam and he has expressed his 
views in opposition’, which Allen (2010:174) identifies is a frequently used form of 
rationalisation, where the speaker justifies their anti-Islam views by referring to 
someone ‘in the know’. Finally, he links the court case with Sheik el Hilaly, who is 
Muslim and who is viewed by many as representing Muslims in Australia. In his speech 
Cadman presents el Hilaly as a violent Muslim and an illegal immigrant (both 
characterisations demonstrate the deviant nature of Muslims) and contrasts him to the 
pastor, who is a ‘non-violent’ individual.
In a similar link between the ‘global Muslim problem’ and Islam and Muslims in 
Australia, MPs repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of ‘Islamic charities’ (See 
especially Mr Danby, Hansard 7 October 2003). Jason Wood (La Trobe, Vic LP), in his 
first speech to parliament in 2004 (Hansard, 17 November, 2004) warned that terrorists 
will infiltrate Australia through ‘schools, charities and religious and community 
groups’. Wood referenced an ‘Al-Qaeda expert’ to inform his audience that terrorists 
will ‘infiltrate schools, charities and religious and community groups in order to recruit 
followers to their cause’. Further, Wood warned that Muslims in Australia could be 
incited to take up terrorism. He said, ‘As Australians we need to ensure we do not 
ostracise our multi-cultural communities or our regional neighbours, as this will play 
right into the hands of Muslim extremists and terrorist groups’.
Similarly, two years earlier, speaking about the attack in Bali in 2002, Carmen 
Lawrence (Fremantle, WA ALP) (Hansard, 22 October, 2002) warned that ‘prejudice 
against Arabs and Muslims will turn them- if we overreact globally by stereotyping all 
of them- from sources of help, the moderates particularly, against terrorism to sources 
of further terrorism’. She stated:
Terrorists hope generally that a clumsy and over-generalised strike against them will turn those 
sympathetic but immobilised people to action and sacrifice, and strengthen their own status at the 
apex of that pyramid. We have seen that happen over past decades. They also hope for a reaction of 
stereotyping and prejudice so that more people will identify with them, that they will be seen not just 
as a tiny extremist splinter group but as representative of a whole group of people. They are 
tendencies that we must resist at any price.
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Although both Wood and Lawrence are communicating a need to stop stereotyping 
‘Arabs and Muslims’, they are essentialising ‘Arabs, Muslims and Islam’ and then 
differentiating between terrorists and non-terrorists or potential terrorist sympathisers 
amongst Muslims. Further, Wood is particularly worried that ‘As Australians we need 
to ensure we do not ostracise our multicultural communities or our regional 
neighbours’, as he is worried that Muslims in Australia, as well as our ‘Muslim 
neighbours’, have the potential to turn into terrorists or terrorist sympathisers, if 
terrorists ‘infiltrate schools, charities and religious and community groups in order to 
recruit followers to their cause’. This is a type of ‘naturalisation’, where terrorism is 
seen as an inherent tendency in Muslims, which should not be ‘provoked’, and a form of 
displacement, where all Muslims are either terrorists or have the potential to be 
terrorists. Indeed, the meaning disseminated involves the same negative evaluation of 
Muslims as terrorists.
On the topic of schools and multiculturalism in Australia, Don Randall (Canning, WA 
LP) (Hansard, 16 February, 2004), whilst discussing the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Better Bargaining) Bill 2003 and the value of teachers in Australia, 
claimed:
Ultimately, as we know, there are schools in this country where they do strange things— for example, 
in Western Australia it caused a lot of problems not so long ago, before Christmas, when some 
schools said they would not allow the singing of Christmas carols in the schools. How bizarre, how 
unAustralian is that? It was going to offend the cultural and religious rights of another group. This is 
Australia, after all. We are not doing what France is doing and outlawing headwear for Jews and 
Muslims and crosses for Catholics et cetera. Surely in Australia we can be celebrate Easter and 
Anzac Day and not be that politically correct...
While Randall does not explicitly suggest that Islamic schools are behind the banning of 
Christmas, his reference to the banning of Christmas and political correctness is part of 
the overall outrage about some schools banning Christmas celebration for fear of 
offending ‘minorities’ in Australia. Indeed, Poynting et al (2004:227) explain that, in 
2002, the headmaster of a ‘fundamentalist’ Christian school ‘sent parents a newsletter 
explaining their policy of disabusing students of the fantasy of Santa Claus, arguing it 
was not part of the Christian tradition’. Poynting et al (2004:227) contend that the ban 
on Santa was seen as part of the ‘excesses of multiculturalism’, which led to the debate 
to focus on multiculturalism ‘and in particular the intolerance of Muslims towards 
Christian traditions’ (see also survey results Dunn et al, 2007).
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This debate about the clash between Muslims and Christian values was also aired in 
Parliament by Steven Ciobo (Moncrieff, Qld LP) (Hansard, 8 March, 2004) when he 
discussed multiculturalism in Australia:
I often reflect that my immediate family is a typical example of what makes Australia the nation that 
it is. I have an Italian father, who immigrated to Australia with his family as a refugee shortly after 
the Second World War. My mother, bom in North Queensland, had an English father and an 
Australian mother. My wife, Astra, was bom an American and now enjoys dual citizenship. My 
family is but one small example of the heritage of this great nation. It is a heritage that has delivered 
peace, stability and relatively good fortune to all Australians, whether they were bom on our shores 
or chose Australia as their new home.
Accompanying and accommodating our collective heritage is our uniquely developed Australian 
ethos. Commentators have coined a lexicon that embraces this ethos. Australian values shown in 
phrases such as ‘a fair go’, ‘a fair crack of the whip’ and ‘underdog supporters’ are examples. As a 
cultural identity it is sometimes hard to define. However, it is quintessentially Australian to believe in 
a tolerant, open society. Australians have striven for a pluralist society for decades. It is a reflection 
of our past as a nation and an acceptance that Australians are very comfortable with cultural enclaves. 
Indeed, we hold a special place in our collective heart for the Chinatowns as well as for Lygon Street, 
Sunnybank, Footscray and Altona, to name only a few. As a nation, we have embraced yum cha, 
baklava, goulash and kebabs as alternatives to barbecued snags or meat pies.
For decades immigrants to Australia have recognised the promise of this country—the promise to 
provide a clean canvas for immigrants with the only consideration required being a commitment to 
being Australian. The best summary I could provide is encapsulated in the chorus of We Are 
Australian:
We are one, but we are many;
And from all the lands on earth we come. We share a dream, and sing with one voice, I am, you are, 
we are Australian.
Since those words were released to the Australian public, we have absorbed them. They best define 
our national insight—the recognition that even though we may dress differently, eat different food or 
worship a different deity we are bound together by the dream of ensuring this nation remains a liberal 
democracy which provides reward for effort, a helping hand and, above all, a fair go.
My grievance today is that this commitment is being eroded. It is my observation that multicultural 
Australia is being hijacked by political correctness. The consequence of this hijacking has been the 
growing social divide we now witness occurring in our nation’s cities. Slowly replacing our historical 
commitment to cultural diversity and an overarching uniformity of values are increasingly prevalent 
examples of the pursuit of value diversity. The social engineers of the political left reject historical 
Australia as fake multiculturalism. They view cultural diversity and value uniformity as only the 
half-measure. The Labor Party’s commitment is to not only a culturally diverse but also a value 
diverse Australia.
Examples of the social upheaval caused through the adoption and promotion of a value diverse 
Australia include the frightening crime wave of pack-rapes that we have seen in Sydney’s western 
suburbs. These were base crimes committed against Western women, perpetrated by criminals with a 
value set which dictates that Western girls are easy or are viewed as being sexually promiscuous. In 
the face of these crimes, the debate about cultural values in Australia became hot. Those on the 
political left sought to have the crime viewed as being no different to any other rape. Advocates for 
the left asserted that the moral turpitude of these crimes was no different to any other. The victims’ 
factual accounts of racist slurs and race related verbal abuse highlighted that these crimes were not
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run-of-the-mill. These were crimes committed by individuals who showed no remorse for their 
actions. According to them, after all, the victims deserved it and were treated as they should have 
been....The columnist Janet Albrechtsen appropriately and accurately classified these crimes and the 
value set that lay behind them as being a consequence of values diversity. She accurately highlighted 
the problems we see appearing in Australia because of this value diversity. Predictably, the politically 
correct pilloried her for daring to raise the issue. I expect certain elements to respond to this debate in 
a similar way. The current Leader of the Opposition, the member for Werriwa, used this chamber to 
publicly assail her, describing her in the most repugnant way—especially given the subject matter— 
as a ‘skanky ho’. The Labor Party and the political left may wish to see a world through the eyes of 
moral and cultural relativism. The promotion of values in which, for example, women are second- 
class citizens, Jews are morally corrupt or Western democracies are to be attacked and slain is 
offensive to the Australian character, to our heritage and, of course, to all Australians.
Recent comments by Australia’s leading Muslim cleric, Sheikh Hilali, that the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 were God’s work, intimations that he supported suicide bombers and support for a 
jihad against the West are all offensive. These comments, although disputed by the mufti as being 
translation errors, demonstrate a clear disdain for the pluralism from which Australia has grown and 
to which so many immigrants have contributed. Recent comments by the Australian Federation of 
Islamic Councils indicate recognition of the damage done to Australia’s social fabric by such 
disgusting remarks. Of primary concern to me and to many of my constituents, however, is the 
knowledge that such views are at best often excused as being a cultural difference or at worst actively 
promoted and supported as some kind of ridiculous testament to our cultural maturity.
This nation is founded on cultural diversity and value uniformity. Australians, whatever their origin, 
recognise the strength of this bedrock and join together to assert this principle. It is a principle that 
should require of immigrants a demonstrated commitment. Our immigration policy favours those 
with English language skills—those who are seeking assimilation into Australia, witnessed not 
through their dress, their food or their god but through their values. The politically correct may have 
ensured that the term ‘assimilation’ has become a profanity. However, it is not enough for 
immigrants to simply alter their geography. It is our values that must be adopted, not only our 
freedoms. Immigration policy should require a commitment to a pluralistic Australia—an adherence 
to a ‘fair go’. Failure to demonstrate this commitment should result in expulsion....The political left 
may, predictably, level the charge that I am the ghost of Enoch Powell. They are wrong. Enoch 
Powell was a racist. I revel in my family’s history. I celebrate our nation’s history and the great 
contribution virtually all immigrants have made and continue to make to Australia. I reject Powell’s 
vision of nationhood. I do, however, find wisdom in one statement. Powell once argued that the 
nation is lived largely in the mind. This is the commitment that is sought. Australians are generous of 
spirit. We do not mind what your background is as long as you accept ours. Our nation should live in 
each of our minds through our commitment to gamering strength through cultural diversity, through 
testifying to our unity with the belief that all are equal and the belief in equality of opportunity and 
through being willing to give a hand-up. We are our own nation. Our cultural identity flows from our 
multicultural base; but let there be no mistake: it is not defined purely by it.
Ciobo does not use the word Muslim when describing the ‘crime-wave’ of ‘pack-rapes’ 
in Sydney, or hatred for women, Jews and the West, a set of ‘values’ often attributed 
singularly to Muslims in a post-9/11 environment. While Ciobo’s main argument seems 
to be that multiculturalism embraced through cuisine is commendable, he sees the 
embrace of alternative cuisine as the limit of cultural exchange. He explains that 
Australia has come to embrace plurality and this is reflected in the embrace of ‘cultural 
enclaves’, such ‘Chinatown and Lygon Street’, and exemplified through the embrace of
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ethnic foods, including Middle-Eastern cuisine, ‘as alternatives to barbecued snags or 
meat pies’.
Ciobo also, alarmingly, posits that ‘(t)he consequence of this hijacking’ is the creation 
of the ‘social divide’ that is eroding Australia’s commitment to cultural diversity. He 
unmistakably uses the objectionable words of a single Sheik in Australia, Sheik Hilali 
(Al-Hilaly), to lend weight to his argument that the comments made by the Sheik can be 
held up to demonstrate the excesses of multiculturalism in Australia, because the Sheik 
can be excused on the grounds o f ‘cultural difference’.
Finally, in the context of a political environment that targets immigrants unwilling to 
integrate (once again Muslims), Ciobo refers to ‘uniformity of values’ multiple times 
during his speech and, in the end, states that ‘Our’ immigration policy favours those 
with English skills and those that want to assimilate in Australia by adopting ‘our’ 
Australian values. Those that do not conform should be treated with ‘expulsion’. This is 
a fairly standard speech in anti-immigrant circles. It fits the profile analysed by Wodak 
and van Dijk (2000) in their studies on racism in European parliaments. Mr Ciobo’s 
speech contains the hallmarks of positive self-representation through the denial of the 
potential charge of racism, while he presents a negative representation of migrants.
‘Good Muslim Community’ and Productive Diversity
Much of the discourses on Islam and Muslims in the Australian House of 
Representatives focused on negative or problematic talk about Muslims and Islam. 
However, as might be expected, there are also ‘positive’ stories about Muslims and 
Islam that stem from the direct experience Members have with Muslims from within 
‘Islamic communities’ in Australia. A number of MPs felt it was necessary to remind 
their audience that not ‘all Muslims are terrorists’ and that, despite terrorism, there are 
many ‘good Muslims’ in Australia. The stories about the ‘good Muslim’ seem to be 
spurred by verbal and physical attacks on Muslims around significant terrorist events 
such as 9/11, Bali bombings etc. Most, but not all, stories about good Muslims in 
Australia stem from the personal experience with members of ‘Muslim communities’ 
and focus on fetes, charity drives and successful people ‘who happen to be Muslim’, for 
example Hazem El Masri, the Canterbury winger, ‘who is, of course, of Lebanese 
descent. What an amazing young man he is. Not only is he a brilliant footballer but he is 
a respected member of his community and a wonderful ambassador for people of the
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Muslim faith in Australia in particular’ (Leo McLeay Watson, NSW ALP McMullan, 
Hansard 10 December 2002).
This discourse about ‘good’ examples of Muslims must be set within the wider context 
of many more exchanges about bad or evil Muslims. So, while these discourses 
seemingly present a counter-discourse to the ‘All Muslims are terrorists’ rhetoric after 
9/11, Mamdani (2005:102) warns that ‘Whether it is the search for the “good Jew,” the 
“good black,” or the “good African” -  or indeed “the noble savage” -  history teaches us 
that any search that claims to divide a people between “good” and “bad”, “moderate” 
and “extremist”, must ring a warning bell’. Further, Allen (2010:168) posits that 
‘Islamophilia’ is as harmful, reductionist and essentialising as any Islamophobia. The 
same symbols, attributes and appellations are used to describe ‘good’, ‘mainstream’ and 
‘moderate’ Muslims as are used to describe ‘bad’, ‘evil’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims. 
Further, as Hall (1997:272-274) aptly explained, countering negative representation 
with positive representation does not actually deal with the inherent binaries that have 
been created. Therefore, as Allen (2010) suggests, positive representation does not 
undermine the ideological content being disseminated.
The positive contributions Muslims make in Australia were largely discussed in a 
generalizing fashion. For example, ‘Muslim communities’ were referred to as being 
under attack, or as responding to an attack. If individuals were named, they were mostly 
‘Muslim community leaders’, Imams or Sheiks, or ‘ambassadors’ of the Muslim 
community or disembodied Muslims. An example here is Ross Cameron’s (Parramatta, 
NSW LP) (Hansard, 26 Sept, 2001) desire to ‘acknowledge the outstanding 
contribution, in my electorate of Parramatta, of Muslim Australian citizens who are 
making an extraordinary contribution in the professions, in medical science, in research 
and in education’. Similarly, Gavan O’Connor (Corio Vic ALP) (Hansard, 17 
September, 2001) explained, ‘In Geelong we are very fortunate indeed to have many 
races and all the great religions represented in our community. I join with all of them, 
including the peace loving Muslim community in Geelong, in extending to the people of 
the United States of America our profound sorrow at your loss...’.
These kinds of generalisations exemplify the polarizing and dehumanising aspects of 
the ‘good Muslim/bad Muslim’ rhetoric. Mamdani (2002:767) explains:
Certainly, we are now told to distinguish between good Muslims and bad Muslims. Mind you, not
between good and bad persons, nor between criminals and civic citizens, who both happen to be
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Muslims, but between good Muslims and bad Muslims. We are told that there is a fault line running 
through Islam, a line that separates moderate Islam, called “genuine” Islam, from extremist political 
Islam.
Another predominant element in the talk about the good Muslims is a focus on charity 
or charitable events as key to the Muslim communities’ show of solidarity. References 
to organizations like Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria (Maria 
Vamvakinou, Calwell Vic ALP) (Hansard, 13 February, 2002) and the Islamic 
Women’s Association (Emerson Rankin, QLD ALP) (Hansard, 22 March, 2004), as 
evidence of good work undertaken by various organization in charitable endeavours, 
was not uncommon. However, a direct link between charitable work and belonging in 
Australia was made by some MPs. For example, Gary Hardgrave (Moreton, Minister for 
Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs QLD LP) (Hansard, 11 February, 2003) goes to 
great lengths to present Iraqi, Muslim and Middle-Eastern people in Australia in a 
positive light, suggesting that the ‘Muslim community’ has demonstrated a concern for 
people who have been hurt by bushfires here in Canberra and, as a result of their 
charitable contribution, they have demonstrated that they are a part of Australia:
I have known the Muslim community to demonstrate a concern for people who have been hurt by 
bushfires here in Canberra. And indeed they have demonstrated a concern about other atrocities in 
other places. That the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils was able to generate some $22,000 
to help the Bali victims and present that cheque last year, proves again that they are very much a part 
of this country and deserve our support, particularly at this critical time.
In this excerpt, Hardgrave engages in fragmentation when he points to the seemingly 
exceptional act of the ‘Muslim community’. He differentiates between these ‘good 
Muslims’ and the not-so-good Muslims; a discourse that Allen (2010) suggests 
perpetuates the dissemination of negative meaning about Islam and Muslims.
In another example, Hardgrave (Hansard, 9 February, 2005) draws attention to the 
‘diversity dividend’ and how people can come to belong in Australia through their 
charitable donations:
Many of the local Islamic community have come from places like South Africa and Zimbabwe. They 
are professional people who have brought enormous skills; 96 per cent of the Muslims who have 
come from South Africa and Zimbabwe to Queensland have come as business migrants. They have 
brought investment opportunities and skills...In the last few weeks they have been involved in the 
business of raising enormous amounts of money for the tsunami appeal. I was pleased to attend a 
function which, with other efforts raising funds from local mosques, pulled together some $200.000. 
Last weekend we saw children on a walkathon. It was kids for kids, raising funds under the 
organisational auspices of Crescents of Brisbane, getting kids to understand that they can make a 
difference. These are great examples of a local community digging deep and doing good things. It is
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also a good testimony of a community, particularly the Islamic community, that has had a difficult 
time in recent years. It has affected me as a person. It has affected my conduct as a member of 
parliament. I am very, very proud to know these people...We also have many people who are new to 
Australia and have come from the Horn of Africa— from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia. An enormous 
number of people have come from Sudan. We know that they are there because the Courier Mail 
discovered that in the last seven days. I have talked proudly about these people wherever I have gone 
around the country and will continue to do so. They are people who understand what it is like to have 
nothing. When they come to a country like Australia— where freedom is a given and where liberty, 
the right to do everything that is permitted by law, is something they have never known before they 
have come to this place— it really reminds us about exactly who we are and where we come from.
In this extract, Hardgrave presents the ‘Islamic community’ as unified even as he 
stresses their different national origins. Further, Hardgrave feels that it is necessary to 
point out that there are professional people with enormous skills, who are ‘business 
migrants’ and who have brought investment opportunities and skills with them to 
Australia. The ‘Islamic community’ also raises money for charity. This characterisation 
of the ‘Islamic community’, albeit a seemingly positive one, works to continually 
present Muslims in Australia as immigrants and obfuscates the reality that Muslims in 
Australia are diverse, with over 30% of Muslims born in Australia (ABS, 2007). More 
importantly however, this stress on ‘good’, economically beneficial and productive 
Muslims continues to communicate that the opposite, i.e. ‘bad’ Muslims, continue to 
exist and that the ‘Muslim community’ as a whole in Australia is ‘problematic’.
For example, in the aftermath of the arson attack on the Kiraby Mosque in Queensland, 
Hardgrave (Hansard, 24 September, 2001), thoughtfully points out that the mosque used 
to be a church, built in 1924, which ‘ has been used by the Islamic community in a very 
peaceful way for prayers five times a day and for weddings’. He also takes the 
opportunity ‘to praise the Islamic community in my electorate for their commonsense 
and their downright Australianness’ for the way they reacted to the arson attack. 
Similarly, Laurie Ferguson (Werriwa, NSW ALP) (Hansard, 10 November, 2005) 
explains that there are ‘almost 100,000 Victorians practicing the Muslim faith, 
originating from more than 60 countries, with diverse languages, cultural and ancestral 
backgrounds. I believe we need to do more to assure these people who look different 
from us that they have a place in our community and that they are welcome and safe in 
our homes, our parks, our schools and our shopping centres. We need to remember that 
not everyone who wears a Hijab is a terrorist or an extremist Muslim—just as not 
everyone who wears a cross is an extremist Christian. We need to remember that 
terrorists are in fact very rare in the Australian community’ (emphasis added).
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‘Positive’ stories about Muslims and Islam were conspicuously presented by MPs as a 
form of counter-discourse to anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments. However, this 
discourse about ‘good’ Muslims continues to present Muslims as intrinsically worthy of 
note. The essentialist and reductionist nature of Islamophilia (Allen, 2010:168) 
disseminates the same information about Islam and Muslims. These representations do 
not undermine the ideological content being disseminated, nor do they challenge the 
binaries created to describe ‘good’ Muslims and ‘bad’ Muslims. Moreover, the ‘good’ 
stories presented here continue to define Muslims as ‘immigrants’ and their worth is 
directly tied to whether or not they can be directly economically beneficial to Australia. 
The stress on the ‘economic’ credentials of Muslim migrants is connected to the wider 
ideas about the ‘economic dividend’ derived from diversity discussed in Chapter 5.
Muslim Community in Australia
Positive references to Muslims and Islam in Australia were made to showcase ‘good 
Muslims’, to ‘defend’ Muslims and to possibly act as a counter-discourse to the idea 
that ‘all Muslims are terrorists’. However, much of the talk in defending Muslims still 
characterised Muslims as being different to other Australians, belonging to ‘Muslim 
communities’ and headed by ‘Muslim leaders’. Consequently, Muslims are often 
referred to as a collective and should therefore be collectively celebrated or punished. 
For example, Islamic communities are viewed as being at the forefront of the war on 
terror and that Islamic leaders should do more to quell the terrorist tendencies of their 
followers. Danby (Hansard, 29 November, 2005) stated:
The enemy in this war adopts the rhetoric of Islam but is in fact quite alien to the traditions of Islam, 
particularly to the traditions of Islam in our region and particularly in Indonesia. It has been good to 
see several prominent Australian imams over the last few months condemning these 
terrorists....Whatever we call this ideology, I think the term I prefer is ‘jihadism’. We know what it 
looks like and we know what it is capable of. It has claimed the lives of nearly 100 Australians in 
New York, Bali, London and Jerusalem. That it has not so far claimed Australian lives on our own 
soil is a combination of good luck and good intelligence work by ASIO and the AFP. We should 
understand, however, that attacking Australian and other Western targets is incidental to the real 
objectives of the people who mastermind and fund these attacks. Their objectives are not religious, 
and Islam should not be blamed; their objectives are political. Their objectives are to overthrow the 
governments of all Muslim countries.... It is very sad that a small number of Australian Muslims 
have fallen victim to this delusion. This is a serious issue for the Australian Muslim community, and 
we have seen good statements from leading imams recently suggesting that the leadership of the 
community is taking this issue seriously. I am always careful in speeches I make on this topic, and I 
think all members should be, to distinguish Islam from the extremists who misuse it for political 
ends. I reject the view that all Australian Muslims are potential terrorists. I agree that we should 
prevent the victimisation of Australian Muslims. That is why I support the stand taken by the Leader 
of the Opposition that this legislation should be accompanied by legislation protecting religious
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minorities in Australia against vilification, incitement and abuse...The fact remains, however, that a 
small number of Australians have been taken in by the purveyors of this evil ideology and that some 
of them have become active sympathisers with this jihadist death cult that has killed 100 Australians. 
A few have trained abroad with terrorist-affiliated groups. This is an urgent problem, as I have said, 
for the Australian Muslim community to confront. I think a majority of Australian Muslim leaders 
know that. Those imams—let me stress, the very few imams—who have incited young Australian 
Muslims to sign up with those groups bear a heavy responsibility for what has now happened to some 
of them...
Danby suggests that Islam in the region, especially in Indonesia, is not as extreme as 
Islam in the Middle-East. However, he blames Muslims for the deaths of many in the 
cities he mentions. However, Danby states that political Islam is the problem and so he 
wants to call it ‘Jihadism’ (metonym for Islam), to differentiate it from the other kinds 
of Islam. However, in whatever ways Danby describes Islam, he continues to refer to it, 
therefore perpetuating the negative meanings associated with Islam and Muslims. 
Further, Danby sees Islamic terrorism as a problem for the whole Muslim community in 
Australia, for which Imams should take responsibility. Similarly, both Hardgrave and 
Hatton argue that the identification of terrorists (i.e. criminals) is a responsibility of 
‘Islamic communities’ and their ‘leaders’. Hardgrave (Hansard, 11 October, 2003) 
explained that ‘We need Muslims in Australia to take charge of their religion and the 
public relations associated with their religion at this time. We need Muslims in 
Australia to stand ready as an example to the evil in other places that their actions are 
not going to change the way in which we are bringing people of all backgrounds and 
beliefs together for the business and best benefit of Australia as a nation’.
Similarly, John Hatton (Hansard, 6 December 2004), when discussing the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2004, differentiated between 
‘normal Australians of the Muslim faith’ and the ‘problematic’ ones:
I heard a journalist make an argument recently that was quite strong and very sound. My electorate of 
Blaxland—the Attorney would know a number of the people I am alluding to—has a very high 
proportion of people who come from overseas. We also have a relatively high proportion of people 
from the Middle East, with a good part of the population being of the Muslim faith. There are major 
mosques within my seat and next door in the seat of Watson. It is with those normal Australians of 
Muslim faith that part of our safety and security lies. The argument I heard put—a very sound one, I 
think—was that it is that part of the population that is most acutely aware of the problems concerning 
fundamentalists who would turn their religious faith upside down. They attempt to use a very strange 
and weird interpretation of the faith as a weapon and turn it against the people of Muslim faith in 
Australian society, and those who are around them...The point the journalist made is quite right: it is 
people in those most endangered communities, that might harbour terrorists with links to Jemaah 
Islamiah or al-Qaeda, who are going to give people up to the authorities. They have done it already, 
and they will continue to do it, because they do not want their lives and the lives of their children 
destroyed. If those communities harbour people who would do us harm—we have already seen
237
examples of that—then they will be part of our first line of defence. That is the key element that 
people misunderstand—the importance of people of the Muslim faith in our communities to the fight 
against terrorism. They are not a repository for terrorists. Terrorists might attempt to hide amongst 
them, but quite clearly it is in their interests and ours that they readily and quickly identify those 
people so that they cannot do us the main harm that they wish to do.
Hatton rationalises his argument by stating that it was a journalist who made these 
remarks. He links immigration, the Middle-East and mosques in his speech about 
terrorism and counter terrorism. He differentiates between ‘normal Australians of 
Muslim faith’ and terrorists, who are hiding amongst Muslims and whom normal 
Muslims can identify. It would seem that they have ability to pinpoint the terrorists 
because of their shared religion. Similarly, Daryl Melham (Banks NSW, ALP) 
(Hansard, 29 November, 2005), when discussing the Anti-terrorism Bill (No.2), accuses 
the Government of alienating the ‘Islamic community’ and not allowing them to be ‘our 
eyes and ears’:
The problem is that the government have alienated the Islamic community. They have turned the 
whole Islamic community against them instead of allowing them—if it were done properly—to be 
our eyes and ears within their community, looking out for those people who are breaking the law. 
The whole community has been smeared or feels smeared because of some of these laws. That is not 
appropriate. I addressed a function at the request of my colleague the member for Reid. Ordinary, 
decent, law-abiding Muslims were frightened that they might somehow be raided, arrested or charged 
just by going about their business. That is a bit of a problem.
On a number of occasions Danby (Melbourne Ports, Vic ALP) voiced negative views 
about Islam and Muslims in Australia (as other sections in this chapter indicate). In the 
context of terrorism and terrorism funding in particular, Danby (Hansard, 7 October, 
2003) has questioned the criminality of Islamic charities and their links to Australia and, 
on 29 March 2004, he questioned the Attorney-General in regard to Sheik Hilaly’s 
connections to the ‘military wing of Hezbollah’. Further, on August 4th, 2004, Danby, 
in his speech on the Opposition’s position on the Anti-terrorism Bill (No. 3) 2004, 
Danby detailed his concerns about terrorism in Australia and his views on alleged 
terrorists, such as David Hicks, Mamdouh Habib, Jack Roche and others suspected of 
terrorist activities who he characterised as ‘immigrants to Australia from Islamic 
countries’. He further voiced his concerns about terrorism and Sheik Hilaly’s views on 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Al-Hilaly). He stated:
It is obvious that all these people are ‘Islamists’ (the terrorists). I use that word very carefully. These 
are people who misuse a great monotheistic religion for political purposes. This is no criticism of the 
great religion of Islam. With the exceptions of Roche and Hicks, they are immigrants to Australia 
from Islamic countries. We are frequently told that we must not scapegoat the Arab and Islamic
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communities in Australia by associating them with terrorism in an indiscriminate way. This is of 
course true, and in my view neither I nor anyone else on this side of the House has been guilty of 
doing so and, to the best of my knowledge, I have not observed people on the government side doing 
so to date. We should all be very careful to distinguish between Islamists—people who misuse Islam 
for political purposes and for their fanatical ends—and the vast majority of Muslims, including 
Australian Muslims. The great majority of Australians who have migrated here from Islamic 
countries are peaceful and law-abiding people who have no desire but to live in peace, practise their 
religion and enjoy the same rights and freedoms as other Australians....I have to say, however, that 
certain statements have tended to foster suspicions in the minds of non-Muslim Australians, giving 
ammunition to ignorant people who wish to scapegoat Australian Muslims. Those statements are the 
ones made by one particular self-appointed leader of the Australian Islamic community, and he is 
Sheikh Taj el-Din A1 Hilaly, the Imam of the Lakemba Mosque in Sydney. He has a long record of 
statements which appear to be bigoted and condone terrorism. In February this year, Sheikh Hilaly 
gave a sermon at a mosque in Sidon, Lebanon, in which, according to a translation supplied by the 
Australian Embassy in Beirut—the Australian Embassy, not some other organisation—he said:
Sons of Islam, there is a war of infidels taking place everywhere. The true man is the boy who 
opposes Israeli tanks with strength and faith. The boy who, despite his mother’s objections, goes out 
to war to become a martyr like his elder brother. The boy who tells his mother: ‘Oh mother, don’t cry 
for me if I die. Oh mother, Jihad has been imposed on me and I want to become a martyr.’
In that statement Sheikh Hilaly is praising organisations like al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah, which 
promote and carry out suicide bombings in Iraq, Israel and recently Turkey. They send out teenagers 
and children of other people, not their own children, to blow themselves up with explosives, and in 
doing so they kill large numbers of innocent civilians. If young Australian Muslims like the deluded 
young man Zak Mallah hear their religious leaders speaking in these terms, is it surprising that a few 
of them may be sufficiently influenced to want to go down the same path as suicide bombers in other 
parts of the world? We do not want this kind of incitement here in Australia... So here we have a 
man who should be much more responsible. He puts himself forward as a spiritual leader in 
Australia’s largest city, at the head of a fast growing community of Australians—a community which 
runs schools in which young Australians are educated—and he thinks that the terrorist massacre of 
September 11 was God’s work against oppressors. I think it was a political act by a deluded group of 
fanatics, and I do not think that any spiritual leader of any denomination should apologise for or 
incite on behalf of these people. I would like Sheikh Hilaly to explain these inflammatory remarks to 
the families of the Bangladeshi Muslim kitchen workers who were killed in the World Trade Centre 
on September 11...I contrast Sheikh Hilaly’s words with the conciliatory words of many Muslim 
leaders in Australia, including Yasser Soliman of the Islamic Council of Victoria, Sheikh Fehmi of 
the Preston mosque and other people in the Muslim community in Australia who take a much more 
responsible stand. They do not want to be stereotyped or scapegoated as sympathisers with terrorism, 
but they have a dilemma and, with great respect, I point out to them that, if the words and actions of 
Sheikh Hilaly continue, they tend to embarrass their entire community. I have noticed that when 
Sheikh Hilaly has been interviewed by Four Corners or other programs he speaks much more 
moderately, but you cannot say one thing overseas and another thing in Australia about these matters. 
They are too serious, and we hold you to account in this country for words that you say overseas.
In the excerpt above, Danby makes a distinction between ‘Islamists’ and Islam, but, 
while acknowledging that he should not be ‘scapegoating’ the Arab and Islamic 
communities in Australia, he still draws the connection by calling them all ‘Islamists’. 
In his use of the metonyms of Islam, in this case ‘Islamists’, Danby clearly associates 
Islam and Muslims with terrorism. Further, he differentiates (through the process of
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fragmentation) between ‘Islamists’ and the ‘vast majority of Australians’, between ‘bad’ 
Imams and ‘good’ Imams and between ‘peaceful and law-abiding’ migrants and Islamic 
migrants who are terrorists. He further states that, although Muslims do not want to be 
stereotyped or scapegoated, they have a dilemma with Sheikh Hilaly, as his words ‘tend 
to embarrass their entire community’. Further, he connects Zak Mallah (charged with 
terrorism but acquitted) with preaching of Imams in Australia, as well as making a 
connection between Sheik Hilaly and the Muslim community in Australia, which he 
notes: ‘runs schools in which young Australians are educated’.
In this way, Danby unifies all Muslims in Australia as ‘problematic’ and engages in 
‘expurgating the Other’, the process through which, as Allen (2010:182) describes, an 
enemy is constructed which is portrayed as harmful or evil and which members are 
called on to expurgate. Generally, Islam as a whole, but more specifically as 
manifestation in the person of Osama bin Laden, has been treated as the enemy that 
needs expurgation. However, in this case, Sheik al Hilaly is defined as a harmful enemy 
who requires expurgation. Although the connections to terrorism that Danby makes are 
not always overt, he manages to ‘rationalise’ his argument by connecting terrorist 
activities to the Islamic community in Australia, through a series of sometimes 
incoherent connections, such as when he connects Sheik Hilaly as the spiritual leader 
‘in Australia’s largest city, at the head of a fast growing community of Australians—a 
community which runs schools in which young Australians are educated’. This 
connection between terrorism, Sheik Hilaly’s comments and the influence this has on 
young Australians in Islamic schools is also echoed in the views voiced by Dick Adams 
(Lyons, TAS, ALP).
In March 2004 (Hansard, 3 March, 2004), Adams spoke about young men in Australia 
who have Tost their way’ through the education system and the ‘ethnic problems we 
have in our cities.’ He finally links this to problems with Centrelink. The connections 
are unclear. However his mention of the youth in Australia being susceptible to 
brainwashing is within the wider context of Australia’s youth being brainwashed by 
Islamic clerics:
They have lost their way through the education system and now have nothing to fall back on. I watch 
our teenagers and compare them with teenagers and young men in other countries. There are striking 
similarities—and I talk of suicide bombers in the Middle East and the ethnic problems we have in our 
cities. They are young, energetic men who have little hope, who are totally disaffected by the current 
world and who are ripe for brainwashing by whatever cult happens along at the time. We have had 
the Eastern and Western religious cults, and now we have the Middle East varieties tied up with the
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Muslim fundamentalists. These cults come and go, but they run their course. They take with them the 
flower of our youth— in particular, teenage boys. We cannot as a nation afford to have that 
happen....This means our society is failing them. It means that there are few programs in place to 
help young people make the transition from school to work. Having a home and a training course is 
becoming only a dream for many of our young people. Centrelink is making so many errors that 
young people are being breached for problems beyond their control.
Discourses about the Muslim community continue to set this putative community apart 
from other Australians. Muslims are viewed as belonging to ‘Muslim communities’, 
headed by ‘Muslim leaders’. Further, Islamic communities are viewed as being at the 
forefront of the war on terror, while Islamic leaders should do more to quell the terrorist 
tendencies of their followers. The idea that there is an identifiable ‘Islamic Community’ 
in Australia and that this community can be identified through its leaders is largely the 
result of the creation of ethnic community leaders as part of the various multicultural 
policies implemented by various Australian governments (Tabar et al, 2003; see 
Chapter 5). These discourses about the Muslim Community in Australia automatically 
‘unify’ Muslim individuals into a single collective identity which can be celebrated or 
reprimanded as the political context dictates.
Muslims as Immigrants
The discourses about the ‘good Muslim’ cannot be divorced from the wider discourse 
on terrorism and Islam and the desire to differentiate between ‘moderates’ and 
‘fundamentalists’; those who are closer to ‘us’ and not a part of ‘them’. What 
constitutes ‘us’ however, depends, in this context, largely on who is speaking, as the 
suspicion of Muslims as potential ‘terrorists’ lurks within the characterization of 
Muslims used in their ‘defence’. Sometimes, the word ‘Australian’ is used in the 
discussion about Muslims and Islamic communities in Australia, but more often 
Muslims and Islam are talked about in the context of the ‘Other’.
Muslims and Islam were spoken about in reference to immigration and their 
immigration status. For example, in the aftermath of the London bombings (7 July, 
2005), Prime Minister John Howard (Bennelong, NSW, LP) (Hansard 9 August 2005), 
felt it was necessary to point out the immigrant nature of the boys’ parents. He said:
This is not the time to have a lengthy debate on the issues of terrorism, except to remark that those 
who stand accused of this crime were British-born citizens. They were the children of immigrant 
parents. As the Australian newspaper so poignantly put it in an analysis of the experience of Sam 
Ly—  whose parents were Vietnamese immigrants to Australia— one young man, the child of 
immigrants in a new country, took a particular path, a positive path, which tragically ended in his 
death; others took a different path which ended in these destructive deeds. It does raise questions
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indeed about the argument that terrorism is in some way a product of social exclusion and loneliness 
in a new country.
Malcolm Turnbull (Wentworth NSW, LP) (Hansard 28 November, 2005) also felt it 
was necessary to speak about the immigrants and integration in the context of the 
London bombings:
All of us have been horrified by the way in which young men and women bom in the West have been 
brought into this terrorist campaign. One of the London bombers was a 20-year-old, cricket-loving 
son of a small businessman. How many of us would have fitted that description when we were 20? 
Yet he decided, or was persuaded, that his mission was to destroy his own life and that of many 
others....It has already become obvious that there have been efforts to radicalise members of the 
second generation of Muslims living in Europe. Too many of the children of immigrants from North 
Africa and the Middle East, far from integrating with the host society—and seeing themselves as 
French, British or German—are being urged to adopt a pan-Islarnic identity as a substitute for the 
national identity of the countries of which they are citizens....The identities of all of us are made up 
of different elements—nationality, religion, cultural background and locality, to name just a few— 
but a cohesive and secure society cannot afford to allow those trying to subvert it to develop within 
that society a hostile minority which not only rejects any common identity with other citizens, but is 
so despising of the host society, our society, that it seeks to destroy it. There are people in our midst 
who promote hatred and who glorify terrorism and violence—both within and without our borders. 
Our greatest challenge is to stop these inciters of hatred from misguiding the young minds they seek 
to pervert to violence. And to do that we need strong laws, good intelligence and efficient police 
work; but above all we need the co-operation and support of our fellow Australians of Muslim faith. 
We must not forget that a key objective of the terrorists is to stir up resentment against Muslims, so 
that as they feel more alienated from the wider Australian society they are more vulnerable to the 
terrorists’ propaganda...The only truly effective weapon against extreme totalitarian Islam is 
moderate Islam. Any Australians who respond to terrorism by demeaning or denouncing Muslims are 
reacting precisely in the way the terrorists intend them to. And that is why our defence against the 
terrorist threat must be conducted on many fronts. Swift action by police and intelligence agencies is 
vital and should be applauded, but so is the winning of hearts and minds. And in that regard, the 
leadership shown by the Prime Minister in engaging the Muslim community of Australia has been as 
important as his leadership in responding decisively to immediate threats of terrorist attack.
John Howard4s excerpt indicates that the ability to undertake acts of terrorism might be 
related to certain ethnicities/and or certain types of migrants. His differentiation 
between the victim and the perpetrators of the acts of terrorism, their only commonality 
being their immigrant background, communicates that there are ‘good immigrants’ and 
‘bad immigrants’, not just criminals and victims. Similarly, Turnbull’s assessment of 
the background of the bombers does not solely focus on the background of the bombers 
themselves, he unifies’ all ‘second generation Muslims living in Europe’, with a 
particular focus on ‘children of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East’, as 
potential terrorists, who refuse to integrate into ‘the host society, our society’. This 
delineation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ characterises ‘them’ specifically as Muslims, 
second generation immigrants, North African and Middle-Eastern dupes and/or
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terrorists. Further, Turnbull engages in ‘fragmentation’ when he claims that ‘The only 
truly effective weapon against extreme totalitarian Islam is moderate Islam’.
References to the immigrant characteristics of Muslims in Australia have been a 
common theme in the discourses analysed. The focus on Islam in Australia as an 
outcome of immigration obfuscates the fact that over thirty percent of Muslims in 
Australia are Australian-born (Dunn, 2005) and that, like other religions in Australia, 
Islam does not denote a particular ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ but is a religion that is observed 
by a variety of Australian citizens. The characterization of Muslims as immigrants or 
the children of immigrants continues to place them outside of what it means to be 
Australian. There is a remarkable tendency in this characterisation to set immigrants 
apart from the rest of Australia and to attribute immigrants with negative characteristics 
such as being ‘Muslim’. This positioning of immigrants and Islam in Australia means 
that Muslims in Australia are viewed as having more in common with refugees and 
asylum seekers than they do with other Australians.
‘Dying Race’
The ‘racialisation’ of Muslims in the parliamentary debate analysed was most evident in 
the ways that one particular parliamentarian described Muslim as ‘people who do not 
look like us’ (Laurie Ferguson, Werriwa, NSW ALP) (Hansard, 10 November, 2005). 
However, the racialisation of Muslims in the discourse was broader than the mere 
suggestion that Muslims were physically different to Australians. Poynting et al 
(2004:14) define ‘racialisation’ ‘as the ways in which complex social phenomena are 
refracted through and become explained primarily in terms of ethnic and racial 
categories of social perception’. Certainly, most references to Islam and Muslims in 
Australia were conveyed using ‘racialised’ understandings of Islam and Muslims. In 
another clear case of ‘racialisation’, Katter (Kennedy, Qld Ind.) explains that 
immigrants from the Middle-East have the potential to breed ‘Australians’ out of 
existence. In 2003, Katter (Hansard, 10 February, 2003) spoke to Parliament about 
Australia’s low birth-rates and communicated his fear that ‘we are officially a dying 
race’. He then explains that we ‘are watching the death of the West’ and that 
immigration policy in Australia will lead to Australia being populated by a different 
‘race’. He said:
That brings me to the issue of having children in our society. One of the hallmarks of current
Australian society is that we have one of the lowest birthrates in the world. In fact, this nation is no
longer replacing itself—we are officially a dying race. This problem has very serious ramifications in
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other parts of the world. For those who like reading books, Patrick J. Buchanan’s The Death of the 
West is a very interesting treatise. He says that by the year 2015—I do not know when his book was 
printed Western Europe will require 20 million people to come in to man the current economic and 
industrial operations in those countries. For Europe to be able to continue the way it is, it would have 
to get 20 million people in from other countries. There would simply not be the Europeans there, 
because the Europeans are not having children. The last time I looked, Russia had the lowest birthrate 
on earth, so people would most certainly not come from there. The only countries from which those 
people could come would be the Middle Eastern countries and the North African countries, who are 
very different culturally and in every other way to the people of Europe. Buchanan named his book 
The Death of the West, and if you saw that population demographic analysis you would see his 
premise is most certainly correct: you are watching the death of the West... Let me move on. If in fact 
this country decides that it will launch a big immigration policy, there will be people coming to 
Australia, but they will naturally be a different people from those who are here today that we know as 
Australians. You will have an Australia, but it will not be the race of people that are here today. ...
Katter characterises Australians as a particular race that is dying. He justifies his 
argument by citing, Patrick J. Buchanan’s The Death of the West, which rationalises his 
argument that Australians too, like their counterparts in the West, are a ‘dying race’. 
Katter ignores Australia’s diversity, instead characterising it as predominantly White 
and Anglo-Celtic, presumably the ‘race’ he is referring to in his speech. Further, Katter 
differentiates between ‘Europeans’ and people from the Middle-East and North Africa 
who are ‘very different culturally and in every other way to the people of Europe’. He 
unifies ‘Middle-East and North Africa’ as homogenous entities that are incapable of 
sharing any similarities with an homogenous Europe. This characterisation is a variant 
of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis that so many MPs have used in their characterisation 
of Islam and Muslims.
Conclusion
The dissemination of negative meaning about Islam and Muslims (Islamophobia) is 
evident in the analysis of parliamentary discourse undertaken for this study. While 
undoubtedly there were some seemingly ‘positive’ evaluations of Islam and Muslims, 
the majority of the discourse in the years under review was predominantly and 
consistently negative. Following Allen (2010), even the ‘positive’ characterisations of 
Muslims and Islam disseminated negative evaluations about Islam and Muslims given 
the characterisations continue to stress the nature of the ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’ problem 
that requires a solution.
A key point to emerge from the analysis was the idea that Islam is a foreign religion that 
does not readily find resonance in Australia, outside of the relatively small community
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of Muslims within the country, who are repeatedly referred to in terms of their 
immigrant identities. This finding is in line with findings from the analysis of the 
discourse on Muslims and Islam in the media and surveys conducted within the general 
population in Australia (see Poynting et al, 2004; Aslan, 2009; Dunn et al, 2007). 
Further, while there were some MPs who noted the similarities between Islam and 
Christianity, the general depiction of Islam as breeding terrorists and Muslims as 
violent, intolerant and misogynistic further exacerbated the focus on Islam as a religion 
for ‘Others’ outside Australia, with very limited relevance to religious practice for 
Australian citizens. ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ were viewed as totally alien (sometimes 
understood as an alien ‘nation’, ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and/or terrorist group depending on 
the speaker and context) and were understood as a threat to ‘our way of life’; a life that 
does not include Muslims.
Consequently, since the politicians themselves cannot know with any certainty the 
shape, nature and extent of Islam and Muslims in Australia, what they communicate, via 
their discourse on Islam and Muslims, is a picture of ‘us’, rather than a clear and 
consistent picture of ‘them’. This positioning of Muslims and Islam in Australia is 
predicated on a putative cultural and religious understanding of their incorporation 
within the space of ‘multicultural’ Australia and not as individuals or self-assigned 
groups capable of engaging politically within their environment to advance their 
needs/causes.
This chapter, however, went further than demonstrating the existence of Islamophobia. 
It demonstrated that Islamophobia does indeed utilise atavistic meanings, established 
ideas about the ‘Other’ and established prejudices and fears that are particular to the 
Australian context. Fear of the ‘Asian invasion’, negative evaluation of, and resentment 
for ‘cultural diversity’ and multiculturalism and anxiety about immigration and the 
dilution of the ‘Australian race’ continue to be preoccupations in the Australian ‘social 
consciousness’, even as these fears and preoccupations did not originate with the 
‘Muslim problem’. Islamophobia thus merely gave a new relevance and new context 
for the negative evaluation of the ‘Other’ that has been iteratively developed, resulting 
in a ‘sedimented effect’ (Dunn, 2005), through which ideas about the ‘Other’ in 
Australia continue to be framed.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
This dissertation posed the question: How have accumulated ideas/definitions of who 
can, and cannot, belong in Australia and the circumstances of their belonging come to 
permeate the discourse on Muslims and Islam in Australia? The present study 
approached the subject of belonging by exploring how ideas, concepts and policies of 
belonging for ‘Others’ in Australia impact specifically on views about belonging for 
Muslims in Australia. To answer this question, this dissertation was divided into two 
major sections.
The first section highlighted the relevant ‘social, political and historical contexts’ within 
which discursive practices about Islam and Muslims are situated in Australia. Since the 
social/cultural/political context is made up of various phenomena, so the social and 
historical contexts for this study were confined to the socio-historical phenomena that 
have, over time, come to define how and when ‘Others’ come to belong in Australia. 
Nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship were investigated in order to understand 
which state-led ‘projects of belonging’ have defined the ways in which ‘Others’ are 
thought to belong in Australia.
The investigation into the social historical context for this dissertation revealed that 
ideas about the ‘Other’ have undergone numerous iterations as each successive change 
in immigration policy brought about new policies for the acceptance, settlement and 
incorporation of immigrant ‘Others’ into the polity. The White Australia Policy, which 
was enacted out of fear of the ‘Other’ and which predicated belonging in Australia 
based on a ‘racial fit’, eventually came to be replaced with other policies, including 
various iterations o f ‘integration’, which both acknowledged ‘diversity’ as an inevitable 
aspect of Australia’s enlarged immigration program, and communicated a putative 
national culture which immigrants are expected to integrate into. Further, various 
multicultural policies were implemented by various Australian governments as a 
pragmatic response to the needs and demands of the growing ‘ethnic communities’ in 
Australia. This piecemeal approach to immigrant incorporation has proven to be 
successful in the Australian context, as none of the catastrophic fears about diversity 
eroding social cohesion, fears which formed the backbone of the White Australia 
Policy, ever eventuated (Jupp and Nieuwenhuysen, 2007). However, this has not meant 
that opposition to ‘multiculturalism’ was scarce or that fears about the erosion of social 
cohesion stemming from ‘diversity’ were subdued.
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Multiculturalism, since its formal inception in the 1970s, has attracted vehement 
opposition from political figures in Australia and none more so than John Howard. His 
personal ideas, and the ideas of other members of his Government, about immigrants 
and immigrant integration, were canvassed in various chapters of this dissertation so 
there is no need to recount them here; however his opposition to multiculturalism was 
influential in two key ways.
Firstly, although John Howard’s opposition to multiculturalism began long before the 
events of September 11, 2001, the various terrorist related events during the Howard 
years came to strengthen the idea that multiculturalism was bad for ‘social cohesion’ 
and therefore his opposition to multiculturalism was justified. The terrorist events also 
focused Howard’s anti-multiculturalism on Muslims and Islam, which allowed for a 
better articulation of what, precisely, was thought to be bad about multiculturalism and 
how a stress on ‘citizenship’ was better for social cohesion. Primarily, the argument has 
been that some immigrants, especially Muslims, were viewed as non-integrating and 
therefore negatively impacting on Australian national identity and social cohesion. It 
was believed that multiculturalism encouraged allegiance to entities other than Australia 
and this was a major concern for the safety and social cohesion of the country.
The second key way in which Howard’s opposition to multiculturalism was influential 
was in the way that his ideas highlighted key weaknesses in the broader 
philosophical/ideological and political ideas about the incorporation of the ‘Other’ into 
the Australian polity. Successive Australian governments have incontrovertibly changed 
the Australian demographic characteristics through their pursuit of an enlarged 
immigration program. This has meant that ‘ethnic’, ‘racial’ and religious diversity in 
Australia is a reality. However, the ways in which ‘diversity’ is thought to be 
incorporated into the national identity has meant that ‘ethnic’, ‘racial’, ‘cultural’ and 
religious diversity and differences continue to be viewed as peripheral to the ‘real 
Australia’ and as a potential threat to it. Therefore, fears associated with diversity, first 
formally articulated in the White Australia Policy, continued to inform ideas about the 
‘Other’ during the Howard years. These fears were not limited to, but include, the fear 
of an ‘Asian invasion’ through the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers on Australia’s 
shores; fear of a ‘racialised’ ‘Other’ that does not ‘fit’ in Australia and is therefore a 
threat to Australian national identity and values; fear o f ‘cultural relativism’ and the loss 
of a distinctly ‘Australian’ culture and ‘Australian way of life’, and fears about the 
erosion of social cohesion due to ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ diversity. These atavistic fears
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of the ‘Other’ were found to have been articulated in the wider political rhetoric 
canvassed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in this dissertation and in the debates on Muslims and 
Islam in the Australian House of Representatives in the years analysed.
The second major section of this dissertation focused on Islam and Muslims in 
Australia. This section demonstrated the link between the socio-historical context 
investigated in section one of the dissertation and the ways in which Muslims and Islam 
are discussed by Australian politicians. The discursive practices analysed in this study 
focused on debates about Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives 
in the years between 2000 and 2006. The intent was to highlight that discussions of 
Muslims in the Australian House of Representatives were not simply about the personal 
reactions of MPs to various ‘Muslim terrorist’ events, but, rather, related, in a 
systematic way, to the social and historical context of the ‘Other’ in Australia. Allen’s 
(2010) theory of Islamophobia as ideology was used to analyse the discourses within the 
House of Representatives.
Allen’s (2010) theory helped to highlight the shape and nature of anti-Muslim and anti- 
Islamic discourses in the data analysed. The theory was useful in its ability to transcend 
the limitations encountered by other analytical approaches to ‘Islamophobia’ which 
focused on what Allen (2010) has called the ‘products’ of Islamophobia. The prevalence 
of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments in Australia, since at least the events of 9/11, 
has been documented by a variety of scholars in the Australian, as well as the 
international, context. As such, it would not have been surprising, or particularly useful, 
to simply demonstrate that Australian politicians also engaged in anti-Muslim and anti- 
Islam discourses. Consequently, Allen’s (2010) theory of Islamophobia as ideology was 
fruitfully used to demonstrate the existence of Islamophobia as ideology in the 
discourses analysed, as well as the ways in which ‘atavistic’ ideas about the ‘Other’ 
shaped anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic discourses in an Australian context. Therefore, this 
dissertation demonstrated that Islamophobia as ideology is present in the discourses on 
Muslims and Islam in the Australian House of Representatives in that period and that 
this form o f ‘Islamophobia’ highlights two primary issues.
First, following Allen (2010), Islamophobia as ideology perpetuates negative meanings 
about Islam and Muslims. This means that Islam and Muslims in Australia are narrowly, 
and negatively, defined and fixed as a perpetual ‘outgroup’ in society. Islamophobia 
undoubtedly affects general societal views on the belonging of Muslims and Islam in
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Australia, as well as making it likely that discriminatory practices in society are 
informed by Islamophobic ideas. Allen (2010) also concluded that it is likely that 
legislation and policies that implicate Muslims such as anti-terror legislation also 
disseminates Islamophobic content, but further research is needed to substantiate this 
point.
The negative meaning disseminated about Islam and Muslims through Islamophobia 
means that it did not matter whether the discourses about Islam and Muslims in the 
Australian House of Representatives where negative or positive evaluations of Islam 
and Muslims, the same negative meanings continue to be communicated. This means 
that, even when well-meaning MPs tried to counteract negative stereotypes with 
positive ones, the end result was the same. Understanding the existence, shape and 
nature of Islamophobia is thus only the first step in understanding what is at stake in 
combating such an insidious ideology.
Second, Islamophobia in the Australian House of Representatives, during this period, 
mobilises atavistic ideas about the ‘Other’ and, in doing so, further ingrains fears and 
prejudices of the ‘Other’ already present in Australia (which were not initially created 
with Muslims and/or an Islamic foe in mind). Fears about the ‘Asian invasion’, the 
destruction of the ‘Australian race’ and the ‘Australian way of life’, through 
immigration and the excesses of cultural pluralism in Australia, were all used to 
communicate negative meaning about Islam and Muslims. These atavistic myths 
continue to have currency in the Australian social imagination because they have not 
been sufficiently dispelled in the philosophical/social and political visions of belonging 
for ‘Others’ in general.
Van Dijk (1993b) contends that the ideas which ‘elites’ disseminate about minorities 
and other vulnerable populations have significant power to influence societal 
conceptions. Indeed, negative ideas about Islam and Muslims and the justification for 
these negative ideas strengthens negative ideas about immigration, diversity and the 
putative lack of social cohesion (for the rest of Australia) generally. These negative 
ideas revitalise prejudices against the ‘Other’ that have supposedly been banished to 
Australia’s racist past and which do not apply in modem Australia. Highlighting the 
atavistic myths used in the promulgation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim discourses in 
Parliament indicate that ‘diversity’ and its implications are critically misunderstood by 
our country’s law makers. Therefore, the presence of Islamophobia as ideology in the
250
House of Representatives points to the very likely possibility that Islamophobic 
ideological content permeates policy initiatives generally, although as was suggested, 
further research needs to be undertaken to substantiate this.
Ultimately, this dissertation has argued that belonging for Muslims in Australia is 
problematised, not because there is anything inherently deviant or legitimately negative 
about all Muslims and Islam in general, but because the various definitions of 
belonging in Australia, outside a purely legal understanding of citizenship, 
unequivocally exclude Muslims and Islam from any substantial ‘we’ of the nation.
‘The Clash of Civilisations’ in Australia
One of the most powerful dualisms created in the last decade has been the one based on 
the comparison between the Western democratic ‘way of life’ and Islam and Muslims 
(Aly, 2007). While this dualism existed prior to the events of 9/11 (Said, 1997; 
Manning, 2006), the terrorist events marked a shift towards the popularising of this 
antagonism through the ‘War on Terror’ campaign, headed by the United States of 
America. Moreover, as the global media were used to promulgate Western ideological 
interests, it also featured as a key disseminator of a single ‘Islamist’ ideology intent on 
waging war on Western interests. The global media (Western and otherwise) has been 
one of the chief mechanisms through which this dualism came to be popularly known 
and understood as a matter of sociological (cultural) inevitability (see Manning, 2006 ), 
rather than as a contingent political construct.
The dualism is largely expressed as a totalising confrontation between the West and 
Islam, often referred to as a ‘clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1997). Each side is 
characterised by its ability to encompass vast geographical regions, diverse cultures, 
languages and political systems in order to justify its position. The ability to present a 
united front emerges from the practice of essentialising ‘the societies of the other and of 
themselves’ (Aly, 2007:xvii). Aly contends that the dualism is largely driven by 
egocentrism and the ability to dehumanise the other side (Aly, 2007:xvi-xvii), which is 
a characteristic of ideology.
Moreover, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis permeated the ways in which Australian 
politicians characterise the relationship between Australia and Islam. The ways in which 
MPs spoke about Islam and Muslims in the years analysed suggested that the dualism 
served as a convenient, if not vague, assessment of the place of Islam as a foreign entity
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within Australia. This assessment automatically characterised Islam as diametrically 
opposed to Australia and to Australian interests. As Allen (2010) theorised, and as 
became evident through analysis, MPs used varied references to infer meaning about 
Islam and Muslims and some of these references were to national origin (Iranian, Iraqi), 
geographical region ‘Middle East’, phenotypes (‘People who look different to us’) and 
references to unpalatable cultural traits (mistreatment of women, prone to violence), all 
characteristics that were deemed to be foreign to Australia.
Hence, while the use of the term ‘ethnic minority’ has been the norm in Australia since 
the diversification of immigration criteria, cemented through the introduction of official 
multicultural policy, ‘religious minorities’ are a recent addition to the political lexicon 
in Australia and Muslims are neither clearly classified as ethnic minorities, nor as 
religious minorities. As such, politicians have generally disregarded the fact that over 
30% of Australia’s Muslims were bom in Australia. Moreover, Muslims are not ‘ethnic 
minorities’ and do not neatly fit into the ‘multicultural framework’ set up in Australia in 
the 1970s. However, Muslims and Islam continue to be corralled into having racialised 
‘Islamic community’ leaders who speak on their behalf and whom politicians can access 
in order to identify and manage the ‘Muslim community’ in Australia. In fact, 
Australian MPs seem to come to know Islam and Muslims in Australia through the 
‘Islamic leadership’ and, for the most part, do not approve of Muslims and Islam in 
Australia because of these very same ‘leaders’.
Further, the discourse on Muslims and Islam in Parliament demonstrated that politicians 
acknowledge that Muslims in Australia are here because of the broadening of 
immigration criteria and that they are part of multicultural Australia, but that Muslims 
also uncomfortably tested the limits of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism and 
tested the ‘benefits of cultural diversity’. Because, multiculturalism and cultural 
diversity have been treated as a ‘management’ issue, and not a political issue, by various 
Australian Governments, the Minister of Immigration is able to proclaim that 
immigration and indigenous diversity have always been part of the Australian 
environment, therefore diversity ‘is an everyday part of Australia, not a challenge to it’ 
(Andrews, 2007). In this regard, Muslims in Australia are part of Australia’s 
immigration-driven demographic diversity, but not part of the ‘harmony’ that has 
putatively historically characterized Australian multiculturalism.
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The ‘Australian culture’ continues to be placed at the ‘centre’ of Australian identity, 
while minority ‘cultures’ are simultaneously made peripheral to it at the national level. 
These minority cultures continue to be viewed as outposts of other national identities 
and other ‘civilisations’. Moreover, the Australian culture is simultaneously made to be 
a central component of the integration of individual immigrants; hence, the injunction 
that immigrants (especially Muslims) must integrate into the Australian way of life and 
that there are ‘good’ immigrants, who have integrated, and ‘bad’ immigrants, who have 
not, and who do not, ‘belong’ in Australia. Within this model, Australian culture 
becomes more articulated when compared to other cultures and is broadly characterized 
in discourse to include all that is ‘good’ in ‘Western culture’, whereas other ‘cultures’ 
are held to be ‘static and knowable’, and largely vulnerable to negative evaluations, 
depending on political needs. Indeed, the superciliousness found within descriptions of 
Islam and Muslim in the discourse analysed for this research rendered Islam and 
Muslims knowable, largely through the prism of terrorism and/or the personal 
knowledge MPs had of Islam as a religion.
Political ideologies then, as is exemplified by Islamophobia as ideology, promulgated in 
a variety of ‘Western’ countries, including Australia, create exclusive categories of 
belonging that do not necessarily neatly coincide with geographical boundaries, and so 
attack and marginalise both ‘foreigners’ and their own citizens. This way ‘us’ and 
‘them’ have not been confined to ‘civilisational’ boundaries but have acted to further 
categorise and alienate citizens within the state.
Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Belonging in Australia
The various ways in which belonging for the ‘Other’ has been imagined and 
implemented through the various ‘projects of belonging’ in Australia has meant that a 
‘racialised’ understanding of national belonging continues to frame ideas about who can 
belong in Australia. This vision of national belonging is expressed in different ways at 
each step of the immigration process. The acceptance of immigrant at the ‘borders’, 
whether as economic migrants, asylum seekers or refugees, is premised on a continuing 
racialised idea o f ‘fit’ in Australia. This was most clearly articulated during the various 
Howard Governments (1996-2007) which characterised refugees and asylum seekers in 
ways that differentiated between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Further, the introduction of the 
citizenship test for new migrants which was heavily endorsed as ‘teaching migrants 
Australian values’ (ABC 2005c; DIAC 2007; Erebus International, 2006; Topsfield
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2006) before they became Australian citizens was a further articulation that only certain 
people were desired as immigrants to Australia.
Barriers to belonging, aimed at particular groups, and presently it is Muslims, are often 
embedded in understanding o f ‘self and ‘other’ that negates diversity and positions it as 
a characteristic of the ‘Other’, and hence deviant and threatening. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in 
this dissertation highlighted the ongoing definitions of the ‘Other’ found in the ‘projects 
of belonging’ for immigrants in Australia. The ‘White Australia Policy’, and the 
subsequent development of an understanding of Australian nationalism as produced and 
promulgated in response to immigration, still acts as a legacy in the ways ‘Others’ 
continue to be characterised in cultural, religious and ‘racialised’ ways in Australia.
Prior to the Howard Government’s overt representation of ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ immigrants, the separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was also articulated 
in the visions of ‘Multicultural Australia’ in various policies that categorised and 
organised ‘ethnic communities’ in ways that purported to be just and fair. The terms of 
engagement within ‘multicultural’ Australia are based on a cultural understanding of 
diversity and difference and not a political understanding of diversity and difference.
Cultural understanding of diversity and difference implies that cultural groups are 
knowable and discernible by the rest of society and that perceived and/or real cultural 
antagonisms are not politically based, but are sociological and hence irreducible 
(Modood, 2007). Conversely, a political understanding of difference and diversity 
recognises that cross-cutting cleavages exist throughout society and both individual 
members as citizens and groups and communities as political collectivities have the 
right to, and should, have the public space to contest, deliberate and challenge 
antagonisms, whatever shape or form they presume to take.
The combination of the continued racialisation of the ‘Other’ in Australia with certain 
conceptions of culture has incontrovertibly resulted in an ‘ethnicised’ understanding of 
the ‘Other’ that continues to rely on controversial ethnic taxonomies which exaggerate 
certain differences between ‘groups’, while not taking into account real ‘difference’ 
between groups. Multiculturalism, as articulated by various Australian Governments, 
has worked within a very specific framework which ignores religious diversity and 
privileges a certain understanding of cultural diversity that is defined in narrow and 
limited ways. ‘Ethnicity’ is a product of immigration and ‘ethnic communities’ are 
thought to be primordial entities that must be managed within the space of the nation.
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Part of the management process has been the creation of ‘ethnic community’ leaders 
through whom, historically, ‘ethnic claims’ have reached the Government (Tabar et al, 
2003). Various multicultural policies in Australia have championed very narrow 
definitions of groups and group affiliations and therefore the ‘management of 
multicultural Australia’ (Hage, 1998) has rested on the management of ‘ethnic 
communities’ through their ‘ethnic leaders’.
The ways in which multiculturalism has been defined in Australia has been divorced 
from the ways in which people in Australia actually live their lives and has made certain 
that ‘multicultural Australia’ is an ‘ethnic thing’, that has no relevance for, and does not 
resonate with, the rest of Australia. Definition of cultures as ossified, rigid and 
essentialised continue to present real and mythical separations between cultures and 
sees some world views as deviant and harmful and as eroding a narrowly defined idea 
of ‘social cohesion’.
Conceptions of nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship as social cohesion in 
Australia have come to act as barriers to belonging for Muslims in Australia. Indeed, the 
prevailing myths that underscore nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship in 
Australia speak directly to a small group within Australian society (predominantly 
people who fit the ideal Australian stereotype, which is often portrayed as the core of 
Australia’s national identity). These myths of belonging have alienated and excluded 
those deemed to be ‘ethnic’ or religious minorities in Australia. Harmful ‘difference’ 
has come to be exclusively articulated in ‘ethnic’ and religious ways and, as a result, 
people who exhibit unacceptable ‘differences’ in some form are alienated and excluded 
from what it means to be Australian. The underlying beliefs about Australian identity 
laid the groundwork for Islamophobia as ideology.
Re-energising the Politics of Belonging
The idea that nations, national identity and citizenship can unproblematically act as 
definitions of belonging is challenging, not least because the identities of people who 
make up nations, enact nationalisms and have citizenships are in constant flux. 
Moreover, adopting definitions of belonging that are based on a fear of the ‘Other’ 
(within and without the state) do not adequately reflect the realities of what is 
happening within, without and across nations. Whether advanced as ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’, 
in recent years, Western-democratic-states have not escaped communicating cultured 
understandings of belonging that privilege a certain culture and religion over others and,
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as such, have promoted a zero-sum form of belonging that, at first, seemingly 
disenfranchises some citizens, but, ultimately, fails all citizens.
One of the underlying arguments for a re-conceptualisation of belonging in Australia is 
the need to rearticulate ways in which people who have diverse ‘racial’, cultural and 
religious backgrounds (and foregrounds) can belong to polities and not be made to feel 
like permanent ‘guests’ (Hage, 2002). There are arguments that support the contention 
that allowing people to have a stake in their present and future makes for better polities 
(the whole idea of ‘democracy’). Moreover, the fact that there are groups in society 
marked by ‘difference’ (variously defined and articulated) is incontestable and the fact 
that plurality needs a political response continues to be one of the many enduring 
sociological arguments for ‘multiculturalism’ (Benhabib, 2002; Modoou, 2007:117). 
One of the key failings of Australian multiculturalism was to limit what constituted 
legitimate ‘groups’. Limiting or constraining the definition of groups meant that only 
certain groups would be recognised by government for funding purposes and all other 
groups, communities or individuals were to be excluded. Modood (2007:117) explains 
that, although there are groups in society that are marked by difference, and, while 
difference can be religious, ethnic or cultural (or any combination of these amongst 
numerous other combinations), ‘not all groups are groups in the same way’.
Moreover, the ways in which groups organise differs dramatically. Some community 
groups are highly organised and appeal to members of the community beyond their 
immediate members (some Christian sects, Buddhist and Hindu groups have a broad 
approach). Other groups are shaped by tight, close-knit, community structures that are 
closed off to outsiders. Yet, other groups can be marked by economic alliances, 
language, heritage (the diaspora) and cultural or geographic location (Modood, 2007).
At the same time, individuals within these groups differ in their attitudes and 
inclinations toward group identity. This diversity is not only evident across groups, but 
also across the individuals who constitute these groups. Hence, historically, different 
groups have also experienced markedly different rates of ‘integration’ in society 
(Modood, 2007:117-119; see also Greig et al, 2003), for example, those based on 
differing employment and/or educational prospects and/or success at political 
mobilisation (Davidson, 1997a). In addition, this does not preclude diversity that 
manifests in ways which are not particularly ‘ethnic’, religious or ‘racial’ within 
society; such as those based on class, sexual preference etc. (Yuval-Davis, 2011). What
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this implies however, is that, while ethnic and/ or religious and/or cultural minorities 
exhibit ‘differences’ when grouped into religious, racial or cultural groups, the people 
who make up the groups also connect with other identity markers within society, such 
as class, gender and geography, which may entail their ethnic identities being 
backgrounded, rather than foregrounded. The key issue here is that those who 
successfully background their cultural, religious and/ or ethnic identities are viewed as 
the ones to have succeeded in ‘integrating’ into society and therefore belonging. 
However, it has been shown empirically that there are multiple forms of integration, 
where difference does not necessarily ‘disappear’ and indeed cannot disappear 
(Modood, 2007:118; Batainah, 2008).
The recognition that difference and diversity permeate society in ways that cross ethnic, 
racial, cultural, demographic and sexual categories and life stages has vast implications 
for the way difference and diversity impact on the political organisation of, and 
contestations within, a polity. Therefore, it is important to be flexible about the forms 
that difference and diversity take. Identities are important to people (Hall, 1996) and 
they certainly cannot be subsumed into state-sanctioned categories that neatly connect 
individuals to religious, ethnic or cultural groups, in order to dictate the terms of their 
recognition. However, even as individuals in society have complex identities and are 
marked more realistically by a kind of hybridity (Hall, 1996; Bhabha, 1990; Bhabha, 
1994; Bhabha, 1998), it continues to be the case that ‘groups’ in society are stigmatised 
and marginalised and need to be recognised as such. Therefore, as Modood (2007:121) 
states ‘...the justification-both normative and pragmatic- for multiculturalism is the need 
to give respect to stigmatized or marginalized identities that are important to people and 
cannot be disregarded in the name of the individual, or for that matter, social cohesion, 
integration or citizenship’ (Modood, 2007:121).
The appropriate identification of difference and the avowal of diversity and its political 
repercussions (Davidson, 1997a) has vast implications for the definition of citizenship. 
In Australia’s history, citizenship, outside of its legal definition (1948), has had multiple 
symbolic and discursive identities (Briggs, 2009). As such, Australian citizenship is 
moulded and shaped by historical contingencies which also mean that citizenship does 
not automatically contain within it stable and necessarily enduring normative 
commitments (Modood, 2007:125). However, at present, citizenship in Western, 
democratic countries is thought to be imbued with assumptions of equality, fairness and 
due process, assumptions usually denied non-citizens, in particular asylum seekers and
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refugees. Closer empirical analysis demonstrates that these assumptions are ideals and 
not necessarily available to all citizens (Indigenous Australians are a prime example; see 
also Greig et al, 2003; Briggs, 2006; Modood, 2007). It has also been argued that, 
historically, citizenship has been culturally-specific, gendered and class based 
(Andersen and Siim, 2004; Benhabib and Resnik, 2009) and the franchise was generally 
reserved for those born within the territory of the nation-state (Shachar, 2009). Whilst 
the citizenship franchise has been liberalised, other instances of exclusion, based on 
‘race’, culture, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and class, endure. Indeed, while historically 
there has been little agreement on what it means to be a citizen, it cannot be denied that 
citizens of countries like Australia are marked by ‘difference’ and diversity and this 
heavily inflects ideas and practice of citizenship (Modood, 2007:126).
The contingent nature of, and flexibility inherent in, citizenship makes it highly 
susceptible to political trends and, depending on the symbolism and discourses 
mobilised, citizenship can be culturally based and, as such, exclusive, rather than 
inclusive. Indeed, as was demonstrated in Chapter 6, the Howard period witnessed a 
marked interest in imbuing Australian citizenship with cultural meaning in order to 
make it more ‘precious’ (Batainah and Walsh, 2008; see also Betts and Birrell, 2007), 
because it was argued that too many new recipients of Australian citizenship differed 
‘culturally’ from mainstream Australians (see Chapter 9).
So, while there may be an evident tension between ideals of Australian citizenship and 
actual Australian citizens, it remains the case that definitions of citizenship are open to 
contestation and, in part, contesting the meaning of citizenship should be left up to the 
citizens themselves. As Modood (2007:128) explains, ‘Citizenship, then, consists of a 
framework of rights and practices of participation but also discourses and symbols of 
belonging, ways of imagining and remaking ourselves as a country and expressing our 
sense of commonalities and differences, and ways in which these identities qualify each 
other and create-should create-inclusive public spaces’. Ideally then, citizenship should 
be a space within which contestations occur, where diversity is most evident and at its 
most vocal. However, the Australian experience, as set out in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
points to an antagonism between at least two notions of Australian society. The first 
consists of a notion of Australian society where diversity and difference are negated 
and/or made peripheral to the ‘real’ Australia, a ‘real’ Australia which immigrants are 
asked to integrate into. The second notion consists of an Australia society where 
diversity and difference are part and parcel of the ‘real’ Australia. The ‘real’ Australia
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which seriously takes into account difference and diversity needs a political response 
that is commensurate with the facts of diversity and difference and the inevitable 
contestations that diversity and difference arouse in a population.
However, if the rhetoric of belonging is embedded in cultural understandings of 
belonging, then ‘assimilation’ (whether overt or covert) continues to be the over-riding 
policy of immigrant incorporation. This creates a situation in which the immigrant will 
never fully belong to the ‘we’ of the nation and will always be subject to cultural 
definitions of the day (to which they cannot directly contribute); in other words subject 
to the power of definition as to who belongs and who does not and what characterises 
this belonging. The politics of belonging then are not about private belongings 
(belonging to clubs or association etc.) or how private citizens choose to feel like they 
belong to a certain nation, people or religion. The politics of belonging are about 
investigating all dualisms, including such dualisms as insider/alien, legal/illegal and 
belonging/non-belonging, in order to come to understand the politics at their heart. 
Although, as Schmitt (2007) recognised the duality may never disappear, the very 
creation of ‘who is in and who is not’ certainly changes according to the politics of the 
day.
The singling out of Australian Muslims as the group that is diametrically opposed to 
Australian culture helped highlight paradoxes in Australian national identity, its 
multicultural policies and the relationships between the need for labour, the desire for 
new citizens and immigration. One of the ways in which this discrepancy can be 
explained is through the identification of the workings of ideology. Hegemonic powers, 
through ideology, often set up self-serving dualisms which simplistically collapse and 
limit conflict in society into a ‘we/they’ position which inevitably leads to a politics of 
no alternative. Ideology and its attendant social engineering mechanisms may indeed be 
viewed as limiting or denying the necessary agonistic politics sorely needed to dissipate 
conflict in a diverse society. The power to decide who is included and who is excluded 
from the ‘we’ is part and parcel of the political. As Mouffe argues (2005a: 17, see also 
Mouffe, 2005b), it is about ‘recognizing the hegemonic nature of every kind of social 
order and the fact that every society is the product of a series of practices attempting to 
establish order in the context of contingency’. Power, and especially institutionalised 
power that privileges some groups in society over others, is evident in any dualism. 
Hegemonic influences couched in terms of ‘liberal values’, state sovereignty, the 
preservation of ‘our way of life’ and ‘maintaining social-cohesion’, all seemingly
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apolitical, must be investigated, especially on matters of inclusion and exclusion, in 
order to highlight the political act of delineating who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, and the 
reasons for their inclusion/exclusion.
Contribution and Suggestions for Further Research
This dissertation problematised traditional conceptions of belonging for ‘Others’ in 
general, in order to come to understand belonging as something which is created and 
sustained through a ‘politics of belonging’, rather than as a taken-for-granted 
understanding of belonging based on primordial ties. This was undertaken with the hope 
that this would shed some light on the barriers to belonging for Muslims in particular.
The approach taken in this dissertation differentiated it from other scholarship in the 
field in two significant ways. This dissertation focused on the nexus of theory and 
praxis in the Australian experience of immigration and immigrant integration. Previous 
research in the area has primarily focused on elements of nationalism, multiculturalism 
and citizenship in Australia and/or presented empirical findings from research on 
attitudes toward Muslims, or has focused on the media representation of Muslims in 
Australia. Rarely have both the theoretical and the empirical approaches been brought 
together to further knowledge about Muslims in Australia. Certainly, there has been 
very little systematic attempt to relate broader understandings of the official definitions 
of belonging in Australia and how and why Muslims are viewed as incapable of 
belonging in Australia (for exceptions see Poynting et al 2004; Aslan, 2009; Dunn et al, 
2007). Further, while much has been written about immigration, immigrants’ settlement 
and government policies in Australia, and this literature was very relevant to this 
dissertation, there is very little literature that draws on an historical understanding of the 
various definitions used in the creation of immigrant settlement policies and examines 
how they can corrupt belonging for ‘whole communities’ in Australia (see, for example, 
Hage, 1998). Thus, the difference between the present study and previous scholarship in 
the area is that this research approached the subject much more broadly in order to 
investigate the links between ideas about the ‘Other’ and their place in Australian 
society in general and how Muslims are represented in particular.
Further, this dissertation contributes to scholarship in the field in three significant and 
distinctive ways. First, there has been no research on the discourse on Islam and 
Muslims in the Australian Parliament, although references have been made to the 
Islamophobic nature of political discourse in Australia (see Dunn et al, 2007; Aslan,
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2009; Every and Augoustinos, 2007). Further, this is the first time that Allen’s (2010) 
theoretical framework treating Islamophobia as ideology has been used in research 
conducted in Australia and, consequently, it is the first time that Islamophobia has been 
identified in the Australian House of Representatives. Finally, this research has 
demonstrated that ideas about the (non)belonging for Muslims in Australia are greatly 
hindered and burdened by the normative conceptions of the ‘Other’ in Australia which 
were discerned in the Islamophobia disseminated by Members of the Australian House 
of Representatives between 2000-2006.
It remains the case however, that the full implications of this study will only come to 
light with further research. Although the implications of Islamophobia in the Australian 
House of Representatives can be theoretically deduced as resulting in direct 
discrimination toward Muslims and Islam, it is yet to be revealed how this might impact 
on policy formulation and implementation. It would be necessary to conduct research 
that specifically investigates the repercussions of Islamophobia on legislation or social 
policies that relate to immigrant integration, for example. It would also be useful, as 
Reisigil and Wodak (2001; see also Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2009; Wodak and van 
Dijk, 2000) have done in the European context on anti-Semitism, to investigate how 
Islamophobia in political discourse directly impacts societal perceptions of Muslims, 
Islam and ‘Others’ in the nation. To date, specific systematic research on the 
implications of Islamophobia in Australia has not been undertaken.
If the concept of social cohesion in a multicultural society is to be built on foundations 
that reflect the challenges presented by a politics of belonging, the various challenges to 
belonging need to be addressed. The reliance on an apolitical, ‘managerial’ approach to 
belonging, through the insistence on the use of inadequately examined concepts and 
policies of inclusion, based on citizenship and ‘cultural fit’, does not take into account 
barriers to belonging, such as Islamophobia as ideology. While Islamophobia as 
ideology undoubtedly influences the ideas, concepts and policies associated with 
belonging for Muslims in Australia, the atavistic myths used to buttress anti-Islamic and 
anti-Muslim ideas indicate that barriers to belonging for ‘Others’ in Australia will 
continue to seriously hinder genuine advances in the creation of a broader, and much 
more inclusive, ‘we’ of the nation.
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